

15 Feb. 2018

Jacqueline N. Deal

President, Long Term Strategy Group

“Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”

Hearing on “China’s Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States”

## Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I was asked to address how the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military modernization is challenging both US Pacific Command (PACOM) operations and US national security interests in the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations (AOR), and then to outline some recommendations to Congress. Below I will start with the challenge to our national security interests and then cover the challenge to our operations in the PACOM AOR before offering some recommendations, but let me first state my bottom lines:

- Ideologically hostile, revisionist, expansionist major powers pose the greatest threat to US national security interests, and the PRC is proving to be an ideologically hostile, revisionist, expansionist major power. Xi Jinping’s pronouncements at the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress made clear the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) intent to supplant US global leadership. This suggests that it is past time for Americans to recognize the competition in which we are now engaged.
- Ongoing modernization, restructuring, and operations of the PRC’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), are aimed at creating more “strategic space” for the PRC, to make it safe for the PRC to coerce regional powers and, over time, to spread the CCP’s own rules and norms, so that countries in Eurasia and beyond defer to and accommodate the party’s wishes. A prerequisite for accomplishing this goal is disrupting US alliances, and extruding or neutralizing the US military’s presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific AOR.
- To this end, the CCP coordinates PLA activities to work together with and support PRC efforts in other domains, including economics, diplomacy, and political/information warfare. These efforts have succeeded in some measure in deterring the United States from developing, much less implementing, effective strategies for the competition.
- The PRC is mounting challenges at an accelerating pace out of weakness as well as out of strength, and the United States still possesses many competitive advantages that we could exploit if we seize the opportunity.
- If the PRC succeeds in securing additional “strategic space” and enforcing deference, US prosperity and freedom will suffer, and the PLA threat to our physical security will grow.
- To forestall ominous trends and protect US interests, members of Congress should consider reinforcing the new US National Defense Strategy and designating the PRC our number one foreign policy and defense challenge. They might also consider the following:
  - Countering PRC strategy should be our paramount priority, to include redressing PRC espionage and sensitive technology extraction (whether by theft or through investment in US firms or funds), deleterious trade policies, and political warfare and intelligence operations.
  - Congress could encourage or require federal departments and agencies to undertake cooperation with US allies and partners to respond to the array of challenging activities that the PRC is undertaking.
  - Congress could also mandate regular unclassified and classified updates of the Defense Department’s implementation of the new National Defense Strategy. These reviews

would have more leverage if Congress identified metrics for assessing the success of policies taken to advance the strategy over time.

### Challenges to US National Security Interests in the Asia-Pacific

The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) sets out US national security interests as follows:

- First, our fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life...
- Second, we will promote American prosperity...
- Third, we will preserve peace through strength...
- Fourth, we will advance American influence.<sup>1</sup>

In other words, as a primary matter we seek to protect our people and territory, our prosperity, and our freedom. We don't want to be targeted physically, robbed, coerced, or deprived of our ability to exercise basic rights, including the right to select our leaders, exercise free speech, and assemble and worship as we choose, among other important freedoms. How does PLA modernization, and the broader PRC strategy within which it fits, challenge these interests?

As the new US NSS notes, for much of the last century, US strategy was focused on defeating ideologically hostile, revisionist, expansionist major-power opponents, which we recognized as our principal security challenge. After the Cold War, however, the United States entered a period of strategic "drift,"<sup>2</sup> during which we lost focus. Instead of seeking to limit the power of the CCP regime, another potential peer competitor, we instead encouraged it, in the mistaken belief that once the PRC reached a certain level of development and engagement with the world, the party would fall or at least become less authoritarian and more inclusive. In other words, in the decades after 1989 we fostered the rise of a 21<sup>st</sup>-century major power whose ideological hostility, revisionist aims, and expansionist tendencies many Americans are only just now coming to appreciate. Because of the character of its regime, and by virtue of its size and capabilities, the PRC is on track to threaten the fundamental US national security interests laid out in the 2017 NSS.

