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China Bulletin: September 16, 2025

Tuesday, September 16, 2025
Download PDF (China Bulletin: September 16, 2025)804.17 KB

Highlights

  • Beijing Uses Military Parade to Showcase New Capabilities and Global Influence. 1
  • Xi Pushes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to Reshape Role. 2
  • SCO Development Bank Takes Aim at Dollar-Based Finance. 2
  • Chinese Ships Collide in the South China Sea while Harassing a Philippine Vessel 2
  • Rare Earth Traceability to Strengthen China’s Export Control Enforcement 3
  • China’s Market Sees Stock Rally in August 3

Beijing Uses Military Parade to Showcase New Capabilities and Global Influence

Xi Jinping used a September 3 parade celebrating China’s WWII victory to display new weapons, bolster his status among other autocrats, and manipulate historical memory to serve the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political agenda.

  • For the first time, Beijing displayed a “triad” of nuclear-capable missiles that can be launched from land, air, and sea—which Chinese state media hailed as China’s “strategic ace.”[1] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also unveiled new weapons that could be used to support an invasion of Taiwan, including hypersonic antiship missiles that could target U.S. warships, new combat drones to help navigate mountainous terrain, and lighter tanks designed to better survive drone strikes.[2]

  • Leaders from 26 largely authoritarian countries attended the military parade in Beijing.[3] The event marked the first time the leaders of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran (sometimes described as an “Axis of Autocracies”) have gathered in the same place.[4] The leaders of six Southeast Asian countries were also in attendance, underscoring China’s growing influence in the region.[5]

  • The spectacle of Xi Jinping—flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jung Un—striding before a group of other mostly authoritarian leaders served as a visual symbol of Beijing’s bid to build an alternative world order with itself at the center.[6] China’s propaganda surrounding the parade also emphasized Chinese contributions to WWII as a means to argue that China deserves to play a central role in shaping the global order today.[7]

  • In the leadup to the parade, Chinese state media asserted that Taiwan’s “return” to China was among the “fruits of victory in WWII” and an “important component of the postwar international order.”[8] As part of China’s efforts to court Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), former Chairperson of the KMT Hung Hsiu-chu and KMT veterans of WWII attended the parade at Beijing’s invitation.[9]

Xi Pushes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to Reshape Role

On August 31, 2025, General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping hosted 20+ world leaders at the SCO summit in Tianjin, where he laid out his strategy to turn the regional security bloc into a vehicle to bypass Western economic and tech institutions.

  • Xi, flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, presented himself as a champion of multilateralism and sovereign equality. His emphasis on technology, economic cooperation, and development initiatives suggests a vision of evolving the SCO from a focus on regional security into a global political and economic organization positioned as an alternative to U.S. influence.[10]  

  • Prime Minister Modi’s attendance was notable not only because it came amid tariff disputes with the United States but also because it was his first time to China in seven years, highlighting his desire for rapprochement with Xi. In a potential bid to balance these engagements and demonstrate India’s strategic independence, though, Modi stopped in Japan on his way to Tianjin and departed before the military parade.[11]

  • China, India, and Russia signed a SCO statement condemning U.S. support for Israel in Gaza and the terrorist attacks that India attributes to Pakistan, marking the first time that India criticized U.S. support for Israel and that China and Russia censured the attacks in India.[12] This consensus demonstrated Beijing’s growing influence and all three countries’ willingness to compromise and present a unified front.[13]

  • At the summit, Xi introduced the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), seeking to position China as a leading voice and provide an alternative governance framework for developing countries in regional and global institutions.[14] While the GGI is still nascent, Beijing’s concept paper indicates it intends to use the initiative to shape global norms and set standards, particularly in emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space—where international rules are limited or still being developed.[15] 

SCO Development Bank Takes Aim at Dollar-Based Finance

At the summit, SCO members agreed to launch a multilateral finance institution, adding a means for sanctioned states to conduct transactions outside the dollar-based financial system. 

