Highlights
- China Uses "Routine" Coast Guard Patrols to Assert Sovereign Authority East of Taiwan
- China Claims to Demonstrate First Operational Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent
- Credit Losing Steam as Growth Driver and Macroeconomic Tool
- Q2 Growth Slows as Iran Conflict Increases Costs; Export Dependence Grows
- China Plans to Consolidate Data Center Construction
China Uses “Routine” Coast Guard Patrols to Assert Sovereign Authority East of Taiwan
By establishing a persistent coast guard presence, Beijing is using its lawfare playbook to assert legal authority while avoiding the appearance of military escalation.
- On July 4, Beijing announced that China Coast Guard (CCG) patrols around waters east of Taiwan would henceforth be considered "routine."[1] The announcement marks another step in Beijing’s gradual expansion of Chinese maritime activities around Taiwan. It follows the CCG’s June 2026 "special maritime traffic enforcement operation” and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) December 2025 exercise blockading key ports and territory around Taiwan.[2]
- China’s actions are part of its lawfare campaign—using patrols and law enforcement actions, backed by claims of legal authority, to reinforce its dubious sovereignty claims. By maintaining continuous "routine" CCG patrols, Beijing is asserting that it is the sovereign power with the right to exercise law enforcement authority in the waters east of Taiwan.[3] Using the CCG rather than the PLA Navy avoids military confrontations and allows Beijing to portray these activities as law enforcement while establishing the persistent presence necessary for a future blockade.
- The new patrols also fit within Beijing’s broader effort to increase pressure on U.S. treaty ally Japan. Over the past year, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Japan could respond militarily to a Taiwan contingency, pursued an expanded security agenda, and launched talks with the Philippines to determine the boundary between their overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the waters east of Taiwan.[4] Chinese state media, in turn, framed the patrols as a response to Japan’s “provocations” and “unrepentant attitude" over contested waters, signaling Beijing’s determination to challenge a more active Japanese security posture in the region.[5]
China Claims to Demonstrate First Operational Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent
The launch sought to bolster the credibility of China’s long-range second-strike nuclear capability, though questions about its operational effectiveness remain.
- On July 7, China fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carrying a dummy warhead into the South Pacific—the first publicly known Chinese SLBM test into international waters. Beijing described the launch as "a routine part of China’s annual military training," suggesting it intends to routinize open-ocean SLBM testing as part of its sea-based nuclear posture.[6]
- China’s SLBM launch from the South China Sea served as a public demonstration of its "bastion" strategy—protecting its ballistic missile submarines in heavily defended waters close to home while retaining the capacity to strike distant targets. This approach reduces the need to patrol in more vulnerable open-ocean waters. As the PLA Navy builds up undersea sensing networks and other defensive infrastructure in its near seas, it is trying to create secure zones that boost the survivability of its sea-based nuclear deterrent.[7]
- By conducting the test under somewhat realistic operational conditions, China signaled that it places a higher priority on strengthening the credibility of its long-range second-strike threat than on the diplomatic costs. The missile’s splashdown near Pacific Island states drew criticism from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, underscoring that even countries Beijing has sought to cultivate as partners viewed the test as destabilizing.[8]
- Unconfirmed reporting citing Taiwan defense officials, however, suggests the missile may have been launched from a surfaced submarine rather than while submerged. If accurate, this detail could indicate that China has not yet perfected submerged launch procedures or remains cautious about the reliability of its underwater launch technology.[9]
Credit Losing Steam as Growth Driver and Macroeconomic Tool
Credit growth has fallen to record lows despite favorable interest rates; bad sign on many fronts.
