Highlights
- China Strongly Condemns U.S. Actions in Venezuela
- Beijing Frames Large-Scale Military Exercises around Taiwan as a "Resolute Response" to Recent U.S. Arms Sales
- China Reiterates Plans to Drive Demand by Boosting Investment
- China Leads a Joint Naval Exercise with Many BRICS Plus Countries
- China Uses Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods to Attempt to Coerce Japan
China Strongly Condemns U.S. Actions in Venezuela
Venezuela is one of China’s closest partners in Latin America, but assistance following the ouster of Maduro will likely remain rhetorical.
- China has made statements and shown support for Venezuela since the United States started ratcheting up pressure on the Maduro regime in August 2025.[1] As part of that effort, China sent a delegation of senior diplomats to Venezuela, who met with Maduro just hours before his capture.[2]
- China immediately denounced the January 3rd U.S. raid in Venezuela, and its UN representative stated at an emergency UN Security Council meeting that “China was deeply shocked by and strongly condemns the unilateral, illegal, and bullying acts by the United States.”[3] China’s rhetorical focus on violations of international law and global opinion indicate China is leveraging the U.S. action to continue its efforts to frame the United States as a threat to global security.[4]
- The ouster of Maduro’s government would represent a blow to Chinese interests in Latin America. Venezuela is one of China’s closest partners in the region, in 2023 becoming one of only seven countries in an “all-weather” partnership with China, its highest designation for such a relationship.[5] Venezuela is the largest purchaser of Chinese military equipment in the region and has procured missiles, armored vehicles, and air defense radar systems.[6] China has also constructed and may have the ability to remotely access two satellite tracking stations within Venezuela.[7]
- Beijing has been one of Venezuela’s closest economic partners for two decades. Chinese policy banks loaned more to Venezuela than to any other Latin American country; at least $10 billion in Chinese bank loans is outstanding.[8] China also purchases most of Venezuela’s oil despite U.S. sanctions.[9]Despite these ties, disruptions of crude oil imports from Venezuela will have limited impact on Beijing because they account for only 4 to 4.5 percent of China’s seaborne imports, and similar blends of crude can be sourced from countries like Canada, Iran, and Iraq, albeit at higher prices.[10]
- For more on China’s ties to Venezuela, see Joseph Federici, Nicole Morgret, Benton Gordon, and Graham Ayres, “China-Venezuela Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 13, 2026.
Beijing Frames Large-Scale Military Exercises around Taiwan as a “Resolute Response” to Recent U.S. Arms Sales
China’s Justice Mission-2025 military exercises rehearsed blockading Taiwan and denying access to U.S. forces during a Taiwan contingency.
- On December 29–30, 2025, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted Justice Mission 2025 joint military exercises encircling Taiwan.[11]During the exercises, the PLA fired 27 rockets into waters to the north and southwest of Taiwan, ten of which landed inside Taiwan’s 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone—the closest PLA rockets have come to Taiwan since at least 1996.[12] The exercises demonstrated the PLA’s anti-access/area denial capabilities and ability to target U.S. forces during a potential Taiwan contingency.[13]
- Beijing framed the exercises as a “resolute response” to the United States’ announcement of an $11 billion package of arms sales to Taiwan on December 17, though exercises of such scale typically involve months of advance planning.[14] During the drills, the China Coast Guard (CCG) released a poster depicting a CCG vessel intercepting a cargo ship carrying HIMARS rocket launchers to Taiwan.[15] Chinese state media asserted that the poster sent a message that China could potentially intercept deliveries of U.S. weapons to Taiwan as a “law enforcement” measure.[16]
- China’s most recent military exercises are part of a broader pattern of escalating gray zone pressure targeting Taiwan, which is discussed in the Commission’s 2025 Annual Report to Congress.[17]
- Another example of that escalating pressure (see figure) is the exponential increase in PLA incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ)—from only 20 in 2019 to 3,764 in 2025 (an increase of more than 18,700 percent).[18]
Figure: PLA Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, 2019–2025
Source: Various.[19]
China Reiterates Plans to Drive Demand by Boosting Investment
China’s gameplan for economic growth will likely compound global trade tensions in 2026.
- China named as its number one economic priority for 2026 efforts to drive domestic demand and build strong domestic markets, but it pledged familiar, ineffective methods to do so.[20] As a result, China is likely to fall back on investment and manufacturing exports to maintain annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth at around 5 percent.[21] With China’s domestic demand weak, global trade imbalances will likely continue to rise in 2026.
