SECTION 3: HOTSPOTS ALONG CHINA'S MARITIME PERIPHERY

Key Findings

- U.S. presence and alliance commitments have helped maintain regional stability in Asia. China's aggressive actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan Strait threaten principles such as freedom of navigation, the use of international law to settle disputes, and free trade. If Beijing continues to increase its control over the East and South China seas, the United States could receive requests for additional assistance by allies, friends, and partners to improve their capabilities to defend themselves, along with calls for the United States to remain engaged in the region to maintain security and stability.

- With China actively preparing contingency plans for operations against U.S. allies, friends, and partners along China's maritime periphery, the United States and China could quickly become involved in a conflict if Beijing escalates. This risk becomes greater depending on the level of tensions associated with any of the following flashpoints: the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cross-Strait relations.

- Chinese leaders are cautious about letting a crisis escalate into conflict, and Chinese military thinkers study “war control” as a method for limiting the scope of a conflict to minimize negative consequences and achieve a victory at minimal cost. However, if Beijing believes the risk of a response to Chinese action is low, China may be tempted to risk brinksmanship to achieve its national objectives. Furthermore, if Beijing is unable to avoid escalation, any crises involving the use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) create opportunities to widen a crisis into a conflict that results in the use of force.

- China has emphasized building a military capable of responding to situations in multiple regions and has developed theater commands capable of planning and executing missions in their respective areas of responsibility. A key element of success in achieving operational objectives, however, will be managing resources across multiple theaters should China find itself challenged in multiple directions simultaneously. This could create an opportunity to dissuade Chinese aggression or potentially result in Beijing escalating or accelerating a conflict.
• The PLA presently lacks the amphibious lift to directly assault Taiwan, and would instead have to successfully seize ports and airfields for the flow of follow-on forces to conduct on-island operations. Likewise, sustaining a prolonged air and maritime blockade against Taiwan is likely to strain PLA logistical capabilities, potentially disrupt trade routes through East Asia, and inhibit freedom of navigation in the region. These are high-risk operations for China, and may be conducted only after other coercive options are exhausted.

• Military facilities currently under construction in the Spratly Islands are intended to improve the PLA's operational reach by strengthening logistical support, extending operational reach, and bolstering the military's capability to monitor potential adversaries. Once these outposts are completed, they will improve the PLA's ability to take action against Vietnamese or Filipino forces on adjacent features if so ordered. China's militarization of these features is therefore inherently destabilizing for its neighbors who have overlapping sovereignty claims.

• There are several U.S. alliances and other commitments that could be activated by a maritime hotspot conflict with Japan, the Philippines, or Taiwan. Depending on the scenario, the United States could be expected to become involved in a conflict, although China will seek to discourage this by many means, possibly to include ensuring conflict remains in the “grey zone” where U.S. defense commitments are uncertain and the onus of escalation is shifted to China's adversary.

• The forward presence of U.S. forces in East Asia, coupled with the treaty alliances and partnerships of the United States in the region, constitute the most important factor in deterring Chinese adventurism. Nevertheless, they also increase the likelihood, should deterrence fail, that the United States becomes involved in armed conflict. The Commission has documented in previous reports how the balance of military power in the region has shifted in China’s direction. Should that shift continue without a change in U.S. policy, there is a danger that Chinese leaders will consider the United States an obstacle to their ambitions that must be removed. In that event, Beijing may decide to escalate a crisis when the circumstances seem favorable to the achievement of China's larger ambitions.

Recommendations

The Commission recommends:

• Congress require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering Chinese coercion activities in the Indo-Pacific coordinated through the National Security Council that utilizes diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal instruments of national power.
Introduction

The East and South China seas are bordered by China and several U.S. allies,* friends, and partners including the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. These waters contain many islands, rocks, and reefs, the ownership of which is disputed by these and other claimants. In the East China Sea, China views the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands as Chinese territory, and in the South China Sea, China insists the Spratly Islands—which contain features also claimed by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam—and other island groups are Chinese territory as well. Although most of the land features in dispute are relatively small, some have the potential to generate large swaths of maritime sovereignty; some also have significant military and economic value. In the case of Taiwan, a U.S. security partner, China lays claim to the entire island in addition to smaller islands administered by the Taiwan government.

China considers these disputed areas “hotspots” for which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively preparing contingency† plans. As tensions over these hotspots escalate, the risk of an armed conflict between China and U.S. allies, friends, and partners in the Asia Pacific rises. Depending on the nature of a “hotspot” contingency, a military response by the United States could be warranted.

This section explores China’s threat perceptions related to its sovereignty claims in the East and South China seas and vis-à-vis Taiwan; how China plans to respond to perceived challenges to its claims; and the implications for the United States and U.S. allies, friends, and partners in the region should there be a conflict. It specifically discusses how the Chinese military thinks about conflict, crisis control, and military operations. This section is based on the Commission’s April 2017 hearing on the topic, the Commission’s May trip to Asia, unclassified statements by U.S. officials, and open source research and analysis.

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*The United States maintains five collective defense arrangements in the Asia Pacific, including the treaty agreement between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand; the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines; the treaty of mutual cooperation and security with Japan; the mutual defense treaty with the South Korea; and the Southeast Asia Treaty (also known as the Manila Pact), a collective defense arrangement encompassing Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Although the treaty’s founding organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, was dissolved in 1977, the collective defense arrangement remains in force. The treaty, along with the Thanat-Rusk communiqué of 1962 and the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance, constitutes the basis of U.S. security commitments to Thailand. In 2003, the United States designated Thailand a Major Non-NATO Ally. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements”; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Thailand”; U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954.”

†The U.S. Department of Defense defines a contingency as “a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP-3-0 Joint Operation Planning, August 11, 2011.
Security Environment

China’s Security Assessment of Its Maritime Periphery

China’s senior leadership believes the first two decades of the 21st century are a “period of strategic opportunity” that provides China a chance to expand national power and achieve the “China Dream.”

China’s leaders see unification with Taiwan and control of disputed territory along China’s maritime periphery as an important part of achieving this “China Dream.” Furthermore, challenges in these areas are viewed by Beijing as threats to China’s “core interests” emanating from multiple “strategic directions,” driving China’s po-

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*In 2012, Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping began discussing the “China Dream,” a concept regarding the rejuvenation of the Chinese people, the realization of China as a prosperous and strong state, a strong military, comprehensive national development, and a content population. Furthermore, as Chairman of Central Military Commission, President Xi said “a strong military is needed for the great renewal of the Chinese nation.” Xinhua, “Speech by Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations: Adapting to the Forward Momentum of the Times, Promoting World Peace and Development,” March 25, 2013. Translation; Xinhua, “Profile: Xi Jinping: Pursuing Dream for 1.3 Billion Chinese,” March 16, 2013; Xinhua, “Xi Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation’,” November 29, 2012.


‡According to The Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative book published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, strategic directions are determined by “the strategic objective ... to be accomplished, the degree and direction of threat to oneself, the strategic intentions of both sides, and the strategic situation and geographical conditions.” China’s 2015 defense white paper, which outlines China’s national military strategy, calls for the PLA to prepare to respond to crises in multiple domains and geographic regions simultaneously, indicating there are multiple strategic directions that would be assigned to the PLA’s theater commands. However, while theater commands are likely assigned primary and secondary strategic directions, Taiwan remains the primary strategic direction at the national level. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Hotspots along China’s Maritime Periphery, written testimony of Mark R. Cozad, April 13, 2017; Luo Derong, “The Action Guideline for Armed Forces Building and Military Struggle Preparations - Several Points in the Understanding of the Military Strategic
political and military leadership to plan for contingency operations for these hotspots. These challenges are outlined in China’s 2015 defense white paper, *China’s Military Strategy*, which discusses threats to “national unification, territorial integrity,” and disputed maritime claims in the South and East China seas. Chinese leaders do not always accept the constraints of international law in defending their national objectives. For example, China frequently defines its “core interests” to include exercising sovereignty in parts of its maritime periphery which, under international law, other countries have legitimate competing or superior claims. For that reason, what China calls defense of its “core interests” is often a challenge to international norms or the rights of other countries. In addition to the use of deterrence to prevent challenges to Chinese interests, China employs coercion to prevent other countries from resisting Chinese encroachment, using its growing military and non-military power to intimidate countries so that they do not assert, or do not defend, their rights.

**Territorial Integrity and Unification**

According to the 2015 defense white paper, “The Taiwan issue bears on China’s reunification and long-term development, and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation.” China’s long-term unification strategy, as the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) observes, “incorporates elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.” Beijing has relied on coercion through military modernization efforts, maintaining forces within striking distance of Taipei, and holding Taiwan-focused military exercises to shape Taipei’s behavior. For example, the PLA Rocket Force maintains approximately 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait to strike key military and leadership sites; the PLA Air Force stations advanced fighters and surface-to-air missile systems within range of Taiwan airfields to achieve air superiority over the island; the PLA Navy continues to build and deploy multi-mission surface combatants to conduct sea superiority operations within the first island chain; and the PLA Army exercises for a Taiwan invasion. Furthermore, China has been investing in upgrading the sensors for a range of air-, ship-, and shore-launched missiles, which are improving the precision strike capability of China’s air, missile, and naval forces within the first island chain. (See Chapter 2, Section 2, “China’s Military Modernization in 2017,” for more information on developments in Chinese military modernization, and Chapter 3, Section 3, “China and Taiwan,” for the latest developments in China’s persuasion and coercion efforts toward Taiwan.)

With Taiwan’s 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (which advocates greater autonomy from...
mainland China),* Beijing is concerned Taiwan will pursue independence.† In a departure from her predecessor, President Tsai has refused to endorse what is known as the “1992 Consensus” a tacit understanding reached at a meeting between representatives of Taiwan and China in 1992 that there is only “one China” but that each side may maintain its own interpretation of the meaning of “one China.” Beijing has used President Tsai’s refusal as justification to pursue a pressure campaign against Taipei, to include severing official cross-Strait communication channels, issuing informal sanctions against Taiwan, and “poaching” Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. As a result of Beijing’s approach to the Tsai Administration, cross-Strait tensions have been unusually high. According to Robert G. Sutter, professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington University, “It’s more likely that [Beijing and Taipei] won’t reach an understanding and that this will make the situation less certain and perhaps less stable, and [the United States] should be ready for that.”