  • China pledged $1.4 billion in lending and $280 million in grants to SCO members over the next three years as a step toward establishing a new multilateral lending institution that would undermine the effectiveness of U.S. and global sanctions.[16] While these are small sums compared to the initial capitalization of the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the BRICS New Development Bank, the SCO bank’s governance structure could give China outsized influence over the institution.[17] Key details could become sticking points, though, such as determining SCO member voting shares, proportion of renminbi versus other currencies, and managing risks from lending in sanctioned states.[18]

  • The proposed SCO Development Bank would enable China to legitimize its support for sanctioned states like Russia and Iran.[19] President Putin embraced the idea, perhaps a notable change in power dynamics given Russia’s opposition to a similar proposal by China in 2010.[20] During the summit, Putin proposed further economic integration measures, such as issuing joint bonds and establishing a joint trade settlement system.[21]

Chinese Ships Collide in the South China Sea while Harassing a Philippine Vessel

Philippine government footage shows that a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) cutter collided with a Chinese Navy destroyer while attempting to threaten a smaller Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship near Scarborough Shoal.[22] 

  • The PCG believes the CCG ship attempted to ram the PCG ship prior to the collision.[23] The CCG has a history of ramming Philippine vessels as China attempts to assert its expansive claims in the South China Sea, violating a 2016 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruling.[24] 

  • The CCG’s presence and aggression around the Scarborough Shoal grew in the months leading up to the incident, as the PCG carried out a mission to assert the rights of Philippines vessels and fishermen in their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[25] To attempt to justify intensified control of the area, China has declared it a nature reserve.[26]

  • CCG and PLA Navy aggression has increased as China grandstands following the embarrassment of the crash.[27] China is building up forces around the Second Thomas Shoal near the Philippine outpost, raising concerns that China may take action that would activate the U.S. defense treaty with the Philippines.[28]

Rare Earth Traceability to Strengthen China’s Export Control Enforcement

To tighten its control over the rare earths industry and crack down on smuggling, China is rolling out a reporting and traceability requirement for exporters.

  • In August, China publicly unveiled monthly reporting requirements for rare earth element (REE) production for the traceability system.[29] The measures had quietly gone into effect on July 28, after draft measures were circulated for public comments in February.[30] Beijing has been seeking to improve its enforcement abilities even before imposing export licensing requirements on seven REEs and related magnets in retaliation for U.S. tariffs in April 2025. (According to U.S. Secretary of Commerce, China subsequently relaxed the restrictions in June, following May trade negotiations in Geneva.)[31] 

  • These measures deepen Beijing’s 15-year effort to strengthen central control over the REE industry. In 2012, two years after China first introduced REE controls on exports to Japan, Chinese state media estimated that black market sales were 120 percent of legal exports.[*][32] China consolidated the industry in 2016 from over 100 producers to six state-owned enterprises (SOEs), most of which were further merged into a mega-SOE in 2021, which helped to eliminate circumvention of export limits through illegal mining and smuggling.[33] 

  • The announced measures also extend quotas to REEs imported for processing.[34] Given China’s outsized share of REE processing—91 percent of the global market—the traceability reporting system will also provide Beijing intelligence on foreign sourcing, for example, on REE ores and oxides imported for processing from Burma (Myanmar) and Australia, which are shipped to China for processing.[35] With deeper insight into the global market, Beijing may be better positioned to impose controls on the ten REEs it has yet to restrict. 

China’s Market Sees Stock Rally in August

In August 2025, Chinese stock markets surged in a rally disconnected from economic fundamentals. After over a year of attempting to revitalize market sentiment, policymakers in Beijing are now faced with the challenge of stabilizing growth and engineering a “slow bull” market that drives stable wealth creation. 