- Since the 2008 financial crisis, China’s economic growth has been fueled by the largest credit boom in history. [10] Debt has outpaced official GDP growth, eclipsing 300 percent last year—double 2008 levels. [11] While key growth drivers like the property sector relied heavily on debt-fueled investment, the model has also yielded steadily less: as leverage has climbed, each additional yuan of borrowing has driven less growth.[12]
- In another sign of economic weakness, lending dropped precipitously in the first half of 2026 despite historically low benchmark lending rates. [13] New RMB loans totaled 10.7 trillion, a 17 percent drop from 2025 H1. [14] Total social financing (TSF), a broad measure of credit in China’s economy, grew just 7.4 percent year-over-year in the month of June, its slowest pace on record and well below the 13 percent average in the five years before COVID. [15] These declines come even though the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has held benchmark rates at record lows for more than a year, with the one- and five-year loan prime rates at 3.0 and 3.5 percent, respectively. [16]
- Competition for borrowers has compressed lending margins so far that 86 percent of China’s publicly listed banks now sit below the net interest margin the industry treats as necessary for sustainable operations.[17] And official figures likely mask other problems. Chinese authorities reported a nonperforming loan ratio of 1.5 percent, while independent estimates put the real figure closer to 10 percent.[18] Thin margins leave banks less able to absorb bad loans and build capital to lend. While heavy state control likely dispels any immediate liquidity crunch that could lead to crisis, the deeper risk is a continued drag on growth, as banks divert more capital rolling over existing debt rather than funding productive activity.
- Chinese officials have cast slower credit growth as a deliberate transition from bank lending toward direct financing through stocks and bonds, suggesting its financial system is maturing.[19] But the data suggest otherwise. Almost 83 percent of “direct financing” is still government bonds, and over 70 percent of those are held by commercial banks; just 3 percent is equity.[20] In other words, as Dragonometry has observed, “direct financing” is really just “Beijing’s fiscal machinery running through the bond market rather than the budget.”[21]
- Looking forward, weak credit demand means less investment, less consumption, and slower GDP growth. It also means Chinese authorities will get less traction on efforts to use rate cuts to spur growth.
Figure 1: Primary Components of Total Social Financing (2021–2026 H1)
Q2 Growth Slows as Iran Conflict Increases Costs; Export Dependence Grows
China’s Q2 growth slowed as the Iran conflict’s cost shock slowed investment and consumption stayed flat, leaving artificial intelligence (AI)-related exports to hold up a growth model that is weaker than headline numbers suggest.
- After closing Q1 stronger than expected, China’s economy faltered in Q2. Real GDP growth declined from 5 percent year-over-year in Q1 2026 to 4.3 percent in Q2—the lowest in three years—though H1 growth of 4.7 percent still aligns with Beijing’s 4.5 to 5 percent target.[22]
- Investment reversed on higher input costs. Fixed asset investment grew 1.7 percent in Q1 2026 but fell sharply to -5.7 percent year-to-date through June, with declines across infrastructure, property, and manufacturing.[23] Fiscally constrained local governments and property developers opted to pause projects rather than absorb higher material expenses.[24] Factories delayed investment due to weak domestic demand, increased costs, continuing excess supply-fueled price wars, and mounting trade tensions.[25]
- Consumption remained weak. Retail sales of consumer goods were nearly flat in Q2, growing just 0.2 percent year-over-year.[26] Fading auto and appliance sales dragged down retail growth after China’s government reduced the scale of incentive schemes that had propped up those sectors in 2025.[27]
- AI-related exports masked overall weakness. China’s goods trade surplus hit a near-record $576 billion in H1, and net exports contributed 21 percent of Q2 GDP growth, up from 15 percent in Q1.[28] Exports rose 20 percent year-over-year in Q2, with integrated circuits (ICs) and automated data processing equipment accounting for 43 percent of that growth.[29] This increase was driven by price rather than quantity; IC exports rose 111 percent in value but only 1.7 percent by unit sales.[30] Memory chips represented 99.7 percent of the year-over-year increase in IC exports as the AI boom also led to soaring conventional chip prices.[31]
- Absent government intervention, China’s economic weakness could show through further in H2. Falling infrastructure bond issuance in H1 points to further investment declines.[32] External demand may also soften as China’s trade surplus has shrunk from 2025, and some of Q2’s rise in exports may have come in anticipation of higher tariffs.[33]
Figure 2: Fixed Asset Investment Year-on-Year Change (Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted, YTD), Q4 2022–Q2 2026
China Plans to Consolidate Data Center Construction
Beijing is shifting from promoting data center buildout to centrally rationing it, a correction to a policy-driven buildout frenzy that signals China believes it can compete on compute efficiency rather than raw scale.
