SECTION 4: HONG KONG

Introduction

This section examines the controversy over implementing electoral reform in Hong Kong's 2017 chief executive election and the resulting pro-democracy protests; China's increasing military presence in Hong Kong; and Hong Kong's declining freedom of the press. It is based on briefings by foreign government officials, meetings with subject matter experts, and independent research. The section concludes with a discussion of the implications of China's growing interference in Hong Kong's political development for the United States. At the time of writing (October 29, 2014), events surrounding Hong Kong's electoral reform process were still developing.

Controversy over Electoral Reform

Throughout the reporting year, debate surrounding how to elect Hong Kong's next chief executive in 2017 reflected a broader struggle regarding China's role in Hong Kong's political development. China's "basic policies" concerning Hong Kong are outlined in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, a legally binding international treaty that dictated the terms of Hong Kong's handover from the United Kingdom in 1997. In the Joint Declaration, China granted Hong Kong a "high degree of autonomy," and promised that "Hong Kong will retain its current lifestyle and legal, social, and economic systems until at least the year 2047," while China would administer Hong Kong's defense and foreign affairs in accordance with the "one country, two systems" policy. The Joint Declaration also established that Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by China's central government "on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally."

Hong Kong's mini-constitution, the Basic Law, serves to legally implement China's obligations under the Joint Declaration. The Basic Law holds that the "ultimate aim" for the development of Hong Kong's electoral system is to select the chief executive "by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures." In the reporting year, Hong Kong's government advanced the electoral reform process to achieve the goal of implementing universal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election. Pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong supported not just expansion of suffrage to all Hong Kong's voters, but also relaxation of nominating requirements for potential candidates. While Beijing's decision on Hong Kong's electoral reform allows all eligible voters to participate in the next chief executive election, it proposes a nominating mechanism that will likely impede democratic candidates from standing.
for election. This violates commitments made in the Basic Law to uphold election by “democratic procedures.”

Electoral Reform Framework Proposed by Beijing

On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) issued a decision that set new parameters for electing Hong Kong’s next chief executive. NPC’s ruling declared that in 2017 the chief executive may be elected by universal suffrage by the city’s 5 million eligible voters. While implementing universal suffrage is considered a milestone for Hong Kong’s political development, the NPC’s decision—hailed by Beijing as “historic progress”—ironically limits the choice of candidates that voters will have if Beijing’s proposal is approved by Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo).

Currently, to be nominated, a potential chief executive candidate must be supported by no fewer than 150 members (or 12.5 percent) of the 1,200-member election committee, which since Hong Kong’s handover has also been responsible for electing the chief executive. While election committee membership has expanded from 400 members in the first chief executive election to 1,200 members in the 2012 election, election committee members represent a mere 0.03 percent of Hong Kong’s registered voter population. Moreover, election committee members are exclusively selected from four major “sectors” (see Figure 1). With strong business and political ties to mainland China, many members are local elites seeking to gain favor with Beijing. One member of LegCo estimated that nearly 80 percent of election committee members are controlled by Beijing. As a result of its small size and bias, the current nominating mechanism cannot reasonably be considered “broadly representative” as required by the Basic Law.
Implementing universal suffrage in the 2017 election will improve upon the current election configuration in which only a miniscule fraction of Hong Kong’s voters can participate, but Beijing’s proposed framework for nominating chief executive candidates is more restrictive than the current mechanism. According to the NPC, only two or three candidates may be nominated to stand for election in 2017. Each candidate must be supported by more than 50 percent of the nominating committee, compared with 12.5 percent in the 2012 election. Beijing announced that the 2017 nominating committee shall be formed “in accordance with the number of members, composition, and formation method of the Election Committee,” such that the new nominating committee is expected to maintain the same pro-Beijing bias as the current election committee. Democracy advocates in Hong Kong worry that, though all eligible voters would have the opportunity to participate in the next chief executive election if Beijing’s proposed framework is approved, the proposed nominating mechanism rules out the possibility of “genuine” democratic election because voters will only be able to choose among two or three Beijing-approved candidates.

Beijing’s proposal also stipulates that the chief executive must be a “patriot” who “loves the country and loves Hong Kong.” In remarks made in 1984 regarding the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China under the “one country, two systems” policy,
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping identified a “patriot” as “one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, and wishes not to impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.” In contrast, Beijing’s current interpretation of the term “patriot” suggests that Hong Kong’s next chief executive should be loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In an article published by state-run media outlet Global Times on September 10, 2014, Chen Xiankui, a professor of Marxism at the Renmin University of China, wrote that “love of party and love of country are one and the same in modern China,” implying that loyalty to the CCP is requisite for patriotism. Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the Global Times, likewise argued on September 3 that separation of love of the Party from the concept of patriotism is a “poisonous arrow” fired by those with “ulterior motives” seeking to undermine China’s unity.

Beijing’s conflation of loving the country with loving the Party extends to Hong Kong’s administrators. During a press conference explaining Beijing’s electoral reform proposal, Li Fei, deputy secretary-general of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), stated “it goes without saying” that chief executive candidates must love both the country and the Party. After democracy advocates in Hong Kong reacted angrily toward the patriotism requirement, NPCSC chairman Zhang Dejiang reportedly said the next chief executive “doesn’t have to love the Communist Party, or uphold the Communist Party,” according to Michael Tien, deputy chairman of a small, pro-Beijing political party in Hong Kong. Zhang clarified that candidates “can’t be against the Communist Party and one-party rule.” It is unclear whether conflicting views on patriotism among government officials are due to “ideological divergence” within the CCP or rhetorical confusion.

