2026 Annual Report to Congress ·
On this page: Executive SummaryKey Findings
Executive Summary
Throughout 2026, China used its growing military, technological, economic, and diplomatic power more assertively while seeking to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. Summits between President Donald J. Trump and General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping in May and September 2026 reflected this dual-track approach. Beijing embraced “constructive strategic stability” as a framework for managing competition with the United States, even as it continued to strengthen its military capabilities, press territorial claims in the Indo-Pacific, support U.S. adversaries, and expand its influence abroad.
China continued to build the military capabilities needed to shift the regional balance in its favor while pressing its interests across the Indo-Pacific. Despite sweeping purges of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) senior leadership, military modernization continued, including advances in amphibious warfare, uncrewed and AI-enabled systems, and nuclear forces. Beijing paired these growing capabilities with a more persistent military and law enforcement presence around Taiwan, increased pressure on Japan, and continued efforts to assert its maritime claims in the South China Sea. China also adjusted the timing and intensity of its activities when confrontation threatened other priorities, underscoring Beijing’s effort to advance its regional objectives while limiting the risk of direct conflict.
Beijing used global conflicts to strengthen important partnerships and improve China’s international standing while limiting its own exposure to its partners’ confrontations with the United States and U.S. allies. China sustained Russia’s war effort and Iran’s military and economic capacity without becoming directly involved in either conflict. Beijing also expanded engagement with several U.S. allies and partners while portraying itself as a more stable and predictable international actor. China sought to expand BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) activities into new areas of security, technology, finance, and governance while expanding strategic infrastructure and security relationships across Africa and Latin America.
China’s greater reach did not mean Beijing could always get other countries to follow its lead. Members of BRICS and the SCO resisted or slowed some Chinese-backed initiatives, while governments across the Indo-Pacific pushed back against Chinese pressure. China’s expanding security relationships also did not always give Beijing or its partners the ability to shape events in a crisis. These limits did not substantially alter China’s direction. Beijing continued to pursue incremental gains, grow its military power, and advance its technology sector, strategic access, and global influence. With two more Trump-Xi meetings expected before year’s end, Beijing will likely continue using “constructive strategic stability” to cement its version of the relationship while steadily strengthening China’s position.
Key Findings
- China accelerated its bid to reshape the international order in 2026. Beijing pursued a coercive but controlled strategy, using its growing military, technological, economic, and diplomatic power to strengthen its position relative to the United States while managing the risk of a destabilizing confrontation. China’s actions before and after the Trump-Xi summits demonstrated that its version of “constructive strategic stability” does not mean constraining China’s broader competition with the United States.
- Even as Beijing sought to manage its diplomatic relationship with Washington, it continued destabilizing activities aimed at the United States, including cyber operations targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, AI-enhanced influence campaigns aimed at the U.S. public, attempts to co-opt U.S. officials, and transnational repression on U.S. soil.
- Xi Jinping concentrated military authority to a degree not seen since the Mao era through sweeping purges of the PLA’s senior leadership, placing greater weight on his personal judgment in decisions over whether and how to use force. Despite the upheaval, PLA modernization continued toward its 2027 readiness milestone for a Taiwan contingency.
- China expanded the scale and sophistication of coercive gray zone activities around Taiwan in 2026 while continuing to build military capabilities for a future conflict. Beijing rehearsed blockade operations, practiced mobilizing civilian fishing fleets, and conducted its first-ever “traffic enforcement operation” in waters east of Taiwan, integrating military, law enforcement, and civilian assets to establish a more persistent presence around the island.
- China remained a critical enabler of Russia’s war effort and Iran’s military capacity in 2026 while carefully avoiding direct involvement in their conflicts. China facilitated more than 90 percent of Russia’s imports of sanctioned technology and supplied Iran with drone components and materials used to make missile fuel while using the growing dependence of both partners to expand its own strategic leverage.
- China’s new Ethnic Unity Law extended Beijing’s legal claims beyond its borders, creating a statutory basis to target overseas individuals and organizations for activities it deems threatening to “ethnic unity.” The provision could create legal and political exposure under Chinese law for U.S. persons and institutions engaged in Taiwan advocacy or Uyghur, Tibetan, and other minority rights work.
- Beijing expanded efforts to build long-term influence and strategic access abroad in 2026. China grew its partnerships, pushed multilateral institutions into new security and governance roles, embedded dual-use infrastructure across Africa and Latin America, and weaponized commercial relationships for political coercion. Beijing also sought to portray itself as a more reliable partner than the United States, but resistance from key partners revealed the limits of its ability to dictate outcomes.