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Chapter 6: The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

Download Chapter 6 (PDF)

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Recommendations|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

U.S. Ambassador to China David Perdue recently warned that Beijing had “weaponized” its dominant position in critical minerals against the world. China’s licensing regime and new regulations could expose individuals trying to diversify supply chains away from China to arrest, criminal prosecution, and asset seizures. While critical minerals are the most urgent chokepoint, China is working to exert greater influence over global commodities markets, pursuing numerous policies that expand its leverage over production and refining, supply chains, and pricing. China has expanded its production and processing of core commodities and become a major force in many segments of agricultural, metals, and energy markets. It has also spent the last three decades developing domestic futures exchanges as a further avenue to exert influence.

The United States and its allies in the UK and elsewhere have long dominated global financial markets, governing the process by which prices of key commodities are negotiated. These deep, liquid markets reduce volatility and let buyers and sellers agree on a fair price—not one dictated by the government of a non-market economy. China views this status quo as a vulnerability, and its 15th Five-Year Plan signals that it will continue to step up efforts to develop its futures markets and optimize domestic commodity supply chains.

China’s influence has already transformed established markets. China has significant reach into the physical infrastructure that transports bulk commodities around the world, vertically integrating mineral extraction, transportation and logistics, refining, and manufacturing of end goods. In 2012, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing acquired the London Metal Exchange, which has since approved more Chinese exchange and clearinghouse members, added the renminbi (RMB) as an acceptable currency for margin, and deepened its ties with China’s metals industry.

Chinese domestic commodity exchanges are some of the world’s largest by trading volume, and they are opening more trading to foreign participants. At the start of 2020, China allowed foreign investors access to only six futures contracts and no options contracts; today it allows foreign access to over 100 combined. Contracts for lithium traded on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange have achieved global benchmark status over similar contracts introduced by exchanges in the United States and the UK. China has used the China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG), a state-owned consolidated purchaser of iron ore, to compel producers to use its preferred benchmarks and settle more trade in RMB. Even in crude oil, one of the largest and most liquid markets long based on U.S. dollar pricing, China has fostered a regional benchmark for medium sour crude denominated in RMB. This benchmark not only expands China’s influence over crude pricing but also could be used to further facilitate sanctions evasion.

As Chinese benchmarks become more widely adopted, China could set the parameters of contracts that global buyers and producers must meet and encourage use of Chinese firms and exchanges. China’s success in broader commodities markets has heretofore been hampered by the network effects enjoyed by existing exchanges and hesitation from international producers and consumers to use China’s financial markets, which are subject to currency and capital controls, are not protected by the rule of law, and have a high potential for opaque regulatory intervention. However, as a witness noted in written testimony for the Commission, “China’s approach is gradual and strategic. It is not attempting to replace existing benchmarks overnight. Instead, it is building parallel systems that may, over time, reshape the global landscape.”

