2026 Annual Report to Congress ·
On this page: Executive SummaryKey FindingsRecommendationsRelated Hearings and Research
Executive Summary
India is one of the few powers outside the U.S. alliance system with the scale to materially affect the long-term competition with China. India is the world’s most populous country and largest democracy. It is a nuclear power with one of the world’s largest militaries. It shares a 2,100-mile contested border with China and occupies a commanding position along critical sea lanes in the Indian Ocean that carry much of China’s energy and trade. While the Western Pacific remains the principal geographic theater of U.S.-China competition, New Delhi presents Beijing with another strategic challenge both on land and at sea. India’s rivalry with China is driven by its own strategic interests, not by alignment with Washington. For the United States, a stronger India could contribute to a more favorable balance of power in Asia while providing an important alternative to Chinese manufacturing and supply chains.
China understands this, and it is actively working to suppress India’s rise across multiple domains. Beijing is continuing its military buildup, asserting sovereignty claims along the disputed border, deepening military support for Pakistan, and expanding its naval and surveillance presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s sharpest tool, however, is economic. Beijing is using its control over critical industrial inputs, technology, and expertise to preserve its manufacturing advantages and make it harder for India to build competing capacity. China has restricted exports of key inputs and products to India to exert economic pressure, recalled engineers and withheld equipment to slow India’s electronics manufacturing, slashed pharmaceutical input prices to undercut new Indian plants, and imposed export controls on battery technology to impede the development of India’s clean energy industry. More consequential for Washington, in 2025 Beijing began to require Indian firms to certify that certain Chinese-supplied inputs would not be re-exported to the United States. While China suspended this requirement as part of the broader Trump-Xi trade détente, it is a lever that can turn India’s dependence on China into a weapon aimed at U.S. supply chains.
India is responding to Chinese pressure while balancing security concerns against its economic development needs. New Delhi is modernizing its military, building domestic manufacturing capacity, restricting Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors, and expanding cooperation with the United States and other partners. However, India recently eased some restrictions on Chinese investment and equipment as the costs of limiting access to Chinese inputs, technology, and expertise have grown. Much of India’s industrial expansion still runs on Chinese machinery, components, and technical know-how, and its dependence on Chinese components has deepened even as its de-risking measures multiplied.
These tensions create both opportunities and constraints for the United States. Washington and New Delhi have spent a quarter century building closer ties across defense, technology, and trade, but India will continue to guard its strategic autonomy rather than align automatically with U.S. objectives.
The two governments have established an ambitious foundation for cooperation. A ten-year defense framework, a bilateral trade agreement under negotiation, technology initiatives ranging from semiconductors to biomanufacturing, and a revitalized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue all point toward deeper ties. The legal and institutional architectures needed to support that cooperation have not changed as quickly, however. Export control regimes, procurement rules, and financing tools that were designed for a different era and a different strategic environment limit what these initiatives can deliver. The result is a growing gap between the ambitions of the partnership and what its underlying rules and institutions can deliver.
Key Findings
- India is one of the few countries with the demographic, economic, military, and geographic scale to significantly affect the long-term balance of power with China. Beijing views India’s rise as a strategic challenge and is applying military, economic, maritime, and other forms of pressure to constrain it. India has its own interests driving its rivalry with China and is committed to “strategic autonomy,” so closer U.S.-India cooperation will not necessarily translate into alignment with broader U.S. objectives.
- The unresolved border remains the central fault line in China-India relations. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes marked a major turning point, making India less willing to separate the territorial dispute from its wider relationship with China. Although New Delhi and Beijing have gradually rebuilt ties since late 2024, strategic distrust remains high and India continues to view peace along the border as necessary for broader normalization.
- China’s evolving military partnership with Pakistan has made a two-front contingency an increasingly critical concern for India. The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict demonstrated how China could strengthen Pakistan during a crisis without Beijing entering the fighting directly, adding to India’s concerns about how a future conflict with Pakistan could develop.
- China’s expanding naval and surveillance presence is beginning to erode India’s longstanding strategic advantages in the Indian Ocean and place additional demands on Indian forces. Beijing is building the infrastructure and logistical networks needed to sustain more persistent naval operations while Chinese naval, surveillance, and research vessels operate closer to India and critical sea lanes. China is also beginning to bring its South China Sea playbook to the Indian Ocean, invoking historic rights and renaming undersea features in ways that could lay the groundwork for more assertive activities and potential claims of jurisdiction.
- India’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing has become an important source of leverage for Beijing—and a growing vulnerability for the United States. China has restricted industrial inputs, equipment, technology, and expertise to India and required some Indian firms to certify that Chinese-supplied goods would not be re-exported to the United States. Chinese pricing has also undercut new Indian pharmaceutical production, illustrating Beijing’s intent to undermine Indian suppliers that can compete with established Chinese producers. These dependencies complicate U.S. efforts to diversify supply chains away from China by shifting production to India.
