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China’s Healthcare System: Addressing Capacity Shortfalls before and after COVID-19

Leyton Nelson, Policy Analyst, Economics and Trade

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Key Findings

- The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has brought unprecedented attention to challenges in China’s medical system. While healthcare in China has made considerable strides in the past decade, it remains ill-equipped to deal with the country’s aging population and rising incidence of chronic disease.

- China’s healthcare system is overly reliant on urban hospitals to provide even basic healthcare services. Hospitals account for just 3.5 percent of medical institutions in China, but they handle 45 percent of all outpatient visits.

- Per capita healthcare spending in China is increasing, but it remains low compared with other major economies largely due to underfunding by the Chinese government. Budget shortfalls in China’s healthcare institutions are a major cause of widespread corruption in China’s medical system.

- Chinese policymakers have prioritized the improvement of healthcare outcomes, most notably in the Healthy China 2030 Plan released in 2016. In line with the goals articulated in this plan, the Chinese government has sought to increase the capacity of its healthcare system through a variety of measures, including merging primary care facilities with hospitals and increasing the number of general practitioners in the country.

- As part of its broader efforts to gain soft power, the Chinese government has promoted traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) both domestically and abroad, despite a lack of evidence showing the efficacy of many TCM treatments. In the past several years, international organizations have begun incorporating TCM into medical standards amid China’s push for greater recognition of TCM.

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views the delivery of high-quality healthcare as an important aspect of its own political legitimacy. While China’s government has made significant improvements to healthcare in the past decade, the healthcare system has not kept pace with many of the changing needs of China’s population. As life expectancy has increased in China, so too has the burden of chronic diseases and the need for long-term and hospice care—problems the healthcare system remains underequipped to address. These problems are compounded by persistent budget shortfalls in many of China’s healthcare institutions that contribute to a widespread corruption problem. Aware of the potential for these challenges to undermine political stability in China, Chinese policymakers have prioritized reform of the healthcare system.

This report reviews challenges in China’s domestic healthcare system and examines the efforts of China’s policymakers to address these challenges. It also examines Chinese policymakers’ attempts to promote TCM both domestically and internationally. The report draws on the Commission’s May 2020 hearing on “China’s Evolving Healthcare Ecosystem: Challenges and Opportunities” and open source research. It expands on topics explored in Chapter 2, Section 3 of the Commission’s 2020 Annual Report, “U.S.-China Links in Healthcare and Biotechnology.”

Chronic Disease and Demographic Trends Strain China’s Healthcare System

Over the past decade, China has made significant progress in reducing the burden of diseases and risks related to maternal, neonatal, and communicable conditions. For example, China’s infant mortality rate fell from 13.1 per
thousand children born in 2010 to 5.6 per thousand in 2019.\(^1\) Over the same period, the maternal mortality rate fell from 30 deaths per 100 thousand to 17.8 deaths per 100 thousand.\(^2\) Similarly, incidence of common communicable diseases such as viral hepatitis, measles, and malaria have all decreased significantly.\(^3\) As people live longer, however, the burden of chronic disease has risen, becoming a significant focus of Chinese healthcare policy. As of 2018, 270 million people in China were estimated to suffer from hypertension, and 116.4 million lived with diabetes as of 2020.\(^4\) \(^5\) A variety of lifestyle and environmental factors, such as smoking and pollution, have also contributed to the rising incidence and lethality of chronic disease. As of 2017, high blood pressure, smoking, high-sodium diets, and particulate matter pollution were the four greatest health risk factors and leading causes of premature death in China.\(^5\)\(^5\)

China’s healthcare system is underequipped to handle the growing burden of chronic disease. It is over-reliant on urban hospitals to provide basic care, and the primary care system, which should play a significant role in chronic disease management, is underutilized. Beijing’s healthcare policies have long tried to foster preventative and primary care as the most cost-effective way to provide healthcare services to China’s large population.\(^6\) However, primary care physicians, particularly those in rural areas, typically receive less training and are consequently less trusted by patients, who prefer to visit urban hospitals even for relatively minor conditions such as fevers and headaches. Moreover, the expansion of healthcare coverage has enabled more patients to self-refer to facilities with a higher quality of care, leading to overcrowding at urban hospitals.\(^7\)

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then serve six years at a rural health organization before being permitted to practice at an urban hospital. There are also several ways for rural medical students to first become assistant general practitioners, with the possibility of becoming fully licensed general practitioners with additional job transfer training.

Despite government efforts, China continues to experience an acute shortage of qualified doctors. The number of doctors has increased in recent years but still lags behind the growing volume of patient visits. Between 2009 and 2019, the number of practicing doctors increased 68.6 percent from 1.9 million to 3.2 million, but the number of inpatient hospital visits grew 100.6 percent from 132.6 million to 266 million over the same period.