- The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and National Data Bureau have reportedly issued guidance barring local governments and state-owned enterprises from building small data centers (under 300 million RMB, 1,000 server racks, and 2,500 kilowatts), requiring pre-approval for medium projects, and confining large projects to national hubs.[34] The instructions give teeth to prior guidance from 2025, stripping subsidies and grid access from non-hub projects and barring developers who misreport data center size from filing new projects for three years, among other enforcement mechanisms.[35]
- The move follows the 2022 Eastern Data, Western Compute (EDWC) initiative, which spurred a local buildout frenzy, though utilization rates at some AI compute centers sat below 30 percent.[36] Despite high demand for compute from China’s AI growth, much of the data center buildout from the EDWC initiative is ill suited to the evolving needs of businesses and labs. Some use dated Nvidia graphics processing units (GPUs) or unreliable Chinese GPUs, and some are simply too small and geographically dispersed.[37]
- The restrictions signal the strong importance China places on achieving its AI ambitions. Coupled with a reported $295 billion centrally administered data center buildout, NDRC, MIIT, and NDB's reported guidance aims to keep represent a decisive move to prevent data center buildout from becoming yet another story of interprovincial competition leading to a surplus of mediocre production.[38] (For more on China’s compute constraints, see Two Loops: How China’s Open AI Strategy Reinforces Its Industrial Dominance.)
This issue of the China Bulletin was prepared by Graham Ayres, Jessica Chai, Benton Gordon, Ngor Luong, Eric Omorogieva, Emma Sampson, and Lyndi Tsering. You may reach us at contact@uscc.gov.
Disclaimer: This bulletin is the product of research performed by professional staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) and was prepared to support the ongoing research and deliberations of the Commission. Posting of this bulletin to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater awareness and understanding of developing issues for congressional staff and the public in support of the Commission’s efforts to “monitor, investigate, and report” on U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. national security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 (as subsequently modified in law, see uscc.gov/charter). The public release of this document does not imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or considerations raised in this staff-prepared bulletin.
Footnotes
- Measured since 2011, TSF, or “aggregate financing to the real economy,” is a broad measure of credit and liquidity that reflects fundraising by Chinese non-state entities. “FACTBOX-What Is China's Total Social Financing Indicator?” Reuters, November 13, 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/factbox-what-is-chinas-total-social-financing-indicator-idUSL3E8M24AN/.
- Server racks are the physical structures (usually metal frames or cabinets) in data centers that house high-performance servers, chips, cables, and cooling equipment. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, AI Tech Stack Glossary, June 25, 2026. https://www.uscc.gov/research/ai-technology-stack-glossary.
- GPUs are a type of computer chip widely used to train and run AI models. Unlike a traditional computer processor (CPU), a GPU can perform many calculations at the same time, allowing it to process the large amounts of data needed for AI much more quickly and efficiently. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, AI Tech Stack Glossary, June 25, 2026. https://www.uscc.gov/research/ai-technology-stack-glossary.
Endnotes
[1] Liu Jingjing, “海警台岛以东海域执法为何常态化” [Why Has the China Coast Guard Normalized Law Enforcement Patrols in Waters East of Taiwan?], CCTV, July 4, 2026, https://web.archive.org/web/20260707145621/https:/news.cctv.com/2026/07/04/ARTIDX4LK9mCIwST0S5b7xVS260704.shtml.
[2] John Dotson, “The PLA’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ Exercise Around Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Institute, January 2, 2026. https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/01/pla-justice-mission-2025/; Ying Yu Lin, “Quasi-Quarantine Operations Held East of Taiwan,” Jamestown 26, no. 13 (June 18, 2026), https://jamestown.org/quasi-quarantine-operations-held-east-of-taiwan/.
[3] Jordan Schneider, “WarTalk: Randy Schriver on Asian Defense,” ChinaTalk, July 12, 2026. https://www.chinatalk.media/p/wartalk-randy-schriver-on-asian-defense.
[4] Matthew Strong, “China Claims Japan-Philippines Talks over Area East of Taiwan Break International Law,” Taiwan News, July 4, 2026. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6395055; Bonny Lin and Kristi Govella, “Escalating Japan-China Tensions: Insights from the Past and Prospects for the Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 5, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-japan-china-tensions-insights-past-and-prospects-future; John Geddie, Tim Kelly, and Mariko Katsumura, “Why Japan PM’s Taiwan Remarks Escalated Tensions with China,” Reuters, November 20, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/why-did-japan-pms-taiwan-remarks-cause-such-stir-2025-11-11/.
