Highlights
- China Shock 2.0 Set to Continue as China’s Trade Surplus Exceeds $1 Trillion
- IMF Links Undervalued Yuan to Distortions
- Xi Purges His Top Generals, Shocking Many
- Beijing Scrutinizes Manus Acquisition
- New Gray Zone Threat: China Marshals Thousands of Fishing Vessels in a Coordinated Drill to Impede Movement in the East China Sea
China Shock 2.0 Set to Continue as China’s Trade Exceeds $1 Trillion
China’s trade surplus reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2025 as domestic economic imbalances from overproduction and weak domestic consumption led to a flood of low-priced Chinese goods in global markets.[1]
- The widening trade surplus was driven by $3.8 trillion in exports, which rose 5.5 percent year-on-year (see Figure 1).[2] Imports were essentially unchanged from last year due to persistently weak domestic demand as well as China’s efforts to reduce reliance on foreign producers.[3] Renminbi (RMB) depreciation contributed to the surplus by making imports more expensive for China while exports became cheaper for China’s trade partners.[*][4]
- As shown in Figure 2, exports of electronics and industrial inputs drove most of export growth, reflecting China’s expanding role as the world’s leading supplier of manufacturing components.[5] In particular, exports of integrated circuits rose by 26.8 percent in 2025, accounting for roughly one-fifth of the $196 billion change in overall exports.[6] Exports from China’s now world-leading new energy vehicle (NEV) industry also bolstered growth, expanding 50 percent year-on-year to total $66.9 billion in 2025.[7]
Figure 1: China’s Trade Surplus, 2020-2025 Figure 2: Chinese Export Growth Drivers, 2025
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Source: China’s General Administration of Customs, Haver Analytics.
The rest of the world has continued to bear the brunt of a “China Shock 2.0.”[†] As exports to the United States dropped following tariff hikes, Chinese exporters pivoted toward other markets, particularly in developing countries.
- China’s exports to the United States decreased 20 percent to $419.5 billion, according to Chinese customs data, as trade diverted to other markets.[8] Exports to countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America accounted for nearly three-quarters of China’s overall export growth, growing 25.8 percent, 13.4 percent, and 7.3 percent, respectively, in 2025.[9] The shift was driven partially by demand for low-cost Chinese automobiles and other consumer goods, intensifying competitive pressure on local producers in these regions.[10]
- The reorientation of China’s exports also likely reflects some level of transshipment, as well as sales of unfinished goods for final assembly, due to Chinese exporters attempting to circumvent tariffs.[‡][11] U.S. tariffs on China averaged 47.5 percent as of November 2025.[12]
- Exports of low-value packages to the United States,[§] including sales from Shein, Temu, and other e-commerce platforms, declined 30.4 percent.[13] The United States eliminated its e-commerce customs duty exemption known as de minimis in August 2025 (the Commission had made a similar recommendation in 2024).[14] This drop was more than offset as Chinese sellers pivoted to other regions. Low-value exports to Southeast Asia rose 32.7 percent to $26.3 billion, and shipments to the EU increased by 41.8 percent to $26.9 billion (though the EU is slated to eliminate its de minimis exemption in 2026).[15]
IMF Links Undervalued Yuan to Distortions
While stopping short of recommending the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) pursue RMB appreciation, International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials pointed to undervaluation of the RMB as a contributing factor in China’s growing trade imbalance.
- A July 2025 IMF assessment found RMB undervaluation of 8.5 percent.[16] Using the same methodology based on updated October 2025 IMF data, experts calculated that the RMB may be undervalued by 18 percent.[17] Goldman Sachs puts the figure higher at 25 percent undervalued in its 2026 outlook.[18]
- The IMF’s statements and broad recognition of undervaluation portend increasing pressure on the yuan to appreciate in 2026, as China’s trade partners allow devaluation of their own currencies to keep their exports competitive.[19] The yuan appreciated against the dollar in 2025 for the first time since 2021.[20] Some analysts believe China’s trade surplus could continue to grow toward $1.5 trillion even as the currency appreciates, given the current high level of undervaluation.[21]
- Xi Jinping has called for the RMB to become a “powerful currency” with global reserve currency status, a sentiment recently amplified when CCP outlet Qiushi published a Xi speech from two years ago on making China a “financial powerhouse.”[22] The PBOC has indicated a commitment to “slow and orderly” appreciation as it looks to balance export-led growth, efforts to stabilize domestic consumption, and RMB internationalization.[23] Recently, a former chief economist of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) outwardly suggested looser capital controls are needed to internationalize the RMB and should be incorporated into the upcoming 15th five-year plan.[24]
Figure 3: RMB/US$ Exchange Rate (2020-Present)
Xi Purges His Top Generals, Shocking Many
The ousting of two senior generals from the Central Military Commission (CMC)—China’s top military decision-making body—raises questions: Who is providing Xi Jinping military advice? What does this mean for military readiness? And is anyone safe from Xi’s purges?