- The readout from China’s 2025 annual December Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC), which sets the country’s economic priorities for the upcoming year, highlighted the problematic imbalance between “strong domestic supply and weak demand” without providing convincing remedies.[22] China’s National Development and Reform Commission allocated only $9 billion (0.2 percent of first quarter 2025 GDP) to local governments to provide subsidies for consumer goods trade-in programs in early 2026.[23] While the programs may provide a temporary boost to retail spending numbers, China pursued a similar policy in 2025—with more resources—to basically negligible effect on total domestic consumption’s share of GDP.[24] Despite continuing lip service, China is still not serious about boosting consumption.
- With low domestic consumption, China is even more reliant on exports to maintain growth, driving global trade imbalances. China’s trade surplus exceeded $1 trillion in 2025.[25] Net exports contributed 29 percent of GDP growth in the first three quarters in official statistics, while alternative growth estimates by research consultancy Rhodium Group indicate that over half of GDP growth came from trade.[26]
- With consumption-focused initiatives sputtering, economic growth in 2026 will likely rely on trade. Even if trade tensions mount over the next year, they are unlikely to significantly slow China’s economy. The muted impact of tariffs on Chinese economic growth in 2025 led the International Monetary Fund to lift its forecast for China’s economy, which it projects to grow by 4.5 percent in 2026.[27] Barring an unanticipated shift in approach within the 15th Five-Year Plan that will be released this March, a sustained reorientation of China’s economic model toward domestic demand-driven growth is unlikely.[28]
China Leads a Joint Naval Exercise with Many BRICS Plus Countries
The Will for Peace 2026 naval exercise illustrates China’s continuing efforts to deepen its security partnerships with middle power countries under the BRICS Plus framework.
- From January 9 to 16, China is leading a number of BRICS Plus countries in a joint multinational naval exercise called Will for Peace 2026.[*][29]BRICS formed in 2009 to coordinate economic policies among member states to counter Western-led global institutions.[30] South African officials are reported to have invited all BRICS Plus member countries, potentially signaling a willingness to expand cooperation among some member countries beyond economic and diplomatic coordination into the security and military domain.[31]
- The exercise is taking place in South African waters and will focus on “joint actions to ensure the safety of shipping and maritime economic activities,” including joint maritime safety operations and interoperability drills.[32] China, Russia, and South Africa are official participants, with media reporting that Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, and Ethiopia sent observers.[33] Initial reports stated that Iran would join the exercise, and Iranian ships were seen entering the same harbor in South Africa used by participant countries, but later reporting indicated that Iran withdrew from the exercise.[†] [34]
- China’s state-run Global Times sought to downplay BRICS Plus as an emergent military bloc and framed the exercise as one that addresses non-traditional security issues such as antipiracy and counterterrorism that threaten maritime economic activities in the region.[35] The PLA Navy (PLAN) has maintained a steady presence in African waters, conducting port calls since 2010 and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008.[36] Two vessels from the PLAN’s naval escort taskforce deployed to the Gulf of Aden are assigned to participate in the exercise.[37]
China Uses Export Controls on Dual-Use Goods to Attempt to Coerce Japan
In an escalation of China’s pressure campaign against Japan for its public recognition that an attack on Taiwan could constitute a threat to Japan’s security, China banned a potentially broad swath of exports to Japan on January 6.[38]
- In announcing the controls, Beijing explicitly linked them to remarks Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made in November 2025 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could become a “survival-threatening situation” to Japan.[39] The move is the latest in a string of measures by China to intimidate Japan, including military exercises, warnings against tourist travel, and bans on Japanese seafood, but prior actions were justified on pretextual grounds rather than as reactions to Takaichi’s statement.[40]
- Beijing withheld specifics on how it would enforce the ban on exports of dual-use items, although China’s Ministry of Commerce later clarified that it would only affect military firms and not civilian end-users.[41] If the controls are widely applied, it could restrict Japan’s access to a range of critical inputs, particularly critical minerals and rare earths.[‡] By one estimate, 42 percent of Japan’s imports from China consisted of dual-use items in 2024, amounting to $68.4 billion.[42] The export control notice was followed by the launch of an antidumping probe into Japanese dichlorosilane, a material used in semiconductor fabrication.[43]
- It remains unclear which items would be covered by the controls. The Wall Street Journal reported that China has already started restricting some exports of heavy rare earth and related magnets.[44] However, state-run China Daily had published an article days earlier stating that Chinese officials were only considering strengthening controls on rare-earth exports.[45] While Japan has diversified its rare earth supply chains since 2010 when China blocked all rare earth exports to Japan for two months, it continues to import between 60 and 70 percent from China.[46]
- The ambiguity of the policy also provides Beijing future options to selectively ramp up enforcement and intensify pressure on Japan’s economy. Over the past year, Beijing has shown increasing willingness to utilize its export control legal regime to advance geopolitical aims rather than address genuine national security concerns.[§]
This issue of the China Bulletin was prepared by Daniel Blaugher, Rachael Burton, Joseph Federici, Benton Gordon, Zoe Merewether, Nicole Morgret, and Jack Neubauer. You may reach us at contact@uscc.gov.
