



June 8, 2017

Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

Evolving China-Burma Relations and Implications for the U.S.

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Thank you to the members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission for the opportunity to testify on some of the key issues in China's relations with Burma and their implications for the United States. This testimony seeks to answer how China views and pursues its national interests in Burma in the era of political reform and democratization of the former pariah state. It also aims to analyze how the Burmese government and people react to China and how the evolving policies of China affect U.S. interests in Burma.

Geo-strategically, Burma not only sits at the critical junction between South Asia with Southeast Asia, but also represents China's most direct and convenient access to the Indian Ocean. Under the former military government, Burma developed an asymmetrical dependence on China due to international sanctions and isolation. Since the beginning of its political reform in 2011, Burma has been able to diversify its external relations with the West and mitigate China's overwhelming influence. In particular, Burma's warming ties with the United States under the former Thein Sein government have been perceived by China as undermining China's national security and economic interests in the region. How to balance the growing Western influence and restore the damaged Chinese influence in Burma has been the Chinese government's top priority since 2011. China plays an important role in Burma's peace process and in its economic development through longstanding ties with the ethnic groups in northern Burma and the offering of much-needed foreign investment into the country. Its policies have a direct impact on stated U.S. interests in peace, democracy and prosperity in Burma.

Key Chinese National Interests in Burma

China has a 1,370 mile-long border with Burma. Within the framework of bilateral relations, border stability has always been China's most important national security interest. The armed conflicts between the Burmese military and the ethnic groups along the Sino-Burma border directly affect the stability of China's border region. Since the Kokang conflict of 2009 and the reignition of the Kachin conflict in 2011, the ethnic conflicts in Burma have sent tens of thousands of refugees into China's Yunnan province and gravely disrupted local security and social stability.ⁱ At the height of the conflict in 2015, Burma's warplanes constantly invaded Chinese airspace, bombed Chinese territories and killed Chinese civilians on Chinese soil.ⁱⁱ

Border instability and ethnic conflict in Burma have had an indirect impact on China's internal stability. The Burma army's repeated invasion of Chinese airspace, resulting in the deaths of Chinese civilians on Chinese territory, caused the Chinese people to question the Chinese government's competence in

protecting the safety of its own nationals and territory against a much weaker Burmese military.ⁱⁱⁱ These questions were intensified when Beijing's repeated protests proved futile. The Kokang rebels appealed to the Chinese people's sympathy and support as an overseas Chinese Han diaspora group persecuted by the Burmese central government.^{iv} The success of their public relations campaign has hurt China's internal stability because of the perception that the Chinese government had failed to protect the Chinese Kokang population in Burma, as well as its own citizens in China, which raised questions about its legitimacy with the Chinese public.^v

Economically, China's interests in Burma have primarily focused on the natural resources and the transportation routes through Burma, as exemplified by the Myitsone dam project, the Sino-Burma oil and gas pipelines and the Letpadaung copper mine project, which collectively are valued at more than \$8 billion in terms of committed investments.^{vi} After the substantial decline of Chinese investment in Burma right after political reform in Burma began, Chinese investment has increased steadily from \$180 million in 2014 to \$200 million in 2015 and \$300 million in 2016.^{vii}

China sees a key role for Burma to play in China's Belt and Road Initiative. China's overall design is to build connectivity projects and transportation networks through Burma into South Asia and Southeast Asia. Projects such as the Kyaukphyu special economic zone and deep-sea port could become a key node in China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road via the Indian Ocean.^{viii} Individual projects under the initiative include highways, a deep-sea port and pipelines. Earlier in 2017, China and Burma agreed to open a cross-border oil pipeline. Such projects are intended to enhance China's energy security by developing alternative energy transportation routes. Burma is also seen as an ideal country to absorb China's overcapacity in its infrastructure industries. Given Burma's backward infrastructure development, such as in the power sector and transportation industry, Chinese state-owned companies have seen Burma as an attractive market with great potential for construction contracts.

In terms of strategic values, Burma is one of two countries that can facilitate China's access to the Indian Ocean—the other being Pakistan, which is much less stable and presents a much higher security risk. Additional ocean access could potentially make China less dependent on the Straits of Malacca and the disputed South China Sea for energy transport routes. Chinese Navy has in the past made port calls in Burma, and whether China will try to turn the Kyaukphyu deep-port into a dual-use facility in the future has been a highly sensitive and controversial issue in Burma, whose constitution forbids the use of its territory by foreign military.

