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Chapter 5: Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage

2026 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress

The Year in Review

  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)

China’s Efforts to Expand Its Global Power and Influence

  • 3. China’s Other Front: India and the Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
  • 4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful Practices
  • 5. Active Intercept: China’s Efforts to Narrow U.S. Undersea Advantage
  • 6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

China’s Technology Ambitions

  • 7. Collect, Steal, Buy, Fuse, Monetize: How China Is Turning Data into Assets and Ammunition
  • 8. Silicon to Sovereignty: China’s Bid to Control the AI Stack from Wafer to Weights, Part One

Taiwan and Hong Kong

  • 9. Taiwan: A Crucial Window for a Critical Partner
  • 10. Hong Kong: Enabler of China’s Global Finance and Technology Ambitions

2026 Annual Report to Congress · November 18, 2026

Download Chapter 5 (PDF)

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Recommendations|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

For decades, the United States has enjoyed a military advantage beneath the sea. China is systematically seeking to erode that advantage. Even as it modernizes and expands its submarine force, Beijing is pursuing multiple means to constrain U.S. submarine operations, particularly by improving its ability to detect them inside the first island chain through a layered sensing architecture and a growing portfolio of autonomous underwater systems. These efforts could be consequential in a Taiwan contingency, where U.S. submarines would pose a significant threat to PLA forces crossing the Taiwan Strait.

China treats the undersea domain as a single arena of strategic competition. Beijing is integrating military modernization, scientific research, commercial industries, and emerging technologies into a mutually reinforcing ecosystem that allows capabilities and knowledge developed for one purpose to support others. Military-civil fusion provides institutional channels for scientific and commercial capabilities to support national and defense priorities. Submarine modernization, undersea sensing, autonomous systems, and subsea telecommunications infrastructure provide Beijing multiple ways to improve its ability to understand, operate in, and ultimately contest the undersea environment. Regardless of whether commercial seabed mining becomes economically viable, China’s oceanographic research and seabed exploration have produced environmental data, seafloor knowledge, and deep-sea technologies with applications for submarine operations, undersea sensing, and anti-submarine warfare.

China remains well short of displacing the United States as the dominant undersea military power. Its sensing networks remain fragmented, autonomous systems face substantial technical barriers, and many of its more ambitious concepts remain developmental. However, China does not need to eliminate the U.S. advantage to constrain U.S. operations. Continued gains in sensing, autonomous systems, submarines, and dual-use technologies could narrow that advantage enough to make U.S. operations in the Western Pacific—especially within the first island chain—more difficult, more costly, and more uncertain.

Key Findings

  • China is seeking to erode the U.S. undersea advantage through multiple lines of effort that extend well beyond traditional naval modernization. Beijing’s investments in submarines, sensing networks, autonomous systems, oceanographic research, subsea infrastructure, and seabed technologies give it several avenues to narrow the U.S. advantage, with institutional links that allow capabilities and knowledge developed in one area to support others.
  • China does not need to match the United States submarine-for-submarine to alter the military balance in the Indo-Pacific. China’s most immediate undersea objective is not destroying U.S. submarines but rather making them easier to detect. Even intermittent detection of U.S. submarines inside the first island chain could force changes in how they are routed and employed, increase the effort required to preserve stealth, and raise the risks of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency.
  • China is developing a layered sensing architecture that could make strategically important waters less permissive for U.S. submarines. Satellites, autonomous systems, seabed sensors, and oceanographic mapping are expanding China’s ability to collect undersea data, but integrating these systems into a reliable operational picture remains a major challenge.
  • The PLA has a growing portfolio of uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) that conduct a range of missions, but its ability to employ large numbers of them effectively remains unproven. UUVs already support oceanographic collection, sensing, and surveillance, while China is developing systems for mine warfare and other combat missions. If China overcomes persistent communications and coordination challenges, its manufacturing capacity could become an important advantage in fielding autonomous systems at scale.
  • China’s submarine modernization will place additional demands on U.S. forces charged with preserving the undersea advantage. A larger, quieter, and increasingly nuclear-powered Chinese submarine force will be more difficult to monitor and track, extend the PLA Navy’s operational reach, and improve the survivability of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent.
  • China’s role across the subsea cable industry gives Beijing access to critical infrastructure and strategically important waterways with military and intelligence value. Chinese firms manufacture, own, install, and repair cables supporting global communications, creating opportunities for intelligence collection and maritime surveillance as well as coercion or disruption during a crisis. U.S. actions have constrained Chinese participation in some projects but have not eliminated Beijing’s presence across the global cable ecosystem.
  • China is gaining military value from seabed exploration and oceanographic research, driving investments well beyond seabed mining’s commercial viability. Seafloor mapping and environmental data can improve understanding of the acoustic environment and inform submarine operations, anti-submarine warfare, and sensor placement, while deep-sea exploration advances relevant robotics and engineering capabilities. China’s investments could also position its firms to play a leading role if seabed minerals become commercially important.

