

“U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2013 Report to Congress: China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the Cross-Strait Relationship”

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before the

Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

Hearing on “2013 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”

November 20, 2013

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on China’s maritime disputes and the cross-Strait relationship. As Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, I am pleased to share some of the Commission’s findings on these topics, which we made public today in our *2013 Report to Congress*.

OVERVIEW

Although China’s strategic center of gravity has been largely land-based for centuries, modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), particularly its naval force, has enabled a seaward shift since the mid-1990s. The PLA’s growing range of missions – now far wider than the singular goal of Taiwan unification that once dominated Beijing’s military planning – has resulted in increasingly capable naval and maritime law enforcement fleets. Despite warming China-Taiwan ties, China remains committed to maintaining a cross-Strait balance of power that allows for the eventual unification of Taiwan with the mainland. Moreover, China’s military modernization, rising economy, and growing diplomatic influence are improving China’s ability to assert its interests in its “near seas” – the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.

The Commission continues to maintain a focus on these developments in our *2013 Report to Congress*. Our fact-finding trip to the Philippines last year informed a section on the South China Sea in the *2012 Report*. This year, Commissioners met with the leaders of the armed forces and political bodies in Japan and Taiwan to sharpen our understanding of the East China Sea dispute as well as the current state of the cross-Strait relationship. Those conversations served as the basis of two sections in this year’s report – one on China’s maritime disputes and one on developments in Taiwan. My testimony focuses on these two areas.

China’s interest in defending its near seas is encompassed in China’s overarching maritime defense strategy, Offshore Defense. This strategy seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- Deter and defend China against foreign military intervention in Chinese affairs, such as peacetime foreign military operations near China that Beijing judges threaten its interests and foreign amphibious invasions, blockades, and strikes against the Chinese mainland.
- Deter and reverse any moves by Taiwan toward *de jure* independence.

- Develop a sea-based nuclear submarine force to support Beijing’s nuclear deterrence strategy.*
- Deter and defend against threats to China’s maritime trade routes.
- Deter and defend against challenges to China’s maritime territory, sovereignty, and resources.
- Protect China’s interests abroad.¹

During peacetime, the strategy emphasizes gaining control of China’s near seas and steadily expanding the maritime perimeter out to China’s Second Island Chain.[†] During wartime, the strategy calls for engaging opposing naval forces as far from the Chinese coast as possible and, if necessary, overwhelming those forces as they approach China. The most important wartime task is to prevent foreign military forces from interfering with China’s wartime objectives.² The U.S. Department of Defense characterizes these operations as “antiaccess/area denial.”** China, however, uses the term “counterintervention,” reflecting its perception that such operations are reactive.³

China’s claims in the South China Sea overlap those of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. The South China Sea claims of China and Taiwan are generally coextensive due to their origins from a shared political heritage. China also has disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and Taiwan. Here, China claims not only the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu in China and Diaoyutai in Taiwan) as Taiwan does, but also an extended continental shelf off its eastern coastline into the Okinawa Trough.⁴ Largely due to Beijing’s perception of its growing political and economic clout in the region and its modernizing maritime force, China since 2009 - 2010 has grown increasingly assertive in pressing these maritime claims. As interactions between Chinese forces and other maritime forces operating in the region – including the U.S. military – become more regular, China’s adherence to international protocols at sea will become increasingly important for the safety of all air and maritime operations in the region as well as the stability of the security situation in the East and South China Seas.

U.S. treaty alliances and forward-deployed military presence in Asia bind the United States to the region in ways that link its security interests to the peaceful resolution of sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and across the Taiwan Strait. The United States maintains treaty alliances with two of the claimants – Japan in the East China Sea and the Philippines in the South China Sea – and maintains a substantive relationship with its longtime friend and partner, Taiwan. A crisis involving any of these parties could trigger U.S. treaty and legislative commitments. The United States also has an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the maritime commons across the Asia Pacific, which serve as crucial global and regional trade routes.

* The primary objectives of China’s nuclear deterrence strategy are to deter nuclear and conventional attacks; should deterrence fail, survive a nuclear attack and conduct a nuclear counterstrike; prevent an adversary from using the threat of nuclear weapons to coerce China or compel it to back down; and strengthen China’s global image. U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013* (Washington, DC: 2013), pp. 29-31.