While the “one country, two systems” principle and the Basic Law stipulate that the chief executive is “accountable” to both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments, nowhere does the law mandate that the chief executive must be a patriot or loyal to the CCP. Likewise, according to Deng Xiaoping’s original explanation of the “one country, two systems” policy, Hong Kong’s leader need not “be in favor of China’s socialist system,” but only “love the motherland and Hong Kong.” However, in a strongly-worded white paper on the implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong issued on June 10, 2014, China’s State Council Information Office reasserted the central government’s position on how the policy applies to Hong Kong’s administrators. The white paper, a high-level document intended to explain Beijing’s policies to foreign audiences, addressed what Beijing considers the “many wrong views” surrounding Hong Kong’s political development that stem from “confused” and “lopsided” understanding of the “one country, two systems” principle.
China’s White Paper on the Practice of “One Country, Two Systems”

- **Hong Kong’s Autonomy:** The white paper emphasized that Beijing maintains “overall jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, and that the “high degree of autonomy” guaranteed in Hong Kong’s Basic Law is derived “solely from the authorization by the central leadership.” The State Council asserted that, for Hong Kong, “there is no such thing called ‘residual power.’” In accordance with the “one country, two systems” principle, the existence and preservation of Hong Kong’s capitalist system “is subordinate to and derived from ‘one country’.”

- **Universal Suffrage:** The white paper proclaimed Beijing’s commitment to implementing a conditional form of universal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election, which “must serve the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests” and “tally with Hong Kong’s actual conditions.” Any system of universal suffrage “must conform to HKSAR’s [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] legal status as a local administrative region directly under the central government” and in “accord with” relevant NPCSC resolutions.

- **Mandatory Patriotism:** The white paper asserted that “loyalty” and “loving the country” are “basic political requirements for Hong Kong’s administrators.” This assertion echoed claims made by Chinese officials throughout the reporting year that the next chief executive of Hong Kong should abide by the principle of “love the country, love Hong Kong” and should not oppose nor confront China’s central government.

The barristers of the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) have argued the requirement that Hong Kong’s chief executive love China is “highly questionable as a matter of law” and “cannot possibly be a reasonable restriction” as it contradicts articles in the Basic Law that guarantee the right to stand for election in keeping with “democratic procedures.” Moreover, the HKBA has also argued that the categorization of Hong Kong’s judges and judicial officers as “Hong Kong’s administrators” upon whom a political requirement is imposed, as stated in the white paper, would send the message that Hong Kong’s courts are “part of the machinery of the Government and sing in unison with it.”

- **Foreign Intervention:** The white paper warned of “outside forces” that are attempting to “use Hong Kong to interfere in China’s domestic affairs,” and called on readers to “prevent and repel the attempt made by a very small number of people who act in collusion with outside forces” from interfering with Beijing’s interpretation of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong. Chinese state-run media and Chinese officials warned that Western-backed “color revolutions” and “street politics” bring not democracy but chaos comparable to that in Ukraine and the Middle East.
While the existing system has twice allowed democrats to run,* requiring potential chief executive candidates to satisfy Beijing’s standards of patriotism and earn approval from a largely pro-Beijing nominating committee makes it unlikely that a democratic candidate will be nominated, marking a “colossal step backwards” in Hong Kong’s political development, according to former head of Hong Kong’s civil service Anson Chan. As such, Beijing’s proposal appears to conflict with Article 45 of the Basic Law, which calls for election by universal suffrage in accordance with “democratic procedures.” Activists argue that Beijing’s proposal also violates Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as established by the United Nations Human Rights Council, which stipulates:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

Article 39 of the Basic Law states that the ICCPR “shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws” in Hong Kong. Therefore, any nominating mechanism that impedes certain candidates from standing election based on political affiliation is inconsistent with Article 39 and Article 45 of the Basic Law.

Considered by some scholars to be “the worst outcome imaginable,” Beijing’s plan for Hong Kong’s next chief executive election may also be designed to shut down aspirations for democracy in the Mainland. Larry Diamond, founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, said that the “Iranian-style rigged system” proposed by China offers no progress toward democracy, and is “not even an effort to gesture toward democracy.” Hu Jia, a prominent Chinese dissident in Beijing, believes that, as Hong Kong is a “mirror for people on the Mainland,” “the outcome of this battle for democracy will also determine future battles for democracy for all of China.”

By offering only “fake” democracy, Beijing may be sending a message to Tibet, Xinjiang, and even Taiwan that political change must ascribe to Beijing’s rules. There are few remaining options for rectifying Hong Kong’s electoral system before changes to the 2017 electoral method are finalized. A proposal based on Beijing’s framework will not be adopted unless it is approved by two-thirds majority in LegCo. If the pro-

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In 2014, Hong Kong ranked second by the World Bank in ease of doing business; fourth by the International Institute for Management Development in world competitiveness; and first by The Heritage Foundation in economic freedom. If the electoral proposal is not approved, Hong Kong will maintain its current electoral system under which the largely pro-Beijing election committee would choose the chief executive in 2017. All 27 pan-democratic LegCo members (of 70 total members) vowed to veto a final proposal that is based on Beijing's framework, but NPCSC Deputy Secretary-General Li Fei said that it would be a “big step backwards” if LegCo did not approve the plan. Another possibility is that the formation of the nominating committee, yet undetermined, will not be as closely modeled on that of the election committee as expected. If the electoral base of the nominating committee were expanded, democratic candidates might still have a chance of being nominated. Regardless of which electoral configuration is chosen by Hong Kong, the NPCSC has the final say on any changes to the Basic Law, including changes to electoral methods.

Some analysts believe that Beijing’s display of control over Hong Kong’s political reform may reflect the central government’s perception that Hong Kong’s economic importance to China is declining. According to a report issued on August 27, 2014, by Trigger Trend, a Guangzhou-based research firm, Hong Kong is becoming a “mere second-tier city” in China. Based on comparisons of Hong Kong’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth with that of major regional cities in China, the report concluded that Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Tianjin will overtake Hong Kong in terms of GDP by 2017, while inland cities including Chongqing, Chengdu, and Wuhan will catch up by 2022. Hong Kong has long been the gateway to foreign investment in China, and is consistently ranked near-top in global competitiveness by international organizations. However, if China accomplishes its lofty economic reform goals to internationalize the renminbi, liberalize its capital account, and reform the banking system, Hong Kong’s role as a middleman in facilitating capital flows into China may shrink, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank. China is only obligated to maintain Hong Kong’s status as a market economy until 2047 in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration; if the two economies are less integrated at that time, Hong Kong’s designation as a market economy is susceptible to change.

International Response to Beijing’s Proposed Electoral Reform Framework

In July 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) launched an inquiry into the UK’s relations with Hong Kong 30 years after the signing of the Joint Declaration. The inquiry aims to determine whether Britain and China are “living up” to commitments made to preserve residents’ lifestyle, rights, freedoms, and social system for 50 years after the handover. Lord Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of Hong Kong, believes that the United Kingdom has a “continuing moral and political obligation” to ensure that China keeps the commitments it made. The inquiry has been met with suspicion and fierce opposition from Chinese officials, who call for it to be can-
celled as it interferes in China’s internal affairs. Liu Xiaoming, Chinese ambassador to Britain, warned FAC chairman Richard Ottaway that the inquiry does not “serve the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, or the healthy development of China-UK relations,” and that it “will ultimately harm the interests of Britain.”

In response to Beijing’s election framework proposal, the U.S. Department of State warned that Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity are dependent on maintaining the city’s status as “an open society with the highest possible degree of autonomy and governed by rule of law.” After U.S. national security advisor Susan Rice met with top Chinese officials in early September 2014, U.S. officials said “the ability for people of Hong Kong to choose their leaders based on the will of voters” is fundamental, and that Beijing’s proposal is one step of the electoral reform process, “there’s further to go.” Following the eruption of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in late September 2014, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said the legitimacy of the chief executive would be diminished if voters were not given “a genuine choice of candidates that are representative of the peoples’ and the voters’ will.” When U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry addressed the electoral decision protests in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Washington, DC, on October 1, 2014, Mr. Wang insisted that “Hong Kong affairs are China’s internal affairs,” and that “illegal acts that violate public order” will not be tolerated. Hua Chunying, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed that China “firmly opposes external forces supporting illegal activities, such as the Occupy Central movement,” and is “opposed to any foreign and external interference in China’s internal affairs by any country.” President Obama is expected to raise the issue with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November.

**Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement**

The people of Hong Kong remained politically active throughout the year, as demonstrated by the high volume of protests held. Notably, on June 4, 2014, the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, more than 100,000 Hong Kong residents gathered to commemorate the victims of China’s crackdown on peaceful student protest. The largest since 1989, the vigil mirrored growing discontent among some Hong Kong residents with China’s historical attempts to restrict civil liberties. On July 1, 2014, the 17th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover, democracy advocates peacefully participated in one of the largest marches in Hong Kong’s history, from Victoria Park through the Central business district. Estimates of attendance vary widely; police said that the number of marchers peaked at just over 98,000, while the University of Hong Kong and *South China Morning Post* estimated the total was closer to 150,000. Pro-democracy group Civil Human Rights Front, organizer of the march, estimated that 510,000 people marched during the eight-hour demonstration.

Intense political campaigning in the lead-up to the central government’s decision on electoral reform in 2017 spurred reactions from groups across the political spectrum. Democracy advocates drew wide support from students, middle-class voters, independent
media,* and members of the city’s judiciary. The most prominent pro-democracy force, known as Occupy Central with Love and Peace (Occupy Central), is a civil disobedience campaign organized in 2013 to advocate for democratic elections in Hong Kong. Since its inception, Occupy Central has widely publicized that 10,000 of its participants will occupy Hong Kong’s Central business district, effectively blocking access to government offices and buildings that operate there, unless Beijing accepts sufficiently democratic elections in Hong Kong.65

Both Hong Kong and Chinese authorities expressed disdain for the Occupy Central movement. Current Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying (CY Leung) and Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao denounced the movement as illegal, and threatened that carrying out any protests would “delay universal suffrage.”66 On August, 17, 2014, protesters supporting Beijing’s view and estimated to number between 88,000 and 111,000 marched through the city to express their opposition to Occupy Central, which they claimed would disrupt peace and prosperity in Hong Kong.67 Amid allegations that marchers were bribed to attend, one Chinese-language news source reported that the Federation of Hong Kong Shenzhen Associations might have arranged for as many as 20,000 people to march in exchange for $38 and a free lunch.68