[5] Liu Jingjing, “海警台岛以东海域执法为何常态化” [Why Has the China Coast Guard Normalized Law Enforcement Patrols in Waters East of Taiwan?], CCTV, July 4, 2026, https://web.archive.org/web/20260707145621/https:/news.cctv.com/2026/07/04/ARTIDX4LK9mCIwST0S5b7xVS260704.shtml.
[6] Joseph Rodgers, Bonny Lin, and Leon Li, “China’s SLBM Test Underscores the Importance of a Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 7, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-slbm-test-underscores-importance-ballistic-missile-launch-notification-agreement; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2026年7月6日外交部发言人毛宁主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on July 6, 2026], July 6, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260715131230/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202607/t20260706_11975942.shtml.
[7] Chris Buckley, “Why China Fired a Long-Range Missile into the Pacific,” New York Times, July 7, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/07/world/asia/china-missile-test-submarine-pacific.html; Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, written testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Part of Your World: U.S.-China Competition Under the Sea, March 2, 2026. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/RADM_Brookes_Testimony.pdf; Andrew S. Erickson, statement for the record for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Part of Your World: U.S.-China Competition Under the Sea, March 2, 2026. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/Andrew_Erickson_Statement_for_the_Record.pdf.
[8] Ministry of the Prime Minister–Vanuatu, “Vanuatu Raises Concern over Ballistic Missile Launch in the Pacific,” Facebook, July 8, 2026. https://www.facebook.com/pmo.gov/posts/989627797205866/; Prime Minister of Australia, Press Conference – Honiara, Solomon Islands, transcript, July 7, 2026. https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-honiara-solomon-islands-07july26.
[9] Bill Gertz, “Taiwan Intelligence: Chinese Sub Fired Missile from Surface,” Washington Times, July 15, 2026. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jul/15/inside-ring-taiwan-intelligence-says-chinese-sub-fired-missile.
[10] Logan Wright, “China’s Economy Has Peaked. Can Beijing Redefine Its Goals?” Rhodium Group, September 1, 2024, 8–9. https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Chinas-Economy-Has-Peaked.-Can-Beijing-Redefine-its-Goals.pdf.
[11] U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Total Credit to Non-Financial Sector, Adjusted for Breaks, for China, updated June 15, 2026. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QCNCAM770A.
[12] Dirk V Muir, Natalija Novta, and Anne Oeking, “China’s Path to Sustainable and Balanced Growth,” International Monetary Fund, November 15, 2024, 2, 4-5. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2024/238/article-A001-en.xml.
[13] Chusnul Chotimah, “China Holds LPR Rates at Record Lows for 14th Month,” Trading Economics, July 19, 2026. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/interest-rate/news/568031; “China Lets Policy Loan Rate Fall to Record Low to Boost Economy,” Bloomberg, May 26, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-26/china-lets-policy-loan-rate-fall-to-record-low-to-boost-economy.
[14] Wang Shiyu, “China Credit Growth Misses Forecasts as PBOC Flags ‘New Normal,’” Caixin, July 16, 2026. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2026-07-16/china-credit-growth-misses-forecasts-as-pboc-flags-new-normal-102464812.html; People’s Bank of China via Haver Analytics.
[15] People’s Bank of China via Haver Analytics.
[16] Chusnul Chotimah, “China Holds LPR Rates at Record Lows for 14th Month,” Trading Economics, July 19, 2026. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/interest-rate/news/568031; ”China Lets Policy Loan Rate Fall to Record Low to Boost Economy,” Bloomberg, May 26, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-26/china-lets-policy-loan-rate-fall-to-record-low-to-boost-economy.
[17] Kensaku Ihara, “Nearly 90% of Listed Chinese Banks Fall Below Profit Threshold,” Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2026. https://asia.nikkei.com/business/finance/nearly-90-of-listed-chinese-banks-fall-below-profit-threshold.