[†] The Second Island Chain refers to a line that stretches from the Kurile Islands through Japan, the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands, and Indonesia. It encompasses maritime areas out to approximately 1,800 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland.

** “Antiaccess” (A2) actions are those intended to slow deployment of adversary forces into a theater or cause the forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would otherwise prefer. A2 affects movement into theater. “Area denial” (AD) actions are those intended to impede an adversary’s operations within areas where friendly forces cannot or will not prevent access. AD affects movement within theater. U.S. Air-Sea Battle Office, *Air Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges* (Arlington, VA: May 2013), pp. 2-4.

As the U.S. defense budget tightens, the United States will face difficult choices in implementing its “rebalance” to Asia. A major challenge ahead for Washington, therefore, will be to stand firm on its security commitments while allocating sufficient resources to achieve its overall foreign policy and security goals in the Asia Pacific region.⁵

CHINA’S MARITIME DISPUTES: The East China Sea and South China Sea

China’s strategy in the East and South China Seas involves delaying the actual resolution of its maritime disputes while strengthening its maritime and air forces to better assert its claims.⁶ China probably judges that as a result of its growing power and influence vis-à-vis other claimants to the East and South China Seas, time is on its side with regard to consolidating control over its maritime claims.

How Beijing Asserts and Enforces its Maritime Claims

Maritime Law Enforcement and Naval Forces: China employs its maritime law enforcement ships to monitor, protest, and in some cases harass foreign vessels engaging in activities that it believes violate its maritime sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. Beijing likely views this approach as less provocative than deploying its navy and a means to reinforce its maritime claims by allowing China to present the confrontation as a domestic law enforcement issue rather than a foreign defense issue requiring the military. Nevertheless, the PLA Navy still plays a role by backing up maritime law enforcement patrols from a distance, visibly training and transiting through disputed waters, and resupplying Chinese-controlled land features in the South China Sea.⁷

Beijing also opportunistically uses its maritime law enforcement and its naval fleets to react to perceived attempts by rival claimants to challenge China’s sovereignty, and has exploited tactical errors by some of these claimants to change the status quo of its maritime disputes in its favor. Through a highly visible and persistent maritime presence, China has obtained *de facto* control of some disputed land features and waters in the East and South China Seas, including most recently Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea. When the Philippines deployed a naval vessel in response to a fishing dispute last May, Beijing used the opportunity to patrol the reef’s vicinity with superior maritime forces and rope off its entrance to prevent Philippine vessels from operating there.⁸ Today, over a year after the conclusion of the months-long standoff, China continues to maintain control over the reef.

China also has applied this approach with some success in the East China Sea’s Senkaku Islands. Viewing the Japanese government’s September 2012 purchase of several of the Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese citizen as a deliberate attempt to change the status of the disputed territory, China used the opportunity to advance its claim to the islands.⁹ Following the purchase, China’s maritime law enforcement and naval forces sharply increased maritime and air activity near the islands. By doing so, Beijing seeks to underscore its own claim to the islands as well as pressure Japan into officially acknowledging a territorial dispute, which Tokyo refuses to do. Likely due in part to a more formidable balance of power in the East China Sea than in the South China Sea, China has not sought to obtain *de facto* control over the Senkaku Islands as it did at Scarborough Reef.

Legal and Administrative Measures: China uses legal mechanisms to demonstrate *de jure* governance over disputed waters.¹⁰ In an effort to justify its claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has submitted its own claims to the UN and contested competing claims through UN mechanisms. China also has passed domestic laws declaring rights in its claimed territorial sea and exclusive economic zone and outlining regulations for mapping and surveying its claimed waters. For example, in its southernmost province of Hainan, China established fishing regulations that enable Hainan authorities to board, inspect, and expel foreign vessels “illegally” operating in China’s claimed waters.¹¹

Drivers of China's Maritime Disputes

Sovereignty and "Core Interests": China's position of "indisputable sovereignty" with regard to its claims in the East and South China Seas underlies its overall policy approaches to those issues. As tensions involving China's maritime disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea have grown since 2009, official and unofficial Chinese sources indicate China views the East and South China Seas as central to its "core interests,"¹² which authoritative Chinese speeches and documents define as China's (1) national security, (2) sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (3) sustained economic and social development.¹³ Beijing makes core interest declarations to signal to other countries that China is unwilling to compromise on particular policy issues and to imply that China would use force to defend these interests.

Much to the concern of the Commission's Japanese interlocutors, China appeared to designate the Senkaku Islands a core interest this April.¹⁴ Subsequent official Chinese statements have not clarified the status of the islands, allowing Beijing to maintain flexibility in its approach to the dispute, prevent any domestic accusations that China is adopting a weaker stance, and deny that it is taking unilateral actions or escalating tensions.¹⁵

Nationalism: China exploits popular nationalism to support its foreign policy goals in the East and South China Seas. China's official and popular historical narrative with regard to the East and South China Seas is a product of China's education system and official media, which cultivate and promote the notion of China's victimization by Japan and the West during what China calls its "century of humiliation" from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries.¹⁶ Due to the strength of popular nationalist and anti-Japanese sentiments in China, Beijing sees East China Sea sovereignty as a political legitimacy issue: Whereas a robust public defense of China's sovereignty could satisfy popular demands and strengthen the legitimacy of Chinese leaders, measures popularly viewed as weak against foreign insults and provocations could undermine legitimacy.¹⁷

Economic Development: China views the East and South China Seas as central to its economic development, due to their resource potential and significant role as maritime transit routes. The development of natural resources – especially fishing – is closely linked to nationalism in the context of the maritime disputes because these activities can quickly galvanize popular nationalist sentiment.¹⁸ These types of responses to perceived foreign encroachments upon national or historic fishing grounds are typical across the region. For example, when the Philippine Coast Guard fired shots at a Taiwan fishing boat in disputed waters in May of this year, the resulting death of a Taiwan fisherman set off nationalist outpourings across Taiwan. The incident led to three months of strained relations between Taiwan and the Philippines that ended only after Manila offered an official apology, agreed to pay compensation to the victim's family, and recommended homicide charges for the Philippine Coast Guard personnel who opened fire on the Taiwan fishing boat.¹⁹

China also has a critical interest both in the seaborne trade of energy supplies via the South China Sea and the potentially significant oil and gas resources that lay beneath it. Currently, nearly one third of global crude oil and over half of global liquefied natural gas pass through the South China Sea, much of it en route to China's eastern provinces, the powerhouses of China's export- and manufacturing-driven economy.²⁰ In addition to the role the South China Sea plays in China's energy trade, China and the other claimants seek to exploit subsea oil and gas resources projected to lie beneath disputed waters.²¹

CHINA AND TAIWAN: The Changing Cross-Strait Balance of Power

China and Taiwan in 2013 enjoyed relatively positive relations, characterized by growing economic ties and relatively amicable political relations. Since the Commission's *2012 Report to Congress*, the two

sides established reciprocal trade promotion offices across the Strait,²² enacted a trade in goods agreement, signed a trade in services agreement,²³ signed a currency clearing agreement,²⁴ and continued discussions on a cross-Strait trade dispute settlement mechanism.²⁵ Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou told the Commission that his agenda for cross-Strait diplomatic relations during his second term includes securing additional economic agreements, expanding cross-Strait educational exchanges, and establishing reciprocal representation offices.

Despite these generally positive trends, China's cross-Strait policy remains focused on pursuing a balance of economic, political, and military power that heavily favors China with the goal of eventual unification of Taiwan.

Since the late 1990s, China's military modernization has focused on improving its capabilities for Taiwan conflict scenarios. This modernization program likely is designed to hedge against a failure of Beijing's cross-Strait diplomatic strategy; deter Taipei from taking steps toward official independence; signal to the United States that China is willing to use force against Taiwan if necessary; and enhance China's ability to deter, deny, or delay any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. The PLA is more prepared than in the past to conduct several different military campaigns against Taiwan, including a partial naval blockade and a limited air and missile campaign.