China in Burma's Peace Process

As Burma's largest neighbor with a 1,370-mile border between them, China has been an essential player and a critical factor in Burma's peace process. Especially for the ethnic armed groups in northern Burma, their complicated ties with China are the result of the intricacy of historical, ethnic, and emotional linkages, as well as political and economic connections. These groups have sustained their de facto independent kingdoms within the state of Burma for decades. Their ceasefire agreements with the government ended in 2011, and most of them have been engaged in active combat since. China's relationships with these groups have contributed materially, or even in some cases deterministically, to their ability to continue these struggles. While China is not the fundamental cause of Burma's ethnic conflicts, and China may not have actively facilitated the continuation of the conflicts, the reality remains that China's relationships with ethnic armed groups in northern Burma has complicated the conflicts' resolution. In other words, while the success of Burma's peace process

may not depend on China, China nevertheless has great ability to influence the process and stymie its result if it so chooses.

China's official position on Burma's peace process follows its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. At a bilateral level, China respects the peace process as Burma's internal affair and has pursued a policy of "persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues" (劝和促谈). The Chinese special envoy, Ambassador Wang Yingfan and his successor Sun Guoxiang, has been present as a witness at multiple rounds of negotiations between the Burma central government and the ethnic minority groups, including the signing ceremony of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. Under the NLD government, the Chinese government has worked hard to persuade the non-signatory groups of the NCA to participate in the 21st Century Panglong Conference (or Union Peace Conference, UPC) in 2016 and 2017.

However, China's position is not impartial or altruistic. While China respects the peace process as Burma's internal affair, it also maintains that its relations with the ethnic armed groups in northern Burma have deep historical roots and complicated causes. Therefore, although China claims to be willing to facilitate and mediate the peace process, the level of its commitment has always been questioned by Burmese and Western observers. Indeed, within the policy community in China, some have argued continually that China should sustain the ethnic armed groups in Burma as leverage to check the Burma central government's intentions and actions. In the broad context of Burma's political reform and its perceived pro-West foreign policy adjustments, this need is seen to have grown increasingly imperative.

China's role in the Burma peace process is further complicated by the behavior of certain Chinese special interest groups and individuals in their support of the ethnic armed organizations in Burma. Shared business interests and sympathy toward the ethnic armed organizations have laid a firm foundation for audacious interference in Burma's peace process, which peaked in 2015 with the Kokang conflict and its aftermath. Certain Chinese companies and businessmen have identified northern Burma as a convenient location for illegal activities because such territories are barely, if at all, policed by either Chinese or Burma authorities. The substantive support they have provided to the ethnic armed organizations does not represent China's official policy toward Burma, but it serves to reinforce the perception of a duplicitous Chinese role in the peace process.

China lends a qualified support to Burma's peace process. China desires a peaceful, stable border but it views it as unlikely that Burma's ethnic issues can be resolved for the foreseeable future. Thus, how much China chooses to contribute to Burma's progress depends on the health of bilateral relations – including the Burmese government's support for Chinese political, economic, and strategic agendas – as well as whether Burma chooses to align more with Western powers over China. Furthermore, China's involvement in the peace process is also motivated by concern about the nature of Western involvement and whether it will translate into an intensified Western presence in the border area.

U.S. and China in Burma

In the Chinese perception, the rapid improvement of U.S.-Burma relations since 2011 has greatly affected China's interests in Burma. Most important, the warming of U.S. ties with Burma is perceived to be a key element of the U.S. strategy to rebalance toward Asia, which in the Chinese lexicon equates to a containment policy toward China. As perceived by Beijing, the U.S. successfully alienated Burma's

traditional ties with China and damaged existing Chinese commercial projects in the country, as shown through the suspension of the controversial Chinese Myitstone dam. Although President Thein Sein's decision to suspend the project was made in accordance with the "people's will," the Chinese nonetheless believe that the Burmese decision was made at least partially to curry favor with the U.S. In addition, the Chinese saw NGOs, operating with the support and potential guidance of the US government, as having played an insidious role in undermining Chinese investment projects in Burma. To China, these developments confirmed suspicions of the China-related orientation of US strategic intentions in Burma.

