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Chapter 6: Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation Engine

2025 Annual Report

  • Report Overview
  • Recommendations to Congress
  • The Year in Review
  • 1. U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations (Year in Review)
  • 2. U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs (Year in Review)
  • Efforts to Remake the World Order
  • 3. Axis of Autocracy: China’s Revisionist Ambitions with Russia, Iran, and North Korea
  • 4. Crossroads of Competition: China and Southeast Asia
  • 5. Small Islands, Big Stakes: China’s Playbook in the Pacific Islands
  • Competition in Contested Frontiers
  • 6. Interlocking Innovation Flywheels: China’s Manufacturing and Innovation Engine
  • 7. The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space
  • Exposure to China’s Economic Distortions and Coercion
  • 8. China Shock 2.0
  • 9. Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains
  • 10. Power Surge: China’s Electrification Drive and Push for Global Energy Dominance
  • Taiwan and Hong Kong
  • 11. Taiwan
  • 12. Hong Kong
Download Chapter 6

On this page: Executive Summary|Key Findings|Related Hearings and Research

Executive Summary

In the decade since launching Made in China 2025 (MIC2025), the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) industrial, science, and innovation policies have multiplied and expanded in scope. China deploys an arsenal of tools to execute these policies and affect its capacity to develop and produce advanced technology. The evidence shows that comprehensive strategic planning, massive state funding, and adaptive implementation have allowed China to overcome previous industrial policy failures. As roads and bridges act as public goods benefiting the entire state, China’s policies have constructed an “industrial commons”—a collective resource base Chinese firms can exploit to advance technological capabilities. This industrial commons positions China to develop and support firms that will dominate established markets and control emerging sectors.

Numerous industrial policy successes demonstrate the strength of China’s industrial commons and how advances in overlapping industries catalyzed innovation in other technologies or products. China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry was built on a range of preexisting capabilities, including lithium batteries for consumer electronics and a large automobile manufacturing sector. In turn, EVs served as a platform that helped drive innovation in directly related sectors, like battery technology, and in related capabilities, like LiDAR used in autonomous systems. Similarly, China’s capabilities in industrial robotics are supporting the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled factory production models, promising scalable gains across the manufacturing sector. In synthetic biology, China’s sophisticated laboratory infrastructure and growing biotech manufacturing base are positioning it to become a leader in commercializing global scientific discoveries from pharmaceutical to non-pharmaceutical applications, with state-backed facilities enabling rapid translation from research to production at scale.

Key Findings

  • Chinese industrial policy has established the landscape for becoming an advanced manufacturing and innovation powerhouse. By conducting industrial policy on an unprecedented scale, China now leads global innovation in many targeted sectors and has built a manufacturing base that is integrated into many legacy and advanced technology supply chains.
  • China’s industrial policy systematically constructs clusters of interconnected manufacturing capabilities while securing control over foundational technologies. Innovation follows manufacturing, and China is leveraging this approach to generate “interlocking innovation flywheels”—technical advances in one sector rapidly catalyze breakthroughs in adjacent sectors, creating compounding technological advantages that accelerate with each cycle.
  • Through MIC2025 and related policies, China has secured dominance in much of the legacy and advanced componentry for today’s most prevalent consumer and enterprise technology products. Given that key innovations often happen on the factory floor, China’s current dominance gives it a significant leg up in terms of future cycles of iteration and innovation as well as a source of essential components for new technologies.
  • China’s industrial policy and Party-state control have also positioned it to attain first-mover advantage in technologies of the future, like synthetic biology, quantum technologies, and automation (including humanoid robots). Where the key sectors in MIC2025 mostly reflect mature markets in which China seeks to displace incumbents, becoming the first mover in emerging and nascent technologies would position China to set the future rules of the road.
  • Rapid growth in targeted industries has not offset weakness in the broader economy, producing a two-speed economy in which prioritized high-tech sectors contrast with lagging sectors beset by structural economic challenges. All indications suggest General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping will prioritize China’s technology ambitions over other policy goals. He believes developing and moving into new technologies can strengthen China’s competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States and other prospective competitors. China’s expenditure on industrial policy has had a cumulative impact that will continue to drive advances in research and development (R&D) and manufacturing capabilities, meaning that momentum in the high-speed economy will likely continue to grow.
  • Overinvestment and overcapacity resulting from China’s industrial policies have consistently led to large economic distortions across the value chain for targeted sectors. These distortions often threaten U.S. producers and developing economies attempting to move up the value chain. They also create an environment of intense competition within China as firms compete for market share in artificially expanded markets, forcing firms to increase efficiency, reduce production costs, and repeatedly cut sales prices to stay ahead of rivals. The firms that survive this process, like EV maker BYD, are then typically highly competitive in global markets.
  • In the early stages of these product cycles, and often beyond, China’s approach is divorced from market principles, and its success largely stems from using subsidies, state coordination, and other nonmarket practices to undercut competitors in foreign markets.

Read the full chapter (PDF)

Related Hearings and Research

Hearing — February 6, 2025
Made in China 2025—Who Is Winning?
Research — November 18, 2025
Vying for Quantum Supremacy: U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Technologies
Research — November 14, 2025
Made in China 2025: Evaluating China’s Performance
Previous chapter5. Small Islands, Big Stakes: China’s Playbook in the Pacific IslandsNext chapter7. The Final Frontier: China’s Ambitions to Dominate Space

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