

# **Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 7 February 2013**

## **China's New Leadership and Implications for the United States Panel V: The U.S. "Rebalance" to Asia**

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Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. "Rebalance" to Asia in the context of developments in China and implications for the United States.

Our allies and friends in Asia enthusiastically welcomed our president's announcement that Asia will be a top priority for our security mission and presence. They welcomed our secretary of state's "pivot" announcement calling for increased diplomatic, economic, and security investment. Well aware of the political and economic conditions in the U.S., they await implementing actions – with some worry.

Our policy announcements were the beginning of our work, not the product. Incredible opportunities – economic, trade, and otherwise – beckon across the region, but tensions, disputes, and threats increase. Prompt U.S. action is required on many challenges, but most urgently on economic matters, trade agreements, and security. All must be done in close consultation with our allies, friends, and yes, China. Our policies and strategies must be regional in orientation to fulfill the intent of the announcements. Any specific China considerations must be integrated within the broader policies and strategies.

In very broad terms, three things are needed: a strategic concept, resources, and an organization that can effectively and efficiently apply resources to implement the concept. We need a national strategic concept describing what we're doing, how and why. It must win support in the region, and here at home. Support by the American people is essential to secure the resources needed for implementation. Any concept that cannot win the support of the electorate is destined to fail. An organizational structure with all necessary authorities must be created within the government to ensure leadership, resource stewardship, efficient implementation, and oversight.

The United States, our allies and our friends have unique and complex relationships with China. These are mixtures of cooperation, competition and conflicting interests. Asia bears many enduring, bone-deep historical grievances, territorial disputes and clashes over access to seabed resources. Military forces, naval forces and armed law enforcement agencies of all nations operate in close proximity. U.S. strategic clarity, including a publicly discussable U.S. military strategy focused on defense of our allies provides assurance, clarifies alliance roles and missions, guides U.S. force shaping, and avoids unnecessary provocation and miscalculation.

In the past, our security policies and strategies were clearly focused, and publicly debated. The story goes that as the Soviet Union was collapsing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff summoned his Chairman's Study Group – his personal think tank. This 4-person group consisted of three carefully-chosen colonels and a Navy captain representing each service. The

Chairman had a simple question: “What do we do now that we’ve lost our best enemy?” The massive U.S. national security establishment that emerged to win the Cold War had accomplished its mission without another world war or nuclear conflagration. As the USSR climbed down from the ramparts, our national security structure’s single organizing principle was collapsing, and with it our old models and conventions. They did not work anymore.

In many ways we are still looking for a new “best enemy” – a single organizing principle. Life was much simpler for our bureaucratic functions when we had a single, well-defined villain, right out of central casting. The villain is gone. China is most definitely not the new answer. We have a vital economic relationship with China, as do our friends and allies in Asia and as does Europe and the rest of the world. Most important, not one of our allies or friends wants us to pick a fight with China – but they do want us to maintain security and stability, and protect allied vital interests.

The U.S. needs China to be a successful contributor to the international system. That’s settled policy from the time we championed their accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. At the same time, we need to work with our allies and friends and support their interests, many well beyond those considered “traditional” security interests. We have many fundamental disagreements with China. We need to have as many positive conversations and cooperative programs with China as possible to provide a proper context for our disagreements. Every one of our allies and friends wants to have a productive relationship with China. They need the United States to play a different role than we did when the world was bi-polar, and we were the quarterback of the “Free World” team. Our challenge is developing a compelling strategy for Asia that supports our interests and those of our allies and friends without a declared enemy.

The U.S. is coming to grips with the importance, and the unique nature, of our Asian challenges. President Obama declared: “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.”<sup>1</sup> Secretary Clinton described our new approach as a “pivot” or “rebalancing” toward Asia. This remains the most enduring description to date of our emerging policy in Asia and the Pacific. She said we stand at a “pivot point” as we prepare to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, that we have to be smart and systematic about where we invest our time and energy, and that “One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.”<sup>2</sup>

In short order, and in an atmosphere of Continuing Resolutions without actual resolution, imminent fiscal cliffs, potential national default, unknown budget allocations, and transition of key Asian policy-makers, we began discussing our future Asia and Pacific force posture. Secretary Gates introduced the concept of a “widely distributed, operationally resilient, politically sustainable” forward presence. U.S. and Japanese force realignments that began years

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<sup>1</sup> “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011, available at <[www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament)>.