Disputed Claims in the South China Sea

Protecting territory claimed by China in the South China Sea has become an increasingly important mission for the PLA. Chinese military scholars at China’s National Defense University and the Academy of Military Science argue that while China does not seek a conflict with the United States, “the South China Sea and the East China Sea are . . . issues that must be settled in the course of China’s rise.” Although China has used force to resolve disputes in the

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* Cross-Strait relations have shifted between periods of instability and stability depending in part on China’s perceptions of the political party in power in Taipei. In 1995–1996, China conducted a series of missile tests off the coast of Taiwan to intimidate Taiwan voters in the run-up to the island’s first presidential election. This event became known as the “1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.” In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victory of Chen Shui-bian over the Kuomintang (KMT/Nationalist) candidate resulted in an eight-year period of tension across the Taiwan Strait, with Beijing fearing the DPP would pursue independence. This period resulted in increased PLA exercises focused on a Taiwan contingency, and Beijing’s passage of the Anti-Secession Law after President Chen won a second term. China-Taiwan political relations improved after the KMT’s victory over the DPP in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election and under Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s Administration. However, with the 2016 DPP victory and inauguration of President Tsai, Beijing is again concerned that Taiwan will pursue independence activities. Beijing’s perception that Taiwan politicians will encourage nationalism that will result in opposition to China’s unification remains a key driver of China’s military modernization efforts, which are intended in part to provide Beijing a tool to deter “separatism” or punish Taiwan if deterrence fails. Richard C. Bush, “Taiwan’s Security Policy: Brookings Institution, August 9, 2016, 9; Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream,” CNA, June 2016; Michael S. Chase et al., “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation (prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission), 2015, 24, 32; Lee Teng-hui, “Always in My Heart,” Cornell University Alumni Reunion, June 9, 1995.

† According to a declassified National Intelligence Estimate produced by the U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Board in 1999, China has four “red lines” concerning Taiwan that could result in the use of force to compel unification: (1) Taiwan’s declaration of formal independence or a referendum modifying its Constitution to establish independence; (2) foreign support for Taiwan’s independence forces; (3) Taiwan’s development of nuclear weapons and a means to deliver them to the Mainland; and (4) widespread instability or unrest in Taiwan. The first “red line” was codified in Beijing’s 2005 “Anti-Secession Law,” which intended to prevent Taiwan’s separation from and ultimately promote unification with the Mainland. The law also authorizes the use of force if “independence forces” succeed in separating Taiwan from the Mainland, a major event occurs that would lead to separation from the Mainland, or the loss of all possibility for peaceful unification occurs. These “red lines” likely have not changed in recent years. Anti-Secession Law (China), 2006; U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Board, National Intelligence Estimate China-Taiwan: Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations, September 13, 1999.
South China Sea in the past,* it has managed its South China Sea claims in recent years with a mix of naval presence, harassment, and hostilities from maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia,† and a massive reclamation and fortification campaign of the features it occupies within its claimed “nine-dash line.” Furthermore, in 2012, China Coast Guard ships wrested control of the disputed Scarborough Reef from the Philippines. In 2016, a UN tribunal specifically ruled that China’s nine-dash line, recent land reclamation activities, and other activities in Philippine waters were unlawful.‡ The ruling, which has no inherent enforcement mechanism, has not deterred further Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. This assertiveness has increased tensions with other claimants in the South China Sea, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, giving rise to instability in the region.

Disputed Claims in the East China Sea

China and Japan both claim the Senkaku Islands§ in the East China Sea. China views Japan’s administrative control¶ of the islands as an occupation of Chinese territory. While tensions have fluctuated between China and Japan over the islands, they increased significantly in 2012 following the Government of Japan’s purchase of the islands from a private Japanese owner, effectively nationalizing the islands. Since the purchase, China has sought to erode Japan’s claims by challenging Tokyo’s administrative authority and attempting to establish China’s authority over the islands via China Coast Guard and PLA Navy patrols.** Likewise, the PLA

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†China’s maritime militia, a quasi-military force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA, has a key role in China’s South China Sea strategy. They are trained to participate in a variety of missions, including search and rescue, reconnaissance, deception operations, law enforcement, and “rights protection,” which often entails activities like harassing foreign vessels in China’s claimed waters. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017, May 15, 2017, 56; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016 Annual Report to Congress, November 2016, 197; Andrew Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Fishing Militia Is a Military Force in All but Name,” War Is Boring, July 9, 2016.
§The Senkaku Islands are known as the Diaoyutai in Taiwan and Diaoyu in China.
¶In September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased three of the five islands from their private owner. Japanese officials said this was intended to prevent their planned development by a third party, which they feared would heighten tensions with China. Nevertheless, Japan’s nationalization of the islands angered China and sparked an increase in tensions. Regardless of ownership, all five islands and three sets of rocks that constitute the Senkakus were under Japan’s administrative control before the purchase. According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the “Senkaku Islands were not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 that legally defined the territory of Japan after World War II. Under Article 3 of the treaty, the islands were placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. The Senkaku Islands are included in the areas whose administrative rights were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands that entered into force in 1972.” Mark E. Manyin, “The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations,” Congressional Research Service, October 14, 2016, 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands, April 13, 2016; Jane Perlez, “China Accuses Japan of Stealing after Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands,” New York Times, September 11, 2012; Chico Harlan, “Japan’s Ambassador to China Returns for Talks amid New Row over Islands,” Washington Post, July 15, 2012.
**During the Commission’s May 2017 trip to Japan, a Japanese defense official indicated that China conducts “checkbox incursions” into waters near the Senkaku Islands three times per
Air Force and Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies occasionally conduct air patrols near the islands, prompting the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to scramble in response to Chinese aircraft in the area. The air patrols near the islands, regular PLA Navy presence patrols beyond the island’s territorial seas, and China Coast Guard incursions into these Japan-administered territorial waters create opportunities for miscalculation and conflict.

Chinese Strategists’ Thinking about Hotspots

Chinese Strategic Thought and Conflict

Chinese military and security analysts understand that China’s expanding international interests, desire to manage stability, and need to safeguard China’s maritime sovereignty claims will create tensions between China and the United States, as well as with some of China’s neighbors. For example, Meng Xiangqing, deputy director of China’s National Defense University Strategic Studies Institute, asserts risk and tension can create opportunities for China:

On [Scarborough Reef], we have made a breakthrough, and now control the island. In the [Senkaku Islands] dispute, we now hold the initiative, breaking Japan’s hundred years of so-called ‘actual control.’ Looking at it in this sense, a bad thing can be changed into a good thing, and a challenge … (becomes) an opportunity.

China’s foremost strategic writings seem to accept that China’s pursuit of its territorial ambitions will invite risks of increased tensions and even conflict. The 2015 defense white paper says, “Hotspot issues, such as … territorial disputes, are complex and volatile,” and the 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy recognizes the potential for conflicts to arise from China’s expanding interests. Furthermore, in discussing the role the PLA should play in continuing to secure China’s “period of strategic opportunity,” in

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* According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, in 2016, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force “scrambled 851 times against Chinese aircraft, an increase of 280 times compared to the previous fiscal year.” Likewise in 2016, the Japan Coast Guard responded to 121 China Coast Guard incursions into the 12-nautical-mile territorial seas around the Senkakus. Japan Ministry of Defense, Japan Defense Focus, May 2017; Japan Coast Guard, Japan Coping with Trend of Chinese Boats in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, February 28, 2017. Translation.

† In its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, a state has full sovereignty, subject to the right of innocent passage. In its contiguous zone, a state can enforce customs-related laws. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, foreign civilian and military ships may transit through a country’s territorial sea according to the principle of innocent passage, which prohibits activities that are “prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State,” such as military exercises, intelligence gathering, and “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.” UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “Part 2: Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.”

2011 Zhang Qinsheng, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff in the Central Military Commission, argued:

Securing a period of opportunity in the coming decade or even longer will be a new challenge. Instability and uncertainty in the world’s development is more obvious, and contradictions and conflicts are harder to avoid. Protecting and using … this period of strategic opportunity is the basic focal point of strategic direction now and for some time to come. The armed forces shoulder a glorious mission and a sacred responsibility in protecting this period of strategic opportunity.²⁷

**PLA Thinking about Force Employment**

Timothy R. Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation, points out that Chinese military writings provide insights into how the PLA thinks about conflict, saying, “According to military writings, the articulation of … political objectives stands as the starting point for military options. Carefully crafted objectives that take into consideration the nation’s … strategic imperatives provide a clear sense of the acceptable limits of escalation and the proper parameters for military action.”²⁸ Military thinkers in China write about achieving political objectives, limiting escalation, and managing military action through shaping operations, crisis management, and war control efforts:²⁹

- **Shaping operations:** According to Chinese strategists, shaping operations are intended to create an environment that prevents conflicts from arising.³⁰ Should tensions develop in an area that runs counter to China’s core interests, the PLA must be positioned to deter a challenger from escalating such tensions.³¹ Shaping operations before a conflict not only allows Beijing the opportunity to deter a perceived challenge by an adversary; they also place China in a position to respond to an escalating challenge with force if required.

- **Crisis management and nonmilitary operations:** To protect China’s interests in a pre-conflict environment, Chinese military thinkers have called for coordinated efforts between military and nonmilitary authorities. Mr. Heath asserts that “To minimize risk while maximizing potential gains, these thinkers have focused … on potential peacetime and crisis applications, developing a menu of escalation options, and increasing the role of nonmilitary assets in defending [China’s] interests.”³² For example, at the low end of the spectrum, the PLA Navy and China Coast Guard are pursuing what was called for in the 2013 defense white paper as enhanced cooperation between the PLA and maritime law enforcement agencies to defend maritime interests.³³ These types of operations are occurring between the PLA Navy and China Coast Guard in response to Beijing’s perceptions that Chinese sovereignty is being challenged by its neighbors in the East and South China seas. An example of coordination between military and nonmilitary assets at the high end of the spectrum is the standoff that occurred between China and Vietnam in 2014 when China moved an oil rig to
waters also claimed by Vietnam.\textsuperscript{34} China dispatched the PLA Navy and Air Force to support the China Coast Guard while the China Coast Guard was protecting the Haiyang Shiyou 981, an ultradeepwater oil rig operated by China National Petroleum Corporation, and to respond to what Beijing claimed was Vietnam’s violation of China’s sovereignty claims in the Paracel Islands.\textsuperscript{8,35}

- \textbf{War control}: Chinese military thinkers discuss “war control,” or the controlled use of force, to achieve national objectives.\textsuperscript{36} War control encompasses pre-conflict crisis control, operational control during a conflict, and post-conflict stability control.\textsuperscript{37} The objective of war control is to limit the scope of a conflict, minimize negative consequences, and achieve a victory at minimal cost.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Managing Contingencies}

Based on how Chinese military thinkers write about the pre-conflict use of force, China may seek to manage a Taiwan, South China Sea, or East China Sea crisis by seeking gains at the lowest possible cost, while balancing those gains against the risks that escalation could lead to conflict.\textsuperscript{39} As a situation evolves from a crisis to a conflict, China may decide to use force to achieve its political objectives while still seeking to de-escalate, or prevent the further escalation of, the conflict. The 2001 edition of \textit{The Science of Military Strategy} acknowledges that China’s “crisis control” efforts may be ineffective and once a crisis transitions to conflict Beijing will need to act quickly to avoid continued escalation of a conflict.\textsuperscript{40}

The Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident is an example of China escalating hostilities in order to advance a territorial objective and then de-escalating the crisis on Beijing’s terms before a full-fledged military conflict breaks out.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{8}DOD reports that in May 2014, “China established three security cordons around the rig using a large number of China Coast Guard, fishing, and commercial ships, beginning a standoff with Vietnamese ships, which repeatedly attempted to breach the cordon. Both sides relied primarily on non-military maritime assets to assert their respective sovereignty claims near the rig. PLA Navy ships supported operations in an overwatch capacity and PLA fighters, helicopters, and reconnaissance aircraft patrolled overhead. Chinese paramilitary ships frequently resorted to ramming and use of water cannons to deter Vietnamese ships and enforce the security cordons around the rig. In mid-May, anti-Chinese protests over the rig’s deployment erupted in Vietnam and resulted in at least two Chinese deaths and more than 100 injured, after which more than 3,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Vietnam. China also suspended some plans for bilateral diplomatic exchanges with Vietnam.” China withdrew the rig in July, one month earlier than planned. U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015}, April, 2015, 7.

\textsuperscript{9}The 2001 edition of \textit{The Science of Military Strategy} identifies three “fundamental principles of armed conflict control.” The three principles are taking preventive measures, seizing the initiative, and containing the conflict. These principles apply to managing a crisis or the transition from a crisis to a conflict. The first principle suggests China must be “alert” to the potential for a conflict to erupt and to take “preventive measures” by preparing a “strategic plan” for conflicts. Second, China must be prepared to make a “decision swiftly and strive for initiative.” This second principle argues that if a conflict occurs China must act quickly to seize the initiative to “compel the opponent to submit before he has time to react.” The third principle—“effective containment”—indicates that “when conflict occurs, it is necessary to regulate military actions . . . on the basis of requirements of political and diplomatic struggles, and strive to win without fighting or to subdue the enemy with a small war. When the opponent intends to escalate the conflict and has not yet put it into effect, it is necessary to contain the enemy in advance. When the opponent starts to carry out escalation, a tit-for-tat struggle is essential for equivalent . . . or superior escalation to frustrate the enemy's escalation deterrence.” Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., \textit{The Science of Military Strategy}, Military Science Press, 2005, 208.
Crisis Management Framework

In written testimony to the Commission, Mr. Heath provided a peacetime, crisis, and conflict framework for thinking about how China might manage a Taiwan, South China Sea, or East China Sea crisis:

Taiwan

• “Peacetime: Chinese military modernization has complemented economic and political incentives to encourage cross-Strait integration, although to date the combined effect has done little to reverse the decline in Taiwan’s support for unification. The PLA supports Beijing’s drive for unification in part through intimidation. In January 2017, the Liaoning aircraft carrier carried out exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The PLA has also held highly publicized exercises designed to improve its ability to carry out amphibious combat operations against Taiwan. China can be expected to continue to use military coercion as part of a broader effort to drive the two sides towards unification.”

• “Crisis: A crisis could easily emerge if Beijing grows frustrated by declining prospects for peaceful unification. In a crisis, China could demand Taipei adopt at least symbolic gestures towards unification. Media reports that claim Beijing may revise the Anti-Secession Law or enact a National Unification Law could provide legal pretext for such an ultimatum. In a hypothetical scenario, Beijing could cite Taipei’s intransigence in the face of demands as a violation meriting some sort of punishment. Beijing could then provoke a clash involving Taiwan military airplanes, ships, or other assets. Alternatively, the PLA could launch missiles near the island or carry out cyberattacks. Any of these actions could spur a serious military crisis, and the risk of escalation would grow if casualties mounted. The instigation of military crisis to coerce concessions carries risks, however. Such actions could embolden Taiwan and harden sentiment against unification. Worse, they could lead the U.S. to deploy military forces into the theater, potentially escalating the crisis into a high stakes standoff. If mishandled, Beijing could find itself in an unwanted war or be forced to back down in a humiliating manner.”

• “Conflict: Large-scale war to compel unification remains a remote possibility. The most plausible pathway to war would be one in which Chinese brinksmanship backfired and the leadership found itself in a spiral of escalation. The trigger could be any of the conditions listed in the National Anti-Secession Law, or future legislation if passed. Three major options present themselves: a conventional missile attack, a joint blockade, or an invasion. A conventional missile attack campaign would consist principally of sal-
vos of ballistic and air-launched missiles against military targets with minimal warning. These could inflict great havoc, but missile attacks alone are unlikely to compel Taiwan's capitulation. On the contrary, mounting military and civilian casualties from missile bombardment would probably strengthen Taiwan's resolve. A 'joint blockade campaign' could aim to sever Taiwan's economic and military connections with the world through a combination of firepower strikes and the deployment of intercepting naval vessels. But a joint blockade similarly lacks a clear mechanism to compel Taiwan's capitulation. The effect would probably once again be a hardening of Taiwan sentiment against China. Worse, the open-ended timeline provides U.S. forces ample opportunity to marshal forces and attack the blockading naval platforms. An invasion of Taiwan provides the only sure way to replace the leadership with a more compliant authority and ensure unification. Despite gains in PLA capability, an opposed amphibious invasion remains a high-risk operation, especially given the PLA's limited amphibious assault capability and lack of experience. Moreover, a large-scale amphibious invasion would require considerable mobilization, offering ample warning to the United States and Taiwan. The demanding requirements and the risk of major war with the United States make this course of action among the riskiest available to China."

South China Sea

- **Peacetime:** The PLA has worked with civilian authorities to strengthen the country's administration of its maritime regions. The military coordinates closely with the Chinese Coast Guard to patrol and protect occupied features, while national leaders incentivize regional accommodation through diplomatic pressure and economic initiatives like the 'Maritime Silk Road.'

- **Crisis:** Festering and overlapping disputes make the South China Sea ripe for crisis. In the 2012 standoff over Scarborough Reef with the Philippines and the 2014 standoff over the oil rig Haiyang 981 with Vietnam, China demonstrated a growing tolerance for brinksmanship. In the latter incident, the PLA coordinated with fishing vessels; coast guard ships; and political, media, and diplomatic pressure to strong-arm Vietnamese vessels as China deployed the oil rig in its neighbor's exclusive economic zone. A Philippine or Vietnamese misstep in a similar crisis involving disputed reefs, fishing grounds, or drilling for resources could provide the PLA the pretext needed to act aggressively. In such a crisis, China would probably seek some favorable change in the status quo or demonstration of Chinese superiority before seeking...
Crisis Management Framework—Continued

to deescalate. Although neither side would necessarily have the motivation to escalate the conflict, the risk of miscalculation remains high.”

- “Conflict: Although crisis is possible, major conflict remains unlikely in the South China Sea. The most plausible path to war would be an escalation from the type of militarized crisis mentioned above. If China decided to exploit a crisis to seize a Vietnamese occupied feature, for example, Vietnam could retaliate by targeting the Chinese forces. Any Chinese troops on an occupied feature in the Spratlys or Paracels would be extremely vulnerable. China could escalate with forces stationed on the features, but these are limited in number and relatively vulnerable. If China suffered setbacks in the South China Sea, it might involve air and naval forces from the mainland or consider actions on the border with Vietnam. Beijing would probably respond with greater caution to any incident involving Philippine forces, however, due to Manila’s alliance with Washington.”

East China Sea

- “[Peacetime:] As in the South China Sea, China has found the peacetime strategy of incremental administration effective. The PLA Navy can be expected to continue coordinating with the Chinese Coast Guard to administer the disputed waters near the Senkakus and deter their Japanese counterparts. In addition, the PLA announced an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea in 2013 to justify an increase in military aviation patrols over the islands.”

