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Commissioner Brookes and Commissioner Fiedler, and other distinguished members of the commission: I thank you for your invitation to testify before you today on the topic of evolving security dynamics in East Asia.

I understand the Commission is interested in the question of how countries in the region are reacting, and how regional alignments are changing, in response to China’s rise. I argue that China’s growing wealth and military power has not had a significant effect on regional alignments. China’s wealth and military capabilities have been growing for decades, yet during that period the U.S. relationship with Japan experienced a period of drift, and the U.S. alliance with the Philippines was largely dormant.

Although China’s *rise* per se has not affected regional alignments, Chinese *behavior* most certainly has. In the past five or so years, China has grown more assertive in its territorial claims. As China expert Alastair Iain Johnston has written, we have seen “more frequent patrols by various maritime-related administrative agencies, more risk-acceptant action to defend Chinese fishing activities, the encouragement of tourism, and more vigorous diplomatic pushback against others states’ claims.”¹

As Chinese behavior has grown more assertive, countries that dispute territory with it (Japan and the Philippines) have grown more alarmed and have been reinvigorating their alliances with the United States. Another U.S. ally, Australia (which lives in the vicinity of the South China Sea), has also been moving closer to Washington. Tellingly, the one country that is not moving closer to the United States, and indeed can be seen as “hedging” between Beijing and Washington, is South Korea: which does *not* have a territorial dispute with China.

The countries of East Asia, in other words, are not threatened by Chinese power, but many of them do feel increasingly threatened by Chinese behavior. Why is this an important distinction? If countries were reacting to Chinese power, and moving closer to the United States as a result, a trend of growing Chinese power would lead Washington to expect a trend of closer alignments with its allies—including South Korea.

But if countries are moving closer to the United States because of China’s more assertive behavior in its territorial disputes, this has two implications. First, expect increased strain and distance in the U.S. alliance relationship with South Korea. As Seoul continues to hedge, Washington will likely seek more support in countering Chinese power and influence than Seoul will be willing to extend.

Second, regarding its other, increasingly close partnerships, Washington should not take this closeness for granted. They are being driven by China's current assertive behavior—which has changed before, and could change again.

In the remainder of my testimony, I describe (1) the allies who appear to be moving closer to the United States, namely Australia, the Philippines, and Japan. I next (2) turn to a discussion of South Korean hedging, in which I note that one form of South Korean hedging is its unwillingness to move closer to Tokyo. Finally, (3) I conclude with implications for American diplomacy. I draw upon the case of Cold War Berlin as a model for U.S. alliance management in future challenges in East Asia.

REACTIONS TO RISING POWER

The Commission has attentively monitored the stunning rise of Chinese wealth, as well as China's increased military power. At the outset it is important to note that the United States has so far welcomed the increase of Chinese wealth and influence, and has sought to integrate China into the global economy and leadership institutions. This has created a situation in which the United States and China find their two societies and economies deeply interconnected, to both of their benefit. Many scholars of international relations, however, expect that if Chinese wealth continues to grow, relations with the United States will grow more competitive. In such a competition, the United States would care deeply about its network of regional alliances, and how allies are reacting to an increasingly powerful China.

When confronting a rising power, countries might be more accommodating or more antagonistic. On the accommodating end of the spectrum, countries might acquiesce to the demands that the rising power is making (territorial, political, economic). They might choose to strategically align with the rising power, viewing this as less expensive and less dangerous than attempting to confront it. They will embrace a narrative that unites the two countries and distances them from others. Usually, it is smaller powers (rather than great powers) that adopt more accommodating strategies: because they lack the capacity to balance against the rising power, or because allies are unavailable.²

At the other end of the spectrum is “balancing,” in which countries seek to limit the other country's rise. They build up their own military power and mobilize their societies against the rising power. They search for diplomatic and military allies to aid them in their effort. They reject the rising power's growing demands, engage in competitive diplomacy, and may also seek to arm its enemies at home and abroad. Countries that adopt this strategy are usually other great powers, who have the capacity to stand up to the rising state.