A brief review of the PRC's strategy over the past several decades will illuminate the nature of the challenge. For much of the post-Cold War period, the CCP under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao sought to restore the PRC to major-power status, while denying that this was their ambition. "Revival" or "rejuvenation" (*faxing*, 复兴) had been a goal of Chinese nationalists and strategists since the Opium Wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>3</sup> but for the aforementioned "paramount leaders" (*zuigao lingdao ren*, 最高领导人), it was also a way of justifying the CCP's monopoly on power and attendant abuses. Their road to revival began with an embrace of the United States,<sup>4</sup> which would supply the PRC with technology and investment even after the Tiananmen Square crackdown because Americans believed

---

<sup>1</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Dec. 2017, p. 4, available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Dec. 2017, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Random House, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> "Road to Revival" (*faxing zhilu*, 复兴之路) was actually the name of the exhibit on the "Century of Humiliation" (discussed below) at the PRC's National Museum in Beijing that Xi Jinping visited in one of his first public acts upon becoming General Secretary of the CCP in Nov. 2012.

and were assured that such commerce would be good for both sides, that the PRC would remain internally oriented for many years to come, and that the CCP would liberalize politically after it opened up economically.<sup>5</sup> This essentially deceptive, or “hiding and biding,” approach to accumulating resources from abroad succeeded. By the early 2000s, the CCP retained its monopoly in power, even as the PRC was on the verge of overtaking Japan as the second biggest economy in the world. The PLA was also in the final stages of developing formidable new anti-satellite and anti-ship weapons specifically targeted to hold US assets at risk, and it would soon roll out a so-called fourth-generation fighter and the PRC’s first aircraft carrier. Since the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the accession of Xi Jinping in 2012, PRC strategy has shifted in a more explicitly hostile direction. While Beijing still emphasizes interdependence and promises that cooperation with it will be “win-win,” it has added a layer of threats involving the PRC’s economic leverage and new military capabilities; when threats have not sufficed, it has not hesitated to use these tools – to punish those who defy the CCP’s wishes, and to erode the US military’s ability to support its East Asian allies and partners.<sup>6</sup>

What are the CCP’s wishes? At the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping declared, many times, the dawn of a “new era,” and as important but often overlooked, he described this era as one of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a phrase he used 70 times in the report, and three times in the first two sentences. Xi further stipulated the PRC’s pre-eminence “in the East” and described its rising “comprehensive national power” (*zonghe guoli*, 综合国力) as putting it on the road to world-leading status. Achievements cited in support of this proposition included not only economic development and military modernization but also Xi’s signature Belt and Road campaign, along with other initiatives designed to build up the PRC’s “international influence” and advance the CCP’s vision of a “new type of international relations.”<sup>7</sup>

These pronouncements, as well as Xi’s suggestion that the PRC offers a “new choice” or model for developing countries to follow,<sup>8</sup> are unfortunately not empty slogans or boasts. They reflect a bold, direct challenge to the liberal order backed by the United States – a set of institutions that we see as serving the interests of all participants and as conducing to the maintenance of international peace. Where the liberal order revolves around respect for the basic rights and equality of all countries under international law, the protection and promotion of free trade, and the use of juridical means to settle international disputes, the CCP believes, as then-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi asserted in a fit of pique at an ASEAN meeting in 2010, “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries, and that’s

---

<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, CCP officials also courted Moscow in the 1990s and secured Russian support for the PLA’s modernization.

<sup>6</sup> Examples include sanctions against foreign businesses on the mainland and the manipulation of protests, imports, exports, and tourist visas, as well as the deployment of ostensibly civilian, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces, backed by the conventional PLA, around territory claimed by Beijing.

