

Colonel Philippe D. Rogers USMC
Testimony before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on China's Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices, and Tools
Statement on Tools of China's Statecraft: Military and Security
18 March 2008

I would like to thank the Commission for inviting me here to participate on this panel. I must begin with the following statement: The comments that I make today reflect my own personal views, and in no way represent the policies, positions or opinions of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Marine Corps.

First a disclaimer; I would like to bring to the Commission's attention that I am not a Sinologist or China expert. That being said, I did spend over a year studying a particular niche of Chinese engagement at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, last year; specifically China's multifaceted, coordinated diplomatic, economic and military engagement in Africa. This interest stemmed from my participation in a United Nations Peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) from 2000-2001 where I served alongside Chinese peacekeepers. This encounter with Chinese officers introduced me to the (surprising) level of Chinese presence in Africa. The results of my year-long dedication to this narrow subject at the War College are captured in two articles that were recently published. If the members of the Commission are interested in these articles for further background reading or for reference purposes, I point you to the summer 2007 issue of the Naval War College Review for my article on *China and U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Africa*, and to the 2007 Joint Forces Quarterly fall issue for my article on *Countering Chinese Influence in Africa*. I will leave several copies for the Commission that I have brought with me today but they can also be easily found on the web.

In the Commission's written invitation to come speak here today, four questions were listed: *How does China use military cooperation, including arms sales, peacekeeping operations and security relationships to advance its foreign policy goals? To whom is China exporting arms, and what is it selling? Do China's arm sales and foreign military education play a role in expanding China's global influence, and how do these activities correspond to China's foreign policy goals? And lastly: What is the status of China's military cooperation with Burma, Sudan, Iran, Venezuela and North Korea and how does this cooperation affect U.S. security interests globally?* The first three I can answer with varying degrees of specificity with respect to Africa. However, I believe the true value I can provide this Commission, in the context of my responses, is by using Africa as a case study to demonstrate how China uses "package dealing" as a "full on supplier" to effect inroads and security cooperation. The fourth question I cannot directly speak to; however, I will show you how other countries, to include some of the ones you have listed, are using China's example to establish similar diplomatic, economic, and military inroads into Africa.

Growing Chinese Influence in Africa, a Case Study:

While the United States has been preoccupied with global challenges to its security since 2001, China has quietly, steadily, and pervasively increased its influence in Africa, altering the strategic context of this important continent. It has used what it calls an "independent foreign policy" (a term Beijing uses to denote independence from American power) to achieve this, seeking diplomatic, military, and economic influence in

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African nations in exchange for unconditional foreign aid, regardless of the benefiting country's human rights record or political practices. Although advantageous to China, this foreign policy arguably undermines U.S. objectives intended to promote good governance, market reform, and regional security and stability while concomitantly diminishing U.S. influence in Africa. China's relationships with Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, for instance, have enabled these countries to ignore international pressure, and have frustrated efforts to isolate, coerce, or reform them. Left unchecked, China's growing influence will likely facilitate similar behavior from other African countries, stymieing U.S. efforts in Africa and leading to friction, if not outright conflict, between China and the United States.

Current U.S. power and influence are historically unique in their all-encompassing, dominant nature; only hindsight will tell if current strategic gambles furthered this power and influence or precipitated their decline. In this vein, while American foreign policy remains predominantly focused on the Global War on Terrorism, the United States must anticipate future security challenges from emerging threats or competitors. The fast rising, "candidate superpower" China, no longer able "to hide its ambitions and disguise its claws," has matched its meteoric growth with an expansive global policy that strongly resembles what John Mearsheimer would call "offensive realism." As offensive realism suggests, China's yearning for power is manifest not only by its invigorated external focus and more aggressive international policies, but also by "its opportunistic creation of strategic counterbalances designed to increase its influence and limit that of the United States." This increasing Chinese influence (influence defined as the ability to control other actors through the use of power) is nowhere more evident than in Africa.

Africa's emergence as a continent of strategic importance is not surprising considering its vast resources and future potential. China's national objectives (economic expansion, increased international prestige, a unified China and Taiwan, and domestic stability) directly or indirectly fuel its keen interest in Africa.