Countries can also react to a rising power by “hedging”—by working both sides. They accommodate the rising power in many ways, but keep their options open by maintaining good relationships with other potential allies.

THE BALANCERS

In some cases, China's increased territorial assertiveness has led countries to take steps to "balance" against China's rise by moving closer to the United States.

Australia. The strengthening that we have seen in ties between the United States and Australia—allies through the 1951 ANZUS treaty—was far from a foregone conclusion. Australia enjoys favorable geography that puts long stretches of Pacific Ocean between itself and China. Furthermore, China is Australia's largest trading partner: indeed, as the Chinese economy has boomed, Chinese demand for Australia's raw material exports has soared. Some Australian strategists have urged Canberra to adopt a hedging strategy, so to avoid angering Beijing, and to help dampen what they see as an unnecessary "spiral" of competition in U.S.-China relations.

Nonetheless, in recent years, the alliance between the United States and Australia has become stronger. Formerly, Australia hosted only a smattering of American troops. Today, Australia is playing a major role in the U.S. "pivot" or "rebalancing" to Asia – in 2011 the allies announced that 2,500 U.S. Marines would be stationed in Darwin.

The Philippines. The United States and the Philippines are also moving closer together. A U.S. ally since 1952, the Philippines ejected the U.S. military from its bases (Clark Air Force Base and U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay) in 1992. The alliance continued, but only recently has it become more strategically significant to both sides. Both sides are reacting out of greater concern about Chinese behavior. For its part, the Philippines claims parts of the disputed Spratly Islands, which the Chinese have claimed in full. The Philippines has arguably absorbed the brunt of China's increased territorial assertiveness—they previously controlled an area, Scarborough Shoal, but lost control of it to China, which has been pressing for control in other areas (Ayungin).³

In this context Washington and Manila have been pursuing renewed security cooperation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited there in 2011 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the alliance, with a prominent photo-op on the deck of a U.S. warship. More recently Secretary of State John Kerry has also visited, as over 1,000 U.S. soldiers and Marines provided disaster relief in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan. The U.S. and the Philippines are currently negotiating a deal, which they are expected to conclude soon, in which there would be increased U.S. troop rotation through the Philippines. Last month, Philippine President Benigno Aquino warned about a failure to resist aggression in the South China Sea by comparing the situation to Hitler's aggression in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s.

A reinvigorated U.S.-Philippine relationship keeps a longstanding ally, a democracy—with whose people our society and our military have a deep history and close ties—within the U.S. political orbit. At the same time, the U.S. security guarantee of the Philippines brings danger as well. It exposes the United States to the risk of being entangled in a crisis or even war over this territorial dispute—one in which Americans have no direct stake and would not otherwise be involved.

Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has been reinvigorated by China's increased hawkishness in the East China Sea. After the fall of the Soviet Union, people worried about an alliance "adrift"; the Japanese worried that the United States no longer valued Japan as an ally, and feared that the

United States was prioritizing Beijing over Tokyo. But the days of “Japan-passing” have passed. Japan is America’s most valuable ally in the Pacific because of its wealth and high level of development, its highly capable maritime forces, and because both countries worry about China’s increasingly aggressive behavior.

Beijing has given Japan several grounds for concern about how a powerful China would behave. Since the 1990s the Chinese Communist Party conducted a “patriotic education campaign” that emphasizes China’s wartime suffering at the hands of the Japanese. In the Chinese media, “anti-Japanism” sells, and thus flourishes; hatred of Japan surges through Chinese microblogs. Anti-Japanese protests in China in 2012 featured violence against Japanese-owned businesses, and calls for the extermination of Japanese (rhetoric that Beijing did not repudiate).

The two countries run an increasing risk of conflict over competing claims to ownership of islands in the East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu). A political crisis occurred in 2010 when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship, after which the Japanese authorities arrested the captain. Since then Chinese incursions into the airspace and waters of the islands have grown more frequent. Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-15J fighters have intercepted Chinese surveillance planes about 30 km from the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. A Chinese helicopter once flew to within 70 meters of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer *Samidare*. Last year, a Chinese vessel locked weapons-guiding radar on Japanese destroyer. Earlier this winter, the Japanese protested when Beijing declared a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the area.

