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Chapter 4: China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

Download Chapter 4 (PDF)

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Recommendations|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

For two decades, China has presented itself to Latin America and the Caribbean as a provider of economic opportunity without political conditions, infrastructure without Western constraints, and respect for sovereignty without interference in domestic affairs—yet it has repeatedly failed to deliver. Its economic engagement has reinforced a neocolonial trade pattern in which the region ships raw materials and buys back finished goods. A “China Shock 2.0” export wave is undercutting local manufacturers and driving the region’s trade deficit with China to a record high. Beijing’s shift from financing toward ownership and control of ports, power grids, telecommunications, digital, and space infrastructure has converted commercial investment into political leverage and strategic vulnerabilities. Beneath its pledge of noninterference, Beijing works to influence regional institutions through subnational diplomacy, media and diaspora cultivation, coercion relating to Taiwan, and corruption. At the same time, Chinese-linked actors sustain a “Silk Road of Crime” supplying fentanyl precursors, laundering cartel proceeds, driving illicit resource extraction, and supporting other destabilizing illegal activities that Beijing only selectively addresses.

These trends unfold during a period of both vulnerability and opportunity. China’s principal authoritarian partners are weakening: Nicolás Maduro has been removed in Venezuela, Cuba faces an acute crisis, and Nicaragua confronts intensifying U.S. pressure. The United States is contesting Chinese influence and finding receptive audiences among new pro-U.S. leaders moving to diversify trade, restrict Chinese technology, and reclaim strategic assets. Yet two decades of embedded relationships across the region’s economies, infrastructure, and institutions have created dependencies that are costly to unwind, and China’s successes in emerging sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs) and AI ensure it will remain formidable.

Key Findings

  • China has inconsistently delivered on promises to advance Latin American development, sovereignty, and security. Instead, its engagement has deepened regional dependence, constrained government autonomy, and aggravated governance challenges.
  • The United States is pushing back against some instances of Chinese influence, including by pressuring Beijing’s authoritarian partners in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. China’s muted response, along with growing skepticism among new pro-U.S. leaders, may constrain its near-term agenda. Nevertheless, its subnational networks, critical infrastructure presence, and strength in technologies such as EVs and AI will continue to give it influence in the region.
  • The view that China’s regional engagement centers on high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects is outdated. Beijing now uses national, subnational, and multilateral channels to create overlapping economic and political dependencies that endure across election cycles.
  • Beijing’s trade ties have hindered Latin American industrialization and diversification. The region exports raw materials and imports finished goods, while People’s Republic of China (PRC) firms dominate higher-value refining. As exports to China have risen, regional manufacturing employment and value added have declined. China Shock 2.0 excess capacity exports threaten further economic harm to the region’s manufacturers, contributing to a record $46.9 billion regional trade deficit with Beijing last year and prompting some governments to raise trade barriers.
  • China’s operational control of ports, telecommunications, energy, and digital networks creates strategic leverage over host governments and potential vulnerabilities for regional sovereignty and U.S. national security.
  • Beijing frequently operates below the national level, cultivating governors, mayors, and provincial officials through commercial agreements, sister city partnerships, and Party contacts. These relationships survive elections, provide alternative channels when national governments resist Beijing, and create commitments that are difficult to unwind.
  • China’s selective law enforcement cooperation leaves gaps that China-linked actors exploit. A “Silk Road of Crime” supplies criminal syndicates with drug precursors, money laundering services, illicit extraction networks, and shell companies—activities Beijing often declines to address.

Recommendations

  • To enhance the capacity of Latin American countries to screen investments for economic and national security risks, Congress should:
    • Direct the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with other members of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to establish a Foreign Investment Rapid Screening Team (FIRST) that trains and embeds in partner governments in Latin America. FIRST assistance should include:
      • Sending delegations to Latin America to develop screening mechanisms for investment and infrastructure projects as well as to train and work alongside procurement officers, auditors, and investment authorities on anticorruption, contract law, and corporate control structures;
      • Extending technical assistance to subnational governments, which often negotiate major investment and infrastructure projects but have limited capacity to assess national security implications;
      • Coordinating with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency to employ investment and technical assistance resources to incentivize partner countries in Latin America to develop investment screening mechanisms and mobilize U.S. and trusted capital as alternatives to untrusted investors;
      • Coordinating with the Secretary of State and organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy to utilize their core institutes to strengthen the capacity of government and non-governmental organizations to support investment screening and related good governance initiatives.
    • Appropriate funds for the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) to develop model legislation and regulations for strategic investment and infrastructure reviews.
  • The Chinese government has steadily expanded its influence in the multilateral development banks (MDBs), raising its shareholding and voting power, increasing its contributions, and positioning itself to shape lending priorities and institutional governance. The United States has not used its position as a top shareholder, including its unique veto power over certain governance decisions at the World Bank, to effectively advance U.S. interests and hold these institutions accountable. In particular, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring that MDB funds do not disproportionately benefit Chinese firms, yet there is no comprehensive, regularly updated strategy or public accounting of procurement awards to Chinese and U.S. firms across all the MDBs.

