Skip to main content
Home U.S.- CHINA | ECONOMIC and SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

U.S.-China Economic AND Security Review Commission

  • About Us
    hearings navigation
    About the Commission

    The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is a legislative branch commission created by the United States Congress in October 2000 with the legislative mandate to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.

    About the Commission
    • Charter
    • Commission Members
    • Commission Staff
    • Job Opportunities
    • Contact Us
  • Annual Reports
  • Recommendations
  • Hearings
  • Research
    research navigation menu drop down
    Research

    The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is chartered to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The Commission meets its research mission by submitting to Congress an Annual Report, as well as by conducting staff-led reports, contracted research, and more.

    View All Research
    • Censorship and Control RESEARCH BY TOPIC
    • China’s Economy and Resources
    • Compliance with International Rules and Norms
    • Finance and Investment
    • Global Relations and Influence
    • Hong Kong
    • Product Safety
    • Science and Technology
    • Security and Defense
    • Taiwan
    • Trade and Supply Chains
    • Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges FEATURED RESEARCH
    • PRC in International Organizations
    • China-Ukraine Timeline
    • China-Iran Timeline
    • China 201
    • AI Technology Stack Glossary
  • Press
    • Appearances
    • Press Releases
    • All Announcements

Search

Chapter 7: The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space

2025 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress
  • The Year in Review
  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)
  • Efforts to Remake the World Order
  • 3. Axis of Autocracy: China’s Revisionist Ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea
  • 4. Crossroads of Competition: China and Southeast Asia
  • 5. Small Islands, Big Stakes: China’s Playbook in the Pacific Islands
  • Competition in Contested Frontiers
  • 6. Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation Engine
  • 7. The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space
  • Exposure to China’s Economic Distortions and Coercion
  • 8. China Shock 2.0
  • 9. Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains
  • 10. Power Surge: China’s Electrification Drive and Push for Global Energy Dominance
  • Taiwan and Hong Kong
  • 11. Taiwan
  • 12. Hong Kong
Download Chapter 7

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

China has embarked on a whole-of-government strategy to become the world’s preeminent space power. Beijing views space as a warfighting domain and it seeks to achieve space superiority as a cornerstone of its broader effort to establish information dominance—a prerequisite to controlling the battlespace and gaining operational advantage in future conflicts. To this end, China has rapidly developed, deployed, and operationalized advanced capabilities in space launch, satellites, and ground-based infrastructure spanning its civil, military, and commercial sectors. These advancements are closing the gap in the strategic competition between the United States and China in space.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly expanding its space- and ground-based assets to enhance its battlespace awareness, operational coordination, and capacity for force projection. These capabilities improve China’s ability to monitor, target, and challenge U.S. and allied forces across the Indo-Pacific. Over the past decade, China has launched more than 1,000 satellites, dramatically increasing its capacity for persistent surveillance, communications, and precision targeting in support of long-range strike systems. The PLA has also fielded both ground- and space-based counterspace capabilities designed to deter U.S. military action or, in the event of a conflict, degrade U.S. space-enabled operations and power projection. However, as Beijing has expanded its military space capabilities, it has also deepened its own dependency on space assets, potentially creating vulnerabilities of its own. Like any spacefaring nation, this dependency exposes China to counterspace threats that could disrupt its command and control (C2), precision strike, and situational awareness capabilities in a conflict.

Globally, China has harnessed its ambitious space program to deepen relations with developing countries and expand its space architecture in support of military, commercial, and broader strategic gains. China’s rapid progress in establishing a private, though state-directed, commercial space ecosystem in just a decade poses a formidable technological, economic, and geostrategic challenge to the United States. Employing state-led industrial policy and drawing on its vast network of state-owned enterprises in aerospace and defense, China has quickly cultivated a dynamic startup sector focused on seeking to rival U.S. firms in commercial launch and satellite networks. With a growing list of civil space achievements, China is aggressively positioning itself as a global leader in space technology and exploration. It is now seeking to reshape international space governance, influence the development of technical standards, and displace the United States as the world’s premier space power.

Key Findings

  • China is pursuing an aggressive long-term, whole-of-government campaign to expand its space capabilities across military, commercial, and civil domains with the explicit intent of surpassing the United States. These rapid advances in space pose an escalating threat to U.S. national security, intensify U.S.-China strategic competition for international partnerships, and undermine the ability of U.S. commercial firms to compete internationally.
  • China views space as a warfighting domain and has invested heavily in weapons and technologies that can degrade, damage, or destroy the U.S. satellites that provide the backbone of the U.S. military’s C2 network as well as its targeting system. By seeking to deprive the U.S. military of the use of space-based assets, the PLA aims to deny the United States the ability to employ its advanced military systems, eroding the foundations of U.S. power projection and joint operations.
  • Over the past ten years, China has launched a wide variety of satellites on an aggressive schedule, fielding a growing array of space-based capabilities that has strengthened its ability to coordinate its own operations as well as to conduct the persistent surveillance and targeting of U.S. forces. This effort is part of China’s broader strategy to achieve space superiority and strengthen its ability to use long-range precision weaponry to target and disrupt the flow of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific.
  • China is actively leveraging its space capabilities as strategic tools to expand its geopolitical influence. Through offering other countries the use of its satellite networks, launch services, and space infrastructure, China enhances the resilience and global coverage of its space architecture. At the same time, it draws partner nations more deeply into its technological ecosystem, creating long term strategic and economic dependencies on Chinese technology.
  • China’s military-civil fusion strategy erases the line between military and civilian space activities, enabling systems and technologies such as satellites, robotic arms, and launch systems to serve both commercial ends and PLA objectives. The dual-use nature of these systems—compounded by blurry lines between state-owned enterprises and nominally private firms— makes it difficult to distinguish commercial innovation from military capability.
  • In just ten years, China has dramatically transformed an almost non-existent commercial space sector into a thriving, state-orchestrated startup ecosystem. Fueled by strong government backing and industrial prowess, Beijing is now seeking to cultivate national champions that will challenge U.S. space companies on the global stage at a fraction of the cost. This strategy does not just seek innovation and commercial advancement—it seeks to reshape the competitive balance in what will be the most strategic domain of the 21st century.
  • China has achieved major civil space milestones, such as the Chang’e-6 mission returning the first samples from the Moon’s far side. These “global firsts” are much more than just about science; Beijing uses them to assert technological leadership to reshape global perceptions of power. The competition now extends beyond symbolic milestones to a contest over who will define the rules, infrastructure, and norms governing space. If the United States cedes leadership, China is poised to advance a state-driven, opaque governance model that could embed long-term global reliance on its systems and standards.
  • Losing U.S. leadership in space would amount to relinquishing the advantage first secured during the original space race. China seeks to use its rapid advancements in space to position the country as a technological powerhouse and undermine U.S. prestige and economic competitiveness. Falling behind in space would not only diminish U.S. standing, it would threaten U.S. national security, global influence, technological dominance, and commercial competitiveness in the growing space economy.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — April 3, 2025
The Rocket’s Red Glare: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space
Previous chapter6. Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation EngineNext chapter8. China Shock 2.0

U.S.-CHINA

U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission

444 North Capitol Street NW, Suite 602
Washington, DC 20001

202-624-1407linkedintwitterInstagramYouTube

Footer menu

  • Contact Us
  • Privacy
  • Accessibility