In this context of growing Chinese assertiveness, Tokyo and Washington have been moving closer together. A series of Japanese policies reflect a renewed Japanese commitment to the alliance. Japan ousted a prime minister (Hatoyama) who seemed to advocate a more equidistant approach toward China and the United States. In the wake of anti-Japanese violence in China in 2012, the conservative Abe Shinzo became prime minister. Abe favors a “patriotic” stance on history issues, advocates close alliance relations with the United States, and wants to strengthen Japanese defense. Tokyo and Washington have smoothed over obstacles to resolving basing disputes on Okinawa (i.e., the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma). The Futenma relocation has vexed the allies for more than a decade; while the road to its resolution remains rocky, the issue in the past few years has moved in a far more productive direction.

Abe is also pursuing important legal and institutional reforms that will have the effect of facilitating U.S.-Japan cooperation and greater Japanese defense activities. Abe’s government presided over the establishment of a National Security Council (a move welcomed by U.S. defense officials to ease policy coordination) and the passing of a secrecy law (viewed as important for intelligence sharing).

Additionally, the Abe government is deciding whether to lift its long-standing legal prohibition against “collective self-defense,” namely, Japan’s ability to come to the defense of allies (when Japan itself is not under attack). Constitutional interpretation has long held that collective self-defense is prohibited. Toward changing this interpretation, the Abe government has appointed a group of experts to study the issue; their report (due in April) is expected to recommend a lifting of the ban. The government will likely submit revision for the Diet’s approval this autumn

(although Abe has said Cabinet approval alone would be enough to change the prevailing constitutional interpretation). Someday, Japan under Abe may also decide to move toward constitutional revision –the revision or abolishment of Article 9: a seminal event that would permit Japanese power projection.⁴

All of these profound and (from the U.S. standpoint) positive changes in Japanese security policy suggest a rock-solid alliance, yet at the same time, a flurry of commentary in both Japan and the United States laments an alliance in trouble. The reason for this doubt (which I will discuss later in my testimony) relates to the fact that while the United States and Japan share many common security interests, their interests are not perfectly aligned, and the area of divergence—namely, Japan’s island disputes—are becoming increasingly salient in East Asia. It is important, however, to understand that *never before* have U.S. and Japanese interests been so compatible, and thus never before has foundation of the alliance seemed so robust.

HEDGING

Not all allies are moving closer to the United States in response to China’s rise. Specifically, the Republic of Korea (ROK), an ally since the Korean War in 1953, appears to be pursuing a hedging strategy of maintaining close ties with both Beijing and Washington. According to Yonsei University professor Han Suk-lee, “South Koreans believe that it is against their national interest to promote one relationship at the expense of the other.”⁵

U.S.-ROK military relations remain close, but show signs of some distance. Seoul maintains its alliance with the United States, and the two countries enjoy excellent political, military, economic, and cultural relations. In the past several years, the two countries have negotiated a realignment of U.S. forces in South Korea with an eye to making the U.S. military presence there more sustainable. At the same time, South Korean military doctrine also reflects the pursuit of independent military capabilities, particularly related to its concerns about North Korean nuclear weapons. Poll data show that over 60 percent of the South Korean people believe that South Korea should acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Although this has not yet occurred, Seoul has been pursuing greater autonomy from the United States in the strategic realm. With the North Korean threat in mind, Seoul concluded a deal last year with the United States to extend the range of its missiles (up to a 500 mile range). The South Korean military is also developing an independent cyberweapons capability with which to independently attack North Korean nuclear facilities.⁶ The pursuit of such capabilities represents one form of South Korean hedging.