China's explosive economic expansion is fueling its "go global policy." Its voracious appetite for resources forces it to look externally, driving it to "lock up" future energy sources for its anticipated needs. Currently, 25 percent of China's oil comes from Africa. China's economic expansion also requires other valuable natural resources, thereby fueling a continuous search for new markets.

Diplomatically, China seeks international support and prestige by creating close ties with developing nations. Likewise, China uses its position as the sole "developing" United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent member to great advantage by championing smaller countries and their causes. China also goes to great lengths to build international diplomatic inertia to counter recognized statehood for Taiwan. With 54 countries, Africa represents a rich source of future international support for Chinese endeavors.

If successfully realized, the above listed objectives support Chinese domestic stability and security (internal unrest historically being its greatest de-stabilizer) by reinforcing the legitimacy of Communist Party control.

China's growing influence in Africa is surprising in its intensity, pervasiveness, and commitment across the breadth of traditional instruments of power. While the United States is strategically focused elsewhere, China deftly uses a combination of tools,

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enticements, and devices to achieve this influence. Not tethered by pressing security concerns that threaten its existence and blessed with an explosive economy, China leverages its instruments of power in the pursuit of overseas objectives.

China's primary instrument in securing these objectives is its "independent foreign policy." Succinctly, it offers financial aid with no political strings attached. To developing African nations, wary of former colonial masters or superpowers who offer stipulation-based aid, China's willingness to offer assistance without condition is a welcome respite. Although recipients of Chinese largesse understand this undercuts international attempts to induce reform, the attraction of immediate, lucrative, and always-needed investment is too tempting to ignore. In return, China asks for preferential consideration for economic opportunities.

Equally enticing to African nations is China's support from an international perspective. China only recently became comfortable in its "liberal internationalist skin," but it has since learned how to adroitly wield its weight. China leverages close ties cultivated with developing African nations, its UNSC status appealing to less fortunate countries who welcome the apparently equal partnership China offers.

China is also successful as a "full on supplier" of "package deals." It not only seeks new markets and preferred trade, but offers a full range of aid to include military advisors and sales, infrastructure development, medical support and programs, debt relief, low or no interest loans, free trade agreements, education and technical assistance, industrial hardware and software, cultural exchanges, and preferred tourism. It offers these through a combination of private and public (state sponsored) ventures, with Chinese state and provincial representatives armed to low bid contracts, even if at a loss.

Diplomatically, China has formal relations with 47 African countries. During the last six years, Chinese President Hintao and other high level emissaries made repeated trips to Africa while over 40 African country delegations traveled to China. China is also heavily engaged in African regional organizations, and its diplomatic delegations often outnumber combined European and American representatives. In 2006, China hosted an economic forum of 48 African ministerial delegations. It has also built and paid for African embassies in Beijing to ensure their countries' representation.

Economically, China has trade relations with 49 African countries and bilateral trade agreements with the majority of them. The Chinese-African Economic Forum, created in 2000, is an economic windfall for China and its partners. Gross Africa-China trade totaled \$10.6 billion in 2000, \$40 billion in 2005, and is forecasted to surpass \$100 billion in 2010. China instituted seven Trade and Investment Promotion Centers throughout Africa to serve as regional economic engagement focal points, and 700 Chinese companies operate in 49 African countries. Besides heavily investing in extractive industries, China is currently building infrastructure capacity throughout Africa to include dams, railways, port improvements, highways, stadiums, and pipelines. It has lucrative oil contracts with Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan, and there are Chinese trading and manufacturing enclaves throughout Africa specializing in textiles, fishing, and other commerce.

Militarily, China made significant arms sales to Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, and developed a burgeoning small arms

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manufacturing capability in Sudan. China is also a significant contributor to African U.N. peacekeeping missions, and as of January 2008 there were 1,452 Chinese military personnel deployed to eight different peacekeeping operations. Collectively, these actions of a coherent strategy have brought China significant influence in Africa.

