2026 Annual Report to Congress ·
On this page: Executive SummaryKey FindingsRecommendations
Executive Summary
Hong Kong’s political and judicial systems are now subject to complete CCP control. In 2026, Hong Kong’s loyalist legislature passed new rules allowing the chief executive to unilaterally label any criminal matter as a national security case. Those accused of committing national security offenses cannot contest the designation, and there are no elements of civil society left to provide meaningful resistance. With the CCP takeover, the prerequisites for a thriving financial center—rule of law, a fair legal system, and robust market institutions—are at odds with Beijing’s autocratic rule. Yet with the CCP’s support, Hong Kong’s economy has become a controlled valve for China to achieve its strategic aims vis-à-vis the global trading and investment system.
Despite years of trying, the Mainland’s financial markets have not replaced Hong Kong as a conduit to the global financial system. Underdeveloped financial markets and the Party’s need to prevent capital outflows limit the ability of cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen to attract offshore capital. As Western markets have become less viable alternatives, Hong Kong has solidified its role as a venue for mainland technology firms to raise foreign capital for global expansion; almost all of Hong Kong’s initial public offerings (IPOs) in the first half of 2026 were for mainland companies. Hong Kong is also instrumental to China’s efforts to build offshore infrastructure for RMB circulation and investment as it seeks to grow the role of RMB in international financial flows and insulate itself from U.S. sanctions authorities. Hong Kong’s active and complex financial system also helps China act as a key enabler of Iran, Russia, and North Korea’s sanctions and export control evasion.
The international business community and global financial institutions appear willing to overlook the loss of freedom and rule of law in Hong Kong—and the changing nature of Hong Kong’s financial system—as long as the impact to the corporate bottom line remains limited. However, Hong Kong’s economy and financial sector are more exposed to geopolitical and economic risks associated with the Mainland. The implementation of top-down economic planning through Hong Kong’s first five-year plan and the ongoing subversion of market interests for state priorities set up a fundamental contradiction between what makes a financial center attractive and the purpose China wants Hong Kong to serve.
Key Findings
- Beijing’s strong support has been the decisive factor behind Hong Kong’s financial improvements over the last year. Hong Kong led the world in IPOs in 2025, with a comparable level of activity in the first half of 2026—not as a revived global hub but as a venue of choice for mainland firms in Beijing’s priority sectors to access foreign capital. Mainland-controlled firms accounted for 96 percent of these IPOs by number, more than double the percentage from 2018. Rather than suggesting that Hong Kong retains its role as a global financial center, this resilience marks its transformation into a key node in the CCP’s technology ambitions and ties its financial and economic future to Beijing’s priorities.
- Over the past year, the Hong Kong government has continued to systematically expand executive and security powers and give Beijing’s security offices a greater role in local processes, eliminating the legal predictability and judicial independence that previously distinguished the city from the rest of China. The chief executive now has the unilateral ability to define what constitutes a national security matter and can apply the label retroactively to events that occurred prior to the passage of the National Security Law in 2020.
- Beijing’s successful imposition of the mainland security regime in Hong Kong remains basically unchecked. Hong Kong authorities have jailed or quelled through repression elements of civil society that had resisted. The government may force anyone in Hong Kong to unlock personal devices and has restricted trade unions from engaging with foreign organizations. Many with the resources to do so have left Hong Kong. Voter participation has plummeted, reflecting widespread rejection of an electoral system that has forced out any elements disloyal to Beijing.
- The city’s leadership has aligned its development goals more closely with the Mainland, even following the CCP in issuing Hong Kong’s first-ever five-year plan. The government is diverting its resources toward supporting mainland ambitions for global expansion, technological dominance, and self-sufficiency even at the expense of its own fiscal health. In turn, Hong Kong’s business community incentives are aligned with China’s agenda.
- Hong Kong’s growing role in China’s export-oriented economy and a resurgence in the financial sector led by Chinese tech stock IPOs have contributed to strong GDP growth. Beijing’s cooptation of Hong Kong’s economic system is more insidious in some cases. China is using Hong Kong to raise foreign capital for firms that face U.S. restrictions and/or serve the PLA.
- Hong Kong continues to enable China’s support for autocratic regimes in Russia, Iran, and North Korea by acting as a central nexus for sanctions and export control evasion. The city’s position as a global financial center and its lax regulatory environment for business registration combined with the leadership’s refusal to proactively enforce sanctions have allowed corporations to complete billions of dollars of transactions that route dual-use components to Russia’s war in Ukraine, facilitate Russia and Iran’s crude oil sales, and allow North Korea to launder stolen cryptocurrency proceeds.
- Beijing’s direct intervention in the city’s economy has been limited to date, but the stage is set for major challenges ahead. Beijing has ratcheted up its own economic statecraft toolset with expanding export controls, limits on data and technology transfers, and tools to penalize companies complying with U.S. policies Beijing deems objectionable.
Recommendations
- Hong Kong’s legal environment is deteriorating—not in a single dramatic event but through continuous, layered legislation that changes business risk year after year. Virtually any legal dispute involving a U.S. firm or its staff could be channeled into a national security case, and only a recurring statutory assessment keeps U.S. businesses informed.
Congress should require the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Commerce to jointly issue an annual Hong Kong Business Advisory informing U.S. firms of the legal, regulatory, financial, and reputational risks of operating in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Each advisory would include the following:
- An assessment of developments over the preceding year, including new legislation, subsidiary regulations, enforcement actions, erosion of the rule of law, sanctions and/or export control evasion activities, and exit restriction risks.
- Updated guidance on risk exposure for personnel, data, intellectual property, and operations.
- The U.S. Department of the Treasury has identified Hong Kong-based entities as key enablers of crypto-facilitated Iranian oil revenue laundering.
Congress should enact legislation to apply Primary Money Laundering Concern special measures, including correspondent account prohibitions, on Hong Kong Virtual Asset Service Providers that fail to prevent Iranian, Russian, or North Korean cryptocurrency trades.