

## **Experiences and Responses of “Five Eyes” Countries to China’s Influence and Interference**

Andrew Chubb

Senior Lecturer in Chinese Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University  
Fellow, Center for China Analysis, Asia Society Policy Institute

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing on a topic of importance not only to foreign policymaking but also the health of liberal democracy. My research and advocacy in this area has primarily focused on Australia and the United Kingdom, and my testimony draws primarily on those examples.<sup>1</sup>

Rather than a singular national security challenge, the PRC’s attempts to influence and interfere in politics inside other countries are better understood as the sources of a diverse set of risks to liberal democracy. Issues such as electoral interference or elite cooptation present significant risks to national security, but the most demonstrable overseas impact of Beijing’s interference has been on civil liberties and human rights, particularly inside diaspora communities. None of the Five Eyes countries has adequately tackled these effects.

Addressing the PRC’s influence and interference attempts is an opportunity to fundamentally strengthen democratic institutions. However, it is crucial that policy responses recognize and maintain distinctions between issues of national security and civil liberties, both in order to ensure effectiveness and to avoid further unintended harm to liberal democracy. Although widely cited as an example to follow, Australia’s response also illustrates the drawbacks of an aggregated national security approach to diverse issues of influence and interference.

To counter the most impactful PRC overseas political activities in a rights-oriented manner consistent with liberal democratic principles, this submission recommends the establishment of a Transnational Rights Protection Office affiliated with each country’s national human rights institution.<sup>2</sup>

### **1. PRC political activities inside Anglophone democracies**

Several core elements of Beijing’s efforts to influence and interfere with democratic politics are evident in each of the “Five Eyes,” and many other countries beyond. These include:

- Cultivating favorable relationships with politicians and other elites through political donations, lobbying and other forms of outreach;
- Monitoring and coercing perceived political threats, including dissidents and repressed ethnic groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs, often via threats to families inside the PRC;
- Shaping the Chinese-language information environment abroad, including through pressure on local organizations and via censorship of PRC-based online platforms;
- Mobilizing supporters and/or proxies to vocalize support for Beijing’s political positions, counter protests against PRC policies, and ;
- Promoting business ties with Chinese diaspora populations and sub-national governments;

- Distribution of foreign-language propaganda through traditional channels such as the *China Daily* newspaper, and through social media;
- Cultural soft power initiatives, such as Confucius Institutes.

Based on limited publicly available information, one possible variation across the “Five Eyes” countries may be the PRC’s more direct attempts to influence election outcomes in North America. In 2018 PRC external propaganda organs purchased advertorials criticizing the Trump administration’s tariffs in rural Republican-voting regions. In 2022, leaked intelligence reports from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reportedly accused PRC diplomatic missions of covertly channeling funds to multiple election candidates in favor of the incumbent Liberal party.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, PRC interference in Australia and the UK has not obviously sought to favor any one side of politics.<sup>4</sup>

### *1a. Impact of PRC influence and interference*

The core set of PRC overseas political activities described above raises three distinct sets of risks to liberal democracies. As detailed in Table 1, some are matters of national security, concerning the basic integrity of the political system and its decision-making processes. But more constitute encroachments on the civil liberties or human rights of individuals and groups within democratic societies. Meanwhile a third set of risks concern academic freedom inside higher educational institutions.<sup>5</sup> Disaggregating the various issues is a necessary first step towards comprehensive policy responses to protect and strengthen liberal democracy against these risks.<sup>6</sup>

Based on the cases of Australia and the UK, the impact of the PRC’s influence and interference activities appears to have been greatest on civil liberties and human rights inside democracies. Electoral interference and elite cooptation present genuine national security risks, but publicly available evidence of substantive PRC impact on the foreign and security policies of Five Eyes countries has so far been limited.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, Beijing’s interference against dissidents and persecuted ethnic groups has severely impacted on freedoms of speech, political association and social trust in émigré communities, and Beijing’s political red lines powerfully shape the content of the Chinese-language news environment abroad.

The PRC today, like many other authoritarian states, has the capacity to surveil, harass and threaten UK residents who advance critical viewpoints or are otherwise seen as threatening to the party-state. Chinese democracy and human rights campaigners have faced surveillance and infiltration for more than three decades, undermining the movement’s cohesion and effectiveness.<sup>8</sup> In recent years, exiled Uyghurs have described widespread ongoing intimidation from PRC officials, often via digital platforms, including the threat that relatives in Xinjiang could wind up in the region’s mass internment camps. Most concerning, many members of targeted communities fear that seeking help from local authorities would place family members – or themselves – at even greater risk.<sup>9</sup>

While national security agencies in each of the “Five Eyes” now devote significant attention to national security threats arising from CCP overseas political activities, their rights protection institutions have been largely absent in the development of policy responses.

Risk types	National security		Liberal-democratic rights						Academic freedom				
	Electoral interference	Elite co-optation	Extraterritorial suppression of dissent	Control of diaspora media	Co-optation of community organisations	Direct action	Paid propaganda	Economic pressure on commercial enterprises	Financial dependency	Punitive disclosure	Institutional entanglement	Pressure for self-censorship	
Causes	Technological change PRC capabilities PRC statements and behaviour Lib-democratic parties' use of censored social media platforms	Influence of money in politics PRC economic rise Deficiencies in regulatory frameworks State of China literacy among elites	CCP repressiveness PRC economic rise Communications technology facilitating remote coercion Lack of appropriate institutions to protect political rights of diaspora communities	PRC propaganda policy Technology-facilitated censorship Changing audience demography Lack of funding for independent diaspora media	CCP United Front strategy and Overseas Chinese work PRC's economic rise Chinese community demography Host-country governments' lack of engagement with diaspora	State-sponsored CCP policy Nationalist beliefs Participants' susceptibility to inducement / coercion	Spontaneous Nationalist beliefs Alienation of participants from host country	CCP external propaganda drive Decline of media revenue Inadequate labelling	CCP economic statecraft PRC's economic rise State of China literacy among executives	Marketisation of higher education Rise of PRC education market State of China literacy among university management	CCP information-gathering practices Absence of prohibition in university codes	CCP censorship Funding cuts for language teaching Opaque contractual arrangements	CCP repression Protection of sources and other individuals Lack of institutional support

Disaggregation of risks associated with PRC political activities. Source: Andrew Chubb, *PRC Overseas Political Activities: Risk, Reaction and the Case of Australia* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).

Table 1: Disaggregation of risks associated with PRC political activities.

## 2. The US experience in comparative perspective

The broad outlines of the US's experience grappling with issues of PRC influence and interference parallel those of the other four countries. Each of the overseas activities discussed above has been extensively documented in the United States, as elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> The goals and methods of the PRC's pursuit of political influence in the US were evident by the late 1990s, but attracted little attention outside overseas Chinese communities, intelligence agencies and sections of the media until 2017-2018. And like in the other four Anglophone democracies, these activities have generated distinct sets of risks to national security, human rights and academic freedom in the US.

A second commonality between the experience of the US and other "Five Eyes" countries is that grappling with these issues has raised a further set of challenges from within. In each country, public debates over these issues have featured alarmist statements not only from media commentators and pundits, but also politicians and public servants.<sup>11</sup> Studies in the US and Australia suggest alarmist public rhetoric has fed into generalized suspicions directed towards members of the Chinese diaspora, and the fanning of vestigial anti-Chinese racist sentiments.<sup>12</sup> Overbroad and prejudiced discourses such as these are detrimental to social cohesion, public policymaking and national security.

## 3. Political and policy responses

Australia enacted the most rapid legislative response to foreign interference among the "Five Eyes," passing three key pieces of legislation – described by then-Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull as a response to "disturbing reports of Chinese influence" – before the end of 2018:

- *Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act*, passed in December 2018: banning foreign donations to political parties ("EDFR Law");
- *Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act*, passed in June 2018: establishing a new public registry for policy advocacy on behalf of foreign principals ("FITS Law");
- *National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act*, also passed in June 2018: expanding the scope of espionage and secrecy offences, and introducing new criminal penalties for covert, deceptive or coercive interventions into political processes ("EFI Law").

The package strengthened prohibitions on covert lobbying on behalf of foreign principals, outlawed various techniques deployed by the CCP to suppress dissent, and created transparency requirements for former senior officials taking on consultancy work for foreign principals.<sup>13</sup> However, as detailed in section 5 below, Australia's legislative response has raised concerns of both overreach and ineffectiveness.

The UK has been slower in its legislative response to interference issues. The *National Security Bill* (hereafter "*NSB*"), introduced in 2021, mirrors the Australian EFI and FITS Laws in several respects. In common with the Australian legislation, the *NSB* introduces a crime of foreign interference and will establish a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), along with new espionage offences, and broadened sabotage and government secrecy offences.<sup>14</sup> Similar to Australia's case, critics including the UK's National Union of Journalists have strongly criticized the lack of a public interest defence to the new crimes, arguing it threatens the ability of the media to hold power to account.<sup>15</sup>

Australia's FITS Law was enacted with sweeping definitions of "on behalf of" and "foreign principal" that hampered the transparency scheme's effectiveness.<sup>16</sup> The UK's FIRS scheme appears to have the opposite problem of an overly narrow scope of registrable activity. Earlier versions of the bill, like Australia's FITS, would have rendered registrable an extremely wide range of foreign interactions with the UK government. The latest version, presented in February 2023, has a much narrower scope of "foreign powers" that appears to exclude even major state-owned enterprises that are rightfully understood as arms of the PRC party-state. The NSB is expected to pass the parliament in 2023.

In response to the leaked CSIS reports alleging of PRC interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections, the Canadian government announced a review of the effects of foreign interference on those elections, along with an intention to introduce a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry to "ensure communities who are often targeted by attempts at foreign interference are protected." A National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator situated within Public Safety Canada, will coordinate counter-interference actions, replicating a role created in Australia in 2018.<sup>17</sup>

#### **4. Law enforcement and intelligence responses**

United States law enforcement has been the most active among the Five Eyes in pursuing perpetrators of PRC interference. The FBI website features a top-level tab on "Civil Rights," and a page on "International Human Rights Violations" that invites information on foreign interference, particularly transnational repression, from émigré communities. The agency has also launched at least 10 criminal cases against alleged perpetrators of transnational repression since 2020, applying pre-existing offenses such as harassment and stalking.<sup>18</sup> Since its enactment in 2018 Australia's EFI Law has not resulted in any convictions, and only one prosecution – a "preparatory" foreign interference case concerning a donation of \$37,000 to a hospital during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>19</sup>

The FBI's counterparts in Australia and Canada have also set up websites on foreign interference, but do not convey a comparable level of intent to attract engagement from diverse targeted communities.<sup>20</sup> The UK's MI5 and the New Zealand's SIS appear to still lack readily accessible public-facing information resources for such communities. However, in recent years all of the "Five Eyes" intelligence agencies have shown an increasingly forward-leaning tendency in public statements on foreign interference. China has featured regularly in annual threat assessments, and agencies in the UK have stepped forward with public-facing "foreign interference alerts" in lieu of a corresponding criminal offense of foreign interference.<sup>21</sup>

#### **5. Australia's experience**

Australia's experience in counter-interference policy highlights several drawbacks of an aggregated counter-interference approach rolling together national security, civil rights and academic freedom issues.

First, the most impactful techniques of PRC interference have clearly been a secondary concern in counter-interference legislation. A key proponent of Australia's approach, Andrew Hastie has stated that "protect[ing] diaspora groups from coercion was "precisely why the

Coalition government passed foreign interference laws in 2018.”<sup>22</sup> But the EFI Law passed in 2018 appears to have narrowed the scope of protections against such interference. An offence of interference against “any political right or duty” already existed in Australia in the *Crimes Act 1914*. The 2018 EFI Law replaced this with an offence for coercion (force, violence, intimidation, threats) that interferes with exercise of “Australian democratic or political right or duty,” with the Explanatory Memorandum repeatedly stating that the word “Australian” had been added to “limit the operation of this paragraph only to rights that arise because of a person’s status as Australian.”<sup>23</sup> This would appear to exclude many of the groups most vulnerable to PRC transnational coercion, such as Uyghur refugees in Australia. No one has so far been charged over transnational coercion activities under the EFI Law.

More worryingly, Australia’s experience shows how applying a national security lens to issues of transnational coercion can have the effect of recasting the targets of CCP interference as potential threat vectors. This is evident in the Foreign Interference sections of several of ASIO’s annual reports to the Australian Parliament which have alluded to national security threats from diaspora members who may have been coerced into acting as agents of foreign intelligence.<sup>24</sup> This national security angle on the issue of transnational coercion may be real enough, but it is a narrow and potentially inflammatory frame for the issue of transnational right violations as a whole.

A further drawback of the national security approach to countering PRC interference has been unnecessary collateral damage to Australia’s democratic institutions. Australian experts criticized the rapid drafting and enactment of the laws, with the Law Council noting that sweeping language in the *EFI* and *FITS* laws undermined the rule of law.<sup>25</sup> Legal experts expressed particular concern about the EFI Law’s radical expansion of the scope of “national security” to include Australia’s “political, military or economic relations with another country,” bringing a large but undefined array of new matters within the scope of national security.<sup>26</sup> Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International argued it risked criminalising the revelation of human rights violations or illegal conduct by Australian government agencies.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, the securitized, at times alarmist, public discussion on PRC influence in Australia generated an urgency to rapidly enact legislation, and incentivized the politicization of national security by political parties.<sup>28</sup> Besides the issues with the drafting of the EFI and FITS Laws campaign finance experts identified serious shortcomings in the rapidly enacted *EDFR Law*.<sup>29</sup> The law did not prohibit donations from Australian-based subsidiaries of foreign companies, nor cap donations at a level that would prevent undue influence from being generated.<sup>30</sup> Critics have noted that the Law did not even preclude continued donations by either of the two CCP united front tycoons at the center of the media exposés and security agencies’ concerns.<sup>31</sup> Nor did it address the lack of disclosure obligations for donations of up to AU\$14,000, the long lag time for reporting of donations above that amount, and a number of other related issues.<sup>32</sup>

## **6. Policy recommendations**

National security aspects of PRC interference have rightly received significant attention in the United States as elsewhere, but the rights protection aspects of CCP interference have been addressed only tangentially. The FBI has led the way in prosecutions for interference against civil rights of US residents, but the agency’s handful of transnational repression cases do not constitute an adequate or systematic response to the issues. Congress has the

opportunity to lead the US government, allied governments including the “Five Eyes”, and democracies elsewhere, in pioneering focused action to address the rights protection aspects of PRC interference.

The central recommendation of this submission is that each country should establish a Transnational Rights Protection Office tasked with monitoring and analysing transnational rights protection issues, and empowering targeted individuals and communities. The office should be aligned with, or appended to, a national rights protection agency, such as the US Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR). The new office should serve at least five key functions within an overall mandate to investigate and directly mitigate the human rights impact of foreign interference inside the US:

- Providing accessible information, advice and support to individuals facing threats of transnational human rights infringements;
- Collecting data, research and reporting on the prevalence and forms of transnational infringements against US residents’ human rights;
- Supporting individuals, communities and vulnerable family members to access legal assistance, humanitarian visas and potential avenues of redress;
- Advising and supplying information to other US government agencies to ensure extradition, deportation and freezing of assets are not used to violate human rights;
- Investigating future legal avenues of remedy against perpetrators of transnational rights violations against US residents.

The proposed office represents a necessary updating of liberal-democratic institutions for a 21<sup>st</sup> century world marked by intensified global communications and increasing authoritarianism – not simply countering the PRC but rolling back the influence of all authoritarian actors inside democracies by better supporting the targets to exercise their fundamental political rights. It offers a concrete example of how boosting the prospects for democracy internationally amidst the current great power rivalry can and should start with strengthening democracy at home.

The Transnational Rights Protection Office proposal is a central element in a set of mutually reinforcing policy measures that flow from a disaggregated analysis of the national security, civil liberties and academic freedom risks presented by PRC overseas political activities.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The assessments and recommendations outlined in this submission draw from Andrew Chubb, *PRC Overseas Political Activities*, London: Routledge, 2021. For a short US-oriented summary see Andrew Chubb, “China’s Overseas Influence Operations: Disaggregating the Risks,” US-China Perception Monitor, September 14, 2021, <https://uscnpm.org/2021/09/14/prc-overseas-influence-disaggregating-the-risks/>; and for a UK-focused policy report addressing both human rights and academic freedom issues see Andrew Chubb, “Rights Protection: How the UK Should Respond to the PRC’s Overseas Influence,” Lau China Institute, King’s College London, 2022, <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/lci/assets/policypaper0222-rights-protection-how-the-uk-should-respond-to-the-prcs-overseas-influence-final.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Within this testimony:

- Overseas political activities, shorthand for actions seeking to influence or interfere, refers to any state-directed or orchestrated actions designed to exert an influence on the political situation within another country.
- Influence refers to actual effects produced by such activities. Note that influence can be manifest in *inaction* – but it crucially must involve the PRC actions generating some effect. Note also that influence might itself be positive, such as the increased diversity of student populations.
- Interference, following the distinction proposed by the Australian government in 2017 interference refers here to any covert, coercive or corrupt and thus unacceptable activities in pursuit of influence.

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<sup>3</sup> The claims remain unconfirmed as of the time of writing. <https://globalnews.ca/news/9253386/canadian-intelligence-warned-pm-trudeau-that-china-covertly-funded-2019-election-candidates-sources/>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/07/canada-china-election-meddling-leaked-intelligence-reports>

<sup>4</sup> During Australia's 2022 election campaign, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) actively refuted the incumbent Liberal government's claims that China was interfering in favor of the Labor opposition, stating that "doesn't go after one particular party or the other." In the UK, security agencies issued a "foreign interference alert" in January 2022 over lawyer Christine Lee's donations and cultivation of ties to all three major political parties.

<sup>5</sup> Academic freedom issues are largely set aside within in this submission due to space constraints. One initiative addressing this aspect of the PRC and other authoritarian actors' impact on academic freedom is the "Model Code of Conduct for the Protection of Academic Freedom in the Context of the Internationalisation of UK Higher Education," launched in June 2022. See <https://hrc.sas.ac.uk/networks/academic-freedom-and-internationalisation-working-group/model-code-conduct> Full disclosure: the author is a member of the Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group that developed the code.

<sup>6</sup> Author, *PRC Overseas Political Activities*, Chapter II.

<sup>7</sup> Australia and the UK's alliances with Washington have remained a matter of bipartisan consensus, even through the turbulence of the Trump administration. Australian senator Sam Dastyari, who had taken political donations from pro-PRC united front business figures, hastily retracted a remark that the South China Sea was "China's internal affair" as soon it was reported in English, demonstrating the strength of elite consensus against China's position.

<sup>8</sup> Jie Chen, *The Overseas Chinese Democracy Movement* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019).

<sup>9</sup> Index on Censorship, 'China's long arm: How Uyghurs are being silenced in Europe', 10 February 2022; Sophia Yan, 'Exclusive: China continues to harass exiles on British soil, claim victims', *Telegraph*, 16 August 2020.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Chen, *The Overseas Chinese Democracy Movement*, pp. 58-60; Nicholas Eftimiades, 'Foreign Operations', in *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Createspace Independent Publishing, 1994), Chapter 5, esp. pp. 38-42; James Jiann Hua To, *Qiaowu: Extraterritorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese* (Leiden: Brill, 2014). For a more extensive list of sources and evidence, see Chubb, *PRC Overseas Political Activities*, Chapter II.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. FBI Director Christopher Wray's public statements about a "whole of society threat" from the PRC and Senator Marsha Blackburn's claim that "China has a 5,000 year history of cheating and stealing."

<sup>12</sup> Tobita Chow, "How China Threat Narratives Feed Anti-Asian Racism," Justice is Global, 2021, [https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/JIG\\_AntiAsianRacismReport\\_2021\\_0608.pdf](https://peoplesaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/JIG_AntiAsianRacismReport_2021_0608.pdf); Natasha Kassam and Jennifer Hsu, "Being Chinese in Australia: Public Opinion in Chinese Communities," Lowy Institute, March 2021, <https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities/>

<sup>13</sup> Techniques intended to be criminalized under the law include state-directed suppressive counter-protests, threats of harm to family members based overseas, to businesses, and threats of visa denial. 'EFI Law (Aus)', 92.2 and Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 163-166; Australian Government, *Report on the Operation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, 2018-2019* (Canberra: Attorney-General's Department, 2019), pp. 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-bill-factsheets/foreign-interference-national-security-bill-factsheet>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.nuj.org.uk/resource/government-announces-new-national-security-bill-amendments.html>; <https://www.nuj.org.uk/resource/coalition-of-journalism-organisations-slam-the-national-security-bill.html>

<sup>16</sup> After its launch in December 2018, the scheme prompted registrations from several former officials working for foreign interests, but none from PRC united front affiliated groups or Confucius Institutes. Anthony Galloway, 'Foreign Interference Scheme Targets Just One Potential Agent of Influence', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 November 2019. Experts criticised the legislation as overly complex, noting that lawyers were offering clients conflicting advice on whether they needed to register, and the Attorney-General's Department (AGD) struggled to provide clear guidance to the public. Fact sheets explaining the scheme to the public were released in draft form and later required correction, and former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd complained publicly of receiving indeterminate advice from the AGD on the question of which of his own activities he needed to register. See <https://twitter.com/MrKRudd/status/1341870469880795137>; in 2019, the Attorney-General criticised his own department when it asked another former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, to register under the scheme after he spoke at a think tank event co-organised with a US conservative group. Max Koslowski, 'Foreign Influence Laws Won't Change After Tony Abbott Targeted, Porter Says', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 November 2019.