<sup>7</sup> Xi Jinping’s Report to the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, available in Chinese at: <http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2017-10-18/60018047.html>; cited in Rush Doshi, “Xi Jinping just made it clear where China’s foreign policy is headed,” *Washington Post*, October 25, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-justmade-it-clear-where-chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/?utm\\_term=.1694f3b2be0f](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-justmade-it-clear-where-chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/?utm_term=.1694f3b2be0f), and Michael Swaine, “Chinese Views of Foreign Policy in the 19th Party Congress,” *China Leadership Monitor*, Issue 55 (Winter 2018), <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm55-ms-final.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

just a fact.”<sup>9</sup> In other words, smaller countries should fall in line and concede whenever their territorial claims or other economic, security, or political preferences clash with the CCP’s. Other states should also ensure that none of their nationals “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people,” regardless of whether this requires the suspension of popular rights or privileges inherent in their political systems.

The PRC is seeking to achieve this vision of international relations not only by expanding and flexing its military capabilities and economic leverage in the form of trade and market access, but also through external investments in transportation and communications infrastructure, risky loans with foreign property or territory as collateral, the provision of PRC-made weapons, and other projects near to the hearts of autocrats from Eurasia to Africa and South America. All of these lines of effort are designed to help the PRC control and protect resources outside its borders, bind smaller states to Beijing, bypass or eviscerate the existing liberal institutions that govern international relations, and make it harder for the United States to intervene.

In the physical world, the PRC’s investment in container ships and port infrastructure around the world confers the ability to control, monitor, and perhaps interfere with, maritime commerce. “As of 2015, nearly 70 percent of global container traffic passed through Chinese-owned or Chinese-invested ports located around the world,” according to one analysis. “Other reports suggest that Chinese officials may be able to control key ports, such as those running along the Asia-Europe route via the Suez Canal, which could give priority to Chinese vessels.”<sup>10</sup> In the world of institutions and virtual space, the PRC is also sponsoring new bodies, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in which it plays a dominant role and which compete with liberally governed or Western-led organizations; creating new networks, such as the Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System (CIPS) to bypass the Western SWIFT system and deprive other states of a window onto its transactions; and racing to deliver new internet and telecommunications standards, such as 5G wireless communication technology, which would afford Beijing the opportunity to regulate or at least monitor information traffic.

Much of this effort is now subsumed under the banner of the Belt and Road initiative,<sup>11</sup> which an Australian member of Parliament recently warned “employs economic power as an expression of strategic power.” She went on to call it a “game-changer” that represents “a rejection of the conventional ways of doing business since the end of World War II.”<sup>12</sup>

Given how many benefits the PRC has gained from the existing order over the past several decades, its hardly concealed efforts to re-shape it may come as a surprise. Why would the CCP now bite the hand that has fed it? Doesn’t the party worry about losing access to other major powers’ technology and

---

<sup>9</sup> Yang was promoted to the Politburo in Oct. 2017. On his ASEAN outburst in 2010, see John Pomfret, “US Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” *Washington Post*, July 30, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Tony Padilla, “China to Shape International Trade Via Belt and Road,” *Reconnecting Asia*, July 19, 2017, <https://reconasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-shape-international-trade-belt-and-road/>.

<sup>11</sup> Nadège Rolland, *China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*, National Bureau of Asia Research, 2017.

<sup>12</sup> David Wroe, “China’s massive global infrastructure spending a ‘game changer’ for world power, says Labor’s Penny Wong,” *Sidney Morning Herald*, Jan. 24, 2018, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/chinas-massive-global-infrastructure-spending-a-game-changer-for-world-power-says-labors-penny-wong-20180123-h0n09g.html>.

resources, or inspiring a countervailing effort by them? Recent events make more sense when one takes into account the lessons of Chinese history, as they are understood in Beijing, along with the CCP's very real sense of current vulnerabilities.