<sup>2</sup> “America’s Pacific Century” Foreign Policy Nov 2011, available at: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century)

before in the Bush administration – the 2005 Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement and the 2006 “Roadmap” Agreement – were quickly appropriated to symbolize our new policy and strategy.

The Services are now being asked what their contributions might be to our newly declared priority. Each service is responsible to “provide forces trained and equipped” for employment by the regional unified commanders in support of the national security interests of the United States. The development of national strategy as well as the national military strategy – critical assumptions; ends, ways and means coherence; priorities; sequencing; and theory of victory – is above the Services’ pay grade, as they say. We need a declared strategic concept for our forces that supports our Asia and the Pacific policy and national strategic concept. Then we can shape the composition, locations, and activities of the joint force.

“Asia and the Pacific,” the subject of the president’s announcement and the object of our rebalancing and realignment, stretches from the Indian sub-continent to the western shores of the Americas, north and south. It spans two oceans that are increasingly linked by shipping, energy, trade, and strategy. It includes five U.S. treaty allies. It includes sovereign U.S. territory, one island nation in Covenant with the United States that is treated like a territory, and three island nations in Compacts of Free Association with the U.S. It includes the world’s most populous country, and its future most populous country. The world’s largest and second largest Muslim populations within single national boundaries are in this region. It’s home to three maritime straits – the Malacca, the Sunda, and the Lombok – that permit the easy passage of well over 1100 fully laden supertankers per year, most passing on into the South China Sea bringing energy to China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and other countries.

This body of water is bounded by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore. Many nations have competing claims to various islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and thus competing claims to fishing grounds, sea-bed resources, and exclusive economic zones. Fifty percent of the world’s seaborne commercial tonnage and 1/3 of the world’s value in trade traverses this sea. If the world has a critical commercial intersection, this is it.

Traditional international law, as favored by the United States and our allies, calls for freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes. This is being increasingly challenged by China’s claim of historical rights to the entire South and East China seas.

China today is pulled in two divergent directions by continental and maritime interests on a truly trans-regional scale. Fourteen land powers share terrestrial frontiers with China while six maritime countries together enclose the entire Chinese coastline. Of these twenty neighboring states, six rank among the world’s top ten in population, eight rank among the top twenty-five in military forces, and four possess nuclear weapons.

China settled twelve of fourteen land border disputes. China no longer has any natural enemies on her borders, but neither does she have any natural friends. The closest “friends” might be North Korea and Pakistan. A few months ago Burma would have been included, but things have changed. It’s not obvious sharing borders with North Korea and Pakistan provides any advantages. Neither does China have any natural seafaring partners among the six nations on her seaward frontier.

The East China Sea and South China Sea merit special attention. Beginning in 2009 and accelerating in 2010 and 2011, China began exerting ever more pressure on these seas as evidenced by its expanding territorial claims, the more brazen actions taken by its fishing vessels and its unilateral claims to potentially lucrative seabed drilling rights. These seas bathe the areas that are home to China's industry, economy, and wealth. The GDP per capita in the greater coastal region area is seven to ten times higher than it is inland. In no other place in the world do the critical interests of so many states overlap. China would accrue immense strategic benefits if these became the equivalent of inland seas. The offshore states would face correspondingly great disadvantages. This region must be very carefully managed to ensure continued peace and tranquility.

The Asia and Pacific region as a whole has many built-in stresses that can cause conflict. Some of the more dominant, or powerful, include demographics, energy, food and agricultural, and fresh water. All are interrelated, as numbers of people and their movement affects food security, water availability and purity, and energy production and use. These goals often conflict. For example, the use of hydropower to produce energy often reduces the availability of agricultural land and fresh water.