[18] “China’s $300 Billion Pile of Bad Consumer Debt Threatens Economy,” Bloomberg, June 17, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-17/china-s-economy-recovery-threatened-by-300-billion-in-bad-consumer-debt; Kensaku Ihara, “Nearly 90% of listed Chinese banks fall below profit threshold,” Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2026. https://asia.nikkei.com/business/finance/nearly-90-of-listed-chinese-banks-fall-below-profit-threshold; China’s National Financial Regulatory Administration, Supervisory Statistics of the Banking and Insurance Sectors - 2025 Q4, February 12, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260720200849/https://www.nfra.gov.cn/en/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=1251267.
[19] People’s Bank of China, 中国金融结构的变迁和金融市场现代化——中国人民银行行长潘功胜在2026陆家嘴论坛上的主题演讲 [The Transformation of China's Financial Structure and the Modernization of Its Financial Markets – A Keynote Speech by Pan Gongsheng, Governor of the People's Bank of China, at the 2026 Lujiazui Forum], June 18, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260716173016/https://www.gdjr.gov.cn/gdjr/jrzx/jryw/content/post_43605.html.
[20] Anthony Lawrance, “New Funding, Same Money,” Dragonometry Substack, July 5, 2026. https://dragonometry.substack.com/p/new-funding-same-money; Sun Lulu and He Jueyuan, “刚刚！央行重磅数据发布,” [Breaking News! The People's Bank of China Releases Major Data!], Securities Times Online, October 15, 2025. https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3382736.html; People’s Bank of China via Haver Analytics.
[21] Anthony Lawrance, “New Funding, Same Money,” Dragonometry Substack, July 5, 2026. https://dragonometry.substack.com/p/new-funding-same-money.
[22] China’s National Bureau of Statistics via Haver Analytics [Note to Factchecker: See Excel file “2026 Q2 Macro Data,” sheet “GDP % (YTD and Not YTD)”]; China’s National Bureau of Statistics, 上半年经济运行在合理区间新动能快速成长 [In the First Half of the Year, the Economy Operated in a Reasonable Space. New Drivers Quickly Developed], July 15, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260715045115/https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202607/t20260715_1964121.html; “China Sets 2026 Economic Growth Target at 4.5-5 Pct,” Xinhua, March 5, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260313025020/https://english.www.gov.cn/2026special/2026npcandcpcc/202603/05/content_WS69a8ea12c6d00ca5f9a0987b.html.
[23] China’s National Bureau of Statistics via Haver Analytics.
[24] Logan Wright, Allen Feng, and Rogan Quinn, “Q2 2026 Macro Data Recap,” Rhodium Group, July 15, 2026, 6; Thomas Hale, Joe Leahy, and Haohsiang Ko, “Five Things to Watch When China Reports Economic Growth,” Financial Times, July 14, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/c21b8869-6539-414b-8fe2-255b329b8688; “Infrastructure SPB Issuance Picks Up in June,” Trivium China, July 7, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/07/infrastructure-spb-issuance-picks-up-in-june.
[25] “Industrial Profits Surge—But Only for Some,” Trivium China, June 23, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/06/23/industrial-profits-surge-but-only-for-some; “Producer Price Inflation Accelerates amid Iran War,” Trivium China, June 10, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/06/10/producer-price-inflation-accelerates-amid-iran-war.
[26] China’s National Bureau of Statistics via Haver Analytics. [Note to Factchecker: See Excel file “2026 Q2 Macro Data,” sheet “Retail Sales (Goods, yoy %)”]
[27] “Don’t Read Too Much into June’s Weak Consumption,” Trivium China, July 15, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/15/dont-read-too-much-into-junes-weak-consumption-headline; “2026 Consumer Goods Trade-In Program Underwhelms,” Trivium China, January 5, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/01/05/2026-consumers-goods-trade-in-program-underwhelms.
[28] China’s General Administration of Customs via Haver Analytics; China’s National Bureau of Statistics via Haver Analytics.
[29] China’s General Administration of Customs via Haver Analytics; “Exports and Imports Surge on Inflated Commodity Prices,” Trivium China, July 14, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/14/exports-and-imports-surge-on-the-back-of-inflated-commodity-prices.
[30] Cheng Siwei, “China Exports, Imports Surge on AI Boom,” Caixin Global, July 14, 2026. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2026-07-14/china-exports-imports-surge-on-ai-boom-102464151.html.