Hedging is also evident in Seoul’s close ties with Beijing. The two countries enjoy deep trade and cultural ties. They normalized political relations in 1993, recently celebrating the twenty-year anniversary of formal ties. Political relations between Beijing and Seoul have become very warm and productive. Indeed, Chinese leaders have described the recent period as “the best period of ROK-China relations in history.” This is not accidental; as Chinese analyst Jin Kai argues, “Reaching out to Seoul is a part of China’s counter-measures to the U.S. ‘pivot to Asia.’”⁷

One aspect of South Korea’s hedging is the distance it maintains from Japan. Seoul’s rejection of closer relations with Tokyo reassures China that the ROK is not participating in a balancing

effort. Just a decade or so ago, observers were heralding a new, amicable era in Japan-ROK relations. South Korean leaders accepted Japanese apologies for World War II atrocities and pledged to move relations forward. But as Chinese power has grown, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have grown noticeably less cooperative. After some South Korean leaders sought to promote intelligence-sharing with the Japanese (an agreement known as the General Security of Military Information Agreement, or GSOMIA), many South Koreans lashed out against it, citing that Japan could not be trusted. Similarly, plans by South Korean leaders for logistical cooperation in peacekeeping/humanitarian/disaster relief operations (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, ACSA) had to be shelved amidst the public outcry it produced.⁸

The South Korean narrative (evident in leaders' statements and media coverage) depicts Japan as a malignant, potentially recidivist aggressor. Frequent in the South Korean discussion of Japan is its mistreatment of Koreans in the early twentieth century, and calls for Japan to atone for its past atrocities toward Koreans and others. South Korean commemoration emphasizes anti-Japanism, and this includes "ganging up" with Beijing against Tokyo. Recently, the Chinese and South Koreans erected a statue in Harbin, China of Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean who during the Japanese occupation shot and killed Japanese official Ito Hirobumi while Ito was visiting Harbin. This statue is South Korean hedging cast in bronze.

To be sure, Koreans suffered terribly at Japan's hands during Japan's colonial rule from 1910-1945. And when Koreans raise history issues, they are often justifiably reacting to times when Japanese leaders said or did something quite troubling. Tokyo, for its part, could make itself a far more amiable ally with its own dealings with history. Yet at the same time, as seen in the remarkable transformation of relations in other cases (for example, U.S.-Japan relations, and Franco-German relations after World War II), countries intent on reconciliation forge compromise on historical issues and craft a unifying narrative about the past. Instead, Seoul has reversed previous steps to put the past behind. South Korean leaders lambast Japan for impenitence for its World War II atrocities and demand additional Japanese apologies. This approach reflects disinterest in reconciliation with Tokyo.

In other words, the common theme that "history is getting in the way" of reconciliation between Japan and South Korea is incorrect. History does not "get in the way": leaders decide (based on strategic or other interests) whether or not they want to seek reconciliation, and as a result they either put history in the way, or make efforts to remove it as an obstacle.⁹ The fact that South Koreans are unwilling to compromise on history issues certainly relates in some part to Japanese behavior, but also reflects Seoul's hedging between China and the United States. This has enabled the Chinese to conclude, as does analyst Jin Kai, "Seoul is not with the 'other side' at the moment, and Beijing won't have to worry about a face-off with "The Three Musketeers."¹⁰

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

In its East Asian alliances, the United States sees some allies who are seeking closer cooperation with it. They have done so not as a result of China's rise *per se*, but rather as a result of China's territorial assertiveness, which began in the past five or so years. South Korea, which does not have a territorial dispute with China, is the exception. While Seoul maintains its alliance with the United States, it is cultivating excellent relations with Beijing, and distancing itself from Japan, a potential alliance partner.

What are the implications for U.S. policy? First, Seoul's hedging shows us that South Koreans perceive divergence between its interests and those of the United States and Japan. This will likely fuel increased frustration on the U.S. side in coming years. Washington may seek more support in countering Chinese power and influence than Seoul will be willing to extend.

