Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations

Section 2: Tools to Address U.S.-China Economic Challenges

The Commission recommends:

1. Congress examine whether the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should bring, in coordination with U.S. allies and partners, a “non-violation nullification or impairment” case—alongside violations of specific commitments—against China at the World Trade Organization under Article 23(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

2. Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to identify the trade-distorting practices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and develop policies to counteract their anticompetitive impact.

3. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives in technical cooperation. This assessment should describe the nature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on the outcomes; detail the licensing and regulatory regime under which the initiatives occur; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S. researchers and companies are being adequately protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises or the military are benefitting from U.S. taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any Chinese researchers participating in the collaboration have ties to the Chinese government or military; investigate if any U.S. companies, universities, or labs participating in U.S. government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetration originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for the United States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any, among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.

Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation

The Commission recommends:

4. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech review and approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry. As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to seek bilateral or multilateral measures, as appropriate, to address these impacts.

5. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to prepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China on food safety, inspection, mechanisms for addressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistance provided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime.

Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations

Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States

The Commission recommends:

6. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide to the relevant committees of jurisdiction a report, with a classified annex, assessing how the change in the China Coast Guard’s command structure affects its status as a law enforcement entity now that it reports to the Central Military Commission. The report should discuss the implications of this new structure for China’s use of the coast guard as a coercive tool in “gray zone” activity in the East and South China seas. This report should also determine how this change may affect U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard interactions with the China Coast Guard, and whether the latter should be designated as a military force.

7. Congress consider imposing sanctions on key Chinese state-owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoing militarization of the South China Sea.

Chapter 3: China and the World

Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative

The Commission recommends:

8. Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of or vulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure, and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainable development, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law, respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and the media.

9. Congress require the U.S. Department of State to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide an alternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Such a report should also examine where BRI projects fail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI and China’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting of its human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
10. Congress require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), with a classified annex, that details the impact of existing and potential Chinese access and basing facilities along the Belt and Road on freedom of navigation and sea control, both in peacetime and during a conflict. The NIE should cover the impact on U.S., allied, and regional political and security interests.

**Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners**

The Commission recommends:

11. Congress direct the Administration to strengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests and policies pertaining to China, including through the following measures:

   • Urge the Administration to engage in regular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development of common standards for screening mechanisms.

   • Enhance consultations on mitigating the export of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

12. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Justice to:

   • Examine the application of current U.S. laws, including the “Conspiracy against Rights” law, to prosecuting Chinese Communist Party affiliates who threaten, coerce, or otherwise intimidate U.S. residents.

   • Clarify that labels required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act on informational materials disseminated on behalf of foreign principals, such as *China Daily*, must appear prominently at the top of the first page of such materials.

13. Congress direct the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to produce an unclassified annual report, with a classified annex, on the Chinese Communist Party’s influence and propaganda activities in the United States.

14. Congress direct the Administration to discuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO can promote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia, including both countries’ influence operations.

**Section 3: China and Taiwan**

The Commission recommends:

15. Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating procedures to resolve outstanding issues.
16. Congress direct the Administration to produce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supporting Taiwan’s engagement with the international community, including consideration of, but not limited to, the following actions:

- Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei.
- Identify adjustments the United States could take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering the cross-Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei.
- Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S. policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments and support an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries.
- Establish a high-level bilateral U.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.
- Identify key international organizations that would benefit from Taiwan’s expertise and participation, and focus high-level U.S. advocacy efforts to secure Taiwan’s membership or participation in these organizations.

17. Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibit U.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan. Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S. companies.

18. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Concept and take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observers in U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuant to the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwan with the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies.

19. Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services to Taiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement to provide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existing capabilities.

20. Congress express support for the Tsai Administration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

Section 4: China and Hong Kong

The Commission recommends:

21. Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce and other relevant government agencies to prepare an unclassified public
report, with a classified annex, examining and assessing the adequacy of U.S. export control policy for dual-use technology as it relates to U.S. treatment of Hong Kong and China as separate customs areas.

22. Congressional interparliamentary groups engage parliamentarians from the United Kingdom, EU, and Taiwan in a biennial review of China’s adherence to the Basic Law, with specific attention to rule of law, freedom of speech and assembly, and press freedom, and issue a report based on its findings after each review.

23. Members of Congress participate in congressional delegations to Hong Kong and meet with Hong Kong officials, prodemocracy legislators, civil society, and business representatives in the territory and when they visit the United States. In meetings with Hong Kong and Chinese officials, they should raise concerns about Beijing’s adherence to the “one country, two systems” policy and China’s promise to allow Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy.” They should also continue to express support for freedom of expression and rule of law in Hong Kong.

Section 5: China’s Evolving North Korea Strategy

The Commission recommends:

24. Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to provide a report within 180 days on the current state of Chinese enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. A classified annex should provide a list of Chinese financial institutions, businesses, and officials involved in trading with North Korea that could be subject to future sanctions, and should explain the potential broader impacts of sanctioning those entities.

Chapter 4: China’s High-Tech Development

Section 1: Next Generation Connectivity

The Commission recommends:

25. Congress require the Office of Management and Budget’s Federal Chief Information Security Officer Council to prepare an annual report to Congress to ensure supply chain vulnerabilities from China are adequately addressed. This report should collect and assess:

- Each agency’s plans for supply chain risk management and assessments;
- Existing departmental procurement and security policies and guidance on cybersecurity, operations security, physical security, information security and data security that may affect information and communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices; and
- Areas where new policies and guidance may be needed—including for specific information and communications technology, 5G networks, and Internet of Things devices, applications, or procedures—and where existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address supply chain, cyber,
operations, physical, information, and data security vulnerabilities.

26. Congress direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and Federal Communications Commission to identify (1) steps to ensure the rapid and secure deployment of a 5G network, with a particular focus on the threat posed by equipment and services designed or manufactured in China; and (2) whether any new statutory authorities are required to ensure the security of domestic 5G networks.