China and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa:

China's unofficial initial foray into UN peacekeeping missions began in 1989, sending non-military experts on an observer basis to the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group to oversee that country's general election. In 1990, China dispatched military observers to the Middle East in support of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, marking the beginning of its official participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Today, China sends more peacekeepers to more UN missions than any other permanent member of the UNSC. As of January 2008, it had over 1,963 military or police personnel deployed to 13 UN missions. In comparison to China, France has 1,803 personnel in 12 missions, the United Kingdom 366 in 11 missions; the United States 320 in 10 missions; and Russia 291 in 13. Of the 119 nations contributing 90,883 personnel to 18 peacekeeping missions worldwide, China ranks 12th overall (France, 15th; United Kingdom, 40th; United States, 43rd; and Russia, 45th). In fairness to other UNSC permanent members, China's dues represent only three percent of the UN budget (the U.S. share is 22 percent), but its willingness to support UN peacekeeping missions with the low density/high demand commodity of personnel paints China as a "responsible stakeholder" on the international stage. This willingness as a permanent member to contribute a high number of personnel also lends important credibility to the very missions the UNSC approves.

Considering its slow start, China has certainly made up for its initial lack of peacekeeping involvement since 1989. It has contributed not only UN military observers (UNMOs), but engineer battalions, police units, medical teams, and transportation companies. In fact, it has committed itself to permanently providing "one UN standard engineering battalion, one UN standard medical team, and two UN standard transportation companies to ongoing missions" – essentially establishing its own designated expeditionary capability niche. Chinese UNMOs are usually officers selected or volunteered from various specialties and backgrounds. Intelligence, logistics, infantry and personnel officers from various staffs in the Beijing area are often selected to support these roles. Chinese police units, medical teams and transportation companies deploying to UN peacekeeping missions are drawn from various military regions, and these type units have deployed to various missions alone or in some combination. Tours normally last eight months to one year before units or personnel are relieved and replaced. China has clearly established itself as a credible UN peacekeeping contributor, reversing an earlier trend of non-participation, but what brought this sea change about? One of the main reasons for the dramatic upswing in Chinese peacekeeping contributions owes its start to the PLA actions in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The events of Tiananmen damaged the ties developed between the PLA and the people of China since the revolution in 1949. To reestablish the congenial relationship between the broader society and itself, the PLA determined that it needed to take efforts to restore its military

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prestige in the eyes of society and the world. These actions included disaster relief, domestic security and other measures, but also, very importantly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

China's attitude change with respect to UN peacekeeping missions is captured in its own Defense White Paper, *China's National Defense in 2004*. In a chapter entitled International Security Cooperation, in a section entitled Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, it specifically lays out its position on peacekeeping missions: *China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations that are consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter. It maintains that the UN peacekeeping operations should abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter and other universally recognized principles governing peacekeeping operations. China will continue to support the reform of the UN peacekeeping missions, hoping to further strengthen the UN capability in preserving peace.*

This section is unique when compared to other permanent members' national defense strategies which do not specifically list involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and do not classify them under Theater Security Cooperation, an important distinction.

China is currently involved in eight of the nine UN missions taking place in Africa. These missions are in the Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the DROC (MONUC), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Darfur (UNAMID), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO). It is not currently involved in MINURCAT, the mission in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Chinese have also been involved in past missions in Namibia 1989-1990 (UNTAG); Mozambique 1993-1994 (ONUMOZ); Liberia 1993-1997 (UNOMIL); Burundi 2004 (ONUB); and both past Sierra Leone missions, 1998-1999 (UNOMSIL) and 1999-2005 (UNAMSIL). China's participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (1,452 personnel) outweighs its total contributions elsewhere (511). This reflects its keen interest in peacekeeping efforts in Africa, and it has expressed to the UN that enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa in order to meet ongoing challenges to security and stability is a priority.

China's Africa Policy, as defined by *China's African Policy: A White Paper*, specifically addresses its desire for "enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries" as part of "an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace," and that it will "continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa." *China's African Policy*, specifically mentions UN peacekeeping as one of its security cooperation tools, similar to the *Defense White Paper*. It states that, "it will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa," and that it will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa" as part of "Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa."