In future years, Washington would be wise to proceed with a soft touch regarding its South Korean ally. At this early stage—in which U.S.-China competition remains at low levels, and may possibly never fully develop—there is nothing to be gained from forcing South Korea to “choose” between Beijing and Washington. The current iciness in Korea-Japan ties may be in large part due to the particular government in power in Seoul; the ROK may grow warmer toward Japan under a different leader. Additionally, Washington should understand that Beijing's policies have pushed other countries closer to the United States, and in the future it may in fact do the same with respect to Seoul.¹

A second implication of this analysis relates to those allies that have moved closer. Washington should not take for granted the recent closeness in U.S. alliance relations with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. Their drift toward the United States was not an inevitable reaction to China's increased power, but rather a reaction to Chinese behavior—which could change. Beijing has already shifted from a more reassuring, accommodating posture in the late 1990s~2000s (its period of “smile diplomacy”) to a more hawkish posture. Beijing may begin to recognize the costs of its assertive diplomacy and may tactically moderate its policy to appear less threatening to U.S. partners. This would return the United States back to the period in which its allies were less committed than they are today.

Observers may be tempted to draw the conclusion that precisely because the United States should not take its partners for granted, it must be particularly solicitous of their needs and interests. Indeed, some have argued that Washington should more clearly state its support for its allies in their island disputes vis-à-vis China: in order to assuage possible abandonment fears and to maintain strong alliances. As one U.S. official put it, “If all we have are diplomatic response[s] when China is creating new facts on the ground/in the sea/air, this will continue to erode U.S. credibility with allies and partners.” Similarly, “It is time,” argues another analyst, “for tighter security relations and clearer commitments to Japan and other allies like the Philippines that are now under pressure from Beijing. If the administration maintains a cool distance in hopes it will prevent escalation, the result will be more hedging by America's allies....”¹¹

These analysts are correct in the sense that—because of its alliance commitments—Washington will be perceived, by its allies and by the world, as obliged to come to the aid of these countries if China uses force against them over disputed territory. More broadly, these analysts are also correct that the credibility of American security guarantees is vital: without it, American threats and promises will not be believed.

¹ The two countries share key potential areas of dispute, including perceived Chinese coddling of North Korea, and a potential territorial designs by China on what some argue is historic Chinese territory within Korea (the Kingdom of Koguryo).

At the same time, a blank American check to its allies would be ill advised, given the entrapment risk and given the stakes. Although the United States has many overlapping interests with its allies (indeed, more so than perhaps ever before), these interests are not perfectly aligned.

For example, while the United States and Japan have very strong overlapping interests regarding China's rise, their interests diverge over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Tokyo considers them Japanese territory, and views Chinese dominance in the area as unacceptably menacing to Okinawa and the Ryukyu islands. By contrast, Washington takes no position with respect to the islands' sovereignty.ⁱⁱ The United States has no direct strategic interest in who owns the tiny, uninhabited islands. The prospect that this issue might trigger a crisis or war with China – a major economic partner and a nuclear-armed power—is a horrifying one.

America's Asian alliances are based on real, important, and shared interests, and these alliances entail the United States accepting tremendous risk. As such, these alliances need to be built on genuine interests and values. The United States does not want to confront China in dangerous crises over issues in which it perceives little actual strategic interest.

LESSONS FOR ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT FROM BERLIN

In future years, the United States should expect more frequent Chinese efforts to increase its presence in, and control of, disputed areas. Through “salami-tactics,” Beijing will attempt to raise the costs to the United States and its allies of operating there, and to win small symbolic victories to create a sense of Chinese legitimacy and authority. In the South China Sea, Beijing has engaged in a pattern of testing, probing, and seeking to change “facts on the ground.”

With increased patrols, and with its declaration of an ADIZ, Beijing is adopting the same tactics in the East China Sea. As Deputy Secretary of State William Burns said during a visit to Beijing, China has been engaging in “an unprecedented spike in recent activity”; he lamented China's “growing incremental pattern of efforts” to assert control.¹² In coming years, China will likely seek to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan as it attempts to “change the facts on the ground” in the East China Sea.

As they react to future disputes, and manage alliance relations, the United States and its partners should look to the instructive case of NATO in Cold War Berlin. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviets and their East German allies repeatedly sought to squeeze and restrict NATO access to the autobahns that connected West Germany to the isolated city of West Berlin within the East. The West Germans saw in these actions dire threats to West Berlin and to the West German state. They suggested repeatedly that the issue at hand was one of extraordinary import, which challenged NATO credibility and the value of the NATO alliance.