- On January 24, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that General Zhang Youxia, China’s most senior military officer and the vice chairman of the CMC, and General Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, are both under investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations.”[25] The two generals were responsible for overseeing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military modernization plans and preparations for future combat.[26] Zhang was viewed as a close ally of Xi Jinping, both “princelings”—children of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders—who had known each other since childhood.[27] The investigation raises questions about military decision-making, military readiness, and the potential for miscalculation by China’s military.
- The short statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense did not provide details on the allegations, but a PLA Daily editorial published the same day accused both generals of seriously undermining Xi and the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and causing “immense damage to the military’s political building … and combat effectiveness.”[28] The editorial leads analysts to believe the investigation likely stems beyond corruption charges and suggests potential political disagreements over military training and development with Xi, who serves as Chairman of the CMC.[29]
- Other possible explanations for the purges put forth by analysts include Zhang Youxia’s political influence within the PLA and his potential to mobilize an opposition to Xi, Zhang’s connections to the PLA’s Equipment Development Department—which has been the center of widespread anticorruption investigations, and unsubstantiated allegations that Zhang had leaked nuclear weapons data to the United States.[30]
- Xi has now purged five of the six uniformed members of the CMC since 2022, leaving just General Zhang Shengmin, who was reappointed Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission in 2023. However, Zhang Shengmin lacks the operational and combat experience of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.[31] Experts noted if Zhang and Liu were removed due to disagreements with Xi on military timelines and plans, their replacements could be more incentivized to implement Xi’s policies regarding Taiwan and heighten the risk of miscalculation.[32]
- China’s state-media published subsequent commentary on January 31 likely intended to reassure a domestic audience that the investigations strengthen the PLA in the long term, despite short term “difficulties and pain.”[33] The PLA Daily commentary referred to corruption cases as the precise uprooting of “diseased trees,” and underscored optimism for a “new-era” of officers who are nurtured by Xi Jinping thought and thus trustworthy to advance the PLA’s combat capabilities and transform the PLA into a world-class force.[34]
Beijing Scrutinizes Manus Acquisition
China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) launched an investigation into Meta’s late December acquisition of China-rooted, Singapore-based artificial intelligence (AI) startup Manus, alleging its transfer of technology and data may have violated export controls and other regulations. The inquiry potentially presages greater efforts to prevent Chinese AI startups from relocating.
- Overshadowed in headlines by the success of DeepSeek, Manus nonetheless made waves in the tech world in early 2025 with the launch of an AI agent that could perform a variety of complex tasks on behalf of users.[35] A month before Manus’s acquisition by Meta, Microsoft announced a partnership to incorporate Manus into its Agent 365 platform.[36]
- Originally a Chinese company, Manus moved its headquarters to Singapore and distanced itself from Chinese state investment—a strategy called "Singapore washing”—to boost its access to foreign funding, customers, and software.[37] For Beijing, Manus’s success could have been a triumph for China’s AI ambitions but instead underscores challenges in its domestic market and fundraising ecosystem, particularly after U.S. outbound investment restrictions went into effect last year.[38]
- Following Meta’s acquisition of Manus, which occurred several months after Manus relocated to Singapore, MOFCOM reportedly launched an investigation into whether the deal complies with Chinese export controls, technology import and export regulations, and foreign investment law.[39] MOFCOM is ostensibly examining whether Manus’ technologies were barred from overseas transfer under China's Catalogue of Export Prohibited and Restricted Technologies.[40] Subsequent reporting by Bloomberg indicated Beijing’s investigation was expanding into potential violations related to taxes and cross-border currency flows.[41]
- The ambiguity of the investigation provides Beijing future options to negotiate with Chinese companies in overseas markets, even if they have relocated out of China. Beijing is likely weighing its next steps carefully, balancing promoting corporate global expansion versus sending a warning to homegrown AI companies that might follow Manus' Singapore-washing playbook.[42] In the long run, Beijing will likely deploy both sticks and carrots, preventing strategic technology and talent loss while simultaneously trying to address the underlying factors that prompted Manus to relocate abroad in the first place.
