



Ely Ratner
Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Dr. Ely Ratner is the Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His work focuses on U.S.-China relations, regional security in East Asia, and U.S. national security policy.

From 2015 to 2017, Ratner served as the deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, covering the global portfolio with particular focus on Asia and China policy, the South China Sea, North Korea, and U.S. alliances in Asia. From 2011 to 2012, while a CFR international affairs fellow, he served in the office of Chinese and Mongolian affairs at the State Department covering China's external relations in Asia. He also previously worked in the U.S. Senate on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the office of Senator Joe Biden. Outside of government, Ratner has worked as a senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific security program at the Center for a New American Security and as an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Ratner has testified before Congress and published widely on U.S.-China relations and U.S. national security strategy in Asia. His commentary and research have appeared in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Washington Quarterly*, *National Interest*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *Chinese Journal of International Politics*.

Ratner received his BA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He lives in Washington, D.C. with his wife and children.

Dr. Ratner testified to the Commission in March 2014 on "China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia."

Questions for Panelist

1. To what extent do military or national security considerations drive BRI? Describe the ways in which the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been and likely will be involved in BRI projects, explicitly or tangentially?
2. In terms of national security, what does China stand to gain from BRI, and what risks does BRI present to China's national security?
3. One of the new military missions highlighted in China's recent defense papers is the ability for the PLA to protect Chinese economic interests and citizens abroad. Currently, how capable is the PLA of protecting existing BRI projects? What about 5 or 10 years from now?
4. To what extent are actors within China's defense establishment driving or responding to BRI, both as a concept and as it relates to specific projects?
5. How will BRI shape China's military modernization, and vice versa?
6. What are the practical implications of BRI for U.S. defense stakeholders? For example, how could BRI impact the requirements and missions of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Pacific Command? What opportunities and costs does BRI present for U.S. military interests?
7. Does BRI raise any nontraditional security concerns for host countries, China, or others? How might projects be economically, socially, or otherwise destabilizing? What kinds of threats to stability does corruption present? Could projects become vehicles for money laundering or illicit transfers?
8. The Commission is mandated to make policy recommendations to Congress based on its hearings and other research. What are your recommendations for Congressional action related to the topic of your testimony?