China’s hospitals represent a small fraction of healthcare providers (3.5 percent as of 2019) but handle 45 percent of all outpatient visits (see Table 1). Even among hospitals, Tier 3 hospitals (which generally have the highest quality of care) are disproportionately congested, handling 24 percent of China’s 8.74 billion outpatient visits in 2019 despite accounting for just 0.3 percent of all healthcare institutions.

Table 1: Chinese Outpatient Visits in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Number of Institutions</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Providers</th>
<th>Number of Outpatient Visits (Billions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Outpatient Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 3 Hospitals</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2 Hospitals</td>
<td>9,687</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1 Hospitals</td>
<td>11,264</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hospitals</td>
<td>10,654</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care Centers</td>
<td>954,390</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialty Healthcare Centers</td>
<td>15,924</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Healthcare Centers</td>
<td>2,877</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,007,545</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As China’s Population Ages, Demand for Long-Term and Hospice Care Grows

The UN forecasts nearly 450 million people in China will be aged 60 or older by 2045. As China’s 1.4-billion-person population ages, the healthcare system is severely underprepared to provide long-term care to hundreds of millions of elderly people. This is partly because of the increasing life expectancy in China, which has created new demand for long-term care services. China’s life expectancy at birth has increased from 69.1 years in 1990 to 76.7 years in 2018, according to World Bank data. According to State Council data, an average of 13 percent of Chinese over 65 require long-term care, a proportion that becomes progressively higher for each age group: 20 percent of people aged 75–80 years, 50 percent of people aged 80–90 years, and nearly 100 percent of people over 90 years old. Other studies show that middle-aged Chinese may also require long-term care, with the percentage of people...

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aged 45 and older in need of daily care projected to reach 76.7 percent of the estimated total 110.5 million disabled people in China by 2050.*

Until recently, however, the government also did little to prepare the healthcare system to care for a large elderly population suffering from chronic conditions.† According to a national survey conducted in 2015 by China’s National Committee on Aging, a government agency, approximately 80 percent of families seeking long-term care in China were unable to meet their needs.‡ China is only equipped with approximately 300,000 registered long-term care workers, though as of 2018 there are 167 million people over the age of 65.§ Development of assisted living facilities in China is challenged by lack of funding, along with the preference of individuals in need of care to remain with their families.¶ The challenges of providing at-home elder care have been exacerbated by China’s one-child policy as well as massive migration from rural to urban areas, both of which have reduced the number of people available to care for aging family members.**

Over the past decade, the Chinese government has announced several new policies that attempt to address long-term care needs of an aging population and the underlying policy framework around elder protection and related social services. In 2011, the State Council published the 12th Five-Year Plan of China on Ageing Undertaking Development (2011–2015) and the Social Care Service System Construction Plan (2011–2015), which set forth priorities in developing long-term care.*** In 2016, the government launched long-term care insurance pilot programs in 15 cities that provide institutional and in most cases home care.**** In 2019, the government issued a set of policies to improve care for elderly patients, including standardizing criteria for evaluating the needs of elderly patients and increasing the number of healthcare professionals to fill the need for nursing care.*****

China’s aging population is also driving the demand for hospice care. First established in China in the 1980s, hospice care facilities have struggled to meet growing needs and remain poorly integrated into mainstream healthcare.****** Statistics on China’s hospice care sector are often contradictory and unspecific, but even the highest estimate suggests that only 283,000 patients received hospice care in 2018.******* This falls far short of demand since 2.3 million Chinese die from cancer alone each year, according to official statistics.******** In 2017, the government launched a pilot hospice program in five cities, with plans announced in 2019 to expand the program to 71 cities across China.******** Short of massive increases to investment in the healthcare system, however, the reality of caring for millions of terminally ill is likely to further strain China’s already inadequate medical resources and increase social tensions within Chinese society.

Healthcare Capabilities Challenged by Funding Shortfalls

Despite substantial growth, China’s healthcare spending remains low compared to other countries with similar per capita incomes.†† Local governments have long shouldered the majority of healthcare expenditure responsibilities, though in 2018 the Ministry of Finance introduced a “sliding scale” for center-local healthcare cost sharing.†‡ In this arrangement, the central government shoulders 80 percent of the cost burden for the poorest provinces and just 10 percent for the wealthiest, with several levels in between.†§ It is unclear whether this has significantly alleviated the burden on local budgets as Beijing already directed healthcare spending toward China’s poorer regions, with

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* The study noting this projection considered adults requiring long-term care as a subset of all disabled people in China. Chinese law defines a person with disabilities as someone “who has abnormalities of loss of a certain organ or function, psychologically or physiologically, or in anatomical structure and has lost wholly or in part the ability to perform an activity in the way considered normal.” There is no uniform definition of “disability” for determining need for long-term care in China. Several long-term care pilot programs in China have used the Barthel Index, which measures a person’s level of independence according to their ability to perform routine daily tasks such as bathing, feeding, and dressing. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Disabled Persons, 1990; Yumei Zhu and August Österle, “China’s Policy Experimentation on Long-Term Care Insurance: Implications for Access,” International Journal of Health Planning and Management 34 (July 25, 2019): 1661–1674. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/hpm.2879.

† In 2018, China’s total health expenditure was 5.4 percent of its gross domestic product. The average for upper-middle-income countries, a group that includes China, was 5.7 percent. By contrast, out-of-pocket expenses paid by patients accounted for 35.8 percent of all health expenditures, versus 33.2 percent for upper-middle-income countries. World Bank, “World Bank Open Data.” https://data.worldbank.org/.
central and western regions receiving 86.3 percent of the central government’s healthcare-related fiscal transfers in 2017.\textsuperscript{34}

Figure 1: China’s Healthcare Expenditure, 2014–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Individual Expenditure</th>
<th>Social Expenditure</th>
<th>Government Expenditure</th>
<th>Total Healthcare Expenditure Percent of GDP (RHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: China’s National Bureau of Statistics defines social expenditure as all nongovernment healthcare spending other than individual out-of-pocket expenses. It primarily comprises expenditure by insurance providers but also includes healthcare philanthropy and private hospital spending. 
Source: Various.\textsuperscript{35}

Public Health Insurance Coverage Uneven between Rural and Urban Residents

Although the Chinese government claims to provide universal health insurance to its population, many Chinese people still struggle to afford quality healthcare. About 95 percent of the population receive some form of public health insurance, but the level of coverage varies significantly with geography and rural residents tend to receive less coverage than their urban compatriots.\textsuperscript{36}

China’s public health insurance system comprises two main types of coverage: Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) and Urban-Rural Residents Basic Medical Insurance (URRBMI). As the names suggest, the first is an insurance scheme for the urban workforce while the latter is for the rural population and urban residents outside the labor market.\textsuperscript{37} Although the URRBMI resulted from a merger of urban and rural insurance schemes aimed at reducing geographic inequality, risk pooling remains localized and coverage levels vary widely.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, the differences in coverage levels between the UEBMI and the URRBMI are even starker. In 2019, annual per capita expenditure under the UEBMI was $507 (renminbi [RMB] 3,590), compared to $113 (RMB 793) under the URRBMI.\textsuperscript{39} In theory, healthcare is less expensive in rural areas, but since rural residents seeking higher-quality care travel to visit physicians at urban hospitals, the cost of treatment is disproportionately high for the rural population.

Even with near-universal public health insurance, out-of-pocket costs in China accounted for 28.3 percent of all healthcare expenditure in 2019 compared to 11 percent in the United States.\textsuperscript{40} Meanwhile, average annual per capita

\textsuperscript{34} Public health government expenditure in China is less than expenditure for other sectors such as infrastructure, education, and national defense. An analysis of Chinese government healthcare spending shows that total government public health expenditure has also fallen slightly as a proportion of total fiscal expenditure (from 5.70 percent in 2014 to 5.44 percent in 2018). The trends have not been consistent across all provinces, however, and many poorer provinces have seen growth in healthcare expenditure as a proportion of fiscal expenditure, in part due to increased transfer payments from the central government. Hui Jin and Xinyi Qian, “How the Chinese Government Has Done with Public Health from the Perspective of the Evaluation and Comparison about Public-Health Expenditure,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (December 2020).

\textsuperscript{35} Unless otherwise noted, this paper uses the following exchange rate throughout: $1 = RMB 7.08.
healthcare expenditure was $657 (RMB 4,657), constituting 6.4 percent of China’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP)—$10,262 (RMB 75,229)—in 2019.41 The financial burden for those with serious illnesses is considerably higher. For example, the average cost of a hospitalization in 2019 was $1,389 (RMB 9,848), or 12.6 percent of the average annual wage.42 To fill the gap, Chinese insurance giants like Ping An and China Life offer commercial products that cover critical illness, medical reimbursement, disability income, and long-term care.43 The rapid growth in demand for such products clearly demonstrates that public health insurance remains insufficient to meet China’s healthcare needs: total premium revenue for commercial health insurance products grew from $33.7 billion (RMB 241.1 billion) in 2015 to $98.9 billion (RMB 706.6 billion) in 2019.44

Funding Shortfalls Fuel Systemic Corruption

Corruption among China’s hospitals and doctors is a widely acknowledged problem that has contributed to a low level of public trust in the country’s healthcare system and at times led to violence against Chinese doctors.45 In many cases, doctors accept illicit payments, known as hongbao, from patients in exchange for a higher quality of care. The practice of hongbao is widespread in China: in a 2013 survey of residents of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, nearly one-third of respondents said they or a family member had given hongbao to physicians between 2000 and 2012.46 In addition to accepting these payments from patients, doctors and hospital officials also receive kickbacks for purchasing certain types of medical equipment or pharmaceutical products, a practice that has been described as “endemic” in China.47 In a 2010 survey of Chinese doctors, 78 percent of respondents said healthcare companies could not compete in China without paying bribes.48

In some cases, this corruption has involved foreign firms. In 2015, a Chinese court fined British pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline $490 million after the company was accused of paying bribes to public health officials and doctors.49 A 2019 review of Chinese court records by the New York Times found over a dozen cases in which employees for firms such as General Electric, Philips, and Siemens bribed officials in public hospitals.5 In March 2020, U.S. pharmaceutical company Cardinal Health agreed to pay more than $8 million to settle claims arising from alleged improper payments by employees of the firm’s former Chinese subsidiary.50 In November 2020, Pfizer announced in its quarterly securities filing that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission are investigating Pfizer’s activities in China and Russia.51

Corruption in China’s healthcare system is driven by persistent funding shortfalls that have created strong incentives for hospital systems and doctors to accept bribes. Low pay is a common complaint among doctors in China, and according to a 2017 white paper by the Chinese Medical Doctor Association, a national professional association of medical professionals in China, the average annual salary of junior doctors in China was approximately $8,150 (RMB 57,709).52 This was only slightly higher than the average salary of approximately $6,780 (RMB 48,000) for all recent Chinese college graduates, despite heavy workloads for doctors that often include uncompensated overtime.53 As a result, many physicians supplement their official income with hongbao payments.54

Hospitals in China have similarly struggled with resource shortfalls. In 2018, only 10 percent of funding for public hospitals came from government subsidies.55 The majority of funding comes from service charges and drug sales; however, Chinese regulations place ceilings on the markups that may be charged on many medical treatments and drugs.56 These price controls cut down on an important potential revenue stream and lead many hospitals to seek funds through illicit payments.57

The Chinese government has attempted to address corruption in its healthcare system through a variety of measures. For instance, in 2013 China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) issued a regulation banning nine types of behavior in the healthcare sector, including tying physicians’ salaries to revenues from drug sales, paying or receiving commissions for drug prescriptions, and compiling for commercial purposes data on

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physicians’ purchasing patterns of drugs. In 2014, the NHFPC instituted a provincial “blacklist” reporting scheme for medical corruption. Under the regulations, government-funded healthcare institutions within a province cannot purchase medicines, medical supplies, or medical equipment from a company on the blacklist for two years; if a company is on the blacklist twice or more within five years, the prohibition applies nationwide. That same year, the NHFPC also issued a policy requiring physicians and patients to sign contracts not to exchange hongbao.

Despite these efforts, bribery remains a persistent issue in China’s healthcare system. In 2019, Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, described corruption in China’s healthcare system as “endemic,” citing low salaries as a major contributor. High-profile corruption cases continue to occur. For instance, in 2019, Yang Xiangjun, then chief physician at the cardiovascular department of the First Affiliated Hospital of Soochow University in Suzhou, was investigated for accepting hongbao in order to perform medical procedures. Dr. Yang was subsequently arrested and expelled from the CCP. Corruption in medical procurement companies remains widespread as well. A 2019 analysis of the Chinese government’s efforts to address corruption in pharmaceutical purchasing found that while anticorruption regulations have achieved some progress, considerable corruption challenges remain. The study pointed to inconsistent reporting and relatively low fines for violating anticorruption laws (in contrast to the United States) and concluded, “If the fine amounts are not significantly increased, it will remain profitable for drug companies to engage in corruption practices that undermine public health.” The study also recommended that the government “address the root of medical corruption” by focusing on improving financial incentives in the medical system.

Beijing Seeks to Mitigate Healthcare Capacity Limitations

Beijing’s aims for China’s healthcare system are articulated in the “Healthy China 2030” plan, which was first outlined in a 2016 blueprint and subsequent 2019 action plan released by the State Council. Healthy China 2030 adopts a mixture of general guidelines and quantitative targets. First, the plan establishes five overarching goals: improving health levels and life expectancy, effectively controlling health risk factors, improving the healthcare system and delivery of healthcare services, building out the overall scale of the healthcare system, and improving the healthcare system’s governance and oversight. Second, it lays out a set of specific targets to be achieved by 2030, such as raising the average life expectancy to 79 years, reducing smoking to below 20 percent of adults, and reducing deaths from major chronic diseases by 30 percent from 2015 levels (see Appendix for a list of major targets).

Overall, Healthy China 2030 emphasizes tackling environmental risk factors and promoting a healthy lifestyle. This reflects the government’s shift to focus more on preventing and combatting chronic disease. The plan also lays out a number of specific targets for reducing the incidence and severity of common chronic conditions. For example, Beijing aims to increase treatment and management of diabetes and plans to increase the percentage of diabetics whose condition is under control from 50 percent in 2015 to 60 percent by 2022 and 70 percent by 2030. It also implicitly recognizes the burden of an aging population by calling for efforts to reduce the incidence of dementia and disability in those 65 and older, though the plan provides few details on how to accomplish this.