New Gray Zone Threat: China Marshals Thousands of Fishing Vessels in Coordinated Drills to Impede Movement in the East China Sea
Thousands of Chinese fishing boats formed a line hundreds of miles long in a novel operation revealing a potential tactic for a future blockade or invasion of Taiwan.
- Analysis of AIS data revealed large mobilizations of Chinese civilian fishing vessels in the East China Sea, one on Christmas Day involving 2,000 vessels, followed by another on January 11 with 1,400 vessels.[43] While fishing boats have long been part of China’s gray zone toolkit, this mobilization was of unprecedented scale, with the formations stretching for around 200–290 miles.[44] See this link for a fascinating interactive graphic from the New York Times.
- The mobilizations bracketed China’s December 29–30 Justice Mission 2025 military drills around Taiwan, which practiced encirclement, blockading, and obstructing transit.[45] While there was no Chinese reporting directly connecting the fishing vessel mobilizations to the Taiwan exercises, the timing suggests China may be practicing mass mobilization of civilian vessels for use during a Taiwan contingency, where they could complicate U.S. military operations by overwhelming radars and sensors, confounding targeting for missiles and torpedoes, and complicating navigation.[46]
- The apparent coordination of civilian vessel mobilization with the recent military drills suggests the maritime militia may begin to play a greater role in gray zone pressure against Taiwan than it has to date.[47] The province of Fujian across the Taiwan Strait has prioritized strengthening its maritime militia, most recently with measures to increase monetary and other benefits for participating in militia work.[48] Civilian vessels are also likely to play a role in enhancing China’s sealift capacity in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, and they could be called upon for missions like reconnaissance, search and rescue, and mine laying in addition to participating in a blockade enforcement.[49]
Figure 4: Vessel Mobilization on January 11, 2025
This issue of the China Bulletin was prepared by Graham Ayres, Daniel Blaugher, Rachael Burton, Joe Federici, Ngor Luong, Zoe Merewether, and Nicole Morgret. You may reach us at contact@uscc.gov.
Disclaimer: This bulletin is the product of research performed by professional staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) and was prepared to support the ongoing research and deliberations of the Commission. Posting of this bulletin to the Commission’s website is intended to promote greater awareness and understanding of developing issues for Congressional staff and the public, in support of the Commission’s efforts to “monitor, investigate, and report” on U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. national security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 (as subsequently modified in law, see uscc.gov/charter). The public release of this document does not imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or considerations raised in this staff-prepared bulletin.
Footnotes
[*] The RMB fell 3.5 percent in value against the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) basket of currencies. However, it appreciated relative to the dollar, from RMB 7.19 per dollar at the start of 2025 to RMB 7.03 per dollar by December 31. China Foreign Exchange Trade System via Haver Analytics.
[†] For more, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 8, “China Shock 2.0,” in 2025 Annual Report to Congress, November 2025, 429–471.
[‡] For more, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 8, “China Shock 2.0,” in 2025 Annual Report to Congress, November 2025, 429–471, and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 4, “Unsafe and Unregulated Chinese Consumer Goods: Challenges in Enforcing Import Regulations and Laws,” in 2024 Annual Report to Congress, November 2024, 278–292.
[§] Low-value exports refer to exports reported under the commodity code 9804, which records exports that qualify for China’s simplified customs procedures.
Endnotes
[1] “China’s Exports Boom Far from Over after Record Trade Surplus,” Bloomberg, January 13, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-14/china-ends-2025-with-1-2-trillion-trade-surplus-as-exports-soar.
[2] China’s General Administration of Customs via Haver Analytics.
[3] Wataru Suzuki, “China’s Exports Surge, Trade Surplus Hits Record $1.2tn despite US Tariffs,” Nikkei Asia, January 14, 2026. https://asia.nikkei.com/economy/trade/china-s-exports-surge-trade-surplus-hits-record-1.2tn-despite-us-tariffs; Thomas Hale and Haohsiang Ko, “How China Racked Up a $1tn Trade Surplus,” Financial Times, December 11, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/cc04b14e-577b-4668-8897-dea96e60199f.
[4] “IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to the People’s Republic of China,” International Monetary Fund, December 10, 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/12/10/pr-25415-china-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-mission-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china; James Kynge, “China’s Record $1 Trillion-Dollar Trade Surplus Shows the Renminbi Should Be Allowed to Appreciate,” Chatham House, December 8, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/chinas-record-1-trillion-plus-trade-surplus-shows-renminbi-should-be-allowed-appreciate.
[5] Richard Baldwin, “Is China Still the World’s Sole Manufacturing Superpower after Covid?” Richard Baldwin’s Substack, September 25, 2025. https://rbaldwin.substack.com/p/is-china-still-the-worlds-sole-manufacturing; Agatha Kratz, Lauren Piper, and Juliana Bouchaud, “China and the Future of Global Supply Chains,” Rhodium Group, February 4, 2025. https://rhg.com/research/china-and-the-future-of-global-supplychains/.
[6] China’s General Administration of Customs.
[7] China’s General Administration of Customs; Thomas Hale and Haohsiang Ko, “How China Racked Up a $1tn Trade Surplus,” Financial Times, December 11, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/cc04b14e-577b-4668-8897-dea96e60199f.
[8] China’s General Administration of Customs.
[9] China’s General Administration of Customs.
[10] Keith Bradsher, “China’s Trade Surplus Climbs Past $1 Trillion for First Time,” New York Times, December 7, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/07/business/china-trade-surplus.html.
[11] Owen Walker, “US Tariffs Prompt Surge in Chinese Exports to South-East Asia,” Financial Times, December 7, 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/16d0336b-d855-42ae-b0a7-d509d21cec9b.
[12] Chad P. Bown, “US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 14, 2025.
[13] China’s General Administration of Customs.
[14] Arriana McLymore and Helen Reid, “How Will the End of the De Minimis Exemption Impact US Shoppers and Businesses?” Reuters, August 29, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/what-end-de-minimis-exemption-means-us-shoppers-businesses-2025-08-29/.
[15] China’s General Administration of Customs; European Commission, “Customs: Council Agrees to Levy Customs Duty on Small Parcels as of 1 July 2026,” December 12, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/12/customs-council-agrees-to-levy-customs-duty-on-small-parcels-as-of-1-july-2026/.
[16] Brad Setser and Mark Sobel, “It’s Time for China to Let the Renminbi Appreciate Sharply,” OMFIF, November 18, 2025. https://www.omfif.org/2025/11/its-time-for-china-to-let-the-renminbi-appreciate-sharply/; International Monetary Fund, External Sector Report, 2025, 77.
[17] Brad Setser and Mark Sobel, “It’s Time for China to Let the Renminbi Appreciate Sharply,” OMFIF, November 18, 2025. https://www.omfif.org/2025/11/its-time-for-china-to-let-the-renminbi-appreciate-sharply/.
[18] Srinivasan Sivabalan, “China’s Yuan Is 25% Undervalued on Trade Basis, Goldman Says,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/china-s-yuan-is-25-undervalued-on-trade-basis-goldman-says.
[19] Brad W. Setser, “China’s Currency Is Now Facing Substantial Appreciation Pressure,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 8, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/chinas-currency-now-facing-substantial-appreciation-pressure; Srinivasan Sivabalan, “China’s Yuan Is 25% Undervalued on Trade Basis, Goldman Says,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/china-s-yuan-is-25-undervalued-on-trade-basis-goldman-says.
[20] Srinivasan Sivabalan, “China’s Yuan Is 25% Undervalued on Trade Basis, Goldman Says,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/china-s-yuan-is-25-undervalued-on-trade-basis-goldman-says.
[21] Srinivasan Sivabalan, “China’s Yuan Is 25% Undervalued on Trade Basis, Goldman Says,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/china-s-yuan-is-25-undervalued-on-trade-basis-goldman-says
[22] Chucheng Feng, “The latest Qiushi Publication Featuring a Xi speech on Building China into a Strong Financial Nation,” LinkedIn, February 2, 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/fengchucheng_the-latest-qiushi-publication-featuring-a-activity-7424311643850817536-i_Y_; “Xi Jinping calls for China’s renminbi to attain global reserve currency status,” Financial Times, February 1, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/c948b978-c22b-44b7-ba3d-4798e641e673; Xi Jinping, “走好中国特色金融发展之路，建设金融强国” (Follow the Path of Financial Development with Chinese Characteristics and Build a Financial Powerhouse), Qiushi, January 31, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260202135458/https://www.qstheory.cn/20260131/487aa5b5e0804f7ea968118e541b4e91/c.html.