    To focus engagement with international organizations—including international financial institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral institutions—on U.S. strategic interests and ensure adequate U.S. voice and representation at IFIs, Congress should:

    • Direct the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chair of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, to:
      • Submit to Congress a strategy within 180 days to leverage the U.S. voice and vote at the MDBs—the World Bank Group, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and IDB Invest, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development—to counter China’s action at IFIs and other multilateral institutions and to advance U.S. and democratic economic priorities, including responding to foreign adversaries’ exploitation of IFIs. The strategy shall address, at a minimum:
        • The development of programs to expand participation by U.S. and allied suppliers, and U.S. technology alternatives to Chinese options, in MDB-financed projects and procurements, coordinated with existing commercial advocacy mechanisms, including the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and the Advocacy Center;
        • Supplier eligibility criteria grounded in security and technology provenance, together with an assessment of whether such criteria are required under each institution’s existing procurement policy or would require action by its Board;
        • A plan to counter exploitation of these institutions by China and other foreign adversaries, addressed by category, including continued borrowing by countries eligible for graduation, concentration of procurement awards, bilateral co-financing vehicles, secondment and staffing, and incorporation of China’s technical standards into project specifications; and
        • Measures to ensure transparency around beneficial ownership information for suppliers awarded financed contracts.
      • Meet at least once a quarter with the Secretaries of State and Commerce to discuss U.S. priorities for IFI engagement.
    • Amend the annual report required by Section 1701 of the International Financial Institutions Act on International Monetary and Financial Policies (22 U.S.C. § 262r) to require for each MDB disclosure of: (a) the value and number of contracts awarded to suppliers registered in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to suppliers identified as controlled subsidiaries of PRC-domiciled parents, with Hong Kong and Macau reported separately; (b) contracts awarded under section (a) reported as a share of internationally completed procurement and disaggregated by sector and borrower country; and (c) a description of actions taken to heighten scrutiny of state-owned enterprise participation in MDB-financed procurement.
    • Restrict travel funding for relevant offices to non-essential expenditures, for example, limiting premium-class travel, reception and event expenses, large delegations, conferences, and new discretionary initiatives, until the Administration nominates senior director positions.
  • Congress should authorize and appropriate dedicated funding, through the Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, or Secretary of Commerce, to expand the “Rip and Replace” initiative beyond domestic networks to key strategic partner nations and key regions of strategic competition, beginning with Latin America and the Indo-Pacific. The initiative should utilize novel methods and technology from across frontier labs to identify, expose, and harden against weaknesses in Chinese-origin technology and software. It should work with nations to modernize equipment either by replacing certain critical assets within network infrastructure or software to ensure trusted standards are established. Specifically, the initiative should include the following provisions:
    • Replace covered equipment. Building on the $8 million Panama pilot, fund the replacement of non-trusted telecommunications equipment in host nation infrastructure. Assistance should be conditioned on:
      • Host nation operational control of replacement systems and host government concurrence in public announcements;
      • A commitment not to reintroduce non-trusted equipment into assisted networks; and
      • Sustainment included in each project.
    • Assess, harden, and monitor software at scale. Direct the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, drawing on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and National Security Agency (NSA), to apply artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled vulnerability discovery and patching to:
      • Triage host nation exposure through analysis of Chinese-origin firmware and software, producing a prioritized queue;
      • Identify and remediate vulnerabilities in the software on which replacement networks run, including AI-assisted rewriting of legacy code into memory-safe languages where source code is available; and
      • Provide interim detection and monitoring of covered equipment awaiting replacement. Analysis of equipment originating in China should inform prioritization and monitoring.

    Congress should authorize and appropriate the multiyear initiative to execute country-level projects and require annual reporting to the committees of jurisdiction on sites remediated, conditions enforced, partner cost-share, and any reintroduction of covered equipment.

  • Congress should make it U.S. policy that China’s systematic use of Port State Control inspections and detentions of Panamanian-flagged vessels is economic coercion and authorize the President to take all necessary and appropriate economic actions to counter China and support the Government of Panama in this dispute, including leveraging existing sanctions authorities and initiating referrals to the International Maritime Organization to establish a record of China’s weaponization of port access as a tool of geopolitical punishment.

    Congress should further direct the Federal Maritime Commission, which has already flagged the surge in detentions, to investigate the pattern and report findings within 90 days.

  • Congress should provide authorization and the necessary resources to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, and Commerce to provide technical assistance to parliaments in Latin America to help draft and pass legislation to increase transparency and cybersecurity related to critical infrastructure through reforms to oversight, information security, and public contracting.

    To expose the cybersecurity risks, lack of investment, and other hazards in infrastructure facilities with Chinese technology and ownership, Congress should:

    • Direct the Director of National Intelligence to produce an annual unclassified assessment of, and brief other nations on, Chinese infrastructure presence across ports, energy, telecommunications, space, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the Western Hemisphere, including:
      • The security and economic risks associated with Chinese ports and equipment in the United States and countries in Latin America, including cybersecurity vulnerabilities, all potential vectors of military use and access, potential for economic lock-in effects and upcharges, and lack of capital investment.
    • Direct the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, to provide technical assistance to conduct inspections and establish a regional baseline for identifying and remediating vulnerabilities linked to China at strategic maritime chokepoints.
      • Where possible, the Secretary should seek cooperation with host countries for security audits of Chinese equipment and presence, identify highest-risk facilities, and recommend actions to ameliorate risk.
  • Across Latin America and the Caribbean, Chinese-linked criminal networks—money launderers servicing the region’s cartels, illicit resource-extraction operations, and other currency channels that move value outside the correspondent banking system—have converged with an expanding PRC law enforcement presence that complicates, rather than supports, partner-nation cooperation with the United States.

    Congress should direct the President to establish and appoint an executive agent to identify, expose, and disrupt Chinese-linked illicit narcotics suppliers, money laundering organizations, cryptocurrency networks, resource extraction networks, and other criminal facilitators in Latin America and the Caribbean. The executive agent should address risks associated with Chinese police and law enforcement cooperation in the region and should focus on the following activities:

    • Disrupting Chinese money laundering networks.
    • Strengthening partner capacity.
    • Addressing risks from Chinese police training and security cooperation in the region.
    • Improving information sharing.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — March 19, 2026
China’s Expanding Interests in Latin America: Development, Leverage, Coercion, and Crime
Previous chapter3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-PacificNext chapter5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage

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