The world will add nearly 60 million people per year, reaching over eight billion by the 2030s. Most growth will be in developing countries. The United States, alone among developed countries, is expected to add 50 million people. Europe, Japan, Russia, and Korea will join those in absolute population decline. Welfare systems in developed countries are based on assumptions of moderate economic and population growth. Aging and declining populations will stress support systems.

China will add some 170 million, but the population will be aging, and predominantly male. India, in contrast, will add 320 million people, becoming the world's most populous nation before 2030.

Remittance flows are essential parts of the economies of many states. In 2007, the top three recipients of emigrant remittances were India, China, and Mexico. Disruption or alteration of these flows due to failing governments, war, pestilence, natural disaster or other phenomenon can generate uncontrolled population movements and damage peace and stability.

India will continue to grow, risking tension between the rich and the poor, as well as among Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. The Maoists in much of eastern India are India's most important security challenge, according to the Indians themselves.

Rapid development in China, India, and other countries creates a relentless drive to assure adequate and secure supplies of fuel to sustain growth, maintain satisfaction, and prevent internal strife and chaos. Multiple disputes over access to seabed resources in the South China Sea regularly fill the news. Massive additional production and refining capacity is needed to avert resource shortages as world population grows. Japan is currently coping with energy shortages caused by a complex natural disaster, illustrating the fragility of energy infrastructure. One bright spot in the otherwise troubling energy picture is the most recent International Energy Agency's annual report. It states that the world's energy map "is being redrawn by the

resurgence of oil and gas production in the United States". According to this agency, the U.S. has the potential to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia in oil production by 2020.

Every fresh water system on the east, southeast, and south Asian littoral is under heavy pressure from pollution. The search for affordable energy invites upstream countries to build hydroelectric dams on rivers coming out of their mountains. Ungoverned, this can cause devastation to downstream nations and cultures that depend on nutrients in the rivers to sustain their food security.

Ocean fish stocks are already under pressure from over-fishing and illegal fishing. Without some agreement, some code of conduct on fishing and effective enforcement means, many species, and nations, are in danger. One such dispute caused the death of a Korean Coastguardsman at the hand of a Chinese fisherman.

Nuclear issues, both weapons and power generation, are a reality in Asia. The United States, Russia, and China essentially balance and deter one another. But another relationship is that among China, India and Pakistan.

China keeps a careful eye on India's nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, Pakistan is rapidly building its arsenal. If India decides to increase its arsenal, this would likely put pressure on China to react. If China thinks it must increase its arsenal to maintain deterrence that is likely to affect the US-China-Russia balance, with unknown results.

Weapons programs involving nuclear weapons and missiles in China and North Korea are matters of concern for our allies and friends. Many Asian voices call for independent nuclear capabilities. U.S. presence and strong involvement is essential to support our guarantees of extended deterrence and to prevent an arms race.

And then there is the threat from the global trans-national terrorist movements and associated criminal networks. Terror networks and their sponsors are already present in Asia. They gain support from financial flows, both formal and illicit. There are reports of technology cooperation in terms of weapons and material. Other countries struggle with elimination of safe-haven and transit operations supporting terror networks. We may be realigning or rebalancing our presence to favor Asia and the Pacific, but we're hardly likely to be done with this particular threat. The threat is most assuredly not done with us.

North Korean leadership is only too willing to sell anything to those with cash. They are widely suspected to be in league with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Narcotics, sophisticated counterfeit currency, and weapons material round out their offerings.

In support of our national and alliance efforts to meet all these challenges, we are realigning, or rebalancing our forces across the Asia and Pacific region. It has become far more discussed than understood. One particular airfield in Okinawa, Japan – Marine Corps Air Station Futenma – captures most of the commentary. It's merely one part of an overall initiative within Japan that involves a number of successful, and continuing, major initiatives involving both U.S. and Japanese forces. Future U.S.-Japan initiatives may include more joint basing, U.S. and Japanese forces together on the same bases.

A few principles should be stated to put our forward presence in context.

We deploy forces overseas to operate in support of the policy and strategy of the United States, including most importantly the defense of our allies. More broadly we help to assure peace and stability across the region. We do this with the active cooperation and support of our allies and friends.

Military and naval bases overseas are very useful things. They make a profound political statement long before they make a military statement. Any presence of foreign forces in another country requires a compromise of various principles of sovereignty on the part of both countries involved. Any such presence is a strong validation, at some cost, of commitment to common security goals.

Bases are also very useful, and cost-effective, means to develop, train, and maintain forces. Bases support alliance training and development. Bases provide valuable deployment platforms and support for forces operating throughout the region. Whether one fights from these bases in conflict, or from other locations, is a different question driven by a number of factors. But to fight early, you have to be there.

Our forces overseas have an important deterrent role. But if that was all they did, their role would be a very expensive and unprofitable undertaking. The role of our forward deployed forces is far broader and more constructive than simply waiting for someone to turn the master arming switch on. Broad, active, widely distributed presence throughout the theater dampens sources of instability, deters conflict, gives substance to U.S. security commitments, and ensures continuing American access to the region. The presence and the efforts of our forces helps shape the regional geopolitical climate, and they remain immediately available to respond if needed.

Our bases in Asia and the Pacific are concentrated in Alaska, Hawaii, Korea, and Japan. Diego Garcia is a very important facility in the Indian Ocean, but it is not a base in the traditional sense. After a long period of decline following Vietnam, our force presence in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is again growing. These are traditional bases supporting personnel on long tours with their families. As a result, they have schools, commissaries, exchanges, movie theaters, hospitals, dental clinics, recreational facilities, and so on. Our concentration in Japan and Korea reflects the enduring, and urgent, threat of North Korea, our historic obligation to Taiwan, and our Cold War history.

This model of presence will be changing, with forces deployed far more often away from our traditional bases. As mentioned earlier, Secretary Gates introduced the concept of a “widely distributed, operationally resilient, politically sustainable” forward presence. This signals recognition of the importance of South East Asia and the Indian Ocean area. The concept expands the geographic distribution of our forces, and the geographic reach and distribution of our alliances. In all the rhetoric and discussion of our alliance transformation and realignment agreement with Japan, very few observers note the U.S. promise to provide for the continuous presence of Japanese forces and their training in Guam. This is already underway, and it will be increasing. This establishes the presence of Japanese forces on U.S. soil, an appropriate counterpart to our presence in Japan. This is an expansion of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and in the future to the Compact States. It is a major strategic step forward designed to rapidly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our alliance forces when we are operating together in high-intensity, modern operations.

Our presence guidance also calls for a more lean, agile, and expeditionary posture. Expeditionary in this sense means self-sustaining, stepping lightly on the local infrastructure, making do with things as they are. It means making do with conditions that we find, not building “Little America” on foreign soil and enclosing it inside a fence line. It’s tough to win friends when we are living better on deployment, including in combat, than our hosts do at home.

Our presence guidance signals increased emphasis on robust, continuous, bi- and multi-national training, accomplished through expansion of the U.S. and Australian synthetic training environments. These systems, already in place, permit combinations of live, virtual, and constructive forces arrayed in an interactive, hyper-realistic simulation system that replicates faithfully the uncertainty, friction, fog and stress of high-intensity air-land-sea-space-cyberspace integrated operations and combat for commanders and their staffs.

The Marine presence in Australia is, along with Guam, a big first step to these goals. It is a training presence, not a base. The force there will be an immediately deployable, combat-capable combined arms air-ground force. It will be expeditionary, self-sustaining, and self-contained. One mission will be to work and train with forces from Australia, and in the future Japan and other friends and allies. They will be supported by pre-positioned ships and amphibious ships. Mobility will be supported with Joint High Speed Vessels, and commercial High Speed Vessels, as well as organic aircraft, including FA-18, MV-22, KC-130, and F-35B in the future. Combined deployments with Australian, and eventually other forces, are possible.

Our policy for Asia and the Pacific is pretty well defined, if not so well understood. Our forces are in place. The posture, operational employment, and presence will be much improved over the coming months and years.

The missing component is a declared strategy to complement, and implement, our policy. We must develop, and discuss with our allies as well as our own public, a viable strategy to support our goals. A proper strategy includes critical assumptions, ends-ways-means coherence, priorities, sequencing, and a theory of victory. While many official documents include the word “strategy” in the title, few include the specificity and the discipline to take us beyond aspirational statements.

Other voices call for increased definition of our strategy in Asia and the Pacific. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently completed a critical assessment of our Pacific posture for Congress. CSIS concluded, in part:

“There are clear connections between shaping actions and contingency preparation. Given rapid advances in Chinese military capabilities, the consequences of conflict with that nation are almost unthinkable and should be avoided to the greatest extent possible, consistent with US interests. It is therefore critical to achieve the right combination of assurance and dissuasion and to maintain a favorable peace before conflict occurs. At the same time, the ability of the United States to work with allies and partners to achieve those peaceful ends will depend on the perceptions, both of allies and partners and of China, of the U.S. ability to prevail in the event of conflict. U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and a capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with A2AD and other threats to U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific. Demonstrating such capacity is not automatic; one way to undercut

dramatically the regional confidence in the U.S. commitment and the American ability to shape decisions and preserve peace would be to adopt a posture that pulled back from the Western Pacific and focused only on the survivability of U.S. forces and reductions in annual costs of forward presence. Forward presence and engagement are not simply helpful to shaping the environment and setting the stage for effective responses to contingencies – they are indispensable for minimizing the likelihood of larger conflicts.”<sup>3</sup> (Emphasis in the original)

The resources available for defense, including engagement operations, are certain to be more limited. We’re headed for a fleet of 246 ships, significantly short of the 346 called for by the bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review independent panel. This is important because, no matter how capable the ship, it can only be in one place at a time. And power projection that stays is about ships.

Our defense budget will be capped based on national need, not on military requirements. The reduction is not just in terms of the amount of the nation’s treasury allocated to defense. We face another reduction, more serious, from the resources required per weapon. The costs of vehicles, aircraft, ships, munitions, and personnel continue to rise at a rapid rate. Presence requirements will be faced with increasing unit costs, increasing flying hour, driving hour, and steaming hour costs. We are certain to be much smaller, and on an inevitable path to very small indeed. Solutions do not come readily to mind.

Our policy calls for a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces while sustaining ground force presence. Along with the calls for rebalancing we will no longer size ground forces for long-term stability operations. The number of ships will be reduced by stretching out new ship programs while retiring others early. Tactical fighter programs will also be reduced.

Already we hear from friends in Asia that they fear this budget reduction will be like the last such force reduction episode in the 1990s. In their memory, we reduced our presence in Asia then, and called it an improvement, because individual weapons systems were better. Our own documents call for preserving readiness over more force structure. Smaller but better, in other words. Increased readiness is good, of course. But at some point, quantity has a quality of its own.

We have a pressing need for forward presence and extensive engagement operations, confronted by severe budgetary pressures. We need a coherent strategy to efficiently apply our resources and our alliance resources to our overall goals. Such a strategy must address the reality of nuclear weapons and the history of confrontations between nuclear armed states. It must define and expand “engagement” and its connection to contingency plans. While conflict is unlikely, *every* strategy must take into account the likelihood that *any* conflict will be a long war, and not assume, as we often do – and as Europe did in 1914 – that wars will be short. Any worthy strategy must also take a cold-blooded look at the new warfare domains of cyber and space, and their effect on escalation.

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 July 2012 pages 17-18.



We had a public understanding of the tenets of our strategy in NATO during the latter days of the Cold War. We need that level of public understanding again. Most important, we must have a strategy that achieves some compatible relationship between ends and means. An incoherent competition for declining resources will confuse our own public, alarm our allies, and waste the resources we have.

Of paramount importance to the U.S. are the security of our homeland and the security of our allies. Other important objectives flow from that. A public strategic concept that calls for defense of the territory and the interests of our allies and friends avoids unnecessary demagoguery of our intentions, reassures allies and friends, helps to rationalize roles, missions and responsibilities across our alliances, and provides our own citizens with a rationale for defense resources.