<sup>17</sup> <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/03/06/taking-further-action-foreign-interference-and-strengthening>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/transnational-repression>



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- <sup>19</sup> The case's next hearing is due on March 31, 2023. <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/federal-police-to-blight-foreign-interference-in-multicultural-communities-20230224-p5cnd8.html>
- <sup>20</sup> Australia's Countering Foreign Interference website features a page on "Countering foreign interference in communities," but the page offers no advice or contacts for individuals who have been subject to foreign interference against their civil rights beyond an appeal for tipoffs to the National Security Hotline. For vulnerable diaspora community members who suspect they may be under Beijing's surveillance, contacting the National Security Hotline can appear likely to bring even greater risks to themselves and their families inside the PRC.
- <sup>21</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60032711>
- <sup>22</sup> <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/this-student-attended-a-protest-at-an-australian-uni-days-later-chinese-officials-visited-his-family-20190807-p52eqb.html>
- <sup>23</sup> *Explanatory Memorandum*, pp. 92, 163, 169, at <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22legislation/billhome/r6022%22>
- <sup>24</sup> E.g. ASIO Report to Parliament 2007–08, p. 6.
- <sup>25</sup> The Law Council of Australia pointed out that such broad definitions undermine the rule of law, which depends on clarity of rules, especially in relation to serious crimes. *Hansard (Australian Parliament)*, 'National Security Legislation Amendment' pp. 10-11.
- <sup>26</sup> EFI Law, 90.4(1)e; Human Rights Law Centre, 'Response to Amendments Proposed by the Attorney-General's Department', 14 March 2018, p. 7, at <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/580025f66b8f5b2dabbe4291/t/5aa86b72e2c4839970023836/15209869990/78/Human+Rights+Law+Centre++Supplementary+Submission+to+the+Inquiry+into+the+National+Security+Legislation+Amendment+%28EFI%29+Bill+2017+-+14+March+2018.pdf>
- <sup>27</sup> Elaine Pearson, 'Australia's Government Must Guard Against Foreign Interference, But Not By Curbing Our Rights', ABC, 14 June 2018, <https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-14/australia-government-foreign-interference-espionage-human-rights/9857660>; Paul Karp, 'Espionage Bill Could Make Some Protests Criminal Acts, Getup Says', *Guardian*, 26 June 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jun/26/espionage-bill-could-make-some-protests-criminal-acts-getup-says>
- <sup>28</sup> The 2022 election campaign saw the most egregious examples of politicization of national security, with the then-Prime Minister and Defence Minister claiming without evidence that the PRC was intervening in favor of the Labor opposition (see Note 4). But the Labor Party, too, appeared determined to make domestic political headway against the Morrison government in 2019 over MP Gladys Liu's involvement with pro-PRC community qqgroups. Politicization of foreign interference issues was evident as early as the December 2017 by-election in Bennelong. See author, *PRC Overseas Political Activities*, pp.5-7.
- <sup>29</sup> Yee-fui Ng, 'The Foreign Donations Bill Will Soon Be Law - What Will it Do, and Why is it Needed?' *TheConversation*, 27 November 2018, <https://theconversation.com/the-foreign-donations-bill-will-soon-be-law-what-will-it-do-and-why-is-it-needed-107095>
- <sup>30</sup> Paul Karp 'Coalition Bill to Ban Foreign Political Donations Passes Senate', *Guardian*, 15 November 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/nov/15/coalition-bill-to-ban-foreign-political-donations-passes-senate>
- <sup>31</sup> Ng, 'The Foreign Donations Bill'.
- <sup>32</sup> Centre for Public Integrity, 'Hidden Money in Politics: What the AEC Disclosures Don't Tell Us', briefing paper, February 2020, [publicintegrity.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Briefing-paper-Hidden-money-in-politics-2019.pdf](http://publicintegrity.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Briefing-paper-Hidden-money-in-politics-2019.pdf); Danielle Wood and Kate Griffiths, 'Who's in the Room? Access and Influence in Australian Politics', Grattan Institute Report No. 12, 2018, p. 45.
- <sup>33</sup> For an illustrative set of policy recommendations, see author, *PRC Overseas Political Activities*, Chapter IV.