

Statement of

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“To cope with wars at the age of information, when guiding thinking, we should try hard to prevent direct conflicts with the enemy in the high-technology field, and should create and select the most favorable timing, direction, form, and target to annihilate the enemy’s effective forces by combining conventional assaults with the ‘assassin’s mace.’”

From Li Jijun (Lt. General Retd.), former Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, “China Military Science on Strategic Thinking, Scientific Decisionmaking”

Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, thank you for inviting me to share with you my views on what appears to be a new and very significant wrinkle in the conduct of information war by the People’s Republic of China addressing the world of Islam.

In the last two years of the post-9/11 era, China seems to have realized that the United States is facing an uphill battle in its war on terrorism in the world of Islam. This is decidedly a situation which, in the estimation of China’s leadership, provides ripe opportunities for gaining new friends and new strategic openings to sell weapons, to sign energy contracts, and above all, to develop spheres of influence.

In addition, I wish to bring to your attention a recent “asymmetric war” that was fought between the Hezbollah of Lebanon and Israel in July-August 2006. Given the import of asymmetric warfare to the People’s Republic of China, the Hezbollah-Israeli war of 2006 was a critical development. I wish to focus on what I consider to be some major lessons learned by the Peoples’ Republic of China.

¹ Views expressed herein are private and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

My premise is that, considering the fledgling strategic partnership between China and Iran, the chances are high that China's asymmetric warfare specialists not only carefully studied the Hezbollah-Israeli war, but also consulted with their counterparts from Iran and Hezbollah about what worked and what did not. That type of information will be incorporated in China's own operational and tactical countermeasures for any future potential military conflict with a powerful adversary.

I belong neither to the pessimist school (the China threat) nor to the optimist school (the U.S. is safe from the largely hyped China threat), especially in the realm of information war. My position is that the United States is safe from the China threat for now. However, in the context of asymmetric as well as information war, the best offense is a proactive defense.

No one is more voracious a reader of the most recent trends in America's warfighting capabilities, in the American military and civilian officials' handling of information warfare, public diplomacy, and asymmetric war than China's strategic community.² As a result of these studies, they attempt not only to adopt into their strategic repertoire what they consider to be some of the most relevant trends, but also to focus on developing proficient countermeasures.

In the realm of information war and public diplomacy, China's strategic thinkers are closely studying America's vulnerabilities related to its global war on terrorism (GWOT) in the world of Islam, and are eager to adopt strategies that would put their own country in sympathy with the Muslim plight.

In the domain of asymmetric war, an important aspect of China's strategy is to arm surrogates and let them do the fighting with the United States or its allies. In this context, special attention should be paid not only to what they are supplying to Iran, but what Iran, in turn, is supplying to Hezbollah of Lebanon. This is a generic description of China's asymmetric war and information war strategies. Its specifics will be spelled out below.

We must watch with rapt attention China's own innovative approaches to information war and public diplomacy, its interpretation of our strategic thinking, and especially its capabilities and approaches to asymmetric war. The underlying purpose in all these realms is to look for openings, points of vulnerabilities, and then maximize China's advantages.

The focus of my testimony will be to address questions number 2 and 6 as posed in the letter of invitation.

China's Information War against the United States in the World of Islam

² Public Diplomacy is defined as, "the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives. <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm>

Question # 2: What capabilities has China developed for conducting information warfare?

In the post 9/11 era, as part of its information war against the United States, China has decided to exploit the high degree of anti-American sentiments in the world of Islam. In an article published in the international issue of People's Daily dated February 1, 2007, Ye Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, was critical of Bush regarding his conduct of the GWOT.³

Publication of this article is important for three reasons. First, it was published at a time when the security situation in Iraq is being watched closely by the world of Islam. As Pew opinion polls have indicated time after time, political developments in Iraq and Afghanistan are fueling the feelings of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.⁴ The PRC seems to have decided to exploit this sentiment by ostensibly sympathizing with Muslims. Second, China may be hoping that Muslims are ill-informed or that China would ignore its own suppression of Muslims of the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in the name of fighting its own "war on terror." Third, this duplicity notwithstanding, it is clear that Islam is emerging as an issue of "high politics" for leaders in Beijing.