As reflected in Yang Jiechi's outburst quoted above, Chinese tradition teaches that major powers or "hegemons" (*ba*, 霸) behave in a certain way. They use their economic, military, and political influence to coerce smaller powers, and they set up institutions to reinforce a hierarchy of relations on which they sit atop to enable this coercion. Despite our protestations, CCP elites have never really believed that the post-World War Two institutions underwritten by the United States and its allies were neutral or designed to help the PRC prosper. Indeed, modern China's first encounter with international commerce is remembered as the dawn of the "Century of Humiliation" (*bainian guochi*, 百年国耻) in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a period in which foreign imperialist powers exploited the Qing dynasty's weakness to wrest territorial concessions and one-sided trade deals from Beijing.

A corollary of this perspective is that PRC strategists have long anticipated that US patience with the party regime would wear thin. The hope was that by the time we woke up to the reality of CCP ambition, it would be too late – the PRC would be too big and too formidable a competitor to challenge. The United States would have to concede major points of division and generally take into account Beijing's interests in all of our policies. Following the advice of Sun Zi, the PRC would thus be able to "win without fighting." The timeline for this reckoning has contracted both because of the progress that the PRC has made to date (some in the West have estimated that the PRC will overtake the United States in absolute GDP as early as this year<sup>13</sup>), and because internal pressures now compel Beijing to look abroad for new markets and sources of support for, or validation of, the CCP's rule.

If the PRC appears to be in a hurry to cement its position as the new hegemon, that's because it is. Over the last few decades, as its economy has expanded dramatically thanks to manufacturing and exports, the country's reliance on overseas supplies of raw materials, trade routes, and markets has also skyrocketed. This creates an untenable set of external vulnerabilities for the PRC in a world where the old hegemon, i.e., the United States, possesses an asymmetric ability to project power and interdict global sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

In the same period, internally, even as it has increasingly openly challenged the United States and other countries the party has been battling the effects of endemic corruption; a widening gap between the haves and the have-nots; rising tensions among religious and ethnic minorities; pollution that has ravaged the PRC's land, air, and water; an increasing dependency ratio that is only partly the result of the One Child Policy; and the limits of an investment-led economic growth model that has produced scary sums of internal debt.<sup>14</sup> Rather than liberalize to address these issues, the CCP has doubled down on existing policy tools, including using new technologies to broaden and deepen the regime's surveillance apparatus, so that any restive elements can be identified and neutralized before they pose a serious political threat. The PRC's political situation has thus been growing more, rather than less,

---

<sup>13</sup> Mike Patton, "China's Economy Will Overtake The U.S. in 2018," *Forbes.com*, April 29, 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2016/04/29/global-economic-news-china-will-surpass-the-u-s-in-2018/#5d251ec5474b>.

<sup>14</sup> On the growth challenge, see Dan Steinbock, "How to Beat the Middle-Income Trap," *China Daily*, Jan. 29, 2018, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/29/WS5a6e603fa3106e7dcc1373b1.html>, which allows that the PRC is still only a developing country in per capita GDP terms.

fragile. Its push to lock in global major-power status is on the one hand premature and on the other urgent.

### Challenges to US PACOM Operations

In regional military terms, the PRC's ambition to be recognized as a major power – and respected as a Chinese-style hegemon – translates into a requirement to neutralize or extrude US forces. This will help the CCP convince local powers that the US role and influence in the region since World War Two has been an historical anomaly; that American power is fading; and that a reversion to Middle Kingdom primacy is under way, so they have no choice but to accede to a new Beijing-sponsored order. PRC military strategists also appreciate that trends in warfare demand that the PLA move out into peripheral areas where the US military has been routinely operating – from the East and South China Seas to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. This adds an operational rationale to the strategic imperative to push back the United States.