Beijing Prioritizes Collection of Healthcare Data

One of the most promising recent developments in medical research has come from the aggregation and analysis of large amounts of healthcare data, which can lead to breakthroughs in medical treatment and offer significant commercial opportunities. Recognizing the transformative potential of healthcare data, the Chinese government has sought to systematically collect healthcare data. In June 2016, the State Council issued the Guiding Opinions on Promoting and Regulating the Development of the Application of Healthcare Big Data, which stated that

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healthcare big data is a “fundamental, strategic national resource”6 and formulated plans to develop healthcare data.7 In October 2020, China’s Health Council published guidance on standardizing healthcare information in China, in part to improve the use of healthcare big data, according to Chinese state media.8

The Chinese government’s efforts to collect healthcare data extend to the United States, whose healthcare data are particularly valuable due to the ethnic diversity of the U.S. population.9 Chinese firms have invested significantly in U.S. healthcare firms, driven in part by government incentives such as government investment funds that target biotech firms.10 These investments have given Chinese company ownership stakes in U.S. companies that have proprietary genetic sequencing technology and genomic databases.11 Aside from investment, Chinese organizations are also frequently involved in other forms of partnerships, including research and development (R&D) partnerships, research incubators, and corporate partnerships.12 In addition to obtaining U.S. healthcare data through legal means, Chinese entities and individuals have been implicated in intellectual property theft, hacking of U.S. companies, and other illicit activities.13

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese firms have offered testing and other services to other countries, prompting concerns that any data collected from these services may be used for genetic research in China in an undisclosed manner. The most notable firm has been BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute), the largest genomics company in the world.14 In March, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted emergency use authorization to BGI Americas, the U.S. subsidiary of BGI, for its test device to detect COVID-19.15 By August 2020, BGI had sold more than 35 million COVID-19 test kits to 180 countries, including the United States.16 Complementing market access for testing devices, BGI has gained access to global health data by establishing laboratories to support COVID-19 testing. As of August 2020, the company has established 58 such laboratories in 18 countries.17 BGI has denied that it collects foreign genomic data from these tests for research purposes.18

The extent of BGI’s activities, including research collaborations with China’s government, remains poorly understood. Although BGI has referred to itself as a “private company,” a Reuters investigation found BGI has conducted research with China’s military on various topics, including testing for respiratory viruses.19 A February 2021 regulatory filing by BGI also revealed that China’s State Development and Investment Corporation, the country’s largest state investment fund, had purchased a small ownership stake in the company.20

While Chinese firms aggressively pursue the collection of healthcare data abroad, the Chinese government places strict limitations on the sharing of Chinese healthcare data with foreign companies or researchers, in contrast to the open research environment of the United States. Some of the harshest provisions are found in China’s human genetic resource regulations, which state that foreign parties cannot independently collect, store, use, transfer, or export human biospecimens obtained in China.21 In contrast to the United States, the foreign parties must enter into a collaboration with a Chinese partner, and the collaboration must be approved by the Office of Human Genetic Resources Administration, which is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology.22 While many countries regulate access to citizens’ medical data and genetic information, China’s human genetic resource regulations are significantly more stringent and involve substantially greater procedural hurdles. International researchers have expressed concern that such hurdles risk slowing down scientific research.23

In line with the principles and goals established in Healthy China 2030, the government launched a number of reforms over the past five years to rationalize care and address the capacity challenges in China’s healthcare system. In 2015, Beijing began experimenting with mergers of primary care providers and public hospitals into medical consortiums that share resources and information. Policymakers hope these consortiums will result in a tiered care system that will reduce hospital utilization and encourage more people to use the primary care system.24 The consortiums are also aimed at allowing doctors—typically licensed to work only at a specific hospital—additional flexibility in where and how they provide treatment.25 Beginning in 2017, the government expanded the use of

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medical consortiums and by the end of 2018 touted an 83 percent increase in referrals from hospitals back to general practitioners over the previous year. However, as Karen Eggleston, Stanford University professor and authority on China’s healthcare system, noted in testimony before the Commission, such medical consortiums create local monopolies, and without proper safeguards they may actually decrease the quality of care.

Another government initiative is the establishment of a system of general practitioner contract services whereby patients can negotiate service contracts with a general practitioner through their primary care provider. Under such contracts, general practitioners can provide basic health monitoring, management, and consultation services; priority appointment booking and referrals; prescription services; and preventative care. This initiative was piloted in 2011 but has been substantially expanded since the launch of Healthy China 2030. So far, it appears to have achieved some positive results. A study of several counties in Zhejiang Province, which sought to assess local residents’ awareness and usage of the contracting system in 2017, found that 71.6 percent of residents were aware of the program and 50.4 percent had contracted a general practitioner. Those who were aware of the program but elected not to participate were predominantly young and had no history of chronic disease.

To support the expansion of primary care capacity on which these reforms are predicated, the Chinese government is trying to increase the number of general practitioners. Although China has 2.8 doctors per 1,000 people, it has only 2.6 general practitioners per 10,000 people. The Chinese government, therefore, aims to increase this number to five per 10,000 by 2030. These efforts supplement the government’s push to standardize medical education and improve the qualifications of doctors in China.

U.S. firms are well-positioned to complement the efforts of the Chinese government to improve patient outcomes by meeting growing Chinese demand for important healthcare services and products. For instance, medical devices are one of the fastest-growing markets in China, worth over $96 billion in 2019 and increasing by approximately 20 percent per year in recent years. Many Chinese medical professionals consider U.S. medical devices to be the highest quality, providing a massive potential consumer base for U.S. firms. U.S. companies are subject to numerous constraints in China’s healthcare market, however, such as investment restrictions, burdensome approval requirements, and government procurement processes that favor domestic firms. These policies undermine the ability of U.S. firms to compete effectively in China.

Beijing Promotes Traditional Chinese Medicine

While much of China’s healthcare planning has focused on modern medicine, Beijing has also stepped up its promotion of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), a form of healthcare that incorporates treatments such as acupuncture, tai chi, and herbal products. One important contribution of TCM to modern medicine is artemisinin, an antimalarial medication extracted from the wormwood plant *Artemisia annua*. The development of artemisinin was led by Youyou Tu, a pharmacologist at the China Academy of Traditional Chinese Medicine in Beijing, who became the first scientist based in China to receive a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. Beyond this notable example, however, considerable uncertainty exists over the evidence-based efficacy of TCM treatments. According to the National Institutes of Health, “For most conditions there is not enough rigorous scientific evidence to know whether TCM methods work for the conditions for which they are used.” While acupuncture has been widely used as a therapeutic for pain management, in some cases TCM treatments have been linked with severe side effects such as urinary tract cancers and fatal kidney disease. TCM also has been linked to the endangerment of certain animals. For instance, pangolins, anteater-like creatures whose scales are used in some TCM treatments, have become the world’s most highly trafficked nonhuman mammal. In addition, reliance on TCM techniques and products has increased concerns among health experts that pathogens found in animals used in TCM treatments could transfer to humans.

Under General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping, who often refers to TCM as a “national treasure,” the Chinese government has heavily promoted TCM both domestically and internationally. Since 2012, the Chinese

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government has issued 13 plans focusing on promotion of TCM. In 2016, the State Council published the *Outline of the Strategic Plan on the Development of Traditional Chinese Medicine*, which deemed TCM development a “national strategy.” Since then, the number of TCM clinics in China has skyrocketed from 195 in 2017 to 18,785 as of August 2020. Also in 2016, the State Council Information Office issued a white paper on TCM that called for “equal attention to TCM and Western medicine” and discussed international cooperation in TCM. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government’s promotion of TCM was one of the most visible manifestations of China’s “Health Silk Road” initiative, an extension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative focused on promoting China’s global health leadership.

Beijing’s campaign to promote TCM globally achieved a significant victory in 2019, when the World Health Organization (WHO) included a chapter on TCM in its influential *International Classification of Diseases*, which guides how doctors around the world diagnose medical conditions. Chinese media praised the WHO’s decision, calling it “a major step for TCM’s internationalization.” Other medical experts, however, expressed concern that the WHO was legitimizing a scientifically unproven form of medical treatment. Domestically, China’s efforts to legitimize TCM have also taken more coercive forms. In May 2020, Beijing’s Municipal Health Commission issued draft regulations on TCM that call for criminal penalties for anyone who “slanders” TCM. If passed, this would have been the first measure in China to criminalize criticism of TCM. In December 2020, Beijing approved an updated version of the regulations that omitted the criminal penalties.

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s government and state-run media have publicized TCM’s role in treating patients, despite the lack of any evidence proving TCM’s effectiveness in treating COVID-19. In June 2020, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper on fighting COVID-19 that claimed TCM medications were administered in 92 percent of confirmed COVID-19 cases. In some cases, this treatment has been involuntary, with reports of Chinese authorities detaining residents in Xinjiang, home to millions of Uyghur Muslims, and forcing them to take TCM treatments for COVID-19.

### Conclusions and Considerations for Congress

Faced with capacity shortfalls and challenged by a rise in chronic disease, China’s healthcare system struggles to deliver even basic healthcare to many of its citizens, particularly in China’s rural and western regions. China’s policymakers understand that for many, adequate and improving healthcare is a key component of the “social contract” that keeps the CCP in power. They are keenly aware of shortfalls and seek to address the threat that an overburdened healthcare system can pose to social stability. Over the past decade, Beijing has therefore attempted to address these problems through a series of policies to improve healthcare outcomes, including reducing reliance on the country’s overburdened hospital system, shrinking urban-rural disparities in healthcare access, confronting widespread corruption, and modernizing medical education.

If successful, these efforts could significantly improve healthcare outcomes for millions of Chinese, ensuring a better, longer life. At the same time, it would bolster one of the CCP’s key claims to legitimacy: that it can deliver ever-higher standards of living to China’s population. These efforts could also help Beijing attain its goal of making China a global leader in healthcare, something that would not only commercially benefit Chinese healthcare firms but would also afford Beijing significant international influence. China’s aggressive international promotion of TCM over the past several years illustrates the CCP’s appreciation of the soft-power potential in healthcare leadership.