Ye criticizes President Bush for his slip of the tongue in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, when he depicted the impending "war on terror" as a "crusade." Of course, he apologized for that. However, Ye notes that "Muslims were still not satisfied, sensing violation of the authority of Allah." Ye also points out that the "scope" of Bush's "war on terror" has evolved from "reforming Islam" to nakedly opposing "Islamic fascism."

There is little doubt that President Bush's use of the phrase "Islamic fascism" did not sit well in the world of Islam. Muslims never got tired of reiterating that, while Islam has no record of creating a holocaust against a people (such as Jews) because of their religion, the Christian world does. They also point out the double standard in the West for not calling Irish terrorists "Christian terrorists" or "Christian fascists," while there is an ostensible zest to apply the title of a nefarious ideology, which was the product of its own culture, to denigrate Muslims who are violating their religious precepts by indulging in terrorism. China is fully aware of these sentiments. That appears to be one reason why that phrase was also a topic of discussion in Ye's essay.

China's own Marxist interpretation of Islam is perceptible in Ye's observations about religion in general. He writes, "Although a form of social ideology, religions are simply reflections of social and economic contradictions. Conflicts caused by religious issues in today's world mask economic and political struggles."

No Muslim scholar would agree with this dialectical, materialistic interpretation of Islam.

³ Extracted from my essay, "Islam as a Political Issue in China," published in Asia Times Online on February 10, 2007, without a byline. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IB10Ad01.html>

⁴ Pew Global Attitudes, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=827>

Ye goes on to note, "The 'clash of civilizations' is simply a fig leaf of real interest clashes, but in social and economic contradictions religion often plays a unique role. Religion can summon the masses. Conflicts for real economic and political benefits often borrow the sacred cloak of religion, and wars are fought in its name. Religion, however, once entangled in such conflicts, sharpens and complicates the matter significantly."

Muslims would certainly agree with that last sentence.

Why has China become so concerned about President Bush's handling of the "global war on terror"? After all, despite all the mistakes, abuses, and mishandlings in Iraq, the United States has not deprived Muslims of freedom or suppressed them, as China itself has been doing in Xinjiang.

One explanation is that, since a popular perception in Muslim countries—not necessarily a correct one, but certainly a discernment that has found millions of sympathizers in the world of Islam—of the "war on terror" is that it is, in reality, a "war" against Islam, China is simply trying to gain political capital. And there is a lot of political capital to be made on that issue. Close attention should be paid whether and how recurrently China uses this approach in its information war against the United States in the coming months and years.

Ye, quite deftly, also uses the phrase "unilateralism" to criticize the Bush administration at a time when the general perception in the Middle East is that the United States is getting ready to strike Iran, which has been an important strategic partner of China.

As much as the Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf do not wish to see Iran develop nuclear weapons, they certainly do not want to see another round of military operations—even in the form of air strikes—which are bound to further destabilize the region. They also are afraid that, if military action is taken against Iran by the United States or its proxy (Israel), Iran will trigger its own series of asymmetric actions against both.

So, by condemning "unilateralism," China is also winning friends from the Arab side as well as Iran. At least in Ye's essay, China is placing terrorism and unilateralism on the same plane as destructive forces. While one can seriously question the moral equivalency of these issues, one must also understand, from the Chinese vantage point, why that equivalency is so needed at this time.

China has always rejected the notion of unilateralism of other great powers, and especially of superpowers. In the post-Cold War and post-September 11 eras, it has perceived that option as one of the tools in the hands of US decision-makers to threaten military action against China if it were to attack Taiwan.

By condemning unilateralism to fight terrorism, China also hopes to win ample sympathies in the streets of Muslim countries, from Malaysia to Mauritania. Muslims have directly linked unilateralism to regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. They also

abhor it as a source of establishing US hegemony in the world of Islam. Even when the United States does not act unilaterally, they believe, it gives a wink and a nod to Israel, as was the case during the 34-day war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

From the perspective of the balance of power, China's condemnation of unilateralism also underscores its desire to see the evolution of a multipolar global order in which the United States will no longer decide when or whether to use force to impose its will. A multipolar global order also will enable China to influence, if not to veto, America's decision to be unilateral.