Chinese analysts invariably frame the issue of U.S.-Burma ties in a broader context of U.S.-China relations. Their perception of the US presence in Burma is essentially zero-sum: the gains made by the U.S. have come at China's expense. When told by U.S. officials that U.S. policy in Burma is driven by American and Burmese domestic politics, Chinese analysts often question the genuineness of such statements or argue that, at the very least, the U.S. has been inconsiderate of China's vested interests in and relations with Burma. Although there is a general acknowledgement of China's own failures to better manage relations with Burma, in Chinese minds this does not negate the fact that the U.S. exploited those opportunities to expand and deepen the friction between China and Burma.

Since the inauguration of the National League of Democracy (NLD) government in 2016, China identifies an exploitable moment to regain China's influence due to the perceived cooling of relations between the U.S. and Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's de facto leader, is believed to have had key disagreements and difficulties in her relationship with the United States, because of her concern about close U.S. ties with and support to the former Thein Sein government, on the one hand, and, on the other, U.S. disappointment in her approach to humanitarian concerns, especially the Rohingya issue. China has been using the opportunity to convince Burma that China, rather than U.S., is the one country with both the capacity and will to assist the NLD government in addressing the pressing challenges and priorities, such as the peace process and economic development. During President Tin Kyaw's April 2017 visit to China and Aung San Suu Kyi's participation in the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing in May 2017, China reached multiple key economic and assistance agreements with Burma.

U.S. interests in Burma lie in peace, democracy and prosperity. Some of the goals converge with Chinese interests, such as in peace, stability and economic development. However, the interests of the two countries diverge significantly on the political level because an overarching theme of Chinese engagement in Burma lies in a zero-sum competition regarding the U.S.-China power equilibrium in Burma. Competition with the U.S. has been a key determining factor in China's decision-making.

1. On the peace process

China has a strong security interest in northern Burma based on a fear of Western, particularly U.S., intervention in China's immediate neighborhood, across a porous border that can be easily infiltrated. Peace and democracy are a U.S. priority in Burma as the ethnic conflicts and stagnant peace process cast a shadow of uncertainty over the country's future, and some voices inside Burma have called for U.S. intervention and mediation. For China, an open and active U.S. role in the peace process would only further enhance the U.S. influence in Burmese politics and invite an American presence on the Chinese border.

Thus Beijing has reacted strongly to the prospect of a U.S. role in conflict resolution in northern Burma. In 2013, China's top priority was to block the attempted "internationalization of the Kachin

issue,” demonstrated by a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) proposal to invite the U.S., UK, UN, and China to be observers and witnesses of the negotiation between the KIA and the central government. In 2015, China’s ardent opposition prevented the U.S. from becoming a witness to the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement. The factor of U.S. involvement greatly affects China’s strategy in the peace process in two seemingly-contradictory ways. On one hand, a stagnant or stalled peace process will compel the ethnic minorities and/or the Burma government to seek external support, especially from the U.S., as demonstrated by KIA’s case. In this sense, the desire to keep the U.S. out motivates China to stay in and promote the progress of the dialogue.

On the other hand, fearing the potential for growing U.S. influence in the peace process and the border region, in cooperation with Burmese authorities, China also aspires to maintain its leverage by shielding the ethnic armed organizations from destruction by the Burma military. The Chinese approach directly fuels the sustainability of the armed struggle, mitigates the ethnic armed groups’ interests in making compromise and therefore undermines the U.S. interest in peace.

2. On democracy in Burma

The beginning of Burma’s democratic reform coincided with the Arab Spring in the Middle East in 2011. The political change the military government adopted in Burma and the role U.S. policies played in the process have raised great suspicion in China about a so-called “demonstration effect” of the Burmese democratization in Asia. From the Chinese perspective, Burma could very possibly become a catalyst for a domino effect on political liberalization in countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and even North Korea. Burma’s military government designed and carried out its democratic reform rather smoothly and without major political backfire. The safety and wealth of the military leaders have been largely preserved and protected. That in itself could turn into a powerful example for authoritarian leaders in other countries and convince them that democracy could be a viable, or even desirable way out for them without prohibitive cost. China was also worried whether the democratization of a country so close to the China could affect China’s own internal political trend by raising questions about China’s own much delayed political reform.