- “Crisis: The risk of crisis near the Senkakus ebbs and flows as tensions rise and relax between Beijing and Tokyo. The intensifying rivalry between the two Asian giants raises the risk that any incident near the Senkakus could rapidly escalate. The precipitating incident could involve a collision of fishing or maritime law enforcement vessels. An accident involving military platforms, such as aircraft, cannot be ruled out either. Because of the relative parity of conventional military power, escalation would be tempting for both sides seeking an advantage in any subsequent crisis. The most likely outcome would be stalemate, a deepening of frustration and hostility, and an increasing militarization of the problem. This would raise the likelihood of a reinforcing spiral of intensifying hostility, crisis, and potential conflict. The largest risk for China would be one of misjudgment. Nations seeking to exploit military crises have historically frequently miscalculated, resulting in a war that they did not actually want.”
Conflict: Because of the political opprobrium of aggression and the risk of U.S. involvement, an unprovoked Chinese assault on Japanese forces or seizure of the Senkakus would offer little benefit and carry extremely high risks. A more plausible scenario would be an escalation or continuation of hostilities from the type of crisis outlined previously. A spiral of intensifying and protracted crises with little resolution and a deepening of suspicion and hostility would provide a powerful incentive for China to attempt a larger-scale military operation to assert its dominance and humble its foe. A military operation with limited objectives that could be achieved in a short amount of time and appeared largely punitive could demonstrate Chinese prowess, rally public support, and provide the satisfaction of humiliating Japan. Examples might be missile strikes against Japanese naval combatants or fighter aircraft near the Senkakus. This course of action would carry high risks, however. An attack on Japanese military platforms would trigger U.S. involvement, and China could not be sure of its ability to control subsequent events.

Contingency Planning

China's Planning Process

The 2001 and 2013 editions of The Science of Military Strategy provide an overview of the conflicts China anticipates it may face in the future. In addition to a war fought to counter an invasion of the Mainland and a fight to unify with Taiwan, described in the 2013 edition as a “large-scale high-intensity anti-separatist war,” the 2013 edition also includes discussion of a “medium-scale, low- to medium-intensity self-defense and counterattack operation,” which applies to perceived threats along China’s maritime periphery, and a “small-scale, low-intensity anti-terrorist, stability maintenance” operation. The likeliest threats China faces, according to the 2013 edition, come from the maritime periphery, with the most dangerous challenge being a conflict with Taiwan in the form of a “large-scale, relatively high-intensity local war in the sea direction against the backdrop of nuclear deterrence.” At the national level, the assessments based on these threats provide the Central Military Commission (CMC) a starting point for directing the contingency planning process.

National and Theater Planning Process

At the national level, the CMC is responsible for providing strategic objectives and guidance to inform the overall PLA planning process. The Joint Staff Department within the CMC is responsible for national-level operations planning, command and control, and operations command support. Each of the five theater commands is then responsible for developing joint operational-level plans that align with threats emanating from their respective areas of responsibility.
Theater Command and Threat Directions

The PLA's theater command structure is intended to enable PLA forces to quickly meet the requirements of an anticipated regional war scenario by maintaining an operational structure poised to respond to a crisis. The five Joint Theater Commands, established as a result of the ongoing military reforms, include the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands. The operational focus of the theaters is as follows:

- The Eastern Theater Command is responsible for preventing Taiwan independence, compelling Taiwan unification, countering any foreign intervention during a Taiwan conflict, and defending maritime sovereignty claims in the East China Sea.
- The Southern Theater Command's security challenges include defending maritime sovereignty claims and China's sea lines of control in the South China Sea, as well as defense along the border with Vietnam.
- The Western Theater Command is focused on missions associated with combating domestic extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet Autonomous Region, as well as addressing an Indian border dispute contingency. This theater likewise will guard against infiltration by Central Asian extremist and terrorist groups.
- The Northern Theater Command is responsible primarily for stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and conducting border stability operations associated with a North Korea contingency. The theater may also share responsibility with the Eastern Theater for contingencies involving Japan, and likely is responsible for northern border contingencies involving Mongolia and Russia.
- The Central Theater Command is responsible for conducting capital defense operations during any contingency involving another theater's area of responsibility. This theater likely also has responsibilities for responding to domestic emergencies.

Theater plans are prepared by each theater command's chief of staff. Theater plans provide a campaign goal, identify operational objectives, include a force laydown, discuss fighting methods, and lay out the phases of a campaign. Mark R. Cozad, a senior international defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, summarizes the process by which planning occurs at each level:

The planning process at the [national] level begins with the definition of strategic objectives and associated key missions.... Assigned strategic missions are prioritized and distinguished by phase and geographic necessity....

*Mr. Cozad states that “Combat systems are closely related to campaigns, but the organizing principle behind them is functional rather than organizational. Combat systems are characterized by advanced weapons systems being coordinated and integrated across domains and services.”
Campaigns provide a joint organizational construct that includes an operational-level command structure with service- and function-oriented operations groups. Campaigns are the building blocks of PLA wartime planning at the operational level.

Overview of Relevant PLA Campaigns for Hotspots along China’s Maritime Periphery

Campaigns are based on analysis of modern warfare and used to outline a specific type of military operation—such as an air or island blockade—and serve as a template for organizing operational forces along functional lines. The types of campaigns that apply to contingency planning for an incident along China’s maritime periphery are discussed in the 2006 *The Science of Campaigns*, published by China’s National Defense University:

- **Joint firepower strike campaign**: A joint firepower strike campaign would emphasize conventional missile strikes against enemy strategic leadership and military targets. The PLA Rocket Force would be the lead service for this campaign. The PLA Air Force and Navy could contribute to this campaign if it were combined with blockade and anti-air raid operations.

- **Joint blockade campaign**: A joint blockade campaign would be conducted over a long period and would seek to compel an enemy to submit to Beijing’s objectives by punishing the enemy’s economy and military capabilities. The PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force would play a role in this campaign.

- **Joint anti-air raid campaign**: A joint anti-air raid campaign would involve both offensive and defensive operations to defeat the offensive air capability of an enemy through strikes against land- and sea-based air operations. A joint anti-air raid campaign would include the PLA Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Forces.

- **Joint island landing campaign**: A joint island landing campaign would be executed to seize and occupy an island (such as Taiwan or another Taiwan-controlled island). This campaign would require all four services to conduct integrated joint operations during a series of linked campaigns—such as the campaigns identified here—that would result in the destruction of enemy forces, an amphibious operation, and occupation of the island.


*During a PLA joint campaign, a service will be designated the “lead service” in charge of coordinating and executing a phase of a campaign. For example, during a joint blockade campaign, the PLA Air Force would be designated the lead service responsible for coordinating service contributions for “seizing and maintaining air dominance” under the unified command of the joint blockade command headquarters. Zhang Yuliang, ed., *The Science of Campaigns*, National Defense University Press, 2006, 292–309. Translation.*
Overview of Relevant PLA Campaigns for Hotspots along China's Maritime Periphery—Continued

- **Sea force group campaign**: A sea force group campaign would be conducted by the PLA Navy to destroy or degrade an opposing naval force at sea.

- **Coral reef offensive campaign**: A coral reef offensive campaign would be undertaken by the PLA Navy to dislodge an enemy occupying a small island or reef (such as those in the South China Sea). The campaign likely would be conducted by a small formation of multi-mission surface combatants, an amphibious landing ship, and naval helicopters.*

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**Planning Considerations**

China is preparing the PLA for a range of contingency operations for crises that could erupt along China's maritime periphery. Mr. Cozad suggests that ongoing developments in PLA joint training demonstrate China's commitment to preparing for multiple types of contingency operations:

PLA joint exercises since 2010 have focused on developing a variety of key operational capabilities while centering on Taiwan or contingencies on China’s borders. In many respects, these concepts reflect long-term thinking about two of China’s most significant potential conflict scenarios: Taiwan-centered operations and “chain reactions” along China’s periphery. The most significant feature of recent PLA discussion about preparing for military struggle is not which potential conflict scenario is designated as most likely or most dangerous; instead, it is the extent to which China’s leaders are forcing the PLA to become more flexible and ready to deal with a much wider range of potential crises than in the past.

**Managing Requirements and Constraints**

The PLA is likely to conduct contingency operations that cross multiple theaters, requiring significant coordination of military resources. The CMC is responsible for the national-level management of resources, with the Joint Staff Department directing the command of operational capabilities, the Mobilization Department leading mobilization, and the Logistic Support Department coordinating logistic support. These functions will be conducted at the national level by the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center, which will provide guidance and direction to the Theater Command Joint Operations Centers.

One of the more pressing planning considerations at both the national and theater levels will be coordinating a PLA response to

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counter any intervention\textsuperscript{*} by a “strong enemy.”\textsuperscript{73} The PLA often uses the term “strong enemy” in military writings to refer to the United States.\textsuperscript{74} The PLA is particularly concerned about U.S. long-range precision strikes targeting important military sites in China and the need to defend these sites, which would draw resources away from offensive operations.\textsuperscript{75} For any large contingency, each theater command would likely initiate counterattack plans if an enemy attempts to hold strategically important targets at risk, as well as guard against “chain reaction”\textsuperscript{†} challenges to contested claims along China’s periphery while the PLA is conducting operations in what Chinese military planners refer to as the “main strategic direction.”\textsuperscript{76}

These challenges will likely constrain PLA planning options concerning the forces that are available for an actual contingency operation if forces are held in reserve for homeland defense or long-range strikes against the operational forces of a “strong enemy.”

\begin{center}
\textbf{Chinese Contingency Planning versus Real-World Conflict}
\end{center}

China’s publicly available writings on contingency planning and related training and exercise activities provide only partial insights into how China would actually fare in a real-world contingency or conflict scenario. Concerning PLA scenario-based training and contingency planning, Mr. Cozad notes that emphasis on defense mobilization, long-range mobility, intelligence support, and scenario-based training likely have improved the PLA’s ability to develop and coordinate contingency plans for a range of scenarios.\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, given China’s lack of combat experience since 1979, along with a number of other factors, it is difficult to judge how well the PLA will be able to execute a plan associated with a Taiwan, East China Sea, or South China Sea contingency operation.

Some of the PLA’s recent non-combat operations do shed some light on how planning informs operations. For example, the PLA has studied and learned from U.S. military planning efforts associated with the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as U.S. operations in Grenada, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Marcelyn L. Thompson, an Asia analyst for the U.S. Government, indicates the lessons the PLA is learning from U.S. operations include the importance of logistics, intelligence, and scenario-focused train-

\textsuperscript{*}China uses the term “counterintervention” to discuss the types of actions that are often discussed by DOD as “antiaccess/area denial” operations. “Antiaccess” actions are intended to slow the deployment of an adversary’s forces into a theater or cause them to operate at distances farther from the conflict than they would prefer. “Area denial” actions affect maneuvers within a theater and are intended to impede an adversary’s operations within areas where friendly forces cannot prevent access. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, 2013, i, 32, 33; U.S. Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, May 2013, 2.