China's conduct of foreign policy is highly calculated and calibrated. In this sense, by allowing one of its officials—especially an official who deals with religious affairs—to make such public remarks, China is indulging in an exercise to win friends in the world of Islam. As a rising power, leaders of that nation know only too well how important it is for their country to signal to the Muslim world that they are ready and willing to emerge as an important actor, especially if the United States lowers or loses its presence and prestige in the Middle East.

China's Continued Preoccupation with Asymmetric War: Lessons Learned from the Hezbollah-Israeli War

Question 6: Does it appear that China is developing capabilities intended to be used to undercut the qualitative advantage of the United States if a conflict between the two countries were to occur?

Chinese leaders have decided long ago that, in the wake of a conflict, their military cannot fight and win a battle against the U.S. military on a force-on-force basis. However, that reality was not going to discourage a country whose strategic culture has produced original thinkers of the caliber and reputation of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong.

In answering this question, one has to remind oneself of a few famous quotes of Sun Tzu: "All warfare is based on deception." "If your enemy ... is in superior strength, evade him..." and "Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant." One must also recall *Unrestricted War*, published in 1999, by two senior Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. It stated that, when faced with a technologically superior enemy, it is "necessary to dare to completely upset the order of the cards in one's hands and reorganize them in accordance with the needs of war and the interests of a nation."

The conventional wisdom regarding China's asymmetric war doctrine is that it is "aimed at finding key vulnerabilities in American forces."⁵ In the post-9/11 era, that doctrine is focused not only on military-related susceptibilities, but also on other weak points. In this context, one has to keep in mind Chang Mengxiong's concept of "assassin's mace" ("shashou jian"). Using the analogy of acupuncture for fighting asymmetric wars, this concept argues that even a superpower like the United States has a great number of points

⁵ Christopher P. Towmey, "Chinese Doctrines As Strategic Culture: Assessing their Effects," *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, October 2005, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/twomeyOct05.asp>

of vulnerabilities. If the focus of asymmetric attack is on those points, then the military giant can be brought down by a “weak” power like China.

Because of space limitations, a full-blown discussion of this concept is not possible. Suffice it to say that it goes beyond developing a variety of military operations and tactics. It also focuses on exploiting America’s vulnerabilities in the realm of oil imports, causing a run on the U.S. dollar, or on suddenly switching China’s reserve currency from the dollar to the Euro or the Yen, as well as finding new techniques of conducting cyberattacks on U.S. computers. Given the ever escalating dependence of the U.S. civil and military sectors on the use of information technology, America’s vulnerability to cyberattacks will never disappear completely. From the asymmetric war-related penchant of China for “leveling the playing field,” this vulnerability holds virtually infinite promise.

Proliferation of low-tech weapons and transfer of low-tech military platforms formulate a very crucial aspect of China’s attempt to “completely upset the order of the cards” that Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui talked about in *Unrestricted War*. Depending on the significance of its friends and allies in different regions of the world, China has been steadily proliferating these platforms as an essential aspect of upsetting the order of the cards.

The least publicized—indeed, a virtually unknown—aspect of this policy is how much information the PRC has been providing in the use of low-tech weapons, or in training its friends on fighting asymmetric war, either with the U.S. or with its allies. The chief purpose of this policy is to create regional surrogates in order to contain the United States. For instance, China’s concentration on Iran, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has consistently challenged the U.S. hegemony and presence, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. Iran is also one of the chief backers of Hezbollah of Lebanon in its fight with Israel. The fact that Iran is following a policy of proliferating asymmetrical weapons and platforms to Hezbollah also complements China’s own predilection for the proliferation of these weapons and technology, tactics, and techniques.