Occupy Central also attracted criticism from multinational companies. The Big Four global accounting companies (Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) jointly issued advertisements in three Chinese-language newspapers stating their opposition to Occupy Central, warning that it threatens rule of law and disrupts business with multinational clients.69 After pulling valuable advertisements from pro-democracy news outlets (see “Declining Freedom of the Press,” later in this section), British bank HSBC urged investors to sell stock in Hong Kong companies citing “negative news flows” regarding Occupy Central that could serve to “sour relations with China and . . . hurt the economy.”70

Leading up to Hong Kong’s annual July 1 march marking the region’s 1997 handover, Occupy Central organized an unofficial city-wide referendum on three electoral reform proposals, all of which advocated some form of public nomination (see Table 1).71 Nearly 800,000 Hong Kong residents, or 22.4 percent of registered voters, participated in the referendum.72 Of the three proposals, about 42 percent of voters backed that of the Alliance for True Democracy, which gives nomination privileges to the public, political parties, and nominating committee members. Nearly 90 percent of voters wanted LegCo to veto any government proposal that does not allow for genuine fair nomination of chief executive candidates.73 Public nomination has since been ruled out by the Chinese government, arguing that the Basic Law mandates nomination by a “broadly representative” nominating committee.74

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*In this section, independent media refers to media sources that retain a high degree of freedom from political intervention and commercial influence, and promote democracy and freedom of speech in Hong Kong. "Hong Kong In-Media," Multiple Journalism. http://www.multiplejournalism.org/case/hong-kong-in-media-e-a-c-c-a-e-i.
Table 1: Referendum Proposals for Chief Executive Nomination

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Proposal Originator</th>
<th>Supporters</th>
<th>Nomination Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for True Democracy</td>
<td>Democratic and Civic parties; 26 pro-democracy legislators (of 27 total); Joseph Cheng (convener).</td>
<td>Candidates require either support of at least 1 percent of registered voters; endorsement from political parties that have won at least 5 percent of votes in the previous legislative election; or, direct election by nominating committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students</td>
<td>Civic Party; Joshua Wong (convener).</td>
<td>Candidates require support of at least 1 percent of registered voters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Power</td>
<td>2 legislators; Wong Yuk-man and Albert Chan (conveners).</td>
<td>Candidates are nominated by the public, LegCo members, and district council members.</td>
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Voter turnout surpassed expectations despite “one of the largest cyberattacks in history” temporarily shutting down the voting website. Matthew Prince, chief executive of online security firm CloudFlare, explained that the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on the voting site, considered to be among the “most sophisticated” DDoS attacks ever seen, shut down the site by hijacking computers scattered across the world with malware or viruses and using them to send requests to the site in extremely rapid succession. According to Young Wo-sang, poll IT advisor and convener of the Internet Society of Hong Kong’s security and privacy working group, 30 to 40 percent of the 10 billion DDoS attacks came from IP addresses registered to mainland firms in Hong Kong.

In the week leading up to the National Day holiday, which celebrates China’s founding, on October 1, 2014, public dissatisfaction with Beijing’s electoral reform proposal broke out in waves of protest throughout Hong Kong. On September 22, thousands of Hong Kong university students commenced a five-day strike by boycotting classes and demanding “genuine” electoral choice. The Hong Kong Federation of Students, organizer of the boycott, estimated that 13,000 of Hong Kong’s 78,000 undergraduate students attended a democracy rally originating at the Chinese University of Hong Kong on September 22. By Friday, September 26, university students were joined by approximately 1,500 grade school students outside the home of CY Leung where they demanded to discuss Hong Kong’s democratic future with him. Receiving no response, a group of about one hundred protestors gathered near the government headquarters. Some attempted to breach a barricaded area known as Civic Square that was blocked by police, who used pepper spray and arrested some protesters.

With participants estimated to number close to 200,000, protests continued to escalate into the early morning of September 28, when riot police fired 87 cans of tear gas at protestors in order to clear the swelling crowds from the business district roadways. Cheung Tak-keung, assistant commissioner of Hong Kong police,
said police had “no alternative” but to use tear gas—considered a tactic of “minimum force”—to control crowds.\textsuperscript{87} One day later, inspired by “the courage of the students and members of the public in their spontaneous decision to stay” despite police action, Occupy Central organizers announced the movement’s official commencement ahead of schedule to join student protests.\textsuperscript{88} The protesters—now comprising Occupy Central, the students, and other supporters—adopted the moniker “Umbrella Revolution” to describe the movement, as many demonstrators used umbrellas to shield themselves from pepper spray and tear gas.\textsuperscript{89}

After riot police were withdrawn on September 29, protesters continued demonstrating through National Day on October 1. Some protesters, including Occupy Central co-founder Benny Tai Yiu-ting and organizers of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, demanded that Mr. Leung step down.\textsuperscript{90} While removing Mr. Leung from office would placate protesters’ demands in the short-term without obstructing Beijing’s plan for electoral reform, any new leader to take office before Beijing’s reforms are implemented would be selected by the electoral method currently in place.\textsuperscript{91} On October 2, the Communist Party newspaper \textit{People's Daily} reported that the central government would continue “unswervingly” to support Mr. Leung.\textsuperscript{92} Public criticism of Mr. Leung intensified, however, following revelations of his failure to disclose payments he received totaling $6.4 million from an Australian engineering company during his term as chief executive.\textsuperscript{93} According to Mr. Leung’s statement, he is not required by Hong Kong law to disclose the payments.\textsuperscript{94}