  • After sputtering for the first half of 2025 amid economic headwinds and trade tensions, Mainland stock markets surged in August 2025.[36] Up 16.7 percent for the year as of September 9th, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index reached its highest level since China’s 2015 stock market bubble (see Figure 1).[37] 

  • Policy pronouncements and low interest rates drove the rally rather than signs of broader economic improvement.[38] Premier Li Qiang’s statement that China would impose tighter oversight of “irrational competition” in the EV sector served as a market signal that Beijing would expand efforts to curb competitive price cutting, which has weighed on corporate profits in sectors experiencing oversupply.[39] Semiconductor stocks also surged following reports that Beijing was encouraging AI companies to source chips domestically rather than purchasing from Nvidia, after the United States relaxed controls on its H20 chip (see Figure 2).[40] Even domestic media began to show concerns about frothiness, however, as authorities allowed re-circulation of a Forbes China article asserting domestic AI companies were experiencing a bubble.[†][41] 

  • After years of attempting to spur market growth, China’s financial regulators are now trying to rein in speculation, with margin trading also hitting an all-time high, even exceeding the 2015 bubble.[42] Bloomberg reported on September 3, 2025 that regulators were considering options such as relaxing restrictions on short selling and increasing scrutiny of leveraged trades.[43] Beijing has long pursued capital market reforms hoping to encourage stock values to rise steadily over time, but the rally echoes speculative trading that preceded past crashes. [44]

 

This issue of the China Bulletin was prepared by Graham Ayres, Daniel Blaugher, Ngor Luong, Nicole Morgret, Jack Neubauer, Lyndi Tsering, and Cindy Zheng.

Disclaimer: This bulletin is the product of research performed by professional staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) and was prepared to support the ongoing research and deliberations of the Commission. Posting of this bulletin to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater awareness and understanding of developing issues for Congressional staff and the public, in support of the Commission’s efforts to “monitor, investigate, and report” on U.S.- China economic relations and their implications for U.S. national security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 (as subsequently modified in law, see uscc.gov/charter). The public release of this document does not imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or considerations raised in this staff-prepared bulletin.


Footnotes


[*] In 2014, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that China’s REE export quota system violated its WTO Accession Protocol, following a dispute brought by the United States. China complied with the ruling but introduced an export licensing system in 2015, positioning it to deny exports by destination or entity. Yue-Zhen Li, “The Rare Earth Leverage? China’s Export Control Law and Xi Jinping’s Thought on Law-Based Governance,” Asian Law Review 20, no. 312 (2025): 324. https://doi.org/10.58112/alr.20-2.3; World Trade Organization, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum Dispute – Reports of the Appellate Body, DS431, August 7, 2014. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm.

[†] In an August 28 article, Forbes China contributor Yang Jianyong assessed that the “market has been excessively hyped, accumulating considerable risk from profit-taking adjustments” and “contains enormous risks.” The article was later republished by the major Chinese financial publication 21st Century Business Herald. Yang Jianyong, “‘寒王’争议:寒武纪市值超6600亿,是价值重估还是泡沫?” [‘King Cambricon’ Controversy: With Cambricon’s Market Value Exceeding RMB 660 Billion, Is This a Revaluation or a Bubble?], 21st Century Business Herald, August 31, 2025. https://www.21jingji.com/article/20250831/herald/a6fd75689457e0b6e8e3d2509004683a.html; Yang Jianyong, “‘寒王’争议:寒武纪市值超6600亿,是价值重估还是泡沫?” [‘King Cambricon’ Controversy: With Cambricon’s Market Value Exceeding RMB 660 Billion, Is This a Revaluation or a Bubble?], Forbes China, August 28, 2025. https://www.forbeschina.com/business/70311

 

Endnotes


[1] Kathrin Hille, “Lasers, Hypersonic Missles and the ‘Nuclear Triad’: China Flexes Its Military Muscle,” Financial Times, September 3, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/ac2f48f2-6faa-4ecd-af58-bc2665fbe427/; “新华社快讯:核导弹第一方队震撼登场” [Xinhua Dispatch: First Phalanx of Nuclear Guided Missiles Thunder onto the Stage], Xinhua, September 3, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250904132633/http://www.xinhuanet.com/20250903/e42c13bff2304b61a907c6bf2e1dcbb7/c.html.