The Hezbollah-Israeli war of July-August 2006 (aka, the second Lebanon war) is important for China because it was, first and foremost, an asymmetric fight. According to one observer, “The professors of the University of Hezbollah have just rocketed past all the theoretical thinkers at cushy U.S. war colleges.”⁶ Hezbollah did not anticipate an intense Israeli response when it kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006. However, an important aspect of their fighting strategy was to use Katyusha rockets—known for their lack of precision—as terror weapons. Hezbollah’s use of mobile launchers to fire those rockets would have been more effective than it was, had it not been for Israel’s capabilities to effectively search for and destroy them.

⁶ John E. Carey, “Hezbollah is Way Ahead in Asymmetric Warfare,” <http://johnib.wordpress.com/2006/08/17/hezbollah-is-way-ahead-in-asymmetric-warfare/>

There is little doubt that the Hezbollah-Israeli war was studied with high interest by both China and Taiwan for the same reason.⁷ The PRC studied it to fine tune its asymmetric war doctrine in a potential conflict with the lone superpower. Taiwan studied it to develop countermeasures against the dominant PRC military.

In an article on that war, published in Taiwan's National Defense Magazine, Colonel Lu Chun-sheng, an instructor at the Army Command and Staff College of the National Defense University of that country, focused on the tactics and operations of both Hezbollah and Israel and concluded that "the ROC should draw inspiration for its dealing with the mighty PRC military from the Hezbollah in its success in carrying out asymmetric warfare operations against the mighty Israeli defense forces. On the principles of 'effective deterrence, resolute defense,' the ROC military and our massive reserve forces should strive to attain defensive operational advantages via conducting military analyses and applications studies of specific coastal and urban landforms, namely, the Penghu and Taiwan Islands. The military should also study ways to better conduct formal guerrilla warfare operations and master the essence of asymmetrical warfare operations, while tempering a firm and tough anti-enemy spirit and understanding the importance of collaboration between the military and civilian sides, and so forth."⁸

What type of lessons is the PLA likely to have drawn from the Hezbollah-Israeli war? Presented below are some highlights of this war, and of Hezbollah's fighting strategy that the PLA is likely to have found interesting and worth incorporating to suit China's version of a potential asymmetrical war with a considerably powerful enemy.

Table 1. China's Asymmetric War-Related Lessons from the Hezbollah-Israeli War

Noteworthy Features of Hezbollah-Israeli War	Lessons for China
This war was depicted as a "turning point in unmanned warfare." Hezbollah also used drones, and four Iran-made <i>Ababil</i> UAVs during the war (None of those UAVs could do damage; however, Iran might have learned a lot about increasing the	The PRC has already built a number of short-range UAVs as well as some long-range UAVs, Cheng Hong (CH-1). So a UAV-dominated military campaign is very much a part of China's evolving doctrine of asymmetric war.

⁷ "Israel and Lebanon War- An Investigation into Military Conflict between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah Guerrillas,"

https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_240_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/6849256?action=advancedSearch&highlightQuery=eJzTSM7IzEtUcPRzUUgsrszNTS0pykwGc8sTi8B0Sn4yUCwvFcwxMjAw0wQAxwcQSQ%3D%3D&fileSize=76176