According to the 2013 edition of the *Science of Military Strategy* textbook published by the Academy of Military Science in Beijing,<sup>15</sup> “strategic space” (*zhanlue kongjian*, 战略空间) is the area required by a people to “resist foreign interference and aggression, and safeguard their own survival and development.” The extent of the space required “will follow and depend on the extent of expansion of national interests, and even more will depend on the range at which military power can be projected.” Trends in other countries’ ability to conduct power projection, moreover, compel the PLA to transition to “forward defense” (*qianyan fangwei*, 前沿防卫):

The world’s military powers and some peripheral nations are all striving to develop informatized long-range operational systems with new generation aircraft carriers, aircraft, missiles, submarines, unmanned weapons, and space-based information and weapon platforms, etc. as the backbone, and to raise the land, sea, air, space, and networks multi-dimensional long-range operations capability based on information systems. Along with the continuous rise in our nation’s comprehensive national power, the possibility of facing a large-scale invasion, especially on land, is further decreasing. The main war threat has switched from traditional inland direction toward the ocean direction, while the main mode of threat has changed ... to integrated air and space, air and sea, and networks and non-contact air strikes, and our home territory’s interior will be under the enemy’s mid- and long-range firepower coverage.

The concept of expanded strategic space is thus connected to forward defense insofar as the PLA must strive to:

externally push the strategic forward edge from the home territory to the peripheral, from land to sea, from air to space, and from visible spaces to invisible spaces to expand the strategic depth and gradually form into a new three-dimensional strategic space of surrounding and protecting the home territory, radiating to the periphery, and taking care of both the physical and virtual realms.

---

<sup>15</sup> Shou Xiaosong, ed., *The Science of Military Strategy (Zhanlue Xue, 战略学)*, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), the source of the quotations in the rest of this paragraph.

According to the text, this will also clearly require the adoption of “jointness” and improvements in “long-distance warfare,” which the restructuring of the PLA announced in Dec. 2015 was designed to facilitate. Geographically, moreover, the areas within the First and Second Island Chains out to the Western Pacific and northern Indian Ocean are highlighted:

We should fully consider bringing about the geographical superiorities of our nation’s broad land territory and complex, multi-formed terrain, including the protruding arc facing the Western Pacific Ocean and the Northern Indian Ocean, and utilize the rapid development of basic infrastructure such as national transportation and communications as well as the favorable condition of their simultaneous radiation toward the periphery. Then, ... [as necessary], we could implement operations with the mainland and the coastal waters as the strategic inner line to deter, absorb, and control the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean strategic outer line.

Over at least the past five years, such thinking has inspired an increasingly intense campaign of PRC political warfare and military pressure, along with operational activities designed to decrease US military effectiveness and open up those spaces for the PLA to intimidate regional states and secure strategic depth for a potential future conflict with the United States. Again, Beijing would prefer to “win without fighting,” but PRC strategists know that the best way to avoid a war is to prepare to prevail in one.

In a 2015 monograph US Navy Captain Christopher H. Sharman documented the PLA Navy’s (PLAN’s) steady progress since 2004 in implementing “far seas defense” (*yuanhai fangwei*, 远海防卫) in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.<sup>16</sup> In the same period, the PRC has built up a network of substantial new PLAN bases in the South China Sea and interfered with US Navy and auxiliary operations in that area. Regular PLA forces, along with paramilitary and law enforcement assets, have verbally harassed US forces, menacingly shouldered them, sought to damage their towed arrays, and even stolen a US Naval Ship (USNS) unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).

Together with the threat posed by Chinese anti-ship missiles, these activities seem to have had the desired effect. At a “Luncheon Town Hall” panel discussion at a conference I attended in 2013, the video of which is available on Youtube, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert conceded that at least on the surface, the US Navy had changed its pattern of operations within the First Island Chain:

Moderator: If I could just ask about China for a moment, it’s clear that the PLAN is modernizing; they’re increasing their force size; they’re ranging beyond their normal operations areas, and becoming a little bit more assertive out there. Is there anything in what they’re doing that’s causing us to have to make a change at the moment?

Adm. Greenert: Yes, in a way that we are making the change, but we’re making it by conscious effort, and a lot of that has to do with operations inside the First Island Chain. Clearly we talk about maritime interactions as a strategic area. As we look across the interagency approach to, you know, what is it worth where we operate? How does it impact our overall posture in the

---

<sup>16</sup> Christopher H. Sharman, “China Moves Out: Stepping Stones to a New Maritime Strategy,” *China Strategic Perspectives* 9, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2015.