- India has reduced its exposure to China in some sensitive sectors, but its underlying industrial dependence has continued to grow. New Delhi has restricted Chinese investment, limited Chinese participation in strategic industries, and subsidized domestic manufacturing, yet India’s industrial growth has increased demand for Chinese machinery, components, and technical expertise. India’s efforts to build domestic supplier networks will require substantial capital, technology, and time, even as it progresses as a global China Plus One hub.
- U.S.-India cooperation has become more ambitious, but many of the rules and institutions governing it remain poorly suited to the partnership’s current scope and strategic importance. New defense, technology, supply chain, and maritime initiatives have broadened the partnership, but export controls, procurement requirements, financing constraints, and fragmented bureaucratic processes continue to delay or limit implementation.
Recommendations
- The Federal Government has spent years building a wall against risky suppliers in strategic sectors. It now needs a purchasing strategy that makes trusted pharmaceutical production commercially viable. The central obstacle is commercial: manufacturers cannot justify investing in alternative sources of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials (KSMs) without confidence that buyers will continue purchasing from them even when cheaper Chinese supply is available.
To break China’s leverage over the supply of essential medicines, Congress should establish a Comprehensive Critical Drug Diversification (C2D2) program built around U.S.-India cooperation. The program should:
- Establish a pharmaceutical supply chain early warning mechanism for a list of essential medicines to identify APIs, KSMs, and critical intermediates and their production sites; identify single-country and single-facility dependencies; flag emerging disruptions; and direct purchasing and investment toward gaps.
- Authorize the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to establish a Federal Trusted Demand Program, including multiyear commitments for essential medicines made with qualifying U.S. or trusted partner APIs and KSMs. The U.S. government should buy finished medicines it needs while making verified sourcing of critical inputs a condition for participation. The U.S. government should also ensure consistent purchase pricing across agencies. The program should:
- Coordinate how participating agencies verify suppliers and the origins of their critical inputs, including subpoena authority to demand documentation;
- Have the ability to make multi-year purchase commitments for essential medicines; and
- Direct the U.S. government to work with providers to address cost disparities of buying medicines under long-term contracts.
- Include an initiative to support public and private investment in API and KSM production in India. For APIs, producers should be mandated to prove minimal and declining reliance on Chinese KSMs to receive the funding. The initiative should, to the maximum extent practicable, require matching funds from India and coordination with Indian producers to withstand predatory Chinese pricing.
- As the 14th Dalai Lama advances in age, China is preparing to turn his succession into an international contest over legitimacy and will likely use coercive tools to shape its outcome. India, which hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile and shares a longstanding disputed border with China, is the center of gravity in this dispute.
Congress should make it the policy of the United States that the Gaden Phodrang Trust is the sole legitimate authority to identify and recognize the successor to the 14th Dalai Lama and that the United States will not recognize any successor selected or installed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. To carry out this policy and ensure U.S. government readiness for the Dalai Lama’s succession, Congress should direct the Secretary of State to:
- Lead an internal interagency tabletop exercise on succession scenarios, with participation by the National Security Advisor, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and brief the appropriate congressional committees on its findings within 180 days.
- Establish a senior-level channel with the Government of India for succession contingency planning, including intelligence sharing on Chinese influence operations, and report to the appropriate congressional committees on its status within 180 days.
- Conduct Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues and tabletop exercises with Indian counterparts on the political and security implications of succession scenarios.
- Coordinate with allies and partners on a diplomatic response that denies international legitimacy to any successor selected by the People’s Republic of China.
- Counter succession-related influence operations by strengthening the Central Tibetan Administration’s cybersecurity and resilience against China’s cyber and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled disinformation campaigns.
Congress should provide authorizations and appropriations to carry out these activities.
- China’s efforts to constrain India’s regional influence and expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean underscore the importance of a stronger U.S.-India strategic partnership. The United States should deepen operational defense cooperation and foster lasting relationships among the next generation of American and Indian leaders.
Congress should:
- Direct the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage with their Government of India counterparts to strengthen coordination on undersea and maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean.
- These efforts should prioritize moving beyond military exercises toward sustained operational cooperation, including systematic intelligence and surveillance information sharing, coordinated monitoring of Chinese naval and submarine activity, and improved procedures for responding to maritime threats.
- Create an Indo-American Strategic Leadership Exchange Program to forge generational ties among rising leaders in defense, government, business, and academia.
- Direct the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage with their Government of India counterparts to strengthen coordination on undersea and maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean.