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Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

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On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings

Executive Summary

In 2026, China’s two-speed economy continues. The country’s structural economic weaknesses became more apparent, even as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) doubled down on its strategy to promote production and innovation in targeted industries and rely on exports to absorb the excess. Rather than address persistent weak domestic demand and deflationary pressures, China allowed its consumption support programs to expire and continues to funnel credit and investment toward its oversaturated manufacturing sector. The conflict in Iran has introduced a cyclical element to these challenges as global energy supplies tighten, raising costs for China’s manufacturers and leading to economic hardship for many of China’s trade partners.

China’s export of its excess production means it is well on its way to a trade surplus of over $1 trillion for the second year in a row. This “China Shock 2.0”—a flood of low-cost exports—is hurting economies all over the world that fail to put up barriers to China’s market distortions as their manufacturing sectors are undercut by cheaper products. Many of China’s trade partners have introduced more measures to protect domestic manufacturing sectors, including traditional WTO remedies as well as non-tariff barriers. At the same time, China has sought to use concerns about U.S. trade policy to enhance its market access, ironically, claiming to be a more reliable trading partner that supports the rules-based trading system.

Instead of addressing these growing issues, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan released in 2026 showcases its continued focus on technological dominance. Beijing hopes its efforts to dominate technology supply chains and innovate at the frontier—combined with its own de-risking measures—will allow it to weather the broader economic slowdown, achieve self-sufficiency, and enhance its geopolitical power. China has also deepened and expanded its toolkit to exert economic leverage on global markets as well as resist foreign sanctions and export controls.

Key Findings

  • China’s two-speed economy persisted in 2026. Weak domestic demand and shrinking profit margins weighed on businesses at home, even as General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping pressed ahead with efforts to dominate global manufacturing supply chains and advanced technology sectors while strengthening Beijing’s ability to exert economic leverage and withstand pressure from abroad.
  • China still has not lived up to its repeated promises to spur greater consumption. Continued malaise in the property market has kept domestic demand muted, contributing to excess supply in the manufacturing sector. An estimated 87 percent of Chinese urban households own property; with average home prices having declined 20–25 percent since their peak in 2021, the average Chinese household’s wealth has been reduced significantly.
  • Weak labor demand and technological displacement are pushing more workers into “flexible” employment in the “gig” economy, leading to lower and less stable earnings, limited career advancement, and weaker social protections. As of 2026, 320 million people worked flexible jobs, including workers from traditionally professional occupations, such as software engineers, financial analysts, and healthcare workers, placing constraints on China’s ability to boost consumption.
  • Beijing implicitly acknowledged the problem of excess production through its “anti-involution” campaign targeting harmful price competition, as Chinese companies repeatedly slash prices to unload surplus output. The campaign remains limited in 2026, however, and Beijing is unlikely to move more aggressively to curb supply; doing so would undercut exports, a core growth driver, and eliminate many firms’ sole pressure release valve, in addition to putting greater pressure on the labor market.
  • China Shock 2.0 shows no signs of abating: China’s exports accelerated in the first half of 2026 after a record trade surplus in 2025. The resulting flood of exports is hurting manufacturers in developed and developing economies alike, while Beijing has used a range of tactics to forestall a coordinated response.
  • Despite the current détente with the United States, China continues to expand its ability to wield supply chain leverage, withstand U.S. and allied sanctions and export controls, and retaliate against foreign measures the CCP deems “unjustifiable.” These efforts are setting up a clash between competing regulatory systems that could leave foreign companies operating in China caught between conflicting demands while raising the costs the United States and its partners must weigh when using economic statecraft.
  • The 15th Five-Year Plan confirmed that China remains committed to mobilizing the full weight of the state to advance its technology sector. Beijing treats artificial intelligence (AI) as a general-purpose technology—the connective layer driving other priorities, including biotechnology, robotics, and quantum—believing that mastering these foundational technologies will secure a durable, economy-wide advantage and overcome its economic challenges.
  • China continues to face significant compute constraints due to U.S. export controls, yet its frontier AI capabilities have largely kept pace with advances in the United States. Chinese developers are using techniques such as distillation to steal the methods and outputs of top U.S. models to develop capable, lower-cost Chinese alternatives. By releasing these models with open weights and encouraging their adoption abroad, China aims to make its AI systems the global default. U.S. leadership in frontier AI remains real, but China’s strategy for spreading its models could make that lead less secure than it appears.
  • As China’s technologies advance, Beijing is refining its economic toolkit to keep capital, technology, data, and talent at home: screening outbound investment, blocking foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms, restricting AI researchers at frontier labs (and their families) from leaving the country, and limiting the types of foreign investment permitted in its AI companies.

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