Success, however, is far from assured. While the CCP has repeatedly communicated its intentions to improve the quality of healthcare in China, it has largely left the task of financing to the health institutions themselves—even as stringent price controls prevent them from earning substantial revenues on many of the products and services they provide. Continued reliance on large urban hospitals and persistent corruption challenges are stark indicators of the consequences of budgetary shortfalls in medical institutions across China. If efforts to improve healthcare do not

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succeed, the CCP runs the risk of an increasingly underserved and dissatisfied population questioning the legitimacy of CCP rule. Moreover, shortcomings in China’s healthcare system can have effects outside of China, as the catastrophic worldwide health and economic consequences of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate.

China’s efforts to improve its healthcare raise several issues that warrant congressional consideration:

- Can the United States reduce health risks in China and worldwide by cooperating with China to assist in improving China’s healthcare system? Will the CCP allow open access and equitable cooperation to U.S. entities working to assist China? What is the appropriate role of U.S. engagement in improving China’s healthcare system? What should be the focus and priorities of such engagement?

- What restrictions and nonmarket barriers impede U.S. access to China’s healthcare markets? Given the rising demand and aging population, U.S. companies have the expertise, technology, and capacity to support healthcare services in China.

- What steps can the U.S. government take to ensure that the Chinese government cooperates with the U.S. government, other foreign governments, and international organizations in issues affecting global health, including promptly and fully disclosing data on potential outbreaks of infectious disease?

- What market opportunities for U.S. firms do the CCP’s efforts to improve its healthcare system create? What can be done to ensure U.S. firms can fairly participate in China’s healthcare system?

- How can the U.S. government ensure that collaborative medical research efforts with China include open and reciprocal sharing of healthcare data while ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens’ privacy?

- How can the U.S. government ensure that the U.S. healthcare system remains the global leader in healthcare innovation? What steps can be taken to protect U.S. healthcare research and development from theft by or coerced transfer to Chinese entities?

- How can the U.S. government respond to the Chinese government’s attempts to gain influence in international fora, including publicizing China’s Health Silk Road initiative, promoting TCM, and providing medical supplies, vaccines, and assistance to countries in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic?

- What steps can be taken to ensure that Chinese medical treatments and devices sold in the United States are safe and effective?