\textsuperscript{†}Chain reaction challenges arise when a conflict occurs in a theater’s main focus area (or strategic direction) and then another conflict occurs in another theater’s area of responsibility (or a secondary strategic direction). China is particularly concerned about a country along China’s land or maritime periphery with a border dispute taking advantage of China being focused on a conflict that involves another major power, namely the United States. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Hotspots along China’s Maritime Periphery, written testimony of Mark R. Cozad, April 13, 2017; China’s State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015; Shou Xiaosong, ed., The Science of Military Strategy, Military Science Press, 2013, 117. Translation.
The PLA appears to have applied some of these lessons to the 2011 noncombatant contingency operation the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force conducted in Libya to successfully evacuate more than 35,000 people. However, Ms. Thompson argues, “To the extent that China’s contingency planning for and use of its military in the Libya [noncombatant evacuation operation] mirrors any … U.S.-style planning, it most closely approximates crisis action planning, similar to what the United States exercised in coordinating between Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of State entities located in the Asia Pacific in response to the 2004 [Indian Ocean] tsunami.”

Contingency Operations along China’s Maritime Periphery

Taiwan Contingency Operation

DOD assesses China currently lacks the capability to conduct a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. Furthermore, it is unlikely the PLA would be able to conduct an invasion of Taiwan without Beijing risking a military response from the West. The PLA, however, has been tasked with developing operational plans for just such a scenario, and the PLA can currently conduct campaigns involving punitive missile strikes and operations to seize Taiwan’s islands and other Taiwan-controlled land features located along the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea, such as Itu Aba, Matsu, and Jinmen.

China’s Campaign Objectives

The overall national-level objective is for Taiwan to capitulate and submit to Chinese Communist Party rule. Christopher D. Yung, director of East Asian studies at the U.S. Marine Corps University, testified to the Commission that a large-scale joint PLA contingency operation against Taiwan will first attempt to isolate Taiwan physically from its most likely protector, the United States. Second, the PLA will have engaged in military actions designed to directly deter U.S. interference in the conflict. Third, failing to deter American involvement, PLA campaign objectives will be designed to keep direct American military interference to a minimum through so-called “counterintervention” operations. Fourth, anticipating U.S. involvement through air, subsurface, and surface combatant interference in PLA operations, the PLA will attempt to conduct a rapid assault on Taiwan, establish a beachhead, seize ports and air fields, and land ground forces on Taiwan within a short time period (the PLA planning assumption depends on the Chinese assessment of how long the PLA believes the Taiwan military can hold out). Fifth, in the likelihood that the PLA fails to achieve its military objectives on Taiwan prior to American build
up and direct intervention in the conflict, PLA campaign objectives are then likely to involve counterdeterrence operations, pre-emptive strikes on high value operational targets, operations designed to deny the U.S. military access to information and situational awareness, and operations designed to strike at the American logistical system and the U.S. military’s ability to operate for a sustained period forward. 86

Counterintervention Planning Considerations

The PLA has thoroughly considered the counterintervention requirements for pre- and post-initiation of hostilities against Taiwan. 87 The PLA will account for potential U.S. forces capable of responding to a Taiwan contingency and attempt to delay, deny, or deter a U.S. response. 88 It will likewise take into consideration the potential for U.S. allies to assist or support U.S. operations. 89 Lastly, the PLA will take into consideration the likely avenues of approach, operating areas, and bases of operation for these opposing forces. 90 Understanding the force posture for the United States and for U.S. allies such as Japan will allow the PLA to make judgments about the potential capability of these forces to intervene in a conflict and prepare counterintervention option plans using geography and advanced strike weapons to gain localized air and naval superiority during the initial stage of a conflict. 91 This could result in China impeding the flow of forces responding to a crisis by conducting cyber attacks on U.S. mobilization sites and systems, shipping points, embarkation areas, logistics, and the Time Phased Force Deployment Data* systems and Joint Operations Planning and Execution Systems† on which U.S. forces depend.

Full-Scale Taiwan Amphibious and Airborne Assault

Although the PLA Navy currently lacks the “amphibious lift to land sufficient forces to seize and hold” Taiwan, Dr. Yung argues China would have to seize ports and airfields, asserting, “It is possible that the PLA could launch a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault … allowing forces to flow in through these access points.” 92 For this type of operation, most of the forces would come from the Eastern Theater Command and likely be supported by forces from the Southern Theater Command.‡ 93 PLA airborne forces, such as the Airborne Corps located in the Central Theater, would

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*Time Phased Force and Deployment Data is a computer-supported database portion of an operational plan. According to DOD, it “contains time-phased data for moving personnel, equipment, and materiel into a theater [and] … reflects the requirements that strategic and intra theater lifts are assigned against to ensure that the full scope of deployment requirements are identified and satisfied.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations, May 7, 2007, III–17.

†According to DOD, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is a system of “applications that are used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–35 Deployment and Redeployment Operations, May 7, 2007, A–1.

‡Not all forces assigned to the Southern Theater Command will be available to support a joint island landing campaign to seize Taiwan, however. Dr. Yung notes that “Only the 123rd and 124th Infantry Divisions … have been designated as Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Divisions … and have received consistent amphibious assault training. Additionally, the ground forces located in Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces are not geographically situated to quickly participate in a Taiwan contingency. Similarly, not all PLA [Air Force] units … in the [Southern Theater Command] … are likely to be assigned to support a Taiwan contingency. … Given their geographic locations, those air force units assigned to Yunnan are more likely reserved for a Vietnam or India contingency.”
also play a role in a Taiwan contingency. Lastly, additional forces from other theaters will likely be drawn on to support follow-on on-island operations once the PLA has secured ports and airfields throughout Taiwan. For an overview of forces that would be available, see Addenda I and II.

**PLA Training for a Taiwan Conflict**

The PLA has conducted Taiwan-centered exercises going back to the 1990s and possibly earlier. Dr. Yung testified that the PLA conducted at least “96 brigade or larger PLA training exercises between 1990 and 1995 or about 16 exercises per year. The Navy was identified as participating in 36 of these. It is therefore unquestionable that in terms of level of effort the PLA is attempting to improve its capability to conduct large scale military operations.” Since the mid-2000s, China has conducted a series of joint long-range cross-region exercises, such as Stride (Kuayue) and Joint Action (Lianhe Xingdong), that are applicable for preparing the PLA for operations against Taiwan. These types of exercises emphasize the movement of a large number of forces and are probably intended to simulate and practice the flow of follow-on forces into the war zone once a foothold is achieved during a Taiwan conflict. The PLA also practices joint firepower strike operations during the Firepower (Huoli) series of exercises, and the PLA Air Force and Navy conduct training regularly in the East and South China seas.

**South China Sea Contingency Operation**

China’s military, law enforcement, and maritime militia activity in the South China Sea—particularly the ongoing construction of civil-military facilities on reclaimed features in the Spratly Islands—is intended to enhance China’s control over disputed areas in the region. Should Beijing judge that China’s sovereignty claims over occupied features within the South China Sea are challenged by states with overlapping claims, the PLA has a range of campaigns that can be executed to maintain control of these features within the nine-dash line. These campaigns include the aforementioned joint firepower strike, joint blockade, sea force group, and coral reef offensive campaigns. China would certainly incorporate maritime law enforcement operations in conjunction with these campaigns, as well as in the run-up to one or more of these campaigns. This will have significant implications for a contingency in the South China Sea or East China Sea. As numerous analysts have noted, China’s unconventional practice of using its maritime law enforcement agencies and maritime militia to advance its territorial claims and harass neighboring countries’ vessels enables China to effectively assert military might in the “gray zone,” just below the threshold of conflict, putting the onus of escalation on the adversary. This approach was on display in the case of the oil rig deployed to Vietnam-claimed waters, discussed earlier in this section: Chinese maritime law enforcement forces effectively waged a small maritime

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battle against Vietnam, to the point that at least one Vietnamese vessel sank and several vessels on both sides incurred damage. But because only nonmilitary vessels were involved in the actual fighting, this conflict was characterized in international media as a “standoff,” rather than a kinetic conflict initiated by China. This narrative, and the general downplaying of the role maritime law enforcement forces can play in a conflict, greatly benefits China.

Considering the massive expansion of the China Coast Guard’s size and capabilities in recent years, this trend is all the more troubling. The China Coast Guard has experienced a 73 percent increase in tonnage between 2010 and 2016 (from 110,000 to 190,000 tons). In addition to increasing tonnage, China is building and deploying maritime law enforcement ships like the new China Coast Guard ship Haijing 3901, which is larger than the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Furthermore, China has decommissioned PLA Navy ships—which are armed with ship-mounted machine guns—and transferred them to the China Coast Guard after removing the ships’ missile systems; several China Coast Guard ships have reinforced hulls (which are ideal for ramming other vessels).

**China’s Campaign Objectives**

If China initiates a contingency operation against Vietnam or the Philippines—the most likely adversaries in a South China Sea conflict—the PLA would likely seek to achieve its national objectives before the United States can respond. The PLA would rely on a mix of campaigns to include firepower strike, joint blockade, and coral reef landing operations. Any campaign conducted in the South China Sea would be run by the Southern Theater Command; however, other theater commands may support operations, particularly if it became necessary to counter third-party forces intervening on behalf of Vietnam or the Philippines.

**Island Landing, Blockade, and Strike**

PLA island landing operations seek to achieve control over information, air, and sea domains at the outset of a conflict to gain the initiative. This means the PLA is likely to initiate strikes against Vietnam- or Philippines-controlled islands or other land features with little warning to isolate opposing forces by severing communications networks and supply lines and suppressing defending forces. The PLA Navy, Air Force, and maritime law enforcement agencies likely will conduct joint blockade operations to prevent any reinforcement efforts by the targeted forces.