Disclaimer: This bulletin is the product of research performed by professional staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) and was prepared to support the ongoing research and deliberations of the Commission. Posting of this bulletin to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater awareness and understanding of developing issues for Congressional staff and the public, in support of the Commission’s efforts to “monitor, investigate, and report” on U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. national security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 (as subsequently modified in law, see uscc.gov/charter). The public release of this document does not imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or considerations raised in this staff-prepared bulletin.
Footnotes
[*] Original BRICS members included Brazil, China, Russia, and India, with the incorporation of South Africa in 2010. Since 2024, BRICS has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates as new members, and is now often referred to as "BRICS Plus.” BRICS partner countries include Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Stewart Patrick et al., “BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en; “Nine Nations Announced as BRICS ‘Partner Countries’,” BRICS Brasil, January 17, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260109193706/https://brics.br/en/news/nine-nations-announced-as-brics-partner-countries.
[†] The United Arab Emirates Navy is also present in South Africa, but reportedly not participating in the exercise itself. Dean Wingrin, “BRICS Plus Navies Commence Exercise off South African Coast Amid Controversy,” Defense Web, January 12, 2026. https://defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/brics-plus-navies-commence-exercise-off-south-african-coast-amid-controversy/.
[‡] China’s dual-use control list extends well beyond critical minerals. The 2026 catalogue of dual-use technology subject to export license requirements listed 846 items, up from 765 in 2025. China’s Ministry of Commerce, 商务部 海关总署公布2026年度《两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录》 [MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs Announce the 2026 Catalogue for the Administration of Import and Export Licenses for Dual-Use Items and Technologies], December 31, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251231160115/https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_c03d1e511b2b486e829d68e8f1422aff.html; China’s Ministry of Commerce, 中华人民共和国商务部 中华人民共和国海关总署公告2024年第67号 [China’s Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs Announcement 2024 No. 67], December 31, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20250522170027/https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zgdwjjmywg/art/2025/art_1be240170c1f417b87f3dcca9587f89c.html.
[§] For further discussion of how Beijing is wielding its export control regime, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 9, “Chained to China: Beijing’s Weaponization of Supply Chains,” in 2025 Annual Report to Congress, November 2025, 472–536. https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2025-annual-report-congress.
Endnotes
[1] James T. Areddy, “Maduro’s Capture Threatens China’s Ambitions in Latin America,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/maduros-capture-threatens-chinas-ambitions-in-latin-america-09ada754;Shi Yuanhao, “International Community Strongly Criticizes the United States for Interfering in Latin American Affairs,” People’s Daily, December 31, 2025. (国际社会强烈批评美国干涉拉美事务) https://web.archive.org/web/20260103123751/https://world.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1231/c1002-40636166.html; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on December 22, 2025, December 22, 2025. https://www.mfa.gov[dot]cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202512/t20251222_11780748.html; Mark Cancian and Chris Park, “Trump’s Caribbean Campaign: The Data behind Operation Southern Spear,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 10, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-caribbean-campaign-data-behind-developing-conflict.
[2] James T. Areddy, “Maduro’s Capture Threatens China’s Ambitions in Latin America,” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/maduros-capture-threatens-chinas-ambitions-in-latin-america-09ada754.
[3] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Remarks on Venezuela by Ambassador Sun Lei, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, at the UN Security Council Emergency Meeting, January 5, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260105194046/https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202601/t20260106_11806819.htm; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the U.S. Military Strikes on Venezuela, January 3, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260103162501/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202601/t20260103_11797170.html.
[4] Xinyi Wu, “What Assets Does China Have in Venezuela, and What Could Happen with Maduro Gone?” South China Morning Post, January 5, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3338807/what-assets-does-china-have-venezuela-and-what-could-happen-maduro-gone.