[2] Yuanyue Dang and Amber Wang, “Latest China Weaponry in Parade Shows Beijing’s Sharp Focus on Sovereign Defence: Analysts,” South China Morning Post, September 3, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3324227/mainland-china-weaponry-parade-shows-beijings-sharp-focus-taiwan-analysts; David Pierson and Berry Wang, “Xi’s Parade to Showcase China’s Military Might and Circle of Autocrats,” New York Times, September 2, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/01/world/asia/china-parade-putin-kim.html. 

[3] Who Were the Foreign Leaders at China’s Military Parade?” Reuters, September 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/factbox-who-were-foreign-leaders-chinas-military-parade-2025-09-03/.

[4] David Pierson and Berry Wang, “Xi’s Parade to Showcase China’s Military Might and Circle of Autocrats,” New York Times, September 2, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/01/world/asia/china-parade-putin-kim.html. 

[5] “Who Were the Foreign Leaders at China’s Military Parade?” Reuters, September 3, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/factbox-who-were-foreign-leaders-chinas-military-parade-2025-09-03/. 

[6] Nectar Gan, Brad Lendon, Jessie Yeung, and Simone McCarthy, “Xi, Putin and Kim Stand United At Beijing Military Parade in Historic Show of Authoritarian Strength,” CNN, September 3, 2025.

[7] Ken Moritsugu, “China’s military parade is a show of strength from a country devastated in World War II,” Associated Press, September 2, 2025.

[8] Ren Zhongping, “正义必胜 和平必胜人民必胜——写在中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年之际” [Justice Must Prevail, Peace Must Prevail, the People Must Prevail—Written on the Eve of the 80th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War], People’s Daily, September 2, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903191917/https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202509/02/content_30101772.html. 

[9] “纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年招待会在京隆重举行 习近平发表重要讲话” [Reception Commemorating of the 80th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War Solemnly Held in Beijing—Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech], Xinhua, September 3, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903193817/http://www.xinhuanet.com/20250903/37a07e19f9f44b27953e013d5d5a6a01/c.html; “現身天安門城樓!洪秀柱出席中共九三閱兵畫面曝光” [Seen at the Tiananmen Rostrum: Photograph of Hung Hsiu-chu Attending September Third Military Parade Revealed], Liberty Times, September 3, 2025. https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/5165208.

[10] “The Tianjin Axis: China Operationalizes Its Alternative World Order,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 3, 2025. https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-tianjin-axis-china-operationalizes.

[11] “The Tianjin Axis: China Operationalizes Its Alternative World Order,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 3, 2025. https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-tianjin-axis-china-operationalizes.

[12] Michelle Ng, “Xi, Putin and Modi Huddle in Tianjin as China Pitches SCO Unity against Shifting US Order,” Straits Times, September 1, 2025. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-putin-and-modi-huddle-in-tianjin-as-china-pitches-sco-unity-against-shifting-us-order.   

[13] Christopher Bodeen, “SCO Summit Could Challenge US Dominance and Lend Weight to China’s Vision of a Multipolar World,” AP News, September 1, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/shanghai-cooperation-organization-china-us-asia-rivalry-37d58d94f70814c8e7a23721997abc2b.

[14] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Xi Jinping: Pooling the Strength of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to Improve Global Governance, September 1, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903192821/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202509/t20250901_11699629.html.

[15] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative, September 1, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903193355/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html.

[16] Laurie Chen and Mei Mei Chu, “China’s Xi Pushes a New Global Order, Flanked by Leaders of Russia and India,” Reuters, September 1, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-pushes-new-global-order-flanked-by-leaders-russia-india-2025-09-01/; Huizhong Wu, “China’s Xi Announces New Development Bank at Tianjin Summit,” AP News, September 1, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/china-sco-putin-modi-xi-summit-95f1421de601960a9c569933862a09a0; “The Tianjin Axis: China Operationalizes Its Alternative World Order,” Special Competitive Studies Project, September 3, 2025. https://scsp222.substack.com/p/the-tianjin-axis-china-operationalizes.