Western Pacific and in the world, and with a country that we trade with? So some call it lawfare; some call it ... many different areas, but it becomes not just, could we win in a conflict? The question is, do we want to risk that? What is it worth diplomatic-wise and overall? So it has caused us to operate differently, but again it's by conscious [effort]. There are some domains [where] we haven't changed anything. The undersea domain, we own it, we go wherever we want right now today, and it's our job to assure that that is the case. But in some domains, yeah, we've operated somewhat differently. But that's again by our choice. We have the option to approach it differently if we choose to.<sup>17</sup>

As late as 2014, moreover, US civilian and military leaders were putting our defense planners and other national security personnel in a difficult position by invoking concerns about the maintenance of commercial relationships as a reason not to mention the PRC as a competitor.<sup>18</sup>

The PLA, meanwhile, has identified this tendency and approves, noting in the 2013 *Science of Military Strategy* that “intertwining interests” and “common global challenges” mean that countries “cannot stop cooperating with each other in all the other areas because of their differences in one area, and cannot conduct full-scale confrontation because of confrontation in one domain.”<sup>19</sup> Distinguishing friend from foe has become more difficult in this environment, and the thresholds for political and military conflicts have risen.<sup>20</sup> PRC political and information warfare initiatives are therefore designed to encourage the US perception that interdependence guarantees peace, and that any attempts to prepare for hostilities would be not only economically costly but militarily destabilizing. This dynamic creates space for the PLA to act aggressively in the region without fear of serious repercussions. The *Science of Military Strategy* identifies a cyclical pattern of US-PRC interactions, which “ease—intensify—ease,” as struggles of “containment and counter-containment, extrusion and counter-extrusion” unfold.<sup>21</sup> PRC strategists’ confidence that tension will stay within certain bounds partly explains the boldness of their recent initiatives to usurp our global leadership role. It also suggests that the United States could give Beijing pause by appearing to prepare to actually use its competitive advantages to target PRC weaknesses.

### Recommendations for Congress

US national security policy includes all instruments of power, not just military or defense instruments, and the challenges outlined above clearly implicate a range of US government and private-sector interests. That said, the Pentagon’s new US National Defense Strategy offers a useful point of departure in identifying the PRC as our primary threat and in recommending that our strategy involve “expanding the competitive space,” to include working with allies and building on the US military’s enduring strengths in the area of lethality and innovation. To clarify the situation for themselves and educate the American people, members of Congress should consider reinforcing the new NDS and designating the PRC our number one foreign policy and defense challenge.

---

<sup>17</sup> AFCEA West 2013, “Pivot to the Pacific: What Are the Practical and Global Implications,” Jan. 29-31, 2013, San Diego Convention Center, Luncheon Town Hall, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8YcuvAATEQ&list=PLWX4R7nG6a8moZ0bIUtkBBIqaOkbr85zb&index=7>.

<sup>18</sup> <http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/greenert-dont-unnecessarily-antagonize-china>

<sup>19</sup> Shou Xiaosong, op cit.

<sup>20</sup> Shou Xiaosong, op cit.

<sup>21</sup> Shou Xiaosong, op cit.



They might also consider the following:

- Countering PRC strategy should be our paramount priority, to include redressing PRC espionage and sensitive technology extraction (whether by theft or through investment in US firms or funds), deleterious trade policies, and political warfare and intelligence operations.
- Congress could encourage or require federal departments and agencies to undertake cooperation with US allies and partners to respond to the array of challenging activities that the PRC is undertaking.
- Congress could also mandate regular unclassified and classified updates of the Defense Department's implementation of the new National Defense Strategy. These reviews would have more leverage if Congress identified metrics for assessing the success of policies taken to advance the strategy over time.