[31] China’s General Administration of Customs; Luke James, “China Claims Chip Exports Nearly Doubled to $177 Billion in the First Half of 2026 as Memory Prices Surged—96% Year-on-Year Increase Inflated by Hikes,” Tom’s Hardware, July 14, 2026. https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/china-claims-chip-exports-nearly-doubled-to-177-billion-in-the-first-half-of-2026; “Export Prices Surge on the Back of AI Boom,” Trivium China, July 8, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/08/export-prices-surge-on-the-back-of-ai-boom.
[32] Logan Wright, Allen Feng, and Rogan Quinn, “Q2 2026 Macro Data Recap,” Rhodium Group, July 15, 2026, 6–7; Thomas Hale, Joe Leahy, and Haohsiang Ko, “Five Things to Watch When China Reports Economic Growth,” Financial Times, July 14, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/c21b8869-6539-414b-8fe2-255b329b8688; “Infrastructure SPB Issuance Picks Up in June,” Trivium China, July 7, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/07/infrastructure-spb-issuance-picks-up-in-june.
[33] China’s National Bureau of Statistics via Haver Analytics; Logan Wright, Allen Feng, and Rogan Quinn, “Q2 2026 Macro Data Recap,” Rhodium Group, July 15, 2026, 7.
[34] “An AI Export Boom Is Masking China's Domestic Economic Weakness,” Trivium China, July 8, 2026. https://triviumchina.com/2026/07/08/205083/?mc_cid=9835219f2b&mc_eid=7b23d23809; AI碳知的未来 [AI-Powered Carbon Future], “算力建设持续收紧：《算力窗口指导文件》释放了什么信号？” [“Computing Power Construction Continues to Tighten: What Signals Does the ‘Computing Power Window Guidance Document’ Send?”], WeChat [微信公众号], June 25, 2026. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/IXMVnPmuow0JBzuPHDU4nw?mc_cid=9835219f2b&mc_eid=7b23d23809&poc_token=HFXXWGqjBF0S92LmTPtmCC7RXljt-F8v1AzUro5I.
[35] 硅基棠 [Silicon棠], “算力建设迎强监管，算力中心不再想建就能建！ [Compute Infrastructure Faces Tightened Oversight: Computing Centers Can No Longer Be Built at Will!], Zhihu [知乎], November 14, 2025. https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/1972806924845224653.
[36] Angela Glowacki and Cartus Bo-Xiang You, “Abundant Electricity Isn't Enough: China’s Overbuilt AI Computing Power Is Underused,” Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), May 6, 2026. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/abundant-electricity-isnt-enough-chinas-overbuilt-ai-computing-power-is-underused/; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies, 2024, 192. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf.
[37] “部分国产芯片闲置率高达80%？智算中心建设‘点刹’背后” [“Idle Rates for Some Domestic Chips Reach 80 Percent? What Is Behind the Slowdown in AI Computing Center Construction?”], IT时报 [IT Times], April 28, 2025. https://36kr.com/p/3269610247737992; Liu Yilun, “互联网大厂「算力荒」，智算中心却在「卖卡」求生” (Internet Giants Face a 'Compute Shortage,' While Intelligent Computing Centers Struggle to Survive by Selling GPUs), Leiphone, April 21, 2025. https://www.leiphone.com/category/chips/8HySeaP0szP8tU9i.html.. Caiwei Chen, “China Built Hundreds of AI Data Centers to Catch the AI Boom. Now Many Stand Unused,” MIT Technology Review, March 26, 2025. https://www.technologyreview.com/2025/03/26/1113802/china-ai-data-centers-unused/.
[38] “China Prepares $295 Billion Plan to Fund Nationwide AI Buildout, Bloomberg News Reports,” Reuters, June 9, 2026. “China Plans Network to Sell Surplus Computing Power in Crackdown on Data Centre Glut,” Reuters, July 24, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-plans-network-sell-surplus-computing-power-crackdown-data-centre-glut-2025-07-24/; Pingdingshan Municipal Administrative Approval and Government Information Management Bureau, “关于统筹推进算力中心建设打造数字经济发展新引擎的提案” [“Proposal on Coordinating and Promoting the Construction of Computing Power Centers to Create a New Engine for the Development of the Digital Economy”], July 7, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20260715151806/https:/zwdsj.pds.gov.cn/contents/63296/440080.html.