⁸ *Ibid.*

<p>potency of those UAVs in future combat operations).⁹</p>	
<p>4,228 short- and medium-range rockets, artillery, and missiles struck the Israeli territory; Israeli air power remained “essentially useless against small, well-concealed Katyusha-class threats. So too was the Israeli Arrow Weapon System, whose powerful interceptors were designed to defend against improved Scud-class tactical ballistic missiles, not the primitive exploding pipes that pummeled the Israeli home front.”¹⁰ By the end of the war, Hezbollah was launching an average of 200 weapons each day.</p>	<p>Swarming an adversary with missiles is very much a part of China’s warfighting strategy. It is reported to have stationed 790 short-range ballistic missiles against Taiwan, signaling that that strategy will be implemented against Taiwan in the wake of a conflict. It should also be kept in mind that the number of those missiles keeps increasing.¹¹</p>
<p>Israel found out that Hezbollah fighters were very quick about emerging from their hideouts to launch their medium-range missiles (which the Israelis depicted as “suicide launchers”) and then disappearing among the civilian residential areas within a matter of seconds</p>	<p>While one may be tempted to dismiss the incorporation of “suicide launchers” in China’s asymmetric war doctrine, one has to keep in mind that the use of the “human wave” attack was a characteristic of Mao Zedong’s warfighting strategy during the Korean War.</p>
<p>The Israeli Air Force “attained full operational capability of the World’s first Boost Phase Launch Intercept (BPLI) force, a tightly linked network of manned aircraft and UAVs that saturated the airspace to hunt and immediately kill small, mobile, medium-range missile launchers.”¹²</p>	<p>Realizing that the U.S. military will immediately incorporate Israel’s effective use of BPLI tactics, China is likely to develop countermeasures to those tactics to suit its own future campaign requirements.</p>
<p>According to one observer from the Middle East Institute, “A conventional army cannot play its role very well</p>	<p>Chinese military thinkers are fully focused on the challenge of dealing with a powerful enemy. Consider</p>

⁹ For a detailed discussion of this subject, see “Terrorists Develop Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” <http://www.armscontrol.ru/UAV/mirsad1.htm>

¹⁰ Barbara Opall-Rome, “Israel Needs Offense, Defense to Meet Missile Threat,” DefenseNews.com, October 2, 2006, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2134381&C=mideast>

¹¹ “Another Look At China’s Military Growth (06/07/2006),” *Periscope Special Reports*, June 2006.

¹² Barbara Opall-Rome, “Sensor to Shooter in 1 Minute,” DefenseNews.com, October 2, 2006, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2140340&C=airwar>

<p>when fighting with an armed guerrilla group like Hezbollah, although Israel is as powerful a military force as the outside world imagines.”</p>	<p>the following observation made recently by retired Lt. General Li Jijun: “To cope with wars at the age of information, when guiding thinking, we should try hard to prevent direct conflicts with the enemy in the high-technology field, and should create and select the most favorable timing, direction, form, and target annihilate the enemy’s effective forces by combining conventional assaults with the ‘assassin’s mace.’”¹³</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hezbollah’s use of TOW anti-tank missiles (which the United States supplied to Iran decades ago and might have been reproduced by Iran through reverse engineering) was effective. • Hezbollah fighters were also quite effective in hacking into Israel’s radio communications and monitoring the constantly changing radio frequency of Israeli troops and effectively targeting advancing Israeli armor.¹⁴ • Aside from using older anti-tank guided missiles—AT-3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to one recent report, “The line between China’s anti-ship missile development and that of longer-range stand-off weapons has become increasingly blurred in recent times. China continues to refine older and in some respects outmoded weapons (typically the YJ-6/C-60 family). Alongside these, new long-range anti-ship weapons with no obvious Chinese predecessor are now being fielded that may already be evolving into land-attack missiles.”¹⁶ • It is hard to establish whether this tactic, which Iran provided to Hezbollah fighters, was indigenous to Iran’s own asymmetric war doctrine; however, one can be rest assured that the PLA is far more advanced in the use of this

¹³ From Li Jijun (Lt. General Retd.), former Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, “China Military Science on Strategic Thinking, Scientific Decisionmaking,” February 28, 2006.

¹⁴ “Mohammad Bazzi, Hezbollah cracked the code: technology likely supplied by Iran allowed guerrillas to stop Israeli tank assaults,” *Newsday.com*, September 18, 2006, <http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wocode184896831sep18,0,3091818.story?coll=ny-worldnews-print>

¹⁶ “Crouching Tiger: How China is Quietly Evolving its missile systems,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, February 1, 2006.