[23] Carlos Casanova, “China's Renminbi Internationalisation: The Next Phase of Current Account Reforms,” UBP, January 14, 2026. https://www.ubp.com/en/news-insights/newsroom/china-s-renminbi-internationalisation-the-next-phase-of-current-account-reforms; Srinivasan Sivabalan, “China’s Yuan Is 25% Undervalued on Trade Basis, Goldman Says,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/china-s-yuan-is-25-undervalued-on-trade-basis-goldman-says; Brad Setser and Mark Sobel, “It’s Time for China to Let the Renminbi Appreciate Sharply,” OMFIF, November 18, 2025. https://www.omfif.org/2025/11/its-time-for-china-to-let-the-renminbi-appreciate-sharply/.
[24] “中金缪延亮：国际货币秩序的“变”与“不变” ——从“中心-外围”结构看国际货币体系的推动力” [CICC's Miao Yanliang: The "Changes" and "Continuities" of the International Monetary Order – Examining the Driving Forces of the International Monetary System from a "Center-Periphery" Perspective], Weixin, November 27, 2025. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/v70u6UcR6kgK5mtCDwsGfQ.
[25] China’s Ministry of National Defense, 张又侠、刘振立涉嫌严重违纪违法被立案审查调查 [Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli Are under Investigation for Suspected Serious Violations of Discipline and Law], January 24, 2026. Translated. https://web.archive.org/web/20260128175950/http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16439106.html.
[26] Kathrin Hille, “Xi Jinping’s Purge of Top General Sends China’s Military into Uncharted Waters,” Financial Times, January 27, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/3751c839-a9e1-4828-8e4f-0c6d9bb7e20c; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, December 18, 2024, 39–40.
[27] Mei Mei Chu, Antoni Slodkowski, and Michael Martina, “’Nobody Is Safe’: China’s Xi Targets His Close Ally in Purge,” Reuters, January 26, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/nobody-is-safe-chinas-xi-targets-his-close-ally-purge-2026-01-26/; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, December 18, 2024, 39–40; Cheng Li, “Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle (Part 2: Friends from Xi’s Formative Years),” China Leadership Monitor, no. 44, 6–8. https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44cl.pdf.
[28]解放军报社论：坚决打赢军队反腐败斗争攻坚战持久战总体战 [PLA Daily Editorial: Resolutely Win the Decisive, Protracted, and Overall War in the Fight against Corruption in the Military], Xinhua News Agency, January 24, 2026. Translated. https://web.archive.org/web/20260128175333/http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16439153.html
[29] Bill Bishop, “PLA Purges Intensify: Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under Investigation,” Sinocism, January 24, 2026. https://sinocism.com/p/pla-purges-intensify-zhang-youxia; K. Tristan Tang, “Zhang Youxia’s Differences with Xi Jinping Led to His Purge,” Jamestown Foundation, January 26, 2026. https://jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-differences-with-xi-jinping-led-to-his-purge/.
[30] Jonathan Czin and John Culver, “Xi the Destroyer,” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2026. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/xi-destroyer; Austin Ramzy, “Rapid Buildup of Chinese Military Fuels Corruption Scandals,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/rapid-buildup-of-chinese-military-fuels-corruption-scandals-2ca8a132?; Lingling Wei and Chun Han Wong, “China’s Top General Accused of Giving Nuclear Secrets to U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-top-general-accused-of-giving-nuclear-secrets-to-u-s-b8f59dae?; “Xi’s Purge of Top General Spurs Questions on Taiwan, Succession,” Bloomberg, January 25, 2026. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-26/xi-s-purge-of-top-general-spurs-questions-on-taiwan-succession.
[31] Kathrin Hille, “Xi Jinping’s Purge of Top General Sends China’s Military into Uncharted Waters,” Financial Times, January 27, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/3751c839-a9e1-4828-8e4f-0c6d9bb7e20c; Lingling Wei and Chun Han Wong, “China’s Top General Accused of Giving Nuclear Secrets to U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-top-general-accused-of-giving-nuclear-secrets-to-u-s-b8f59dae?; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025, December 23, 2025, 14.