[17] “Project Summary,” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, September 8, 2025. https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/summary/index.html; Farwa Sial, “New World Order against Tariffs: SCO Development Bank as an Anti-Sanctions Tool?” International Development Economics Associates Limited, September 7, 2025. https://www.networkideas.org/2025/09/07/new-world-order-against-tariffs-sco-development-bank-as-an-anti-sanctions-tool/; Peiman Salehi, “Opinion | How an SCO Development Bank Could Shift the Global Financial Order,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3324123/how-sco-development-bank-could-shift-global-financial-order?module=perpetual_scroll_2_AI&pgtype=article; “Shareholding,” New Development Bank, 2023. https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/shareholding/; Steven Elsinga, “China’s AIIB – The Facts to Know,” China Briefing, April 8, 2015. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-aiib-facts-know/.   

[18] Peiman Salehi, “Opinion | How an SCO Development Bank Could Shift the Global Financial Order,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3324123/how-sco-development-bank-could-shift-global-financial-order?module=perpetual_scroll_2_AI&pgtype=article; Jason Corcoran, “Opinion: Putin’s Shanghai Bond Bonanza Is a Pipe Dream,” Moscow Times, September 3, 2025. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/09/03/putins-shanghai-bond-bonanza-is-a-pipe-dream-a90418. 

[19] Laurie Chen and Mei Mei Chu, “China’s Xi Pushes a New Global Order, Flanked by Leaders of Russia and India,” Reuters, September 1, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-pushes-new-global-order-flanked-by-leaders-russia-india-2025-09-01/; Farwa Sial, “New World Order against Tariffs: SCO Development Bank as an Anti-Sanctions Tool?” International Development Economics Associates Limited, September 7, 2025. https://www.networkideas.org/2025/09/07/new-world-order-against-tariffs-sco-development-bank-as-an-anti-sanctions-tool/; Peiman Salehi, “Opinion | How an SCO Development Bank Could Shift the Global Financial Order,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3324123/how-sco-development-bank-could-shift-global-financial-order?module=perpetual_scroll_2_AI&pgtype=article.

[20] “China-Led Bloc to Set Up Development Bank in Win for Xi,” Bloomberg, September 1, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-01/china-led-bloc-agrees-to-set-up-development-bank-in-win-for-xi; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi Introduced the Eight Major Outcomes of the SCO Tianjin Summit [王毅介绍上合组织天津峰会八大成果], September 1, 2025. Translation. https://web.archive.org/web/20250908164526/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202509/t20250901_11699855.shtml. 

[21] “Putin Proposes Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Members Should Issue Joint Bonds,” Reuters, September 1, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/putin-proposes-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-members-should-issue-joint-2025-09-01/. 

[22] Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “VIDEO: Chinese Warship, Cutter Collide in South China Sea,” USNI News, August 11, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/08/11/chinese-coast-guard-navy-ships-collide-in-south-china-sea-during-blockade-attempt-against-philippine-forces.

[23] Priam Nepomuceno, “Chinese Ship in BdM Out to Ram PH Vessel – Brawner,” Philippine News Agency, August 12, 2025. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1256370; “China Accuses Philippine Vessels of ‘Dangerous Manoeuvres’ after Its Own Ships Collided,” Reuters, August 15, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-accuses-philippine-vessels-dangerous-manoeuvres-after-its-own-ships-2025-08-15/; Zhao Ziwen, “Collision between Chinese Ships Expected to Escalate Tension in South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, August 13, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3321617/collision-between-chinese-ships-expected-escalate-tension-south-china-sea.

[24] Cecilia Vega et al., “China Rams Philippine Ship while 60 Minutes on Board; South China Sea Tensions Could Draw U.S. In,” CBS News, September 15, 2024. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-china-sea-conflict-us-role-60-minutes/; Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos and Joyce Ann L. Rocamora, “China Vessel Damages BRP Magbanua; PH ‘Seriously Concerned,’” Philippine News Agency, August 31, 2024. https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1232353.

