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Chapter 7: Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

Download Chapter 7 (PDF)

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Recommendations|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

Beijing sees data as a source of national power, not just a commercial asset or a privacy concern. Under Xi Jinping, it has built a state-backed framework for collecting and using data from across society to advance economic, technological, intelligence, and military goals. China’s strategy is to maximize the amount and variety of data available to Chinese actors (including but not limited to the Chinese government), improve the state’s ability to aggregate and analyze those data, and convert them into economic and strategic advantage. Even seemingly mundane or disconnected information can become more valuable when collected, combined, and analyzed to identify “patterns of life,” behaviors, relationships, and anomalies.

China is building the infrastructure and sector-specific datasets needed to put this strategy into practice. Economically, Beijing has designated data as a factor of production and encouraged local governments and companies to commercialize data within a state-controlled framework. In AI, Beijing is promoting a “data flywheel” in which deployment of AI systems generates real-world data that can improve those systems and support further deployment. In biotechnology, Chinese entities can draw on large domestic biological datasets and, in some circumstances, foreign repositories, while Chinese regulations restrict foreign access to comparable Chinese data. Data also support China’s military, intelligence, and security objectives: the PLA is researching how new datasets can improve equipment, train AI systems, monitor adversaries, identify vulnerabilities, and support operational planning, while Chinese cyber actors have already acquired sensitive personal, technical, and critical infrastructure information with potential intelligence and operational value.

For the United States, the challenge extends beyond protecting individual databases from theft. China can acquire data through both illicit and lawful channels and use them for espionage, coercion, influence operations, technological development, and military planning. U.S. measures have restricted some paths to sensitive American data, but significant vulnerabilities remain, as current U.S. policy largely addresses cybersecurity, privacy, foreign investment, biotechnology, and AI as separate issues. In contrast, Beijing approaches data as a strategic resource that spans across sectors and issues. However, China’s ability to translate its data resources into concrete advantages is not assured: commercial data remain fragmented, and high-quality AI training data are scarce. Even so, its drive to collect, aggregate, and exploit data at scale poses an enduring challenge to U.S. competitiveness and national security.

Key Findings

  • Beijing pursues a state-directed strategy to acquire, consolidate, and exploit data from a vast array of sources, including state surveillance infrastructure, cyber operations, scientific and biomedical sources, and even routine commercial activity, while leveraging AI to fuse disparate datasets into actionable intelligence.
  • China acquires data illicitly through state operations as well as via a contracted “hackers-for-hire” ecosystem. This provides it with access to vast troves of information via cyber operations. Yet cyber theft is only one component of a far broader collection apparatus.
  • China’s legal and institutional architecture ensures state access to data held by any Chinese entity, while cross-border controls allow Beijing to retain high-value Chinese data domestically. Any data a Chinese company collects can be claimed and absorbed by the state, no matter how mundane their commercial purpose.
  • In 2020, China became the first country to designate data as a factor of production, alongside land, labor, capital, and technology, a deliberate decision that elevated data to a strategic national asset and an instrument of national power. It is perhaps the only country to have built an end-to-end, state-directed system to control, collect, aggregate, deploy, and exploit data.
  • China converts data into power through aggregation. Capabilities refined through its domestic surveillance state—fusing biometric, financial, communications, behavioral, and any other data into predictive profiles—are being applied to foreign targets, with AI accelerating the transformation of disparate datasets into “pattern-of-life” intelligence.
  • Beijing is converting its data position into competitive advantage: building a national data infrastructure to power its digital economy; enforcing strategies to generate high-quality AI data by deploying the model in a system that feeds the data back for further iteration; and engineering deliberate asymmetries—most starkly in biotechnology—that maximize access to foreign data while denying reciprocal access to China’s data.
  • China’s data dominance strategy threatens U.S. national security. The aggregation of data on Americans enables espionage, coercion, and influence operations with unprecedented precision; supports pre-positioning campaigns such as Volt Typhoon that collect critical infrastructure data to support “system destruction warfare” in a future conflict; and facilitates the use of stolen technical data to accelerate PLA modernization. Where Washington sees a privacy problem, a cyber problem, and a trade problem, Beijing sees a single resource of national power and has organized its laws, economy, and intelligence apparatus to control it end to end.

Recommendations

  • Data are a strategic asset that can drive scientific discovery, economic growth, and national security, but their value depends on the ability to organize, protect, and use them effectively. The United States needs a coordinated framework that makes data more accessible for legitimate uses, gives Americans control over their personal data, and prevents exploitation by China and other adversaries. An American Data Initiative would advance these goals while providing Americans meaningful control over their personal data.