<p>Sager, AT-Spigot, and AT-5 Spandrel—Hezbollah also used AT-14 Metis-M (high-tech weapon). “The missiles include the European-made Milan, the Russian-designed Metis-M, Sagger AT-3, Spigot AT-4 and the Russian-made Kornet AT-14. The latter is a Syrian supplied missile capable of targeting low-flying helicopters. Iraqi Fedayeen irregulars used the Kornet against U.S. forces in 2003. The most portable versions of these weapons are carried in a fiberglass case with a launching rail attached to the lid.”¹⁵</p>	<p>tactic than Iran.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s C-802, which damaged an Israeli Sa’ar 5, was originally a Chinese-made anti-ship missile (Yingji YJ-2)</p>	<p>China is considered as one of the most advanced cruise and ballistic missile producers in the world. According to one report, “In conventional terms, China is specifically focusing on targeting surface vessels and submarines at long ranges with anti-ship cruise missiles. From Beijing’s standpoint, this is a countermeasure to a possible future U.S. intervention with carrier battle groups, as occurred in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996.”¹⁷ <i>Jane’s Defence Weekly</i> notes, “China is reportedly developing a new cruise missile with nuclear potential.”¹⁸ The PRC is also one of the most prolific proliferators of these missiles. As one observer notes, the tale of the C-802 “is a classic story about the dog-eat-dog nature of the global arms trade and the destabilizing impact of weapons that are</p>

¹⁵ Andrew McGregor, “Hezbollah’s Creative Tactical Use of Anti-Tank Weaponry,” <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370105>; also see Anthony H. Cordesman, Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War, http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/060817_isr_hez_lessons.pdf

¹⁷ “Another Look at China’s Military Growth,” *Periscope Special Reports*, 06/07/2006

¹⁸ Congressional Service Report, “Cruise Missile Proliferation,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21252.pdf>

	not effectively controlled by national regulation or international treaties and agreements.” ¹⁹
Despite the fact that Israel directly targeted Hezbollah’s TV network, Al-Manar, it could not prevent its telecast that relied on commercial satellites. Even though, technologically speaking, it was easy for Israel to jam “transponders on a commercial satellite, it had to worry about others disrupting Israel’s own satellites.” ²⁰	China is actively pursuing the option of “blinding” American satellites, thereby blinding American forces on a large scale in the wake of a conflict. ²¹

Closing Observations

A long-term, if not permanent, aspect of China’s approach to information warfare and public diplomacy is to enhance its strategic presence in the world of Islam, regardless of what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan. China seems to have recognized the power of political Islam, and the implications of the struggle within Islam, to the stability of a number of Muslim countries in the Middle East, South Asia, as well as Indonesia. Criticizing America’s approach to the war on terror—which China has originally supported, but about which it might be in the process of developing a nuanced position—emerges as a new dimension of China’s public diplomacy.

As China sees it, the Muslim world—especially the Middle East—is a region where the U.S. presence and influence is likely to experience increasing challenges. New alignments are likely to emerge as a Shia-dominated Iraq and Shia Iran are seeking new avenues of cooperation and rapprochement. The Sunni states of the Middle East—despite the fact that Sunnis greatly outnumber the Shias all over the world of Islam—are on the defensive in the wake of the rising influence of Iran, both inside and outside the Middle East. They are seeking new avenues of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as of creating a rapprochement with Iran. China seems to have decided that it will no longer leave the ever-significant strategic affairs of the Middle East and that of the world of Islam largely for the U.S. presence and influence. This appears to be an extremely important development in China’s continuing emergence as a power of global significance, presence, and influence.

From the Chinese perspective, improving its capabilities in asymmetric war is a tool that sustains the concern of American strategic thinkers and warfighters at a high level. As

¹⁹ http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.29/subject_detail.asp

²⁰ Barbara Opall-Rome, “Inability to Jam Hezbollah Satellite TV Signal Spurs Israeli Research,” *Space News*, 29 August, 2006, http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/jammit_0828.html

²¹ “Satellite Laser Ranging in China,” UCS Technical Working Paper, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/chinese-lasers-and-us-satellites.html?print=t

long as the United States and China do not start a military conflict, China envisions the asymmetric war-related research and development of new operational and tactical maneuvers as an ongoing chess game with the lone superpower. China may not come out and say it; however, as an ancient civilization, it considers itself as one of the great champions of this game.