[25] Gabryelle Dumalag, “PCG Offered Help After CCG Vessel Collided With Chinese Navy Warship,” Inquirer, August 12, 2025. https://www.inquirer.net/452482/pcg-offered-help-after-ccg-vessel-collided-with-chinese-navy-warship/; Ray Powel, “China's Expanding Control Over Scarborough Shoal,” SeaLight, May 5, 2025. https://www.sealight.live/posts/china-s-expanding-control-over-scarborough-shoal.

[26] Nectar Gan and Kathleen Magramo, “Why is China Setting Up a Nature Reserve in One of the World’s Most Contested Waterways?” CNN, September 11, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/11/asia/china-nature-reserve-south-china-sea-intl-hnk

[27] Koh Swee Lean Collin, “Commentary: Embarrassing South China Sea Collision Has Done More than Physical Damage,” Channel News Asia, August 22, 2025. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/south-china-sea-philippines-collision-navy-coast-guard-tensions-5306226.

[28] Raissa Robles, “Philippines Warns China Not to Cross ‘Red Line’ over Grounded Warship in South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2025.

[29] Mandy Zuo, “China Tightens Rare Earth Rules, Extending Controls to Imported Minerals,” South China Morning Post, August 23, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3322918/china-tightens-rare-earth-rules-extending-controls-imported-minerals. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 稀土开采和稀土冶炼分离总量调控管理暂行办法 (Interim Measures for the Regulation and Management of Rare Earth Mining and Rare Earth Smelting and Separation), July 28, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903172758/https://gyxxh.tj.gov.cn/ZWGK4147/ZCWJ6355/gjjwj/202508/t20250823_7118346.html.

[30] China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 稀土开采和稀土冶炼分离总量调控管理暂行办法 (Interim Measures for the Regulation and Management of Rare Earth Mining and Rare Earth Smelting and Separation), July 28, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903172758/https://gyxxh.tj.gov.cn/ZWGK4147/ZCWJ6355/gjjwj/202508/t20250823_7118346.html; China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 工业和信息化部公开征求《稀土开采和稀土冶炼分离总量调控管理办法(暂行)(公开征求意见稿)》《稀土产品信息追溯管理办法(暂行)(公开征求意见稿)》的意见 (The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Is Soliciting Public Opinion on the "Administrative Measures for the Total Amount Control of Rare Earth Mining and Smelting and Separation (Interim) (Draft for Public Comment)" and the "Administrative Measures for the Information Traceability of Rare Earth Products (Interim) (Draft for Public Comment)”), February, 2, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250909134231/https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/opinionInfo.shtml?id=5650. 

[31] Nandita Bose and David Lawder, “US Says Deal with Beijing Will Expedite Rare Earth Exports from China,” Reuters, June 27, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-deal-related-trade-was-signed-with-china-wednesday-2025-06-26/; Lewis Jackson et al., “China Hits Back at US Tariffs with Export Controls on Key Rare Earths,” Reuters, April 4, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-hits-back-us-tariffs-with-rare-earth-export-controls-2025-04-04; China’s State Council, Decree of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China No. 785, June 22, 2024. https://web.archive.org/web/20240809191529/https:/www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202406/content_6960153.htm.

[32] Huibin Ren, Yaguang Wang, and Kaixiong Liu, “China’s Huge Amount of Rare Earth Smuggling Renders Quota Management an Empty Shell,” Xinhua News, August 26, 2012. https://perma.cc/YUP5-4ULY. 

[33] Yue-Zhen Li, “The Rare Earth Leverage? China’s Export Control Law and Xi Jinping’s Thought on Law-Based Governance,” Asian Law Review 20, no. 312 (2025): 325. https://doi.org/10.58112/alr.20-2.3; Felix K. Chang, “China’s Rare Earth Metals Consolidation and Market Power,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/chinas-rare-earth-metals-consolidation-and-market-power/;Zhang Yuxuan, “稀土王国’正涅槃 重生” [The “Rare Earth Kingdom” Is Being Reborn], China Economic Weekly, June 30, 2023. https://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/2023-06/30/nw.zgjjzk_20230630_2-01.htm.