- What steps can the U.S. government take to ensure that Chinese entities’ use of U.S. healthcare data for medical research does not infringe on the privacy or risk the safety of U.S. citizens?
## Appendix: Healthy China 2030 Plan Major Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>2015 Baseline (if available)</th>
<th>2030 Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achieving longer average life expectancy</td>
<td>76.4 years</td>
<td>79.0 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularizing health knowledge</td>
<td>Health literacy level is 10 percent.</td>
<td>Raise Chinese citizens’ health literacy level to at least 30 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the healthcare system</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. 4.7 registered nurses per 1,000 people. 2. 3.0 (assistant) doctors per 1,000 people. 3. Personal health expenditure should account for about 25 percent of total health expenditure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing an innovative medical and health service supply model</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Establish a “three-in-one” model for prevention and control that integrates professional health institutions, specialized hospitals, and primary-level medical and health institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding the healthcare industry</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>The size of the healthcare industry should reach 16 trillion RMB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening innovation in medical technology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Bring quality standards for medicine and medical devices completely in line with international standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting a healthy environment</td>
<td>1. 76.7 percent of days have acceptable air quality in cities at prefecture level and above. 2. 66 percent of surface water quality is at or better than Class III standards.</td>
<td>1. Continued improvement in the number of acceptable air quality days. 2. Continued improvement in drinking water quality and consumer product safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening comprehensive urban and rural health</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1. All rural people will use sanitary toilets. 2. Increase the number of healthy/sanitary cities to 50 percent, with full coverage of provinces and autonomous regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving nutrition and diets</td>
<td>1. Incidence of adult obesity stunting among children five years old or under is 8.1 percent from 2002–2012. 2. Average daily salt intake is 10.5 grams. 3. Adult daily fat and oil intake is 42.1 grams. 4. Average daily intake of added sugar is 30 grams. 5. Average daily intake of fruits and vegetables is 296 grams.</td>
<td>1. Reduce the incidence of adult obesity stunting among children five years old or under to less than 5 percent. 2. Reduce average daily salt intake to less than 5 grams. 3. Reduce adult daily fat and oil intake to between 25 and 30 grams. 4. Reduce average daily intake of added sugar to less than 25 grams. 5. Increase average daily intake of fruits and vegetables to more than 500 grams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing nationwide fitness programs</td>
<td>1. 89.6 percent of the population meet national fitness standards. 2. The proportion of people who engage in regular exercise is 33.9 percent.</td>
<td>1. Increase the proportion of the population that meets national fitness standards to 92.17 percent. 2. Increase the proportion of people who engage in regular exercise to at least 40 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening training for healthy skills</td>
<td>1. 1.6 sports instructors for every 1,000 people. 2. 88 percent of rural villages have sports facilities.</td>
<td>1. Have 2.3 sports instructors for every 1,000 people. 2. Build sports facilities in all remaining rural villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the public fitness system</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Build a three-tier system of public sports facilities with 2.3 square meters per capita and a 15-minute fitness circle in urban communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing tobacco control</td>
<td>1. The proportion of the population protected by smoke-free regulations is about 10 percent. 2. Percentage of the population over age 15 that smokes is 27.7 percent.</td>
<td>1. Increase the proportion of the population protected by smoke-free regulations to 80 percent. 2. Gradually realize a ban on smoking in public places. 3. Reduce the percentage of smokers over age 15 to 20 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting mental health</td>
<td>1. Chinese citizens’ mental health literacy rate is 12 percent. 2. Chinese citizens sleep an average of 6.5 hours per day. 3. China has 2.6 psychiatrists per 100,000 people.</td>
<td>1. Raise Chinese citizens’ mental health literacy to 30 percent. 2. Increase the average hours Chinese citizens sleep per day to between 7 and 8. 3. Increase the number of psychiatrists to 4.5 per 100,000 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving women’s and children’s health</td>
<td>1. Infant mortality rate of 8.1 percent. 2. Maternal mortality rate of 20.1/100,000. 3. Anemia incidence among pregnant women is 17.2 percent. 4. The national prenatal screening rate is 61.1 percent.</td>
<td>1. Reduce the infant mortality rate to 5 percent or lower. 2. Reduce the maternal mortality rate to 12/100,000 or lower. 3. Provide pregnant women with free basic health services. 4. Reduce anemia incidence among pregnant women to under 10 percent. 5. Increase the national prenatal screening rate to more than 80 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving family planning service management</td>
<td>Birth gender ratio of 113.5 males for every 100 females.</td>
<td>Achieve naturally balanced gender ratio at birth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing mortality of children under 5</td>
<td>Child mortality rate of 10.7 percent.</td>
<td>Achieve child mortality rate of 6.0 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Improving health at elementary and middle schools | Proportion of students that meet national student health standards is 31.8 percent. | 1. Increase the proportion of students that meet national student health standards to at least 60 percent.  
2. More than 25 percent of students nationally are rated “excellent” by national student health standards.  
3. Significantly reduce the incidence of new myopia.  
4. Students should have at least one hour of sports activity daily.  
5. Young people should master more than one sports skill.  
6. Complete compliance of school sports facilities.  
7. Students participate in sports activities at least three times a week. |
| Improving dental health                    | N/A            | Fewer than 25 percent of 12-year-old children have cavities.          |
| Improving elderly health                   | N/A            | 1. Reduce the incidence of dementia in those aged 65 and older.  
2. Increase the percentage of Tier 2 hospitals with elderly medicine units to more than 90 percent.  
3. Increase the percentage of Tier 3 hospitals with convalescence units to more than 90 percent. |
| Preventing early death from major chronic diseases | Major chronic diseases accounted for 19.1 percent of deaths in 2013. | Early deaths from major chronic diseases should be 30 percent below 2015 numbers. |
| Preventing cardiovascular disease          | Mortality rate from cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease of 238.4 per 100,000 people.  
Blood lipid testing rate for people over 35 is 19.4 percent.  
Knowledge of high blood pressure among those over 30 is 47 percent in 2012. | 1. Reduce the mortality rate from cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease to 190.7 per 100,000 or below.  
2. Increase the standard management rate for people with high blood pressure to more than 70 percent.  
3. Increase blood lipid testing rate for people over 35 to more than 35 percent.  
4. Increase knowledge of high blood pressure among those over 30 to at least 65 percent. |
| Preventing and treating cancer             | Overall five-year survival rate for cancer patients is 40.5 percent. | Increase the overall five-year survival rate for cancer patients to at least 46.6 percent. |
| Preventing chronic respiratory disease     | Mortality rate from chronic respiratory diseases in those aged 70 and younger is 10.2 per 100,000. | Reduce the mortality rate from chronic respiratory diseases in those aged 70 and younger to 8.1 per 100,000. |
| Treating diabetes                         | Standard management rate for diabetes patients is 50 percent.  
Diabetes knowledge among those over 18 is 36.1 percent. | 1. Increase the standard management rate for diabetes patients to at least 70 percent.  
2. Increase diabetes knowledge among those over 18 to more than 60 percent. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promoting road traffic safety</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Reduce road-related deaths per 10,000 vehicles by 30 percent.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing infectious disease</td>
<td>37,600 annual schistosomiasis cases.</td>
<td>1. Reduce incidence of Hepatitis B among children under age 5 to 0.5 percent. 2. Completely eliminate schistosomiasis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Where baseline figures for 2015 are not available, they have been substituted with baseline data from the closest available year. Source: Various.

### Endnotes


55 https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(16)31362-9/fulltext