Furthermore, there is competition between the Chinese approach and the American approach to political and economic development in less developed countries such as Burma. China promotes a model that prioritizes economic development at the cost of political liberalization, while the U.S. places more emphasis on the governance, the capacity-building, the social justice in which that development itself is achieved. The different approaches and priorities allow China the luxury of steering clear of governance and human rights issues that are sore spots for the Burmese government and catering instead to the NLD government’s political/economic needs and pursuing transactional relations that serve China’s strategic, political and economic interests. The Chinese approach forms a powerful alternative source of political and economic capital to the Burmese government. It undermines the U.S. interest and efforts to build a true democratic, transparent and accountable government in Burma.

China continues to maintain close ties with the Burmese military despite the military’s interference in civilian affairs and record of human rights abuses. Having learned the importance of developing diverse relations with various political forces in Burma, China has paid special attention not to alienate the military while it pursues good relations with the civilian government and the ethnic armed groups. China continues to be one of the largest providers of military aid, training and arms to the Burmese

military. It directly undercuts the U.S. interest in the professionalization of the Burmese military and its eventual subjugation to civilian control.

3. On sustainable and socially responsible economic development

Drawing lessons from local opposition to Chinese projects in Burma, the Chinese government and companies have become more sensitive to and adept at consulting public opinion and formulating better corporate social responsibility programs for their projects in Burma. Nevertheless, popular complaints and demonstrations against Chinese investments, especially in the hydropower industry, run rampant in the Kachin and Shan states. The locals bear strong grievances against the lack of public participation in the decision-making process for these projects, and are generally suspicious about the authenticity and credibility of the social and environmental impact assessments commissioned by the investors. In this sense, the economic development that Chinese investments generate is far from being sustainable, inclusive, fair or socially and environmentally responsible.

Burma/Burmese Perception of China

The perception of China in Burma is closely associated with the Chinese political and economic involvement in the country. Before the political reform improved Burma's external relations in 2011, the military government had to resort to Chinese political and economic patronage internally and externally due to its international isolations. While the military successfully maintained its rule in Burma, it came at a high price of overwhelming Chinese influence in the Burmese economy and society. The high level of Chinese influence eventually generated fears even within the military government about the sovereignty and independence of their nation. This fear has been a main factor in the Burmese military's decision to pursue reform so as to improve its relations with the international community.

Burma's reform and opening up left China in an awkward position. Due to China's close relations with and support of the previous military government, many Burmese citizens saw China as an accomplice to the military government's poor governance and human rights abuses. In their perception, China exploited Burma's vulnerability, looted its natural resources and undermined its national security- all in the name of "win-win" and friendly cooperation. In particular, some of the largest and most important Chinese investment projects are believed to have been reached with the military government through corrupt deals and bribery. These negative perceptions of China directly fueled the anti-China sentiment in Burma, which peaked in the early years of the previous Thein Sein government.

On a social level, Burmese public opinion towards China has been negatively influenced by two perceptions. First of all, it is widely believed in Burma that China has been supporting the ethnic armed groups and consequently undermining the ethnic reconciliation process of Burma. This view is particularly popular among the Burmese elites. Secondly, at least before the Chinese government took serious measures to manage the behavior of Chinese investors, Burmese considered them to be racist and discriminating in their treatment of local employees. In order to repair the damaged ties and China's poor image in Burma, Chinese government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Department of Propaganda and National Development and Reform Commission, among others, orchestrated broad public relations campaigns in Burma.

Since the NLD government assumed power, China's image in Burma has somewhat improved. For her part, Aung San Suu Kyi has clearly recalibrated Burma's relations with China, attested to by the frequent senior level visits, including two by herself to Beijing in the past ten months. Given the lack of attention given to Burma by the U.S. during the same period, such recalibration is understandable given the NLD government's need for support in the peace process and economic development in order to deliver democracy dividends to the Burmese people. Given Aung San Suu Kyi's popularity among the Burmese people, her attitude towards China has played an important role in shaping a more positive popular perception of China. China's efforts in public relations campaigns, in corporate social responsibility programs, and in catering to the NLD government's needs and demands, have also contributed to the improvement of China's image in the country.