[34] China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 稀土开采和稀土冶炼分离总量调控管理暂行办法 (Interim Measures for the Regulation and Management of Rare Earth Mining and Rare Earth Smelting and Separation), July 28, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250903172758/https://gyxxh.tj.gov.cn/ZWGK4147/ZCWJ6355/gjjwj/202508/t20250823_7118346.html.

[35] Hannah Beech, “What to Know about the Rush for Rare Earth Metals in War-Torn Myanmar,” New York Times, July 11, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/11/world/asia/rare-earths-boom-myanmar.html; Rick Millis, “US-China Deal, and More DoD Money Will Not Loosen China’s Grip on Military-Grade Rare Earths Magnets,” Mining, June 20, 2025. https://www.mining.com/us-china-deal-and-more-dod-money-will-not-loosen-chinas-grip-on-military-grade-rare-earths-magnets/; U.S. Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, March 2025, 91. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025.pdf.

[36] “Margin Trading Surges as Stocks Rally,” Trivium China, September 9, 2025. https://triviumchina.com/2025/09/04/margin-trading-surges-as-stocks-rally/; Wang Juanjuan et al., “China’s Stock Market Roars Back to Life—But Can It Outrun Economic Gravity?” Caixin Global, August 25, 2025. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-08-25/cover-story-chinas-stock-market-roars-back-to-life-but-can-it-outrun-economic-gravity-102354993.html; William Sandlund and Haohsiang Ko, “Hong Kong’s Bull Market Leaves China Behind,” Financial Times, June 30, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/057468de-470c-40a6-8662-d8b61c5058b6.

[37] “Shanghai SE Composite Index,” Financial Times. https://markets.ft.com/data/indices/tearsheet/charts?s=SHI:SHH.

[38] Wang Juanjuan et al., “China’s Stock Market Roars Back to Life—But Can It Outrun Economic Gravity?” Caixin Global, August 25, 2025. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-08-25/cover-story-chinas-stock-market-roars-back-to-life-but-can-it-outrun-economic-gravity-102354993.html.

[39] “Why There Are Fears over China’s Soaring Stock Market,” Bloomberg, September 4, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-04/why-china-s-stock-market-rally-is-causing-concern; Ye Maisui, “A股两融余额站上新高 增量资金踊跃进场” [Margin Financing and Securities Lending Balances on the A-Share Market Hit a New High, with Fresh Capital Actively Entering], 21st Century Business Herald, September 3, 2025. https://m.21jingji.com/article/20250903/505aa05dd04c2237ef35d870dbbcf6fd.html; Wang Juanjuan et al., “China’s Stock Market Roars Back to Life—But Can It Outrun Economic Gravity?” Caixin Global, August 25, 2025. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2025-08-25/cover-story-chinas-stock-market-roars-back-to-life-but-can-it-outrun-economic-gravity-102354993.html; Ken Moritsugu, “Chinese Investors Snap Up Stocks on Hopes for End to Price Wars and Overcapacity,” Associated Press, July 21, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/china-involution-stocks-overcapacity-tariffs-07025779c73c86575559e34450a5df3b; “李强主持召开国务院常务会议” [Li Qiang Presided over the State Council Executive Meeting,] People’s Daily, July 17, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20250717083943/http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2025/0717/c1024-40523519.html.

[40] Yang Jianyong, “‘寒王’争议:寒武纪市值超6600亿,是价值重估还是泡沫?” [‘King Cambricon’ Controversy: With Cambricon’s Market Value Exceeding RMB 660 Billion, Is This a Revaluation or a Bubble?], 21st Century Business Herald, August 31, 2025. https://www.21jingji.com/article/20250831/herald/a6fd75689457e0b6e8e3d2509004683a.html; William Sandlund and Eleanor Olcott, “Chinese Semiconductor Shares Surge after DeepSeek Gives Boost to Homegrown Chips,” Financial Times, August 22, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/3bae7153-ca0b-4f98-89ed-c9094fa0129c; Mao Jun, “利好!A股超级赛道,20%涨停潮!” [Bullish News! China’s A-Share ‘Super Track’ Sees a Wave of 20 Percent Limit-Up Gains!], Securities Times, August 22, 2025. https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3249221.html. 