In reaction to the Umbrella Revolution protests, Hong Kong Chief Secretary Carrie Lam said on September 29 that further government discussions on political reform would be postponed until the Hong Kong government could “re-examine the situation and find a better time to introduce the next round of consultations.”\textsuperscript{95} Mr. Leung said that protesters should not expect the NPC to reconsider or reverse their ruling on Hong Kong’s electoral reform because “the Chinese government won’t give in to threats asserted through illegal activity.”\textsuperscript{96} An advisor to Mr. Leung indicated that the Hong Kong government’s strategy for handling the protests was to “wait and patiently deal with the crisis ... to resolve it peacefully,”\textsuperscript{97} but an editorial published in the \textit{People’s Daily} on October 2 threatened that the “consequences will be unimaginable” for protesters, who “incited the masses, paralyzed transportation, disrupted businesses, stirred up conflict, and interfered with the daily lives of Hong Kong people,” and accused Occupy Central of obstructing Hong Kong’s “smooth transition to democracy.”\textsuperscript{98}

With no clear resolution in sight, demonstrations over Beijing’s decision continued through October in the face of pressure from police, the public, and violent gangs. Starting October 3 and continuing sporadically throughout the protests, gangs suspected of having links to the Triads, an organized crime group, infiltrated crowds supporting and opposing the Occupy Central protests, provoking violence among peaceful demonstrations in the Mong Kok district. According to police superintendent Dan Ng Wai-hon, up to 200 suspected gangsters, of whom more than 40 were arrested in connection with the October 3–4 attacks for fighting and illegal
gathering, “were well-organized and came with a purpose,” though police are still investigating their exact motives. On October 15, clashes between protesters and police over the removal of barricades to resume traffic flow resulted in the beating of a handcuffed protester by seven police officers, who were later suspended.

Following the cancellation of two previously scheduled negotiations, Hong Kong government officials met with five student leaders on October 21 to discuss their perspectives on electoral reform. In response to students’ concerns that the Hong Kong government’s July 2014 report to Beijing on popular political views misled the NPC and influenced its proposed guidelines, Chief Secretary Lam conceded that the government was willing to submit a new report to Beijing acknowledging the popular discontent stirred up by the NPC’s electoral reform decision. The students and other protesters intend to continue demonstrating until their demands for an open nominating process are met, but Mr. Leung reiterated that the Hong Kong government “cannot make something that is not in the Basic Law possible,” and “the Central Authorities … will not retract the decision of the Standing Committee.” At the time of writing (October 29, 2014), student protesters and government officials remained deadlocked over Beijing’s decision.

Macau and Taiwan Follow Hong Kong

Inspired by Occupy Central’s June referendum, democracy activists in Macau held their own informal referendum from August 24–30, 2014, to determine whether residents support universal suffrage in the 2019 chief executive election. Only hours after the referendum began on August 24, police arrested five participants, including poll organizer Jason Chao, on charges of “qualified disobedience,” and started shutting down polling stations. Despite heavy police interference, nearly 9,000 residents cast their votes through an online polling website similar to that used in Hong Kong’s referendum. The results of the poll showed that 89 percent of participants do not trust the current chief executive, Fernando Chui, and that 95 percent of participants support universal suffrage in the 2019 chief executive election. Chief Executive Chui was re-elected to office on August 31 by a 400-member pro-China election committee. He was the only candidate.

For Taiwan, the reform outcome in Hong Kong serves as a warning that, if Taiwan were reunified with China, Beijing would not likely adhere to its promise to protect Taiwan’s civil liberties. In 1982, the NPC made a constitutional provision for reunifying Taiwan with China as a special administrative region under the “one country, two systems” principle, exactly like Hong Kong. Under this provision, “Taiwan’s current social and economic systems [would] remain unchanged, its way of life [would] not change, and its economic and cultural ties with foreign countries [would] not change.” On September 26, 2014, President Xi reaffirmed China’s “firm and unwavering stance” that the best way to reunify Taiwan with China would be under the “one country, two systems” framework. Alan D. Romberg, director of the East Asia program at public policy think tank the Stimson Center, argued that China’s strongly-worded white paper on the application of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong strengthened the case for Tai-
wanese independence as Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” has come under threat.112
Democracy advocates in Hong Kong and Taiwan have become more engaged under the shared threat of China’s control. Activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan have supported each other throughout both Hong Kong’s democratic movement and Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, in which participants occupied the Legislative Yuan in March and April 2014 to protest the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (see Chapter 3, Section 3, “Taiwan,” for fuller treatment of Taiwan and the Sunflower Movement). Taiwan’s main political parties, typically fiercely divided, similarly expressed regret at Beijing’s decision to limit electoral reform in Hong Kong. President Ma Ying-jeou expressed a “high degree of concern and support for [the] Hong Kong people’s continuing fight” for democratic progress, while a spokesman from rival Democratic Progressive Party said that Beijing’s decision “casts a shadow over the process of democratization.”113
Following the breakout of Umbrella Revolution protests in response to Beijing’s decision, President Ma reaffirmed that he “fully understand[s] and support[s] Hong Kong residents’ demand for free nomination and election of Hong Kong’s chief executive, and urge[...] the Mainland authorities to listen carefully to the voices of Hong Kong residents and handle the matter in a peaceful and cautious manner.”114 On Taiwan’s National Day, October 10, President Ma reiterated his strong support not just for Hong Kong’s democratic movement, but for the Mainland’s as well, stating “now is the most appropriate time for mainland China to move toward constitutional democracy.”115