**Amphibious Assault**

Once the defensive forces on the occupied features have been neutralized, the PLA Navy would plan to conduct landing operations to secure the island or reef. In addition to naval gunfire support, the PLA has recently discussed the use of attack helicopters and air assault operations in support of island landing operations. Landing operations would secure command and control centers, air defense sites, and artillery positions to hold the reef or island.
PLA Training for a South China Sea Conflict

China conducts South China Sea-focused exercises that simulate assaults against reefs and small islands. These exercises, which have increased in frequency and sophistication in recent years, are intended to train forces for conducting a South China Sea contingency operation as well as intimidate or shape the behavior of China’s neighbors with competing claims in the South China Sea. In addition to the island assault training conducted by the PLA Navy, China has increased PLA Air Force training over the South China Sea, featuring strike aircraft, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft conducting simulated strikes.

East China Sea (Senkaku Islands) Contingency Operation

Although tensions between China and Japan have diminished somewhat from their peak in 2012, the increasing pressure China places on Japan with its continuous deployment of China Coast Guard ships to the waters around the Senkaku Islands, as well as naval and air activity near the islands, increases the risk of an incident. Should an incident near the islands lead to a crisis and conflict, U.S. Navy Captain (Ret.) James E. Fanell—formerly the director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet and currently a government fellow with the Geneva Center for Security Policy—testified to the Commission that “there are likely three Chinese vectors for a ‘short, sharp war’ against the Senkaku Islands: MLE [maritime law enforcement] scenario, PLA exercise scenario, and Taiwan-style island attack scenario.”

- **Maritime law enforcement scenario:** This would involve China Coast Guard ships displacing the Japan Coast Guard and seizing control of the islands through a process similar to the one executed against the Philippines during the 2012 Scarborough Reef incident. If China is unsuccessful in achieving control through displacement, maritime law enforcement operations could trigger an incident at sea that is used to justify military operations that result in the capture of the islands.

- **PLA exercise scenario:** After years of regular PLA exercises in the East China Sea—drills to which the U.S. and Japanese militaries have become accustomed—this operation would involve launching a force to seize quick control of the islands from a feigned military exercise in the area.

- **Taiwan-style island attack scenario:** Similar to a traditional Taiwan-style island attack scenario, this would focus on mobilization of forces and the execution of a joint amphibious assault to capture and occupy the islands.

These vectors can be viewed as a range of options Beijing may be considering, with law enforcement operations representing the low end and a joint island invasion operation representing the high end. The objective associated with these scenarios would be to occupy and then maintain control of the Senkaku Islands.
Maritime Law Enforcement Forces

As noted earlier, Beijing deploys China Coast Guard and other maritime law enforcement ships—rather than just naval vessels—to advance its claims in disputed waters in both the South and East China seas. Should tensions escalate between Beijing and Tokyo over the Senkaku Islands, China may be tempted to seize control of the islands through a maritime law enforcement operation like the one it executed against the Philippines-controlled Scarborough Reef in 2012. Such an operation could unfold by incrementally increasing pressure on Japan by operating maritime law enforcement ships closer to the islands with the PLA Navy combatants monitoring developments just over the horizon, anchoring, landing on the islands, and finally building on the islands until Japan has two options: surrender administrative control of the islands, or take defensive enforcement action. China would undertake such a campaign using PLA air and naval forces operating in the background to intimidate Japan and attempt to control or prevent the escalation of the crisis into a wider conflict that draws in Japan’s Self-Defense Force and triggers U.S. intervention under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty.*

Training activities and exercises: Training sheds light on how China might seek to execute a joint PLA Navy-China Coast Guard operation in the East China Sea or South China Sea; it also highlights growing coordination and demonstrates efforts to improve command and control. For example, in October 2012 China held an exercise, East China Sea Cooperation 2012, which involved vessels from the PLA Navy and maritime law enforcement ships focused on protecting Chinese fishing activities; during the exercise, the PLA Navy took up protective positions near maritime law enforcement ships and ran off the foreign ships. A May 2013 exercise involving the PLA Navy and China Coast Guard ships near the Spratly Islands focused on command and control and joint patrolling.

Aggressive employment of maritime law enforcement agencies: Maritime law enforcement ships have operated in an aggressive manner in both the East and South China seas, to include operating ships in a way that has led to collisions. Lyle J. Morris, a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, states that in 2011, “Chinese vessels began to employ more aggressive actions, such as ramming and the use of water cannons inside the cabins of opposing vessels.” Additional maritime law enforcement ships with increased capabilities will likely encourage more aggressive behavior in disputed waters.

*Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, January 1960.
Exercise Activities

Should Beijing fail to wrest control of the Senkaku Islands from Tokyo through a maritime law enforcement-style campaign, China may engage in what Captain Fanell describes as a “short, sharp war” that begins under the premise of a routine exercise activity in the East China Sea and quickly transitions into an operation to gain control of the islands. According to Captain Fanell:

> It is important to note that since 2014 the PLA has conducted several large-scale exercises that could very well be rehearsals for a Senkaku Islands campaign. Of greater concern, these exercises could also be intended as a deception campaign, designed to lure U.S. and Japanese audiences into complacency, so that when the actual ‘short, sharp’ Senkaku Islands campaign commences, it is mistaken for ‘just another exercise.’

Amphibious Assault Operations

Based upon the body of Chinese military writings focused on PLA planning and campaigns, the PLA may be planning for landing operations against small islands. The PLA Navy has sufficient amphibious lift to conduct small island-landing operations and the PLA Air Force has enough strategic lift to support airborne operations. Lastly, the PLA Army has been focusing on improving air assault capabilities with helicopter operations, which could contribute to the campaign as well.

Regional Responses and Implications for the United States

Implications of a Conflict in East Asia for U.S. Allies and Partners

Any of the potential crises, contingencies, and military operations detailed previously could create significant challenges for the United States, including possibly inviting U.S. military intervention on behalf of an ally or partner. At the very least, any of these scenarios would have profound implications for regional stability, a key U.S. interest. In scenarios involving treaty allies or defense partners—Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—the United States likely would respond with efforts to counter Chinese aggression. An incident between China and Vietnam that escalated into a conflict could result in U.S. military involvement as well.

Taiwan

The PLA possesses both a quantitative and a qualitative military advantage over the Taiwan military and is capable of conducting a range of military campaigns against Taiwan. To counter this threat, Taiwan has sought to enhance its military capabilities through indigenous production as well as procurement of military platforms and weapons systems from overseas, to include weapons systems produced in the United States or built under license in Taiwan. Taiwan will continue to look to its friendship with the United States to deter Chinese aggression should cross-Strait relations significantly deteriorate.
Military modernization: To counter the PLA’s expanding capabilities, Taiwan has sought to enhance its own military capabilities by developing domestically produced weapons systems and importing other arms. Advanced antiship cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and fast attack patrol ships are among the newest platforms and weapons systems Taiwan has produced.\(^{136}\) Taiwan likewise continues to move ahead on its program to build submarines to counter PLA Navy surface threats.\(^{137}\) The objective of military modernization is to provide Taiwan enough capability to deter an attack, and should deterrence fail, provide Taiwan the capability to hold out long enough for the international community to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf by countering a blockade or disrupting an amphibious assault.\(^{138}\) (For additional information, see the discussion on arms sales, military-to-military contacts, and U.S.-Taiwan defense relations in Chapter 3, Section 3, “China and Taiwan.”)

Military training and preparedness: Taiwan conducts an annual defense exercise, Han Kuang, to test Taiwan military readiness to counter a potential Chinese attack on the island.\(^{139}\) Han Kuang consists of a computer-assisted command post exercise typically held in the spring, and a live-fire exercise held in late summer or early fall.\(^{140}\) The exercise regularly focuses on joint air defense, counter airborne and amphibious landing, joint antisubmarine warfare, and reserve mobilization.\(^{141}\) During the Commission’s May 2017 trip to Taiwan, Taiwan’s Minister of Defense Feng Shih-kuan told the Commission that the 2017 exercise did not take U.S. or Japanese forces into account. The purpose of the exercise was to determine whether Taiwan’s multi-domain deterrence capability would be sufficient to deter any Chinese threat.\(^{142}\)

Maintaining friendships: Taipei relies on the U.S.-Taiwan security partnership to enhance Taiwan’s ability to deter an attack on the island by the Chinese military and diminish China’s ability to use the threat of military force to coerce Taiwan into making political concessions.\(^{143}\) Taiwan likewise maintains close relations with Japan, and both have worked together on a range of maritime issues, including resolving fishing disputes near the Senkaku Islands\(^{9}\) and coordinating between the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration and the Japan Coast Guard for maritime search and rescue operations.\(^{144}\) Japan and Taiwan also have overlapping security concerns regarding China. Tokyo is concerned that continued Chinese encroachment in the East China Sea erodes Japan’s security and threatens Japan’s sea lines, and an attack on Taiwan would deepen Japan’s concern that China seeks to dominate the region.\(^{145}\) Should China attack Taiwan, Taipei would likely expect Japan to allow U.S. forces to operate from bases in Japan and possibly provide some logistical support to U.S. forces operating near Japan.

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\(^9\) During the Commission’s May 2017 trip to Taiwan, former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou said the 2013 Taiwan-Japan fishing agreement reduced the number of annual fishing clashes between Taiwan and Japan from 17 to zero. Ma Ying-jeou, Former President of Taiwan, meeting with Commission, Taipei, Taiwan, May 16, 2017.
Japan

Japan seeks to counter China's challenge to Japan's administrative control of the Senkaku Islands with a combination of political, military, and law enforcement efforts. On the political front, Japan has sought and received reassurance from multiple U.S. administrations that the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Japanese defense establishment has pursued modernization of its coast guard to counter China's actions to erode Japan's administrative control of the islands. Japan likewise continues to improve the capabilities of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces to counter increasing pressure from China in the air and maritime domains.