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**Chief U.S. Policy Goals in the Asia Pacific:**

- Peace, stability, and prosperity
- Be a stabilizing military influence and economic partner in the Asia Pacific
- Strengthen relationships across the region
- Ensure U.S. access
- Promote regional security through enhanced military-to-military cooperation
- Focus on regional institutions to advance clear and shared objectives
- Expand economic opportunity and growth
- Promote democracy and human rights

**Actions in the region that achieve those goals:**

- Senior official attention and participation
- Force realignment initiatives
- President Obama attendance at events:
  - o APEC 2009, 2010, 2011
  - o EAS 2011, 2012
- Established the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China (April 2009)
- Established Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia (November 2010)
- First non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in 2010.
- Revised missile agreement with South Korea increasing the payload and range

**Successes of those policies:**

- American exports to Asia have increased approximately \$87 billion since 2008
- Burma opening up, releasing political prisoners, lifting of sanctions
  - o U.S. eases import ban on most Burmese goods
  - o U.S. lifts sanctions on leading Burmese officials which blocked assets and wouldn't let them participate in transactions with U.S. nationals
  - o U.S. lifted ban on U.S. investment in Burma
- KORUS FTA (approved November 2011, came into force on March 15, 2012)
- New security initiatives with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines

- Japan relaxed its ban on military exports to allow it to take part in the joint development and production of arms with other countries and to supply military equipment for humanitarian missions. Now, Japan's defense budget should stretch much further.
- American presence in the region reassures our friends and allies, providing a stabilizing force as powers rise and countries continue to grow and develop.

### **Shortcomings/Challenges Ahead:**

- Lack of implementing action on the "pivot"
- TPP stalled
- Failure to resume or replace the Six-Party talks
- North Korea's weapons programs continue
- Need to renew the Compact of Free Association with Palau, reassure the Pacific Islands that the U.S. is not abandoning them
- Human rights abuses are still challenging

### **How is China reacting to recent developments in U.S. policy?**

Similar to here in the United States, there is no monolithic "Chinese view" on U.S. policy in the region. Rather there is a range of views and reactions depending on which official you are speaking to, which governmental agency they represent, etc.

The general attitude of Chinese officials could be overall thought to be rather muted and restrained. The Hu administration wanted to avoid any serious deterioration in U.S.-China relations. For example, Xi Jinping has stated he wants to "Control and manage the differences (*guan kong fenqi*)" and State Councillor Dai Bingguo has said, "Major Powers like China and the U.S. should focus their Asia-Pacific policies and interactions on regional peace, development and cooperation."

#### *Official Comments on Specific Issues*

- TPP - Chinese Assistant Minister of Commerce Yu Jianhua: "TPP has set very high benchmarks; whether or not all these members will reach that high benchmark we'll have to wait and see."
- Deployment of U.S. Marines in Australia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Geng Yansheng: "Any strengthening and expansion of military alliances is an expression of a Cold War mentality." He added that the U.S. had stated many times that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and stable China and has no intention to contain China, saying that "We hope the U.S. does what it says."
- South China Sea - Wen Jiabao: "[South China Sea disputes] ought to be resolved through friendly consultations and discussions by the sovereign countries directly involved. Outside forces should not use any excuses to interfere." MFA spokesman Liu Weimin: Territorial disputes should be handled bilaterally and that "foreign intervention will not help settle the issue but will complicate it instead and is not conducive to peace, stability, and development of the region."
- U.S. arms sales to Taiwan - Rear Admiral Yang Yi: "We are going to give a lesson to the U.S. government that harming others will harm yourself."

### *Commentator and Scholar Reactions*

- Chen Xiangyang, deputy director of the Institute of World Political Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR): The real intention of the U.S. in getting involved in the South China Sea issue is to “sow discord between China and ASEAN” and promote its new Asia-Pacific strategy.
- Li Xiguang, Director, at the Center for International Communication Studies at Tsinghua University: “The aim of the new U.S. Asia policy is to isolate and encircle China.”
- Shi Yinhong, professor at People’s University, advised the Chinese government to “think about the reason why the [US] is suddenly so popular in the region.” “Is it because China has not been good enough when it comes to diplomacy with its neighboring countries?”
- Zhu Feng, professor at Beijing University, called for China to “stop blaming the United States, Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines, and reflect first on its own diplomatic blunders.”