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Chapter 9: Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

Download Chapter 9 (PDF)

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Recommendations

Executive Summary

The next 24 months could shape cross-Strait relations for years. Beijing will assess Taiwan’s 2026 and 2028 elections to gauge whether coercion and political pressure can move Taiwan toward unification. However, even an outcome the PRC favors may not deliver what it expects. Taiwan’s public remains overwhelmingly opposed to political integration with China, limiting how far any elected government can move toward Beijing. Xi Jinping could therefore reach 2028 with greater military capabilities and less confidence that political and economic pressure and other forms of coercion can achieve unification. This realization may increase the risk that China will take more aggressive coercive actions against Taiwan, including imposing a quarantine or blockade.

The stakes for the United States have never been higher. Taiwan is indispensable to the Indo-Pacific balance of power and to U.S. technological leadership and economic security. Taiwan’s central geographic location in the first island chain and near key maritime routes constrains China’s options and concurrently enhances U.S. access, capabilities, and operational freedom in the Indo-Pacific. In recent years, Taiwan’s world-leading semiconductor industry has become foundational to U.S. leadership in advanced technologies, particularly AI. A change in Taiwan’s status would alter the military balance in the Western Pacific, test confidence in U.S. alliances, and threaten critical technology supply chains.

Beijing is pursuing its objectives through coercion backed by a credible threat of force. China is seeking to weaken Taiwan’s resistance through military and coast guard activity, cyber and information operations, economic leverage, lawfare, and political influence while building capabilities to blockade or invade the island. Taiwan has responded with increased defense spending, military reforms, investments in resilience, and stronger cooperation with the United States, but significant vulnerabilities remain. Political divisions have slowed defense investments, Taiwan depends heavily on imported energy, and nearly $30 billion in approved U.S. weapons remained undelivered as of August 2026. The near-term challenge is therefore not only to deter invasion but to prepare better for the coercion already happening and likely to escalate—sustained pressure designed to change the status quo without triggering war.

Key Findings

  • The next 24 months will test Beijing’s belief that it can move Taiwan toward unification through coercion and political influence rather than force. This coercion strategy hinges on eventually having a conciliatory government in Taipei, but Taiwan’s public overwhelmingly favors the status quo, constraining how far any elected government can move toward Beijing. Even electoral outcomes in 2026 and 2028 that Beijing favors may fail to produce the political movement toward unification it expects. If China concludes its political strategy is failing, Beijing may turn to greater coercion to force progress on its terms, including through imposing a quarantine or blockade.
  • Taiwan is a first-order U.S. national security interest. A crisis in the Strait would threaten U.S. military power and economic security simultaneously.
  • Taiwan’s continued autonomy is critical to the military balance in the Western Pacific, and its security is closely tied to allied confidence in U.S. commitments. Taiwan’s geographic location denies the PLA a forward military position between Japan and the Philippines and complicates its access to the Western Pacific. Taiwan’s own surveillance, coastal defense, air defense, and maritime capabilities force the PLA to account for threats from the island, while U.S. and allied forces elsewhere along the first island chain further constrain its operations. Chinese control of Taiwan would shift these advantages toward Beijing, extending PLA power in the Western Pacific.
  • Taiwan’s technology ecosystem is at the foundation of U.S. advantage in AI. Taiwan dominates advanced semiconductor production and supplies critical hardware across the AI stack. U.S. reshoring is building domestic capacity but remains deeply dependent on Taiwan’s companies, technology, workforce, and supply chains, making the two economies more integrated rather than making Taiwan dispensable.
  • Coercion and military buildup are mutually reinforcing components of Beijing’s dual-track strategy rather than alternative paths to unification. Political influence, economic pressure, cyber and information operations, lawfare, and other gray zone activities work to erode Taiwan’s will to resist, while the PLA’s growing military capabilities make those efforts more credible and preserve Beijing’s option to impose unification by force if they fail. U.S. and Taiwan planning remains more heavily oriented toward countering an invasion, leaving both less prepared for the challenge likely to come first.
  • China is intensifying its efforts to intimidate and coerce supporters of Taiwan’s autonomy, moving beyond symbolic legal threats toward more concrete efforts to punish opposition to Chinese malign influence and to deter support for Taiwan. Over the past year, Beijing introduced new legal authorities, launched criminal investigations, and took public enforcement actions to intimidate a broader range of Taiwan officials, civil society leaders, and public figures, regardless of their location.
  • Taiwan is strengthening its military and national resilience, but domestic political divisions and persistent vulnerabilities threaten to slow progress during a critical period. Taipei is strengthening its asymmetric defenses, civil preparedness, critical infrastructure resilience, and counterintelligence efforts, but legislative gridlock has delayed or reduced investments that could produce near-term capabilities. Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported energy also leaves it particularly vulnerable to the quarantine or blockade scenarios Beijing is increasingly rehearsing.
  • Delays in U.S. foreign military sales are hindering Taiwan’s ability to field critical military capabilities and weakening deterrence even as Chinese pressure increases. A backlog of undelivered weapons, compounded by delays in finalizing additional arms sales, is pushing needed capabilities further into the future. These challenges slow Taiwan’s ability to enhance its capacity to resist Chinese coercion, blockade, or invasion.