A key determining variable in Burmese public opinion of China hinges on the fate of the suspended Myitsone dam project. The mega project was planned for the upstream of the Irrawaddy river-Burma's "mother river". It has been a highly controversial, contentious and emotional issue for the Burmese people since the day of its conception. In response to people's will, former President Thein Sein suspended the project in September of 2011 and China has been eagerly pushing for a resolution of the suspended project. It is worth noting that although at one point China lowered its bottom line to the compensation of China's disbursed investment upon the cancellation of the project, the NLD government's positive attitude toward China at least initially reignited hopes in China about the resumption of the Myitsone project.

The NLD government formed a commission to investigate the Myitsone dam project in the summer of 2016. However, no definitive assessment or decision has been announced so far, which illustrates the complex nature of the issue and the dilemma it puts the NLD government into. On the one hand, Burma's power shortage has become so critical that it not only affects the nation's economic functioning, but it also raises questions about the future effectiveness of the NLD government. And increasing voices within the NLD government and Burmese society recognize that hydropower projects might indeed be necessary for the country given the increasing power demand. On the other hand, even if the Burmese government decides to permanently cancel the Myitsone dam, it still has to resolve the debt the dam has created and quell the anger in China.

Foreseeably, given the emotional baggage and public sentiment associated with the Myitsone dam in Burma society, if the NLD government decides to resume the project based on perceived merits, it would encounter major political and public objections. While sufficient scientific evidence and thorough policy deliberations should form the foundation for any such decision, Aung San Suu Kyi will be the only one in the country with the authority to pull this through. Such a political maneuver, however, will be costly, judging by the criticism launched against her after she chaired a commission that decided to resume the Letpadaung copper mine in 2013.

Policy Recommendations to the Congress

China has been regaining political and economic influence in Burma since 2016 that has a major impact on U.S. interests in peace, democracy and economic development in Burma. Given Burma's strategic location, a successful Chinese strategy to tie Burma to Chinese dominance in bilateral relations will provide a critical link in China's strategy to consolidate access to and influence in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean towards a China-centric regional order.

The Trump Administration so far has not demonstrated much interest in engaging Burma, creating a perception in Burma that the intensity of U.S. engagement since 2011 has ebbed. This perception

leads Burmese to conclude that prospects of political, economic and ideological support from Washington for Burma's promising but difficult reform process are dim. If the United States wants to maintain the momentum of U.S.-Burma relations, support Burma's reform process and mitigate Burma's reluctant dependence on China for its national agenda, there are steps the Congress can take.

Urge the Administration to enhance engagement with Burma. The Congress should make regular inquiries into Burma's domestic political development including the peace process and civil-military relations, with a keen eye to the role that the U.S. plays in shaping the policies of the Burmese government. The inquiry should cover a broad spectrum of issues beyond the traditional political arena, such as the promotion of U.S. investment in and trade with Burma. The Trump Administration should send clear signals to the Burmese government and the Burmese people that the U.S. remains firmly committed to the democracy, peace and prosperity of their country and is taking serious measures to address their needs for diverse external support.

Include Burma in Asia Trips. The Congress should encourage senior officials of the Administration and members of the Congress to travel to Burma during their Asia trips. This will not only send a clear signal of U.S. commitment to Burma, but will also help the U.S. executive and legislative branches to better understand the complex nature of the challenges Burma faces in order to craft effective and comprehensive policies to assist the NLD government. The officials and legislators would be wise to meet with Burmese civil society organizations and media to solicit views of the local actors and convey strong U.S. support to their nascent democracy and strenuous reconciliation process.

Engage Aung San Suu Kyi. Aung San Suu Kyi remains the most consequential political leader in Burma, a status achieved through her democratic credentials and unparalleled popularity among the Burmese people. The U.S. would be wise to take measures to dissipate the perception of a rift between Aung San Suu Kyi and the United States, which has undermined U.S. credibility and effectiveness in Burma. The U.S. has an intrinsic responsibility to speak out about the humanitarian situations in certain regions in Burma but it does not necessarily have to become an obstacle to the healthy and positive development of U.S.-Burma bilateral relations. Through communications and coordination, the U.S. must ensure that its principled positions on humanitarian issues in Burma does not undermine bilateral ties.