- China has a large and sophisticated short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force, including over 1,100 mobile SRBMs that are positioned in southeast China and able to strike Taiwan. China continues to improve the range, accuracy, and payloads of its SRBMs with the introduction of new missiles or variants and component upgrades.²⁶
- The PLA has approximately 2,300 combat aircraft capable of participating in large-scale air operations, 490 of which are based within range of Taiwan. By contrast, Taiwan's air force has approximately 410 combat aircraft, many of which will reach the end of their useful service life in the next five to 10 years.²⁷
- The PLA has approximately 75 major surface combatants, 85 missile patrol boats, and 60 conventional and nuclear submarines. These units are available for a range of missions, such as enforcing a blockade of Taiwan. As China's naval modernization continues, an increasing percentage of these ships and submarines will feature advanced weaponry. In contrast, Taiwan has 26 major surface combatants, 45 missile patrol boats, and two operational submarines.²⁸
- The PLA Navy has three total amphibious transport docks (LPD), all of which were commissioned after 2008. These LPDs – which can carry a mix of air-cushion landing craft, amphibious armored vehicles, helicopters, and marines – improve China's ability to seize and hold Taiwan's offshore islands.²⁹ However, China at this time does not appear to be pursuing the amphibious lift capability necessary to conduct a full-scale invasion of Taiwan; China still only has about one third of the lift it would need to conduct such an operation.

In addition to its military buildup against Taiwan, China continues to work to isolate Taiwan politically and diplomatically. Beijing's insistence on the "one China principle" precludes any country or international organization from simultaneously recognizing China and Taiwan. This effectively restricts Taiwan's participation in international organizations and activities and prevents Taiwan from promoting its sovereignty. In addition, China in a subtle yet significant effort to demonstrate its sovereignty over Taiwan introduced an inflammatory new passport design in May 2013 that includes images of two

popular tourist sites in Taiwan and a map depicting Taiwan as part of China.* Nevertheless, Taiwan made important progress in strengthening its role as an international actor this year. For instance, Taiwan signed free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore.³⁰ Taiwan also was invited to send a “guest” delegation to a United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization assembly.^{31†}

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States has committed itself to rebalancing its foreign policy to Asia, but now faces the possibility of being unable to implement ambitious diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives due to declining resources. Out of a total of 41 recommendations, the Commission highlighted ten, believing them to be of particular significance. At the top of the list this year is a recommendation that Congress fund the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 60 ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by 2020. The intent is to provide the United States with the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Western Pacific and surge naval assets in the event of a contingency. As Lt. Gen. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, Jr., currently Senior Director, China and the Pacific at the Center for the National Interest stated in testimony to the Commission, “no matter how capable the ship, it can only be in one place at a time. And power projection that stays is about ships.”³²

This recommendation addresses what has been a growing concern of mine: that resources available to the Department of Defense for realizing the Asia rebalance will be insufficient to lend credibility to its security commitments or to counter the changing balance of power in the region. PLA modernization efforts, many of which are designed to limit U.S. freedom of action throughout the Western Pacific, could undermine U.S. interests and security. As a result, it will be important for the United States to remain deeply engaged in the region and demonstrate that it has the capacity and resolve to actively shape – and offset – China’s growing maritime capabilities.³³ In my view, a strong U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific, and the deterrent effect it provides, is critical to preserving peace and stability in the region.

In addition to strengthening our own capabilities in the Asia Pacific, the United States should build the capacity of our partners and allies to improve maritime domain awareness in the East and South China Seas. For this reason, the Commission recommends Congress fund Department of Defense and State efforts to improve the air and maritime capabilities of our partners and allies, particularly with regard to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In another recommendation aimed at building maritime domain awareness, we recommend Congress fund U.S. Coast Guard engagement efforts with counterparts in the West Pacific, given that most of the operational burden among East and South China Sea claimants tends to fall on their maritime law enforcement forces.

The need to deepen strategic trust between the United States and China is reflected in our fourth recommendation regarding maritime disputes. We recommend Congress urge the Department of Defense to continue to develop the U.S.-China maritime security relationship. In operational environments as tense and potentially explosive as the East and South China Seas, strategic trust provides the foundation to reduce the potential of miscalculation at sea.

* Taiwan does not recognize PRC passports. Chinese citizens visiting Taiwan must apply for a “compatriot pass” issued by the National Immigration Agency.