Recommendations

  • The Submarine Cable Act of 1888 only allows the United States to prosecute damage to subsea cables that occurs within U.S. territorial waters (i.e., within 12 nautical miles of its coastline) or damage caused by U.S.-flagged vessels wherever they operate. Current law limits the United States’ ability to address other intentional damage to subsea cables landing in the United States or owned by U.S. entities. The United States must also address its limited repair ship capacity, which has led regulators to allow foreign adversaries to maintain U.S. cables that connect to the United States from a third country. This means provisions that would expand a trusted repair fleet and would ensure reinsurance for cable repair surge capacity during a crisis.

    To address adversarial attacks on critical U.S. telecommunications infrastructure in international waters, Congress should:

    • Amend the Submarine Cable Act to expand jurisdiction to prosecute acts of intentional sabotage against any critical undersea infrastructure landing in the United States or having any ownership stakes from U.S. entities.
    • Strengthen undersea cable repair capacity by:
      • Barring the use of foreign adversaries’ repair ships on U.S. cables and directing regulators to take associated action;
      • In a manner consistent with current law, establishing a Pacific Allied Cable Repair Fleet, under which the Secretary of Transportation may enter operating agreements with qualified cable vessels flagged in the United States, and, where necessary, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan; and
      • Directing the Secretary of Transportation to provide insurance or reinsurance against war risks for foreign vessels engaged in cable installation and repair, in coordination with allied countries when possible.
  • To combat the People’s Republic of China’s “Transparent Ocean” and undersea modernization efforts, Congress should:
    • Direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant departments and agencies, to submit to the congressional defense committees a report, in both unclassified and classified versions, on China’s “Transparent Ocean” efforts and associated programs. The reports should assess China’s progress toward developing a persistent undersea surveillance architecture enabled by data fusion that integrates sensors and autonomous systems across domains from the seabed to space.

    To ensure the United States maintains its advantage over China in cutting-edge autonomous and semi-autonomous undersea systems, Congress should:

    • Direct the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a classified report and briefing on its acquisition and program strategy for autonomous/semi-autonomous undersea systems. The report should address U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) capacity to surge production of these systems and detail how these platforms support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s strategy in a Taiwan contingency.
    • Appropriate funds for DOD to conduct a competitive, multi-supplier uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) hull-manufacturing qualification pilot that expands the industrial base beyond established defense contractors.
    • Appropriate funds to expand DOD and other U.S. government agencies’ procurement of UUVs. These agencies could include those falling under the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
  • To maintain U.S. advantage in undersea surveying and seabed mapping, Congress should authorize and appropriate additional funds to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to expand seabed surveys and mapping operations in the Pacific, with a focus on working with the governments of the Pacific Island countries to conduct surveys in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
    • An agreement with a country under this initiative should condition cooperation on prohibiting Chinese research vessel exploratory activity, seabed mapping, and seabed mining in its waters to the maximum extent permitted.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — March 2, 2026
Part of Your World: U.S.-China Competition Under the Sea
Research — September 22, 2026
China’s Gray Zone Threats to Trans-Pacific Undersea Cables
Previous chapter4. China’s Predatory Diplomacy in Latin America: Broken Promises, Harmful PracticesNext chapter6. The Price of Everything: China’s Bid to Reshape Global Commodities Markets

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