[32] Kathrin Hille, “Xi Jinping’s Purge of Top General Sends China’s Military into Uncharted Waters,” Financial Times, January 27, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/3751c839-a9e1-4828-8e4f-0c6d9bb7e20c; Lee Ya-wen, Wu Shu-wei, and Shih-Hsiu-chuan, ”Analysis/Xi's Military Purge Raises Taiwan Miscalculation Risk: Experts,” Focus Taiwan, January 27, 2026. https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202601270023.
[33] Manoj Kewalramani, “PLA Daily Commentary on Purge of Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli: 'Special Tempering' Underway; 'Diseased Trees' Being Uprooted; & New-Era Officers to Take Charge,” Tracking People’s Daily, January 31, 2026. https://trackingpeoplesdaily.substack.com/p/pla-daily-editorial-on-purge-of-zhang.
[34] Manoj Kewalramani, “PLA Daily Commentary on Purge of Zhang Youxia & Liu Zhenli: 'Special Tempering' Underway; 'Diseased Trees' Being Uprooted; & New-Era Officers to Take Charge,” Tracking People’s Daily, January 31, 2026. https://trackingpeoplesdaily.substack.com/p/pla-daily-editorial-on-purge-of-zhang.
[35] Noah Berman, Eliot Chen, and Rachel Cheung, “Manus, Meta and a Deal That Goes to the Heart of the U.S.-China AI Rivalry,” WireChina, January 14, 2026. https://www.thewirechina.com/2026/01/14/manus-meta-and-a-deal-that-goes-to-the-heart-of-the-us-china-ai-rivalry/; Kyle Wiggers, “Manus Probably Isn’t China’s Second ‘DeepSeek Moment’,” TechCrunch, March 9, 2025. https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/09/manus-probably-isnt-chinas-second-deepseek-moment/; Theo Burman, “What Is Manus? China’s World-First Fully Autonomous AI Agent Explained,” Newsweek, March 6, 2021. https://www.newsweek.com/manus-new-china-ai-agent-explained-2040445.
[36] “Manus Announces Collaboration with Microsoft to Unlock Broader Applications for Its Personal AI,” Microsoft, November 19, 2025. https://manus.im/blog/manus-microsoft-agent365.
[37] Noah Berman, Eliot Chen, and Rachel Cheung, “Manus, Meta and a Deal That Goes to the Heart of the U.S.-China AI Rivalry,” WireChina, January 14, 2026. https://www.thewirechina.com/2026/01/14/manus-meta-and-a-deal-that-goes-to-the-heart-of-the-us-china-ai-rivalry/; Raffaele Huang, Kate Clark, and Amrith Ramkumar, “How Meta’s Newest Acquisition Target Got Around Worries over Its Ties to China,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/how-metas-newest-acquisition-target-got-around-worries-over-its-ties-to-china-de2d24b6; “25亿美元卖给美国，武汉起家的Manus为什么出?” [Sold to the United States for $2.5 Billion, Why Did Manus, Which Started in Wuhan, Leave?], Wuxiang Business Trend, December 31, 2025. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzU2OTk2MzMzNA==&mid=2247639986&idx=1&sn=044a87493a31f0938323ef9870547464&scene=21&poc_token=HLQ2emmjc3dzIhFPyVl3OM10aNS6BxdGMTHNI-t1; Brian Spegele, “China’s Sprint for Tech Dominance Can’t Hide an Economy Full of Holes,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-economy-gap-tech-advance-970296f1?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdN4ERaMwJ1D6QtIl7Jt2e-DgA-pTZYpanFyNk-HsbiLyPHiK1YGAu9&gaa_ts=697a3cbf&gaa_sig=dqo9N3AtZtpYDIxyFQwGuZ8oW5nH0dKVJFheZki1zvTtd2LMmSX3Lr5xE2DZd8_jgFQQZaJZQCVeqg4JCIU9Sg%3D%3D; Charles Rollet, “The US Is Reviewing Benchmark’s Investment into Chinese AI Startup Manus,” TechCrunch, May 9, 2025. https://techcrunch.com/2025/05/09/the-us-is-reviewing-benchmarks-investment-into-chinese-ai-startup-manus/.
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