[5] Jacob Mardell, “PRC Partnership Diplomacy in the New Era,” Jamestown Foundation, September 20, 2024. https://jamestown.org/prc-partnership-diplomacy-in-the-new-era/#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%2042%20unique,now%20Africa%20as%20a%20whole; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on Establishing an All-Weather Strategic Partnership, September 14, 2023. (中华人民共和国和委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国关于建立全天候战略伙伴关系的联合声明) https://web.archive.org/web/20260107192625/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202309/t20230914_11142477.shtml.
[6] Micah McCartney, “China-Made Military Radars Nay Have Failed Venezuela during US Raid,” Newsweek, January 7, 2026. https://www.newsweek.com/china-made-military-radars-may-have-failed-venezuela-during-us-raid-11308099; Diana Roy, “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Arms Transfer Database.” https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferData/transferResults?logic=on.
[7] Ling Xin, “China’s Sensitive Technology at Risk after Trump Abducts Venezuelan Leader Maduro,” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3338844/chinas-sensitive-technology-risk-after-trump-abducts-venezuela-leader-maduro; Xinyi Wu, “What Assets Does China Have in Venezuela, and What Could Happen with Maduro Gone?” South China Morning Post, January 5, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3338807/what-assets-does-china-have-venezuela-and-what-could-happen-maduro-gone; R. Evan Ellis, “China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Update,” Diplomat, February 16, 2024. https://revanellis.com/china-latin-america-space-cooperation-an-update.
[8] Inter-American Dialogue and Boston University Global Development Policy Center, “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database,” accessed January 7, 2026. https://thedialogue.org/china-latin-america-finance-databases; Ryan McMorrow and Joe Leahy, “China’s Influence in US Backyard Tested by Nicolás Maduro’s Downfall,” Financial Times, January 5, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/9d53fc43-6352-4ee5-891e-c067d00305ba; “What Trump’s Ousting of Venezuela’s Maduro Means for China,” Bloomberg, January 5, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-05/china-what-ousting-of-venezuela-s-maduro-means-for-taiwan-oil-imports.
[9] Shotaro Tani, “Venezuelan Oil and China: 4 Things to Know,” Nikkei Asia, January 6, 2026. https://asia.nikkei.com/business/energy/venezuelan-oil-and-china-4-things-to-know.
[10] Joe Leahy and Malcolm Moore, “Donald Trump’s Venezuela Action Raises Threat for China’s Oil Supplies,” Financial Times, January 8, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/f64826fa-5c36-4fb3-8621-ee0b9d9a1ff5; Siyi Liu and Florence Tan, “Chinese Refiners Expected to Replace Venezuelan Oil with Iranian Crude, Traders Say,” Reuters, January 7, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinese-refiners-expected-replace-venezuelan-oil-with-iranian-crude-traders-say-2026-01-07; Lewis Jackson and Sam Li, “China’s Oil Investments in Venezuela,” Reuters, January 5, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-oil-investments-venezuela-2026-01-05; Muyu Xu, “US Pressure Clouds Venezuelan Crude Exports to China, but Spot Supply Remains Ample,” Kpler, December 16, 2025. https://www.kpler.com/blog/us-pressure-clouds-venezuelan-crude-exports-to-china-but-spot-supply-remains-ample.
[11] John Dotson, “The PLA’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ Exercise around Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Institute, January 2, 2026. https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/01/pla-justice-mission-2025/.
[12] “共軍實彈射擊 最靠近台灣的一次” [PLA Live Fire Exercises—Closest to Taiwan], United Daily News, December 31, 2025. https://udn.com/news/story/124693/9235882; Joseph Yeh, “PLA Rockets Land inside Taiwan’s 24 Nautical Mile Contiguous Zone: MND,” Focus Taiwan, December 30, 2025. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202512300025.
[13] Joyu Wang, “Five Takeaways from China’s Military Drills around Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/five-takeaways-from-chinas-military-drills-around-taiwan-47c64aee; Shan Shuang, “单双：解放军围岛军演释放三大信号” [Shan Shuang: PLA Exercises Encircling Taiwan Send Three Main Signals], Global Times, December 30, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260107212742/https://m.huanqiu.com/article/4PkJAjDrSFe.
[14] John Dotson, “The PLA’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ Exercise around Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Institute, January 2, 2026. https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/01/pla-justice-mission-2025/; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2025年12月29日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Lin Jian Holds Regular Press Conference on December 29, 2025], December 29, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260107134750/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202512/t20251229_11789718.shtml.
