Hearings
In his report to the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that China would complete the modernization of its armed forces by 2035 and transform them into “world-class forces” by the middle of the 21st century. Xi’s vision for the composition and mix of capabilities that would allow the People’s Liberation Army to be judged to be a “world-class” military is unknown. Will it be a force with global expeditionary capability, mimicking the United States, or an overwhelming regional force reminiscent of Imperial Japan in 1941? Or, as the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, could it be both? This hearing will explore what the implications of a world-class Chinese military might be for the United States and its allies and partners, with the goal to begin a public dialogue on this topic and develop recommendations for Congress on how the United States might best protect its interests in the face of a highly-capable Chinese competitor.
Hearings
This hearing will examine China’s development of artificial intelligence, new materials, and energy storage, renewable energy, and nuclear power. It will assess China’s capabilities in producing and commercializing these technologies vis-à-vis the United States and its ambitions to export these technologies and shape their global governance in ways that disadvantage the United States. The hearing will also consider China’s potential military application of these technologies and strategic implications for the United States.
Research
In 2018, China reported several cases of African swine fever, or ASF, a highly contagious disease that is deadly to pigs. The disease has now spread throughout China, where it has already reduced the country’s hog population by more than 50 million, and throughout other countries in Asia. This report provides an overview of the ASF outbreak in China, the implications for U.S. exports of pork and animal feed products, and the risks posed to U.S. food safety and food security.
Research
In April 2019, the Hong Kong government formally proposed an extradition bill that would—if passed into law—increase the territory’s susceptibility to Beijing’s political coercion and further erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. The bill, which followed a minimal public comment period and could face a final vote before July 2019, would amend Hong Kong’s laws to allow ad hoc extraditions to mainland China and over 100 countries and territories without mutual extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. In addition to further intruding into Hong Kong’s affairs, the proposed bill could create serious risks for U.S. national security and economic interests in Hong Kong, and potentially violate several key provisions of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which outlines U.S. policy toward the territory. This issue brief provides background on the bill and observers’ concerns with the proposal, risks posed to U.S. interests in Hong Kong, and considerations for Congress.
Research
Chinese companies utilize a variety of methods—many of them covert or coercive—to acquire valuable technology, intellectual property (IP), and knowhow from U.S. firms. These efforts are often made at the direction of and with assistance from the Chinese government, part of Beijing’s larger effort to develop its domestic market and become a global leader in a wide range of technologies. These acquisition attempts frequently target advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and virtual reality, which are still in the early stages of development but could provide dual military and civilian capabilities in the future.
This report explores six methods used by Chinese companies to acquire U.S. technology and IP, including (1) foreign direct investment, (2) venture capital investment, (3) joint ventures, (4) licensing agreements, (5) cyber espionage, and (6) talent acquisition programs. It then examines the effectiveness of existing U.S. regulations to assess and address the risks of increased technology transfers to China.
Hearings
This hearing will examine the implications for the United States of a commercial, scientific, diplomatic, and military strategic competition with China. The hearing will begin with two individual panels comprising a strategic planning perspective on competition with China in space and a current Administration official’s assessment of the balance of power in space and China’s current space-based surveillance capabilities, respectively. The first full panel will examine China’s pursuit of global space leadership, focusing on China’s international space partnerships, its views on international law in space, and its exploration ambitions. The second panel will address the role of military-civil fusion in China’s space ambitions, including the role of military-civil fusion in context of China’s national space goals, U.S. competition with Chinese companies in the international satellite industry, and the adequacy of U.S. export controls. Finally, the third panel will examine China’s military space activities, focusing on its national military space goals and doctrine, its military space and counterspace capabilities, and the intersection of cyber and space in China’s strategy and operations.
Research
China seeks to become an international leader in space, or what it terms a “space power in all respects.” In this role, Beijing aspires to lead international space-related innovation and exploration and establish an advanced system of infrastructure to serve its space sector. China has suffered some setbacks on projects crucial for the progression of program milestones, such as its heavy-lift launch vehicle program, and still lags behind the United States in its human spaceflight and space station program. Nevertheless, China’s space program is a source of national pride, and its consistent high level of political support and funding ensures progress toward establishing itself as a space power. In 2003, China joined the United States and Russia as a member of the exclusive group of countries to have conducted human spaceflight, and since then it has nearly completed a new, rival global navigation satellite system (GNSS)—set for completion in 2020—and demonstrated its willingness to undertake high-risk, high-reward missions, as reflected by its historic landing on the moon’s far side in 2019. China is likely to achieve future milestones in areas where it is lagging behind international standards on shorter timetables than when the United States accomplished similar missions.
This report examines China’s space goals and national space strategy; its progress toward those goals, including an examination of China’s progress in its advanced launch vehicle, long-term crewed space station, and lunar exploration programs; and the primary entities involved in setting and implementing its space policy. Finally, the report assesses the implications of China’s space program for the United States and its continued leadership in space.