At one point the Soviets demanded that NATO convoys present documents to be stamped by East German (rather than Soviet) border guards. Bonn decried this as unacceptable political recognition of East Germany (one of its core concerns); many West Germans, supported by some U.S. foreign policy officials, declared that this issue was central to NATO credibility in West

ⁱⁱ The U.S. position is that the areas are currently “administered” by Japan, and as such fall under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

German eyes, and that the United States must take a firm stance—to the point of risking what would have been a nuclear war.

After many intra-alliance disputes, over multiple crises prompted by the Soviets, the United States chose to define the issue differently. The John F. Kennedy administration decided, as one official commented, that the United States was “not prepared to risk war over rubber stamps.” President Kennedy declared that the core issues at stake—shared by West Germany and the rest of NATO—were “our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin.”¹³ Whether the Soviets wanted to stamp paperwork with red or blue or purple stamps, in triplicate or in duplicate, or if they wanted Soviet, East German, or Hungarian guards to stamp them, was beside the point—and was not worth risking a nuclear war over.

The Kennedy administration thus distinguished between core issues to West Germany and NATO, versus issues that (though cared about by West Germany) were largely symbolic to other NATO members. This created a foundation for a much stronger alliance: one in which members actually believed that their partners would fight if necessary, because the alliance was focused on issues of shared critical concern, rather than on issues of importance to only one side.

Today the United States and its allies need to come to a similar set of understandings in East Asia. To Japan and other U.S. allies, the issue of sovereignty over disputed islands is very important; the challenge facing the United States and its partners is to identify what are the core issues regarding those disputes in which the allies share a strong interest—versus what are the “rubber stamps”: issues that one partner might prefer a stronger stance over, but the other partner views as outside the shared interest.

Discerning between these issues is the key challenge for U.S. alliance management. For in future disputes, the Japanese (like the West Germans) will pressure Washington for solidarity. They will be joined by voices declaring that the United States must stand with Tokyo or risk a devastating loss of credibility in allies’ eyes across the globe; they will be joined by Japan experts explaining how vital the issue is to Tokyo. Sometimes these analysts will be right (when it’s core issues at stake); but sometimes the issue will be akin to rubber stamps: over which a hawkish U.S. policy would be too dangerous given the U.S. interest. In Berlin, as the Kennedy administration formulated it, the core issues were “presence and access.” Determining what are the core issues in island disputes, that the United States and its allies share an interest in defending, is the key challenge for U.S. alliance management in East Asia.

¹ Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), p. 46.

² Stephen Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

³ Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” *Foreign Policy*, August 3, 2012.

⁴ Helene Cooper, “In Japan’s Drill with the U.S., a Message for Beijing,” *New York Times*, February 22, 2014.

⁵ Han Suk-lee, "South Korea Seeks to Balance Relations with China and the United States," Council on Foreign Relations, November 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/south-korea-seeks-balance-relations-china-united-states/p29447>

⁶ <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26287527>

⁷ Jin Kai, "The Weakest Link: How China Seeks to Destabilize the US-ROK-Japan Triangle," *The Diplomat*, February 10, 2014.

⁸ Ralph Cossa, "Japan-South Korea Relations: Time to Open Both Eyes," Council on Foreign Relations, July 2012. At <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/japan-south-korea-relations-time-open-both-eyes/p28736>

⁹ Jennifer Lind, "'Getting to No': 'Getting to No': Narratives and Reconciliation in Japan-ROK Relations," Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 28-Sept 1, 2013.

¹⁰ Kai, "The Weakest Link."

¹¹ Quoted in Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: U.S., China in war of words over South China Sea air zone," *Washington Times*, February 12, 2014, at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/12/inside-the-ring-obama-pushback-against-china-is-pr/#ixzz2vCLvsBcU> ; Dan Blumenthal, "Japan and China: Not yet 1914, but time to pay attention," *Foreign Policy*, January 28, 2014.

¹² Quoted in <http://japandailynews.com/u-s-advises-china-to-stop-risky-activities-in-the-east-china-sea-0643744/>

¹³ Quotes from Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 104.