[15] Fan Wei, Chen He, and Liu Xuanzun, “CCG, GT jointly release poster 'Throat-choking'; HIMARS-carrying cargo ship depicted intercepted off Taiwan island,” Global Times, December 30, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260103162317/https:/www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351854.shtml.
[16] Fan Wei, Chen He, and Liu Xuanzun, “CCG, GT jointly release poster 'Throat-choking'; HIMARS-carrying cargo ship depicted intercepted off Taiwan island,” Global Times, December 30, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260103162317/https:/www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351854.shtml.
[17] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2025 Annual Report to Congress, November 2025, 603–616.
[18] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2024 Annual Report to Congress, November 2024, 629; Gerald C. Brown and Ben Lewis, “Taiwan ADIZ Violations Database,” PLA Tracker, accessed January 9, 2026.
[19] U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2024 Annual Report to Congress, November 2024, 629; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2025 Annual Report to Congress, November 2025, 603; Gerald C. Brown and Ben Lewis, “Taiwan ADIZ Violations Database,” PLA Tracker, accessed January 9, 2026.
[20] “中央经济工作会议在北京举行 习近平发表重要讲话” [Xi Jinping Gives an Important Speech at the Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing], Xinhua, December 11, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251211100530/http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20251211/a583f835702d4dc2b8990ddee4644e92/c.html.
[21] Liz Lee and Yukun Zhang, “China’s Xi Promises More Proactive Macro Policies in 2026,” Reuters, December 31, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-will-push-more-proactive-macro-policies-2026-xi-says-2025-12-31/; “China Likely to Chase 5% GDP Growth in 2026 in Bid to End Deflation,” Reuters, December 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-likely-chase-5-gdp-growth-2026-bid-end-deflation-2025-12-03/.
[22] “中央经济工作会议在北京举行 习近平发表重要讲话” [Xi Jinping Gives an Important Speech at the Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing], Xinhua, December 11, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20251211100530/http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20251211/a583f835702d4dc2b8990ddee4644e92/c.html.
[23] China General Administration of Customs, “Total Gross Domestic Product,” via Haver Analytics; He Huifeng, “China Rolls Out Trade-In Funding for 2026 as Campaign to Spur Spending Continues,” South China Morning Post, December 31, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/economy/policy/article/3338298/china-rolls-out-trade-funding-2026-campaign-spur-spending-continues; “China Allocates Initial $8.9 Billion for Consumer Goods Trade-In Scheme in 2026,” Reuters, December 30, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-allocates-89-billion-fund-2026-consumer-goods-trade-in-scheme-2025-12-30/; “China Unveils $51 Billion in Early Spending to Support Economy,” Bloomberg, December 30, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-30/china-unveils-initial-9-billion-in-consumer-subsidies-for-2026.
[24] Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Jianwei Xu, “The Chinese Economy: Stimulus without Rebalancing,” Bruegel, August 26, 2025. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/chinese-economy-stimulus-without-rebalancing.
[25] China General Administration of Customs, “Imports, Exports,” via Haver Analytics.
[26] China National Bureau of Statistics, “China: Share of GDP Growth Rate: Net Exports of Goods & Services,” via Haver Analytics; Daniel H. Rosen et al., "China's Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026," Rhodium Group, December 19, 2025, 6. https://rhg.com/research/chinas-economy-rightsizing-2025-looking-ahead-to-2026/.
[27] Joe Leahy, “IMF Calls on China to Fix Economic Imbalances,” Financial Times, December 9, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/9c92aa4b-8018-4ffc-adcd-5c32b8c3f643.
[28] Lizzi C. Lee and Jing Qian, “China’s Next Move: Economic Priorities and Policy Shifts for 2026,” Asia Society, December 5, 2025. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-next-move-economic-priorities-and-policy-shifts-2026#key-contradictions-and-structural-tensions--22626; “China’s Perspective on the Trade Ceasefire + 15th Five-Year Plan Breakdown,” Trivium China, November 1, 2025. https://triviumchina.com/2025/11/01/podcast-chinas-perspective-on-the-trade-ceasefire-15th-five-year-plan-breakdown/.
[29] South Africa National Defence Force, “Exercise Will For Peace 2026 Opens with Official Parade,” Instagram, January 10, 2026. https://www.instagram.com/p/DTVzWg5Dqfr/; Jevans Nyabiage, “China to Lead Joint Naval Drills with Brics Nations in South African Water,” South China Morning Post, January 3, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3338479/china-lead-joint-naval-drills-brics-nations-south-african-waters.
[30] Mariel Ferragamo, “What is the BRICS Group and Why is it Expanding?” Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding.
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