China’s Increasing Military Presence in Hong Kong

Heightened activity by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Hong Kong throughout the reporting year alarmed Hong Kong pro-democracy advocates and media, as well as international observers. Under Article 14 of the Basic Law and in accordance with the “one country, two systems” policy, China’s central government is responsible for the defense of Hong Kong. As such, the PLA’s Hong Kong garrison is tasked with the following functions to “vigorously safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”:116

1. To guard against and resist aggression, and to guarantee Hong Kong’s security;
2. To shoulder the responsibility of defense and patrol duty;
3. To take charge of military installations;
4. To undertake relevant foreign military affairs.117

One indicator that Chinese military presence in Hong Kong will continue to expand is the Hong Kong Town Planning Board’s unanimous approval on February 14, 2014, to rezone an area of public space measuring 2,970 square meters along the waterfront of Victoria Harbor where a Chinese military port is being constructed.118 The establishment of the “Central Military Dock” (CMD) was originally provisioned in 1994 under the Sino-British Defense Land
Government officials said that the CMD would be used for “conducting military training, berthing military vessels, running ceremonial activities and carrying out pier maintenance,” though the dock will be open to the public when not in use.\textsuperscript{120} Public objections to the CMD construction plan were significant; during the public consultation period, only 0.1 percent of about 19,000 comments favored the plan.\textsuperscript{121} One of the most contentious points was the Town Planning Board’s decision to rezone the area from “open space” to “military use.”\textsuperscript{122} Opponents of the CMD argue the rezoning not only disrupts public access to the waterfront promenade,\textsuperscript{*} but ensures that public access and law enforcement in that area fall under the discretion of the commander of the PLA garrison rather than the Hong Kong police.\textsuperscript{123} While Annex III of the DLA guaranteed that the “Hong Kong Government will leave free 150 meters of the eventual permanent waterfront . . . for the construction of a military dock after 1997,” it did not stipulate that zoning should be altered in any way.\textsuperscript{124}

In protest of the CMD construction plans, four activists forced their way into garrison headquarters on December 26, 2013, calling for the PLA to “get out” of Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{125} In a move widely perceived as retaliatory, the PLA staged its first air-and-sea drill of 2014 in Victoria Harbor less than one month after the protests. The January 24, 2014, drill was carried out by two frigates and three helicopters, and was intended to make the PLA “more familiar with the air-and-sea situation of Hong Kong and improve its ability to handle emergency situations,” according to state media.\textsuperscript{126} Ni Lexiong, a naval expert and professor of Political Science and Law at Shanghai University, contended the drill was “aimed at warning the public that Hong Kong could continue to enjoy a certain level of freedom, but should not challenge the central government’s political authority, with military means being Beijing’s last step to maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.”\textsuperscript{127}

The CMD is the 19th military site in Hong Kong transferred from the British Army to the PLA as a Military Installations Closed Area (MICA), 18 of which currently cover an area totaling 2,700 hectares (27 square kilometers).\textsuperscript{128} Hong Kong’s Garrison Law stipulates that all restricted access military zones must be defined by the garrison “in conjunction with” the Hong Kong government, while the “locations and boundaries” of such zones shall be declared by the Hong Kong government.\textsuperscript{129} However, an undisclosed PLA radar station and compound atop Hong Kong’s tallest mountain, Tai Mo Shan, was discovered in July 2014.\textsuperscript{130} The military and security publication \textit{Jane’s Defense Weekly} reported the station is likely an electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) facility, though the PLA refused to confirm, citing “military secrecy.”\textsuperscript{131} The facility is behind fences that restrict public access. Dr. Kenneth Chan Ka-lok, a LegCo member of the Civic

\textsuperscript{*}When the CMD section of the promenade is closed for military use, the public can use a pedestrian walkway to the south of the dock area. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchange with Commission staff, October 17, 2014.

\textsuperscript{†}The four activists were subsequently arrested and convicted for breach of the Public Order Ordinance. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchange with Commission staff, October 17, 2014.
Party, supported conducting a judicial review over the garrison’s non-disclosure of the construction and use of the facility because “the public has no knowledge about this and [LegCo] cannot find anything about it from documents filed to the legislature.” With regard to the compound, which is not listed among Hong Kong’s 19 designated military sites (including the CMD), Dr. Chan said the PLA “should follow the Garrison Law provisions to designate the place as a military site with restricted public access.”

On July 1, 2014, the same day as the annual march marking Hong Kong’s handover, the PLA opened three military bases for public viewing of the barracks. The garrison displayed several new pieces of military equipment during the “open day”:

- Small arms: Type 11 pistol, Type 06 (QSW06) silenced pistol, and Type 10 (QBU10) antimateriel rifle
- The garrison’s first two Type 056 Jingda-class corvettes: Huizhou (596) and Qinzhou (597)
- Logistics vehicles: Dong Feng EQ2102J-based trucks

New equipment is often first tested by the garrison before being introduced more widely into PLA service. Among the previously used pieces of equipment displayed was a Z-9WA helicopter armed with two 23mm cannons.

Some Hong Kong commentators believe that the central government could deploy garrison forces to quell democracy protests and that recent increases in military activity are in part meant to intimidate protesters. For example, during “counter-terrorism” drills open to the public that were conducted on July 1, PLA soldiers at the bases were seen carrying riot shields and pepper spray for the first time. While the garrison “does not interfere in Hong Kong affairs,” the Hong Kong government may by law request assistance from the garrison as necessary “in the maintenance of public order and in disaster relief.” Further, if the NPCSC decides that Hong Kong is in a state of emergency which “by reason of turmoil . . . endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control of the [Hong Kong] government,” the central government in Beijing “may issue an order applying the relevant national laws” at its own discretion.