Enhance Support for Capacity Building in Burma. The Congress should ensure that U.S. contributions to capacity building in Burma are not sacrificed or adversely affected in the FY 18 budget. Currently, the most serious challenge to democracy, peace and prosperity in Burma lies in the lack of capacity among its institutions across the political spectrum. Without effective and sufficient capacity building, Burma could easily deviate from the path of good governance and be enticed by the Chinese model of prioritizing economic development and suppressing political liberalization. The State Department, USAID and institutions, such as US Institute of Peace and National Endowment for Democracy, will need the budgetary resources to continue building the capacity of civilian government officials and political parties, to inform and educate civil society organizations in their struggle for justice and social progress, to address the drivers of conflict, and to shepherd the peace process through the inevitable setbacks.

Support Engagement with China in Dialogues on Burma. The Congress should encourage the Administration and U.S. institutions to engage China in continuing Track-I and/or Track-II dialogue on Burma. Especially with regard to the peace process and the ethnic armed groups in northern Burma, the U.S. has a vested interest in promoting counter-narcotics, delivering an effective ceasefire

and achieving an eventual political solution. None of these can be achieved without China's support. The U.S. may not be able make China impose the peace process on the ethnic armed groups in northern Burma, but it should at least prevent China from becoming a spoiler. U.S. should also discuss with China the political, economic, social and environmental implications of Chinese economic endeavors in Burma and explore opportunities for cooperation to promote better, more inclusive and responsible development in the country.

As the Trump Administration crafts its policies toward Asia, Burma -- as a distinct success story of democratization and political reform -- should receive due attention and prioritization. The lack of engagement with Burma, which appears to be emerging in Washington, will only push this strategically located country toward China and boost Chinese influence in an area critical to the U.S. regional agenda. Failure to stay engaged and committed in Burma will take a toll in multiple arenas, including but not limited to: democracy and human rights, U.S. credibility and leadership, China's regional security architecture and its aspiration to regional dominance.

ⁱ "Burma Border Inhabitants Begin to Return from China as Situation Calms," *Xinhua News*, August 31, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/31/content_11968443.htm. "Over 60,000 Burma Refugee Arrivals in China since Conflict Outbreak," *Xinhua News*, March 7, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/07/c_134046681.htm.

ⁱⁱ "Burma Artillery Shells Fell in Yunnan for the Fifth Time" [in Chinese], *Yunnan News*, Yunnan News, May 15, 2016, <http://www.yn.chinanews.com/special/6/178.shtml>.

ⁱⁱⁱ For Chinese netizens' discussions and criticisms of the Chinese government, please see the blog posts on Tiexue BBS, such as at <http://m.tiexue.net/touch/reply.html?8672300>.

^{iv} Peng Jiasheng released an "Appeal to all Chinese in the World" (In Chinese) on February 17, 2016, which was widely circulated on the Chinese internet.

^v For Chinese netizens' discussions and criticisms of the Chinese government, please see the blog posts on Tiexue BBS, such as at <http://m.tiexue.net/touch/reply.html?8672300>.

^{vi} "New Chinese Foreign Investment Commitment Exceed \$8 billion", *The Burma Times*, August 16-20, 2010, <http://www.mmmtimes.com/2010/business/536/biz001.html>.

^{vii} "Overview of Sino-Burma Bilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation," (2014), [in Chinese], Ministry of Commerce, June 11, 2015, <http://yzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/t/201506/20150601008674.shtml>;

"Overview of Sino-Burma Bilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation," (2015), [in Chinese], Ministry of Commerce, September 2, 2016, <http://yzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/t/201609/20160901384778.shtml>;

"Overview of Sino-Burma Bilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation," (2016), [in Chinese], Ministry of Commerce, February 25, 2017, <http://mm.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zxhz/201702/20170202510989.shtml>.

^{viii} Atul Aneja, "All Is Not Smooth on the Silk Road," *The Hindu*, August 22, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/all-is-not-smooth-on-the-silk-road/article7562232.ece>.