† In July 2013, President Obama signed legislation directing the U.S. Secretary of State to “develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan in the ICAO.” Public Law 113-17, “To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly, and for other purposes.” 113th Cong., 1st sess. July 12, 2013. <http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1151>.

Turning to Taiwan, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship continues to be a key component of peace and security in the Asia Pacific. But while Taiwan remains our close partner, the role of Taiwan in the U.S. rebalance to Asia is not entirely clear. In October 2011, then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell testified to the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that “an important part of this turn to Asia is maintaining a robust and multidimensional unofficial relationship with Taiwan.”³⁴ Since then, U.S. officials have not explicitly referred to Taiwan’s actual or potential role in the U.S. rebalance to Asia in public statements. However, Taiwan should be considered a strong potential component in U.S. defense planning in the Asia Pacific. Taiwan’s extensive knowledge of the PLA and its ability to contribute to situational awareness in the region make it an ideal partner for the United States in an antiaccess/area denial scenario.³⁵

To support the strengthening of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the Commission recommends Congress urge Cabinet-level officials to visit Taiwan in order to promote commercial, technological, and people-to-people exchanges. We further recommend Congress direct the Administration to permit official travel to Taiwan for Department of State and Department of Defense personnel above the rank of office director or, for uniformed military personnel, above the level of O-6. With regard to deepening economic relations, the Commission recommends Congress encourage the Administration to continue discussion between the United States and Taiwan concerning a bilateral investment agreement.

Finally, I’d like to highlight the Commission’s recommendation to Congress to direct the Administration to transmit an unclassified report to Congress on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan from 2001 to 2013. As one of the largest buyers of U.S. arms in the world, and the largest in Asia, Taiwan continues to advocate for more advanced weapons from the United States, most notably submarines and fighter aircraft. However, progress on such deals remains elusive, threatening the long-term readiness of Taiwan’s military and further tipping the cross-Strait balance of military power in China’s favor.

Although the United States approved Taiwan’s request to purchase diesel-electric submarines in 2001, to date, there has been no progress on that sale due to a number of factors on both sides. These include partisan political gridlock in Taiwan’s legislature, delays in Taiwan’s commitment of funds, and protracted cost negotiations. Furthermore, the United States has not built a diesel-electric submarine since the 1950s, or operated one since 1990s. The Commission’s *2013 Report* dispels the notion that Taiwan is no longer interested in these submarines. In fact, earlier this year, Taiwan Ministry of Defense officials emphasized to the Commission that the Taiwan Navy’s ability to counter China’s expanding and modernizing submarine fleet will continue to erode as Taiwan’s aging submarine force increasingly is unable to support Taiwan Navy antisubmarine training.

Moreover, while U.S. support of Taiwan’s fighter program should be applauded, planned U.S. upgrades to Taiwan’s existing fleet of F-16 A/B aircraft do not adequately address all of Taiwan’s air defense requirements. The Obama Administration in April 2012 committed to deciding on a “near term course of action on how to address Taiwan’s fighter gap,” but has yet to announce further concrete details.³⁶ Without additional acquisitions, Taiwan’s fighter force will face substantial numerical shortfalls as Taiwan’s fighters are retired over the next five to 10 years.

Taiwan’s diminishing ability to maintain a credible deterrent capability may provide incentives and create opportunities for China to take on greater risk in its approach to cross-Strait relations, including pressuring Taiwan to move toward political talks or using military force to achieve political objectives. Bearing that in mind, directing the Administration to provide a report on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would not only provide accountability on the progress – or lack thereof – of planned sales, it also would support our own strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait.

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and for the Committee's focus on these important topics. I look forward to your questions.