Alan Hoo, chairman of the Basic Law committee and a Hong Kong delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), likened the Occupy Central movement to recent terrorist attacks in Kunming and Xi’an, and claimed that Occupy Central threatens China’s national security. According to Hoo, Occupy Central not only justifies PLA intervention under a state of emergency, but also “fosters the legislation of Basic Law Article 23,” which mandates:

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.
In 2003, an anti-subversion bill proposed under Article 23 was shelved after 500,000 Hong Kong residents protested its implementation. Earlier this year, mainland academics insisted that Hong Kong temporarily adopt Beijing’s national security laws until its own Article 23 legislation is passed. Jasper Tsang Yok-sing, president of the LegCo, said that such a proposal is not consistent with Article 23 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that Hong Kong’s government should enact its own laws to handle subversion against the central government.

Declining Freedom of the Press

The reporting year was considered “the darkest for press freedom for several decades” by the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), as demonstrated by the region’s continued fall in global press freedom rankings (see Figure 2). According to Freedom House, a U.S.-based independent watchdog organization that ranks countries by press freedom indices, violence against journalists and pressure from mainland China were two factors that contributed to the downward trend in Hong Kong’s press freedom dating back to 2004. Likewise, Reporters Without Borders’ 2014 world press freedom index indicated that “growing subjugation” of the Hong Kong administration and media to China’s central government is “increasingly compromising media pluralism.”

Figure 2: Hong Kong’s Global Press Freedom Ranking

Self-censorship on the part of reporters and media outlets alike remained prevalent in Hong Kong in the reporting year. According to a report from the Committee to Protect Journalists, more than half of Hong Kong’s media owners hold political appointments in two of China’s main political bodies, the NPC and the CPPCC, including Charles Ho of the Sing Tao news group; Richard Li (son of Li Ka-shing, commonly referred to as the richest person in Asia) of Now TV and the Hong Kong Economic Journal; and Peter Woo of i-Cable television. As a result, political considerations tend to overshadow objective reporting. According to a 2012 survey of jour-
nalists conducted by the HKJA, nearly 40 percent of respondents said that “they or their supervisors had recently played down information unfavorable to China’s central government, advertisers, media owners, or the local government.”

In the run-up to the 2017 election, the role of the press in determining Hong Kong’s democratic future has become even more critical. Members of the press and media outlets perceived as hostile to Beijing’s interpretation of “one country, two systems” continued to suffer professional and physical attacks, exemplified by the plight of one of Hong Kong’s few remaining independent newspapers, Ming Pao. In January 2014, Ming Pao announced the abrupt dismissal of its chief editor, Kevin Lau Chun-to, after nearly two years on the job. Though Ming Pao claimed Mr. Lau was simply moving to a new position, journalists and scholars speculated that Mr. Lau’s removal was retaliation for Ming Pao’s criticism of government policies and its revelation of the political scandals that derailed 2012 pro-Beijing chief executive candidate Henry Tang under Mr. Lau’s tenure. Ming Pao also partnered with the Consortium of Investigative Journalists in January 2014 to publish an investigation into the overseas tax-haven accounts of Chinese officials.

Out of concern for the preservation of Hong Kong’s press freedom, more than 90 percent of Ming Pao’s editorial staff petitioned the paper to cite reasons for Mr. Lau’s dismissal, while hundreds of protesters gathered outside Ming Pao’s offices calling for media independence. Rallies for press freedom continued throughout February 2014, when popular radio host Lee Wai-ling, who is known for her Beijing-critical commentary, was dismissed without explanation by Commercial Radio Hong Kong (CRHK), one of Hong Kong’s two commercial radio broadcasting companies. To continue broadcasting, CRHK must apply to extend its license, issued by the Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority, by August 25, 2015. It is an “open secret,” according to former CRHK broadcasting director Cheung Man-yee, that outspoken program hosts are often forced to leave due to government pressure when a broadcasting company is applying for license renewal.

On February 26, less than two months after his dismissal, Mr. Lau was critically injured by a knife-wielding assailant in Hong Kong’s Sai Wan Ho neighborhood. Prompted by the belief that the attack (and previous attacks on journalists) was initiated by pro-Beijing assailants in an effort to threaten free media, nearly 10,000 protesters took to the streets on March 2, 2014, in support of Hong Kong’s press freedom, carrying banners reading “They Can’t Kill Us All.” Two suspects found in southern China’s Guangdong Province were charged with Mr. Lau’s assault, and admitted that, as members of Hong Kong triad gang Shui Fong, they were each paid approximately $130,000 to harm but not kill Mr. Lau and then go into hiding on the Mainland. Hong Kong Police Commissioner Andy Tsang Wai-hung said that the attack had “nothing to do with press freedom,” but that the assailants were merely hired hitmen. Less than one month after Mr. Lau’s attack, two Hong Kong media executives were attacked by four assailants with metal bars, an act condemned by the HKJA as another sign of Hong Kong’s deteriorating press freedom.
History of Attacks on Journalists in Hong Kong

- **March 2014:** Lam Kin-ming and Lei Lun-han, executives with a new publication, *The Hong Kong Morning News*, were assaulted by four assailants with metal pipes.

