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Chapter 9: Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains

2025 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress
  • The Year in Review
  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)
  • Efforts to Remake the World Order
  • 3. Axis of Autocracy: China’s Revisionist Ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea
  • 4. Crossroads of Competition: China and Southeast Asia
  • 5. Small Islands, Big Stakes: China’s Playbook in the Pacific Islands
  • Competition in Contested Frontiers
  • 6. Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation Engine
  • 7. The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space
  • Exposure to China’s Economic Distortions and Coercion
  • 8. China Shock 2.0
  • 9. Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains
  • 10. Power Surge: China’s Electrification Drive and Push for Global Energy Dominance
  • Taiwan and Hong Kong
  • 11. Taiwan
  • 12. Hong Kong
Download Chapter 9

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

China has long made clear its willingness to use its economic heft to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic interests. In the past five years, however, it has intensified this strategy by prioritizing control over key supply chains. China has already deployed export controls on critical minerals as a coercive tool, including to seek policy concessions in trade negotiations with the United States and to punish other countries. However, critical minerals are just one among several key sectors in which the United States is highly dependent on Chinese sources or could become dependent in the near future.

Other key sectors include active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), printed circuit boards (PCBs), and foundational semiconductors—all of which are vital to national security and commercial stability, and for which even short-term, partial disruption could cripple critical industries and military readiness. With potentially as much as one-quarter of all APIs sourced from China directly—or indirectly through India—U.S. pharmaceutical supply chains face a vulnerability that could have drastic consequences for the American healthcare system. PCBs are critical to all electronics—from the simplest to the most advanced. Though Beijing faces practical barriers to restricting Chinese PCB content to U.S. end users, China has substantial and growing leverage in this important sector, both via direct sales to the United States and much more significantly via made-in-China PCBs embedded in global electronics products. Foundational semiconductors are a likely future vulnerability. China’s breakneck expansion in production capacity threatens to flood the market and put competitors out of business if left unaddressed. In that case, the United States may soon depend on access to China’s chip industry for producing a wide variety of electronic devices.

As covered in the preceding chapter, an ongoing flood of low-cost Chinese goods is spilling into global markets amid a second China “Shock,” threatening to put global competitors out of business in sector after sector and positioning China for dominance over ever more supply chains. Without bold action to strengthen domestic production, de-risk from potential adversaries, and coordinate more closely with allies and partners, the United States will become ever more dependent on Chinese supply chains while Beijing in turn strengthens its ability to exert leverage via those supply chains by imposing either targeted controls or larger-scale embargoes on critical exports to the United States.

Key Findings

  • China has held a dominant position in many global supply chains for years, once concentrated in lower-value products and materials but now extending to advanced technologies. In the past few years, the country’s economic coercion toolkit has evolved rapidly in sophistication and impact. China now appears poised to accelerate its weaponization of supply chain chokepoints, potentially imposing significant short-term costs on the United States and other trade partners, eroding industrial resilience, and constraining U.S. policy choices.
  • China’s economic model systematically leads to a concentration of global productive capacity in industries targeted for state support, and establishing such chokepoints has been an explicit CCP policy goal for years. China’s supply chain leverage in key sectors will continue to grow over time if unchecked. To date, the United States and other countries have taken only limited measures to mitigate this threat. In the short-term, China has already shown an ability and willingness to weaponize its dominant position in critical minerals supply chains, including export restrictions on gallium, germanium, and rare earth magnets in 2023–2025.
  • China dominates the supply of APIs and other key starting materials (KSMs)—all of which are essential for U.S. drug supply chains. If Beijing actively restricts U.S. access to these materials, the consequences could be catastrophic for U.S. health security, the broader economy, and potentially military readiness.
  • China controls roughly half of global production of PCBs, the essential building blocks of virtually all electronic devices on which integrated circuits and other components are mounted. The United States has lost much of its domestic capacity to produce PCBs and has become heavily reliant on Chinese imports. Losing access to this supply of Chinese PCBs would likely shut down U.S. electronics manufacturing across multiple sectors, including those related to defense, aviation, and critical infrastructure.
  • China’s coming production surge in foundational semiconductors will pose a serious economic and security threat to the United States and other major semiconductor-producing economies. Foundational semiconductors are workhorse components that, while less advanced than leading-edge chips, are critical to the functionality of most electronic devices. Overcapacity in this sector could drive other producers out of business and make the world heavily reliant on Chinese producers for components that form the backbone of both the modern economy and a modern military.
  • Because supply chain vulnerabilities can take years to unwind, it is critical for the United States to immediately develop a more effective risk-mapping tool that identifies where Chinese leverage currently exists as well as the sectors where Beijing’s leverage will likely grow in the future. In order to eliminate such critical dependencies and avoid them in the future, the United States must formulate and commit to a long-term strategy of supply chain de-risking—requiring close cooperation with allies and partners—to achieve the conditions necessary for greater safety and resiliency.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — June 5, 2025
Dominance by Design: China Shock 2.0 and the Supply Chain Chokepoints Eroding U.S. Security
Previous chapter8. China Shock 2.0Next chapter10. Power Surge: China’s Electrification Drive and Push for Global Energy Dominance

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