Key Findings

  • China is moving to translate its physical presence in markets into an alternate network of price benchmarks and futures contracts to give it leverage in key commodities. China has the largest physical presence in commodities markets but has nowhere near commensurate influence or leverage over prices under the current system, partly due to the financialization of commodities markets and the critical role of the U.S. dollar as the dominant currency of exchange.
  • China is the world’s largest buyer, producer, importer, or refiner of many key commodities. Reliance on imported raw materials led China to take numerous measures to vertically integrate access and operations, including by purchasing the rights to overseas mines, building transport and logistics infrastructure to transport raw materials from overseas to China, and becoming a global leader in refining capacity.
  • Beijing is using its physical presence in markets to displace established price benchmarks. In 2022, China consolidated its market power by establishing CMRG to manage purchases of iron ore on behalf of the country’s steelmakers. China has since compelled sellers to shift to preferred pricing benchmarks. A state-owned entity, CMRG’s political heft has allowed it to issue directives to steel mills to boycott certain suppliers and obtain the support of Chinese government agencies in enhancing its negotiating leverage, including more stringent cargo inspections and higher port storage fees.
  • China is leveraging its dominant position in extraction and refining to make rapid progress in expanding domestic commodity futures trading. It is also making progress improving the quality of price signals generated by trading activity. Chinese commodity futures are mostly “in China, for China,” a common approach by the CCP to establish an initial market at home before expanding abroad. Still, China has limited influence over global commodity prices, which are largely set by markets, are denominated in U.S. dollars, and are tied to financial exchanges in the United States and other countries.
  • To build greater sway in international commodities markets, China is pursuing a multipart strategy that has already influenced pricing and governance:
    • China is leveraging its position in certain newer markets where it has a dominant position in numerous segments of the supply chain, particularly those relating to critical minerals for renewable energy and batteries—for example, lithium. China’s dominance of refining and downstream manufacturing limits the capacity for alternative benchmarks to form.
    • China is expanding its network of warehouses for physical delivery in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and abroad to support futures contract settlement. Warehouses linked to commodities exchanges provide the essential infrastructure for storing, managing, and delivering raw materials when futures contracts expire. China’s moves increase the appeal of using Chinese futures, expand China’s role in price discovery, and grow offshore access to physically delivered Chinese futures.
    • As China shifted its purchases of soybeans from the United States to Latin America, the market is fragmenting between a CME Group exchange and China’s competing soybean futures contracts traded on the Dalian Commodity Exchange. U.S. farmers are exposed to further volatility from trade frictions as China substitutes U.S. soybeans for imports from Latin America. China’s state-owned agricultural giants are investing in overseas grain storage, port terminals, and soybean crushing capacity that afford them greater insight into pricing dynamics at each stage of production.
    • The conflict in Iran has demonstrated how China has reduced its reliance on global oil markets. Although China’s onshore oil benchmark still lags behind major Western benchmarks, it has become an important regional price discovery tool. The existence of an RMB-denominated and locally relevant price discovery tool could allow China’s independent refiners to better hedge price risk associated with purchases of sanctioned oil.

Recommendations

  • For over two decades, China has quietly pursued the development of domestic commodities exchanges, and expanded its production and processing of core commodities, becoming a key market maker in many segments and sectors. China is actively working to exert greater influence over global commodities markets with the aim of advantaging its domestic manufacturers and insulating itself against U.S. sanctions. To this end, China is pursuing numerous policies to expand its leverage, growing its domestic commodity exchanges, and opening more “in China for China” commodities trading to foreign participants. In recent years, China established the China Mineral Resources Group and other state instruments to consolidate purchasing of key commodities and has begun leveraging its position as a major buyer in physical markets to compel producers to use its preferred benchmarks and, in some cases, transact in RMB. China is building parallel systems that, absent action, may, over time, reshape the global landscape.

    Congress should direct the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to monitor Chinese engagement and influence in commodities exchanges and warehousing and provide an annual report to Congress on activity, strategic risks, and efforts to coerce market participants as well as signs of market manipulation. To support this activity, Congress should:

    • Expand CFTC foreign market surveillance and provide the CFTC the direction and, as needed, authority to monitor trading activity on Chinese exchanges, including but not limited to the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) and the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE), with particular attention to participant concentration, state-owned enterprise positioning, and coordination among state-owned buyers. Current CFTC jurisdictional limits leave this activity unmonitored, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission does not make these data public.
    • Direct the CFTC to monitor the development of China’s futures markets, in particular for semiconductor, battery, renewable energy, and critical industrial materials. Data on commodity pricing are difficult to obtain, particularly in markets where benchmark usage and settlement terms are embedded in opaque, privately negotiated contracts and are not systematically reported. Thinly traded contracts are susceptible to a risk of biased market data, putting U.S. producers at a disadvantage.
    • Require disclosure of U.S. financial institution exposure to Chinese exchanges and other non-CFTC-registered foreign exchanges, as appropriate. Dodd-Frank reporting captures most U.S. derivatives activity on domestic and CFTC-registered foreign exchanges; however, many Chinese exchanges, including the INE, fall outside this framework, and these exchanges have not sought CFTC registration as Foreign Boards of Trade, meaning U.S. firms can trade on them without that activity being systematically captured in CFTC reporting.
  • Congress should strengthen the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) agricultural market intelligence and early warning capacity by directing the Secretary of Agriculture to enhance USDA’s capacity to monitor Chinese agricultural commodity markets, supply chain flows, and state reserve management—such as dedicated monitoring of the Dalian Commodity Exchange’s price signals and South American logistical flows controlled by Chinese-affiliated entities—and by providing sufficient appropriations to do so.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — April 16, 2026
Pricing the Future: China's Ambitions for Commodity Derivatives Markets
Previous chapter5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea AdvantageNext chapter7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition

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