[41] Yang Jianyong, “‘寒王’争议:寒武纪市值超6600亿,是价值重估还是泡沫?” [‘King Cambricon’ Controversy: With Cambricon’s Market Value Exceeding RMB 660 Billion, Is This a Revaluation or a Bubble?], 21st Century Business Herald, August 31, 2025. https://www.21jingji.com/article/20250831/herald/a6fd75689457e0b6e8e3d2509004683a.html; Yang Jianyong, “‘寒王’争议:寒武纪市值超6600亿,是价值重估还是泡沫?” [‘King Cambricon’ Controversy: With Cambricon’s Market Value Exceeding RMB 660 Billion, Is This a Revaluation or a Bubble?], Forbes China, August 28, 2025. https://www.forbeschina.com/business/70311; William Sandlund and Eleanor Olcott, “Chinese Semiconductor Shares Surge after DeepSeek Gives Boost to Homegrown Chips,” Financial Times, August 22, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/3bae7153-ca0b-4f98-89ed-c9094fa0129c; Mao Jun, “利好!A股超级赛道,20%涨停潮!” [Bullish News! China’s A-Share ‘Super Track’ Sees a Wave of 20 Percent Limit-Up Gains!], Securities Times, August 22, 2025. https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3249221.html. 

[42] Ye Maisui, “A股两融余额站上新高 增量资金踊跃进场” [Margin Financing and Securities Lending Balances on the A-Share Market Hit a New High, with Fresh Capital Actively Entering], 21st Century Business Herald, September 3, 2025. https://m.21jingji.com/article/20250903/505aa05dd04c2237ef35d870dbbcf6fd.html; “China’s Margin Trades Surge to a Record Amid Stock Rally,” Bloomberg, September 1, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-02/china-s-margin-trades-surge-to-record-as-stock-rally-extends; Hudson Lockett, “Beijing’s $114 Bln Stock Market Bet Rings Hollow,” Reuters, September 25, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/beijings-114-bln-stock-market-bet-rings-hollow-2024-09-25/; Arjun Neil Alim and Joe Leahy, “Will China’s $100bn War Chest for Shares Lift the Real Economy?” Financial Times, September 25, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/d478d8c0-9321-421a-83cf-a1d0ce734a8f. 

[43] “China Eyes Curbs on Stock Speculation to Foster Steady Gains,” Bloomberg, September 3, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-04/china-weighs-curbs-on-stock-speculation-to-foster-steady-gains.

[44] Wu Lihua, “吴清:加快推进新一轮资本市场改革开放” [Wu Qing: Accelerate the Advancement of a New Round of Capital Market Reform and Opening Up], Economic Information Daily, September 1, 2025. http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/20250901/5941e4e2fad740e18a1d30084bd7c3b9/c.html; Lizzi C. Lee, “Xi Is Overcoming His Dislike of the Stock Market,” Foreign Policy, October 29, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/29/xi-china-stock-market-rally-slow-bull-stimulus/.

[45] Wei Zhongyuan, “股价高位碰撞折价定增,中芯国际市值一日蒸发800亿” [High Share Price Collided with Discounted Placement: SMIC’s Market Capitalization Evaporated by RMB 80 Billion in One Day], Yicai, September 8, 2025. https://www.yicai.com/news/102815857.html; Xinmei Shen, “SMIC to Take Full Control of Subsidiary Chip Foundry as China’s Fab Industry Consolidates,” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3323904/smic-take-full-control-subsidiary-chip-foundry-chinas-fab-industry-consolidates.

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