- **February 2014:** Kevin Lau Chun-to, former chief editor of the investigative newspaper *Ming Pao*, was badly injured by a knife-wielding assailant.

- **July 2013:** Sze Wing-ching, founder of free Hong Kong daily *am730*, had his car window smashed by two men as he was driving in downtown Hong Kong.

- **June 2013:** A car was rammed into the gates of the residence of Jimmy Lai, founder of the pro-democracy Next Media Group, and an ax and machete were left behind at the scene.

- **June 2013:** Chen Ping, publisher of the political weekly *iSun Affairs*, was beaten by two men wielding batons.

- **July 2008:** Jimmy Lai and pro-democracy leader Martin Lee were the targets of a failed assassination attempt.

- **November 2005:** A small homemade bomb was sent to *Ming Pao*’s editorial offices along with a threatening letter, injuring one female employee.

- **August 1998:** Albert Cheng, host of talk radio’s popular “Tea-cup in a Tempest” program, was slashed with carving knives on his way to work and seriously wounded.


Beijing continued to exert political and economic pressure on businesses that advertise in pro-democracy media sources, further suppressing Hong Kong’s press freedom. Hong Kong’s Next Media Limited (Next Media), the publisher of the outspoken paper *Apple Daily*, was reportedly boycotted by its two biggest advertisers at the instruction of China’s central government. According to Next Media executive Mark Simon, HSBC and Standard Chartered banks were pressured by the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong into ending their long-held advertising relationships with *Apple Daily* in September 2013. Mr. Simon reported that prior to the boycott, the two banks spent approximately $3.8 million on advertisements in *Apple Daily* annually. In addition to the losses incurred by the banks’ boycotts, Next Media reported that additional advertising boycotts on the part of Beijing-dependent firms cost the company at least $26 million annually, or 10 percent of its present value.

Manipulation of media advertising by the central government is likely retaliation for the independent media’s outspoken pro-democracy stance. Jimmy Lai, owner of Next Media and the “most powerful critic of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong,” has been an outspoken political activist since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Under his leadership, Next Media released an online...
animated video mocking Bloomberg’s alleged self-censorship—based on commercial interests—to axe a story on the private wealth of Communist party elites in October 2013. Bloomberg later denied the allegations. Next Media and Apple Daily also face the threat of cyber attacks in retaliation for critical reporting. In the days leading up to Occupy Central’s unofficial referendum on June 20, Apple Daily’s website was flooded by more than 10 billion DDoS attacks in a 24-hour period, many originating from IP addresses in China and Russia. Apple Daily suspected that the attacks were “carried out by hackers from China, trying to suppress Hong Kong people’s determination to fight for democracy and to attack the pro-universal suffrage Next Media group.”

Independent media suffered another blow on July 26, 2014, when popular pro-democracy news website House News unexpectedly announced its closure, citing intense political pressure. Tony Tsoi Tung-ho, House News co-founder and outspoken supporter of Occupy Central, explained his fear of the political atmosphere in a note he posted on the site:

Hong Kong has changed. To act as a normal citizen, a normal media outlet and to do something right for society is becoming difficult, or even terrifying—not that you feel alienated, but fearful. The ongoing political struggle makes people very anxious—many democrats are tracked and smeared. Their past records have been dug up. A sense of White Terror* lingers in society and I feel the pressure as well.

Mr. Tsoi also noted that the popular news aggregator site was not profitable because advertisement revenues were disproportionately low. House News co-founder Leung Man-tao explained that “many big companies don’t place advertisements on our website because of our critical stance towards the government and Beijing.” In his shutdown announcement, Mr. Tsoi claimed that Hong Kong’s tense political atmosphere and “abnormal society” have twisted the market, forcing House News to abandon its core democratic stance.

Implications for the United States

In accordance with the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, the United States supports Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. Beijing’s interpretation of the “one country, two systems” policy and infringement on civil liberties guaranteed to Hong Kong in the Sino-British Joint Declaration not only undermine Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, but also reflect the Chinese government’s failure to comply with international commitments. Moreover, Beijing’s application of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong holds ominous implications for Taiwan if it were to be reunified with China under the same framework. The United States shares with Hong Kong an interest in upholding democratic values,

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*The term “white terror” also refers to a period from 1949 to 1987 when several thousand perceived opponents (Communist or pro-Taiwanese independence) of Chinese Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-shek were incarcerated and executed in Taiwan. Many victims were intellectual and social elite.
human rights, rule of law, independent journalism, and open and fair market competition, all of which are essential for Hong Kong's continued prosperity and development as an international financial center.

Conclusions

• China’s central government has put forth a framework for the election of Hong Kong’s next chief executive in 2017 that effectively excludes democratic candidates from nomination and allows Beijing to control the outcome. This proposal conflicts with standards set forth in Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and runs counter to international commitments made by China in the 1984 Sino-UK Joint Declaration to preserve Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” and way of life for 50 years following its 1997 handover from the United Kingdom.

• Increased Chinese military activity in Hong Kong signals China’s determined presence there and serves to intimidate pro-democracy activists from participating in the Occupy Central movement and other peaceful movements out of fear of military retaliation.

• Increased infringement on Hong Kong’s press freedom, particularly in the forms of violence against journalists and political pressure on advertisers, threatens the media’s ability to serve as a watchdog. The steady erosion of press freedom is a worrying trend that has worsened over the last ten years, and appears to be targeted at outspoken pro-democracy media.
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 4


119. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchange with Commission staff, October 17, 2014.