Furthermore, in addition to legislation passed in 2015 that allowed the Self-Defense Force to conduct military operations overseas and participate in collective self-defense with allies, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeks to amend Japan's constitution to allow for a formal military and the ability to deploy Japan's armed forces outside of strictly “self-defensive” circumstances.

In the context of increasing PLA Air Force activity near Japan's southwest islands—namely fighter and bomber flights through the Miyako Strait, intelligence collection flights along the airspace of Japan's southwest islands, and State Oceanic Administration aircraft flying near the Senkaku Islands—Japan has placed particular emphasis on developing capabilities to defend these islands and working to improve the expeditionary capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Force to defend the islands from attack by China.

- **Military modernization:** The Japan Self-Defense Force is modern and very capable. Modernization efforts are focused on improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; lift capabilities; command, control, communication, and intelligence capabilities; and ballistic missile defense. To respond to sea and air threats, the Self-Defense Force is acquiring SH–60K patrol helicopters, F–35A fighter aircraft, V–22 tiltrotor aircraft, E–2D airborne early-warning aircraft, and armored amphibious vehicles; upgrading its Osumi-class landing ships; and continuing submarine construction.

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*Prime Minister Abe's revision is focused specifically on Article 9 in Chapter 2 of Japan's Constitution, which deals with the “renunciation of war” and states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, The Constitution of Japan, May 3, 1947.

†During the Commission’s May 2017 trip to Japan, Lieutenant General Osamu Onoda, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (Ret.), referred to a May 18 incident in which a Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flew above the territorial seas of one of the Senkaku Islands as a “very provocative action.” Lieutenant General Osamu Onoda, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (Ret.), meeting with Commission, Tokyo, Japan, May 25, 2017. See also Yoko Wakatsuki and Junko Ogura, "Japan: China 'Escalating' Tensions over Disputed Islands," CNN, May 19, 2017.

‡Japan is focusing on bolstering its defense of its southwest islands located in the Ryukyu Island Chain to include the Senkakus. Japan has placed surface search radars on islands between Okinawa and Yonaguni, the Ground Self-Defense Force is increasing amphibious and coastal defense capabilities, and the Air Self-Defense Force has increased its F–15 fighter presence at Naha Air Base to increase Japan's capability to defend these islands from a Chinese attack. Hideaki Kaneda, adjunct fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, meeting with Commission, Tokyo, Japan, May 24, 2017; Megan Eckstein, “Japan Shifting Amphibious, Coastal Defense Units Closer to China; Australia Boosts Its Own Capability,” USNI News, April 5, 2016; Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan, July 1, 2015, 165.
oping advanced ballistic missile interceptors (SM–3 Block IIA) with the United States. In addition to continued investment in Self-Defense Force capabilities, Tokyo continues to focus on increasing the capability of the Japan Coast Guard* by expanding its fleet of patrol ships from 128 to 142 between 2016 and 2020.155

Japan’s Response to a Senkaku Island Contingency

Japan’s response to an East China Sea crisis would likely depend on the nature of Chinese aggression. An accidental collision, a blockade, or island seizure operations would pose different operational and strategic challenges for Tokyo.156 Japan could respond to Chinese aggression in the East China Sea using three phases of operations, according to Michael J. Green, senior vice president for Asia and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies:

“Phase Zero” (under peacetime tensions) would entail the deployment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets near the Senkaku Islands. “Phase One” (as Chinese forces act) would involve the deployment of a [Japan Ground Self-Defense Force] “rapid-deployment” regiment consisting of infantry, mortar, and mechanized companies equipped with amphibious vehicles. “Phase Two” would see the activation of such units in the event that the islands were seized by an enemy.157

If China escalates a crisis to the point of conflict, Tokyo likely would look to Washington for support. Japan would certainly expect a large U.S. force posture in the region and vocal support from Washington noting that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty† continues to extend to the Senkaku Islands to deter aggression. However, should China initiate hostilities against the Japan Self-Defense Force and Japan Coast Guard while those forces were defending the islands, Tokyo would expect Article V to be honored.

Japan’s Potential Role in a Taiwan Contingency

In July 2015, Prime Minister Abe asserted Japan has the right of collective self-defense under Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in cases where Japan itself was not directly under attack. Dr. Green testified to the Commission that “Abe’s commitment to help defend U.S. forces under the collective self-defense right might

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*The Japan Coast Guard does not have a military mission and only conducts maritime law enforcement operations. Furthermore, Japan does not convert Maritime Self-Defense ships into Coast Guard ships. The Japan Coast Guard considers all China Coast Guard ships (even converted PLA Navy ships) to be law enforcement ships, and engages with them as such. Official, Japanese law enforcement, meeting with Commission, Tokyo, Japan, May 24, 2017.

†There is an instance where the invocation of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty may be delayed. Dr. Green argues that “Japanese officials would be … aware that [the perception of] unilateral escalation by Japan would put at risk American support and potentially allow China to force an unfavorable outcome through U.S. pressure on Japan. An internationalization of the dispute in which Japan was forced by its closest ally to de-escalate and relinquish de facto control of the Senkaku Islands would be devastating for the Japanese government and the longer-term credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance—not to mention other U.S. security commitments in the region. The [Japan Self Defense Force] would also be well-aware that escalation beyond the tactical level around the Senkaku Islands would require capabilities only the U.S. military has.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Hotspots along China’s Maritime Periphery, written testimony of Michael J. Green, April 13, 2017.
be considered the quid offered in exchange for the quo of a stronger U.S. commitment to defend Japan against an expanding China.\textsuperscript{161} Dr. Green argues:

\textit{The new interpretation of what is allowed under collective self-defense opens the first real possibility of joint planning and exercises related to contingencies in the Taiwan area, at least in theory. To be clear, Japan has no treaty or political obligation to assist with the defense of Taiwan. Even the United States policy is now guided not by a formal treaty with Taipei, but instead by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which states that: ‘It is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’ Moreover, longstanding U.S. declaratory policy regarding contingencies in the Taiwan Strait has been to assert tactical clarity regarding the U.S. ability to defend Taiwan and our interests in the Western Pacific, but strategic ambiguity regarding the exact circumstances under which the United States would use military force to come to Taiwan’s aid.}\textsuperscript{162}

There are at least three areas where Japan may support U.S. efforts to defend Taiwan if Taiwan is attacked by China. These areas of support would probably be logistics, ballistic missile defense, and contributions to operations to maintain control of sea lanes and down through the Ryukyu Islands.\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{Vietnam}

Hanoi has sought to address Vietnam’s security needs by upgrading its military capabilities while seeking to stabilize its relationship with Beijing and also maintain good relations with the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and others.\textsuperscript{164} Vietnam is also pursuing a military modernization program that is intended to enhance its sea denial\textsuperscript{*} capabilities to counter the significant advantage Beijing holds over Hanoi concerning air, maritime strike, and force projection capabilities into the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{165} Vietnam’s military modernization program appears intended to deny the PLA the ability to operate freely at sea and challenge Vietnam’s maritime claims without costs.\textsuperscript{166}

- \textbf{Military modernization:} In recent years, Hanoi has more urgently pursued foreign military sales from Russia and assistance from Japan and India to upgrade Vietnam’s military capabilities. From Russia, Vietnam has purchased 36 Su–30MKK attack aircraft, 6 KILO-class attack submarines, and 2 S–300 PMU–1 surface-to-air missile systems.\textsuperscript{167} Additionally, Vietnam has entered talks to procure additional surface-to-air missiles from India, and Vietnam’s Coast Guard will receive patrol boats from Japan.\textsuperscript{168}

• **Reef improvements:** Vietnam has been improving its outposts in the South China Sea by dredging on Ladd Reef, extending a runway on Spratly Island to support larger aircraft, and deploying mobile rocket launchers capable of hitting Chinese bases to some outposts.\(^{169}\)

While Vietnam continues to improve the defensive capabilities of its Spratly Island outposts, Mira Rapp-Hooper—then senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security—testified to the Commission that “outright conflict between Vietnam and China seems unlikely, unless China attempts to seize Vietnam-held features. Hanoi and Beijing could find themselves in a destabilizing cycle of arming their Spratly outposts.”\(^{170}\)

**The Philippines**

Despite recently cooling relations between the United States and the Philippines and warming ties between Beijing and Manila, the Philippine-U.S. defense treaty remains intact.\(^{171}\) Furthermore, the Philippines continues to foster a good relationship with Japan and is the recipient of Japanese support to its coast guard concerning equipment and training.\(^{172}\) Nevertheless, without assistance from the United States, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is unprepared to counter China’s use of force to seize and hold Philippine-claimed features in the South China Sea. The longtime priority for the AFP has been counterinsurgency operations against terrorists and militants, which has led military modernization efforts to prioritize the ground forces at the expense of the navy and air force.\(^{173}\) Currently, the AFP operates about 15 surface combatants (3 frigates and 12 corvettes) and 8–12 fighter aircraft.\(^{174}\)

• **Military modernization:** Although AFP modernization under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte remains focused on equipment that supports ground force and counterinsurgency operations, a 15-year military modernization program, which began in 2013 under the previous administration, is starting to take shape.\(^{175}\) The air force modernization program seeks strike aircraft, multirole fighters, airborne early warning and control aircraft, and lift.\(^{176}\) Thus far the Philippines has acquired 2 C–130 aircraft from the United States and 12 FA–50 multirole aircraft from South Korea.\(^{177}\) Manila may seek an additional 12 FA–50 aircraft from Seoul.\(^{178}\) Naval modernization efforts were focused on the acquisition of landing craft, resupply ships, and surface warfare ships.\(^{179}\) The navy has taken possession of two strategic sealift vessels built by Indonesia.\(^{180}\) The Philippines likewise has procured five landing craft from Australia.\(^{181}\) The navy is also acquiring two frigates and an antisubmarine corvette from South Korea.\(^{182}\)

Although the Philippines, under President Duterte’s leadership, seeks closer relations with Beijing, the Philippines and China are unlikely to resolve tensions over the South China Sea permanently.\(^{183}\) The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which has been affirmed by several U.S. administrations, states:

> An armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes... An armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.  