Recommendations

  • The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) aggressive actions to reshape the Western Pacific and force unification with Taiwan are intensifying. Yet much U.S. and allied contingency planning focuses on large-scale invasion scenarios rather than coercion below the threshold of war. The United States needs a coordinated playbook with allies and partners for responding to a range of coercive gray zone activities by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific, specifically concerning Taiwan.

    Congress should:

    • Direct the National Security Advisor to develop a common playbook with allies and partners calibrated to counter multi-domain day-to-day PRC coercion. Departments and agencies involved in executing the playbook should develop tiger teams to address U.S. actions and coalition/allied actions under each area of responsibility. That playbook should provide a unified framework for participating nations to:
      • Share situational awareness and arrange pre-coordinated responses;
      • Counter disinformation and lawfare;
      • Expand combined coast guard operations with Taiwan and regional partners, including through multilateral initiatives; and
      • Support resistance against economic coercion.
    • Amend and extend the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to establish a Taiwan Democratic Resilience Initiative led by the U.S. Department of State, implemented through the American Institute in Taiwan in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other appropriate departments and agencies.
      • The Initiative should strengthen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation to support the resiliency of Taiwan’s civil society and counter PRC united front activities, election interference, and disinformation campaigns. It should also include information sharing with U.S. allies and partners.
    • Direct the National Security Advisor to lead an interagency process to develop a whole of government strategy for deterring, preparing for, and responding to coercive actions by the PRC against Taiwan that are intended to rapidly or substantially alter the status quo, but that fall below the threshold of a large-scale invasion or armed conflict.
      • It should include an assessment of contingency scenarios and for each, provide an assessment of indicators and warnings, likely PRC objectives, decision points, escalation risks, potential effects on Taiwan’s access to critical goods and services, and options for coordinated actions with allies and partners.
  • As China’s military capabilities expand and the regional balance of power shifts, the risk of conflict in the Western Pacific is increasing. Despite growing defense cooperation among the United States and its allies and partners, the absence of a formal multilateral security framework limits their ability to deter aggression and mount a coordinated response to attempts to alter the regional order by force.

    Congress should direct the Secretaries of Defense and State to initiate consultations with U.S. allies on establishing a formal multilateral framework for collective defense in the Western Pacific, building on the multilateral defense cooperation directed by Section 1254 of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Where Section 1254 directs operational integration, this framework would institutionalize the political commitment to collective action needed to deter Chinese military aggression and provide the foundation for a Western Pacific Security Pact. The Pact should:

    • Build on existing regional defense mechanisms among states with established foundations for expanded multilateral defense cooperation, primarily the U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines Defense Cooperation Council, and be positioned to complement multilateral security frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS. Provide a pathway for accession by other states that share the Pact’s principles and possess the willingness and capacity to contribute materially to peace, security, and collective defense in the Western Pacific.
    • Establish a common commitment to collective defense under which members recognize that any major threat to, or violent breach of, peace and stability in the Western Pacific—or any military attack upon the members of this framework—threatens their shared security and national interests and commit to coordinate a powerful collective response to deter or defeat aggression and restore regional peace and stability.
    • Accelerate the legal and military reforms necessary for collective defense, including combined contingency planning and exercises, integrated command and control, expanded intelligence sharing, reciprocal access, and integrated logistics to enable members to operate effectively as a combined force in crisis or conflict.
  • Beijing is using travel bans and other punitive measures to deter and intimidate foreign lawmakers from engaging with Taiwan, including barring four New Zealand legislators from the People’s Republic of China in June 2026. By placing exchanges with Taiwan on the same footing as those with the UK, Canada, and Mexico, Congress would signal that parliamentary diplomacy with fellow democracies is routine, legitimate, and not subject to Beijing’s veto.

    The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, should establish U.S.-Taiwan Inter-Parliamentary Exchanges, modeled on the established bilateral exchanges with the UK, Canada, and Mexico.

    • Like those bodies, the exchanges would convene regular, structured meetings between members of the U.S. legislative branch and members of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan to discuss trade, security, technology, and shared democratic governance.
  • Taiwan is rapidly scaling its civilian and defense drone industries, building asymmetric capability that will be critical to prevailing in a potential future conflict with the People’s Republic of China. Recent U.S. actions to broadly prohibit foreign drone imports stand to restrict a key market for Taiwan’s drone makers and limit mutually beneficial collaboration with U.S. manufacturers.

    Recognizing the benefit to U.S. national security of supporting drone industries of allies and partners at risk of conflict with adversarial countries, Congress should direct the Federal Communications Commission to limit its December 22, 2025 addition to the Covered List of uncrewed aircraft systems and their critical components, to systems and components produced by entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in 15 CFR § 791.4.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Previous chapter8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part OneNext chapter10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

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