¹ Andrew Erickson, "China's Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities," in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., *Strategic Asia 2012-13: China's Military Challenge* (Seattle, WA, and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asia Research, 2012), pp. 60-125; Daniel Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, "Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis of Chinese Views Since the Early 1990s," in Phillip C. Saunders et al., eds., *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), pp. 81-108; Thomas Bickford, *Uncertain Waters: Thinking About China's Emergence as a Maritime Power* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 2011), pp. 20-28; and U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, *The People's Liberation Army: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics* (Suitland, MD: 2009), pp. 5-11.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013* (Washington, DC: 2013), pp. I, 31-33; Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, "Near Seas 'Anti-Navy' Capabilities, not Nascent Blue Water Fleet, Constitute China's Core Challenge to U.S. and Regional Militaries," *China SignPost*, March 6, 2012. <http://www.andrewerickson.com/2012/03/china-signpost-55-near-seas-anti-navy-capabilities-not-nascent-blue-water-fleet-constitute-chinas-core-challenge-to-us-and-regional-militaries/>; Thomas Bickford, *Uncertain Waters: Thinking About China's Emergence as a Maritime Power* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 2011), pp. 28-29; Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, *Red Star Over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), pp. 14-44; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, *The People's Liberation Army: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics* (Suitland, MD: 2009), pp. 5-10; and Roger Cliff et al., *Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), pp. 3-12. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG524.pdf.

³ Jonathan Greenert and Mark Welsh, "Breaking the Kill Chain," *Foreign Policy*, May 16, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle?page=full; U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013* (Washington, DC: 2013), pp. I, 31-33; and Anton Lee Wishik II, "An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLA's Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines," *China Security* 19 (2011).

⁴ People's Republic of China, "Submission by the People's Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea: Executive Summary," December 14, 2012. ; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of China), "The Republic of China's Sovereignty Claims over the Diaoyutai Islands and the East China Sea Peace Initiative," <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/fd8c3459-b3ec-4ca6-9231-403f2920090a>.

⁵ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's New Leadership and Implications for the United States*, written testimony of David Lampton, February 7, 2013; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's New Leadership and Implications for the United States*, written testimony of Michael Auslin, February 7, 2013.

⁶ M. Taylor Fravel, "Xi Jinping's Overlooked Revelation on China's Maritime Disputes," *Diplomat*, August 15, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/15/xi-jinpings-overlooked-revelation-on-chinas-maritime-disputes/?all=true>; Xinhua, "Xi Jinping Stresses the Need to Show Greater Care about the Ocean, Understand More about the Ocean, and Make Strategic Plans for the Use of the Ocean, Push Forward the Building of a Maritime Power and Continuously Make New Achievements at the Eighth Collective Study Session of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau," July 31, 2013. OSC ID: CHR2013073144047122. <http://www.opensource.gov>.

⁷ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas*, written testimony of Michael McDevitt, April 4, 2013; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2012 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2012), p. 215; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas*, testimony of Peter Dutton, April 4, 2013; and U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet senior officers, meeting with Commissioners, July 2013.

⁸ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2012 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), p. 232.

⁹ M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Island Strategy: 'Redefining the Status Quo,'" *Diplomat*, November 1, 2012. <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/>.

¹⁰ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas*, written testimony of Peter Dutton, April 4, 2013.

¹¹ M. Taylor Fravel, "Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: An Update," *Diplomat*, January 4, 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/hainans-new-maritime-regulations-an-update/>; Ben Blanchard and Manuel Mogato, "UPDATE 4- Chinese police plan to board vessels in disputed seas," Reuters, November 29, 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/china-seas-idUSL4N0991Z020121130>.

¹² Edward Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power," *New York Times*, April 23, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all>; Michael Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior: Part One: On 'Core Interests,'" *China Leadership Monitor* 34 (February 22, 2011): 9, 23. <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/67966>; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 34:7 (Spring 2013): 17-18.

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- ¹⁴Kyodo, “China Says Senkaku Islands are its ‘Core Interest,’” April 26, 2013. OSC ID: JPP20130426969071. <http://www.opensource.gov>; *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), “Japanese, Chinese Defense Officials Meet to Ease Tensions Over Senkakus,” April 27, 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201304270049>.
- ¹⁵Caitlin Campbell et al. *China’s ‘Core Interests’ and the East China Sea* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 2013), p. 5. <http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Ccore-interests%E2%80%9D-and-east-china-sea>.
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- ¹⁸U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas*, written testimony of Lloyd Thrall, April 4, 2013.
- ¹⁹*Taiwan Today*, “Taiwan lifts sanctions against Philippines,” August 9, 2013. <http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=208324&ctNode=1983>.
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