Some Philippines-claimed features in the South China Sea could be interpreted to fall outside this definition, which introduces some ambiguity as to whether the United States would intervene in such a scenario.

- After seizing control of Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012, China has intermittently permitted Filipino fishermen to fish at the reef and has harassed some Filipino fishermen, this dispute remains a flashpoint between the two countries.

- In March 2017, China declared its intent to build an environmental monitoring station near Scarborough Reef. The Philippine government has declared that any Chinese building at Scarborough would be a "red line." Should China seek to alter the reef through land reclamation or the deployment of PLA equipment such as surface search radars, this would certainly increase tension between the two countries.

- Second Thomas Shoal—where Filipino Marines man a makeshift outpost on the Sierra Madre, a grounded Philippine Navy amphibious ship—is another potential flashpoint. China has often challenged the resupply of the grounded ship and threatened to destroy the outpost.

- In April 2017, President Duterte declared the AFP would "occupy" all Philippines-claimed features in the Spratly Islands. Although he later walked back the statement, it illustrates the high level of tension that still pervades the China-Philippines relationship with regard to the South China Sea.

### Scarborough Reef Seizure and Calls for Clarification about the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty

Since China’s seizure of Scarborough Reef, there have been calls from within the Philippines for clarification about whether the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty covers Philippine-controlled features such as Second Thomas Shoal. Some subject matter experts—such as Zack Cooper, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Dr. Rapp-Hooper—have raised questions about whether the United States should consider

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*In addition to the likelihood that land reclamation activity at Scarborough Reef would increase tensions between China and the Philippines, Andrew S. Erickson, a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, in his testimony to the Commission stated, “It’s important to ensure that Scarborough [Reef] is not dredged and developed into a key targeting node for China in the South China Sea, where it would, in effect, be the last big piece in the coverage puzzle.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons*, oral testimony of Andrew S. Erickson, February 23, 2017.

clarifying the treaty as well. CNA Corporation senior fellow Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.) argues that while Philippine capabilities should be bolstered, clarification of the treaty could be counterproductive, stating that “The United States needs to be completely committed to a very long term, dedicated effort to improve the Armed Forces of Philippine’s maritime capabilities. Washington should not, however, explicitly expand the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty to cover the contested Philippine claims in the Spratlys.” In February 2016, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, was asked by members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services whether the United States should make an explicit guarantee to respond to an attack on the Philippines military in disputed waters or territory under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Admiral Harris responded by saying, “I think we should consider it, and we should have a discussion of it in the policy arena. Our obligations under the treaty with the Philippines are pretty clear. And whether we extend that to Second Thomas Shoal, which we do not hold as Philippines’ sovereign territory, because we do not take a position on sovereignty, we should have that discussion, I believe.”

The United States

U.S. allies, friends, and partners face a China that seeks to shape the environment in the Asia Pacific to its advantage, particularly along its maritime periphery. China’s behavior around territorial disputes has created concern for Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other South China Sea states. Jacqueline N. Deal, president and chief executive officer of the Long Term Strategy Group, testified to the Commission:

*The U.S. alliance commitments that could be activated by maritime hotspot conflicts in East or Southeast Asia are strongest in the East China Sea. The United States has repeatedly clarified that the Senkaku Islands are covered by its mutual security treaty with Japan. With regard to the Taiwan Strait, the United States remains obligated by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to contribute to the maintenance of Taiwan’s capacity for self-defense. In the South China Sea, the Philippines case is most ambiguous insofar as we have not clarified whether our treaty commitment to the defense of that country applies to disputed offshore islands, though it has been suggested that the Sierra Madre is covered by virtue of its being a commissioned ship. Domestic political developments in the Philippines have also created uncertainty about the future trajectory of its relations with the United States.*
U.S. alliance commitments have helped maintain an environment that encourages diplomatic exchanges between states while preventing another large state from destabilizing the region. A conflict in the East China Sea, South China Sea, or Taiwan Strait would threaten principles such as ensuring seas remain free for navigation, international disputes are settled by legal means, and free trade flourishes.

**U.S. Involvement in a Crisis**

If Beijing continues its incremental approach to increasing control over the East and South China seas, the United States could receive requests for additional assistance by allies, friends, and partners to improve their capabilities to defend themselves, along with calls for the United States to remain engaged in the region to maintain security and stability. If the Chinese decide to use force to resolve a crisis, the United States must be prepared to counter Chinese counterintervention capabilities. Furthermore, the PLA has studied carefully how the U.S. responds to crisis. Dr. Deal testified:

*For the better part of the last century, U.S. power projection has proceeded via a build-up of forces near the target on regional bases and aircraft carriers, followed by strikes on the target from predominantly short-range aircraft. In the face of North Korean and Chinese provocations in the mid-1990s, the United States repeatedly sent carriers to the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait to signal our displeasure and seriousness. Chinese defense scholars have also studied our adherence to the above pattern in the 1991 Gulf War and more recent conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia. Perhaps a sense of confidence about both their grasp of this approach and their counters to it led them to describe it for the first time in the 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy: After the Cold War ended, the United States changed 'forward defense' into 'forward presence' and reduced its overseas garrisons, but it still maintained a certain number of forward garrisons. At the same time, it treated its strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces deployed in the homeland as a backup, using the [former] … to prevent nuclear attacks and large-scale conventional attacks against the United States and its allies, and treating the conventional active-duty and reserve units stationed in the homeland as central reserves, with an emphasis on strengthening the[ir] quick reaction capabilities … to deal with regional crises and conflicts; these would rely on strategic means of air and sea transportation for quick deployment as needed, reinforcing units stationed along the front lines at any time to strengthen their capacity for sustained operations.*

Chinese military thinkers’ study of U.S. operations has influenced China’s military modernization program, which is designed to oppose U.S. forces—including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets—with ballistic and cruise missiles to strike targets entering the region and the bases on which the United States would depend.
China also is pursuing coercion to erode long-term U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific. These coercive options are intended to erode the United States’ strategic position, freedom of action, and operational space in the region. The 2001 edition of *The Science of Military Strategy* states “War is not just a competition of military forces, but an overall contest of political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and other forces. The competitions in the nonmilitary fields such as politics, economy, diplomatic and culture coordinate directly or indirectly with military operations ... [and] military operations cannot [achieve] ... victory without ... support of the ... nonmilitary field.” David Berteau and Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies note that “counterintervention [capabilities] ... also include diplomatic, information, and economic sources of leverage against the U.S. political system and particularly weaker ... states ... to complicate U.S. intervention in Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other regional crises that could involve China.” Mr. Berteau and Dr. Green likewise assert China’s “aim ... [is] weakening U.S. alignment with other states in the region and involv[ing] instruments that range from trade agreements and diplomacy to bribery and individual coercion.” A 2016 Center for Strategic and International Studies report on the U.S. “Rebalance to Asia” strategy notes one of the methods China uses to counter U.S. military basing arrangements in the region is maintaining a PLA strike capability to make U.S. “allies targets instead of sanctuaries, complicating the calculation for host governments....”

However, the United States may be able to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces to Chinese coercion efforts and PLA counterintervention forces by restoring deterrence. Dr. Deal suggests “new concepts for the U.S. military range from options centered on destroying key targets on the Mainland to options revolving around a distant blockade.” PLA writings on island warfare published by both the Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University stress that island campaigns require lengthy planning, which creates an opportunity for an adversary to gain an understanding of how the PLA may conduct contingency operations and ultimately disrupt a contingency operation. Modern amphibious operations are complex and require extensive preparation to execute. This means the PLA must conduct significant pre-conflict planning and preparation to ensure logistical and sustainment requirements are met in order to sustain operations at a distance from the Mainland. Dr. Deal argues that under these conditions and with sufficient warning, the United States “could disrupt a planned operation through ... unexpected visits to or rotations through non-typical access points (e.g., civilian airfields and ports), snap exercises in the region, and/or unexpected displays of new capabilities. Such capacity revelation, in turn, could be accomplished through a leak, a test, or the use of a new system in an observable exercise.”

**Options for De-escalation**

Although DOD planners may be seeking to build de-escalation into response options to a crisis, there is little evidence China can be dissuaded once deterrence has failed and Beijing has made a decision to use force to resolve a crisis along its periphery.
viously discussed, concepts such as “war control” suggest that once a conflict occurs, China will seek to encourage or pressure the United States to yield early in a fight. Any efforts to pursue “off-ramps” may be misinterpreted as weakness and reinforce Beijing’s decision to proceed with executing a contingency plan. Washington may incorporate means to de-escalate in phase zero (pre-conflict) shaping operations to ensure the United States maintains the ability to immediately deter Chinese aggression at the outset of a conflict. This requires the United States to maintain the ability to gain warning of an impending PLA attack and respond to the warning in ways Beijing does not anticipate.
Addendum I: Eastern Theater Command Force Structure

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<tr>
<td>10th Army Aviation Rgt</td>
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Note: This order of battle reflects the PLA Army structure before April 18, 2017, when China announced the armed forces would reorganize into 84 corps-level units resulting in the reduction group armies from 18 to 13.

**Addendum II: Southern Theater Command Force Structure**

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<th>Air Forces</th>
<th>Rocket Forces</th>
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<td>9th Fighter Div, Guangdong</td>
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<td>18th Fighter Div, Hunan</td>
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<td>Fast Boat Flotilla</td>
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<td>132nd Infantry Bde, Hainan</td>
<td>27th Air Reg</td>
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<td>Artillery Div, Guangdong</td>
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<td>12th Amphibious Mechanized Inf Div, Guangdong</td>
<td>163rd Infantry Div, Guangdong</td>
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<td>Special Operations Bde, Guangdong</td>
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<td>Long Range Artillery Bde, Guangdong</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Armored Bde, Guangdong</td>
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**Note:** This order of battle reflects the PLA Army structure before April 18, 2017, when China announced the armed forces would reorganize into 84 corps-level units resulting in the reduction of group armies from 18 to 13.

ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 3


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