    Congress should establish an American Data Initiative to put American data to work as a source of national power, while preserving decentralized ownership, giving Americans control over their own data, and keeping their data out of the hands of China and other adversaries. Congress should:

    Organize Federal Data

    • Make the Administrator of General Services the Federal Chief Data Officer, with binding standards authority over all agencies and every agency Chief Data Officer appointed by and reporting to the Administrator, after consultation with the agency head.
    • Direct the Administrator to govern all federal data by sensitivity and value, including in aggregate, and to make Data.gov the catalog of all federal data, open by default, with registered access for non-public data.
    • Direct the Administrator to establish sectoral data foundries that produce AI-ready datasets, beginning with biology and embodied AI.
    • Require the Administrator’s approval of agency data budgets and bar funding for noncompliant data systems.
    • Apply the confidentiality protections of Title 13 to personal data shared through the Initiative and record every access to non-public federal data in a tamper-proof log.
    • Give the Government Accountability Office continuous access to those logs and authority to review any access to personal data and require an annual report to Congress with agency scorecards and privacy and civil liberties compliance audited by the Government Accountability Office.

    Put Data on the Balance Sheet

    • Make it U.S. policy that data held by federal agencies and U.S. businesses are an asset recognized on the balance sheet.
    • Direct the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to require the Financial Accounting Standards Board to set standards for recognizing data as an asset within two years.
    • Direct the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board to set comparable standards for federal agencies.
    • Direct the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to set matching audit standards.
    • Direct the federal banking regulators to exclude data assets from regulatory capital.
    • Condition the Governmental Accounting Standards Board’s federal funding on comparable standards for state and local governments.

    Let Americans Decide Who Gets Their Data

    • Codify the core prohibitions of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Data Security Program, including its bars on giving China and other countries of concern and covered persons access to Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data and government-related data and its limits on onward transfer, and leave compliance requirements to regulation.
    • Direct the President to designate an appropriate Cabinet or agency official to establish a national opt-in program under which data brokers may not sell, license, or share Americans’ personal data unless the consumer has opted in through a single federal portal that brokers must check before any transfer.
    • Extend the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act to require data brokers, under a common statutory definition that applies throughout the Initiative and includes resellers and other intermediaries, to register with the designated official, hold them liable for transfers made without consent, bar transfers to persons under the jurisdiction of China or another foreign adversary regardless of consent, and make these obligations follow the data through every resale.
    • Require data brokers, within two years, to obtain consent for personal data they already hold or delete it.

    Bring Data Sales Out of the Shadows

    • Define the rights in data that companies, governments, and consenting individuals can buy, sell, and license.
    • Direct the designated official to register and supervise data exchanges, require data brokers, within two years, to sell personal data only through registered exchanges, and require exchanges to verify data provenance and consumer consent, screen buyers for ties to China and other foreign adversaries, including beneficial ownership and intended use, keep auditable records of every transfer, bar unauthorized resale and improper data combination, bar onward transfers to third countries without equivalent controls, meet security standards, and bar participants under foreign-adversary jurisdiction.
    • Direct the Secretary of Commerce to open U.S. data exchanges to participants from allied and partner countries whose governments adopt equivalent consent, provenance, and foreign-adversary screening rules and extend reciprocal access to U.S. participants.
  • In 2024, the Commission recommended that Congress codify the authority established under the “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” Executive Order (ICTS). The Connected Vehicle Rule demonstrates that the ICTS framework can work but it lacks a statutory basis and congressional direction to regularly identify, assess and mitigate risks across high-risk technology sectors.

    Congress should codify the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) and its ICTS authorities, provide dedicated funding and personnel, and require the office, in coordination with relevant federal agencies, to:

    • Regularly assess categories of foreign-adversary information and communications technologies and services that could expose sensitive U.S. data, enable remote access or control, or compromise U.S. critical infrastructure.
    • Report findings and proposed mitigation measures to Congress and initiate rulemaking for sectors posing national security risks, or explain why regulatory action is unwarranted.
  • To prevent China from stealing American data and harming American companies, Congress should establish a systematic effort against the ecosystem that supplies and monetizes China’s cyber intrusions using “hackers for hire” and commercial cyber actors, by taking the following actions:
    • Direct the National Cyber Director, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Defense, to publish annually a list of foreign persons that:
      • Knowingly supply data, intrusion software, and botnet services to China’s state-sponsored cyber actors or “hackers for hire”;
      • Acquire or commercialize data or intellectual property stolen through those operations; or
      • Act as subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, joint ventures, licensees, or significant subcontractors of covered entities.
    • Require within the 180-day period after the publication of each annual list:
      • The Secretaries of Treasury and State to determine whether blocking, financial, or visa sanctions are warranted;
      • The Secretary of Defense to determine whether government-wide or defense-specific procurement exclusion is warranted; and
      • The Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, where communications equipment or services are involved, to determine whether Covered List inclusion is warranted based on a determination by an authorized federal entity.
    • Establish a program that would allow designated U.S. private sector entities to conduct cyber operations against approved foreign entities.
    • Require reporting to the relevant committees of Congress, on: whether sanctions were imposed or list placements made; any identified statutory or resource gaps; enforcement coordination with allies; beneficial ownership and affiliate information; and procurement exposure across federal agencies.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — April 30, 2026
Taking a Bigger Byte: China’s Expanding Strategy for Data Dominance
Research — August 18, 2026
The People’s Republic of Data: How China Is Turning Data into Capital
Previous chapter6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities MarketsNext chapter8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

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