The following breakdown of specific Chinese contingents in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa highlights their accomplishments and contributions.

The seven Chinese UNMOs in the UNOCI mission (Cote D'Ivoire) form part of a larger force comprising over 8,990 total uniformed personnel charged with monitoring the

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cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of military personnel and militias.

In MONUC (DROC), 234 Chinese troops and UNMOs serve alongside 18,410 total uniformed personnel and are charged with “deploying and maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence; discourage violence, by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process; and allow United Nations personnel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of DROC.” The Chinese have sent multiple rotations of troops and UNMOs to this mission to include engineer companies of 175 personnel and medical platoons of 40 personnel serving eight-month tours.

In UNMEE (Eritrea and Ethiopia), seven Chinese UNMOs serve with 2,280 military personnel monitoring the cessation of hostilities and assisting in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed between the two countries.

In UNMIL (Liberia), the Chinese contingent is composed of 581 troops serving as part of a 15,200-military personnel mission tasked with observing and monitoring the implementation of a ceasefire agreement and investigating ceasefire violations, and establishing and maintaining continuous liaison with all Liberian military forces. Past deployments of Chinese personnel to Liberia have been very successful and Chinese peacekeepers are on their fourth tour to the country. For instance, the 1st PLA Construction Engineer Company from Shenyang Military Region, a medical team from the Nanjing Military Region, and a transportation team from the General Logistics Department deployed in 2003-2004. The Construction Company was actually a reserve water supply company which underwent a three-month training period before deploying. These units built a 1200-kilometer road, four camps, two parking aprons, 21 bridges, and leveled off over 70,000 square meters of ground. The medical team treated over 2,300 outpatients, hospitalized over 250 people and operated on 50 persons. The transportation team moved over 30,000 tons of logistics and over 70,000 people. China has cumulatively sent over 2,243 peacekeepers to Liberia to date.

In UNMIS (Sudan), 466 Chinese serve as part of a 9,980-military personnel mission to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by all warring parties. Laiyang in Shandong Province sent a 275-man engineer detachment, a 100-person transportation detachment, and 60-man medical detachment in 2005. Their principal mission was to construct roads, bridges, airports; provide water and power supply; and transport personnel and water. There is a large Chinese presence in Sudan and it is not uncommon to see signs in Chinese along with Arabic and English in Sudan. This is complemented by the Chinese presence in the UNAMID Darfur mission, where 143 serve alongside 9,080 military personnel to contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur.

In UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone), one Chinese UNMO serves as part of a 278-person mission mandated to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in consolidating peace, strengthening democracy, and sustaining development.

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And, lastly, MINURSO (the mission I served in) counts 13 Chinese UNMOs serving alongside a force of 300 military and police personnel with a mandate to one day allow the people of the Western Sahara to determine their future (independence as a country or to be subsumed by Morocco) through a referendum.

So, the question: Chinese peacekeeping in Africa, why does it matter?

What are the Chinese gaining from this experience at different levels?

The strategic value China gains by peacekeeping in Africa

China's recent UN peacekeeping track record reinforces its role as a responsible stake holder in the international community, giving it more global influence. This influence is parlayed into prestige and clout, both of which are attractive lures to African countries, especially those inclined to search for alternative partnerships then those traditionally offered by Western nations.

Couple this with China's overarching strategic approach to Africa which features "an independent foreign policy," over \$2 billion in African aid to date with no apparent strings attached, and diplomatic, economic and military ties with 90 percent of Africa (unmarred by any colonial history in Africa), and it is clear that it is quietly but steadily building a significant presence on the continent.

The resultant influence China gains from African nation support in international fora is important to its "One China" policy; its energy future, commerce, and military-industrial complex; and for the advancement of its international agenda.

This mutually beneficial relationship is reinforced by China's participation in UN peacekeeping missions, a form of security cooperation to China as mentioned. The more China advocates and participates in UN peacekeeping missions, the more influence it creates with the regional organizations (e.g. the African Union) formulating Africa's future.

China has or is developing strong ties with the African nations in which it currently has UN peacekeepers deployed. This may be coincidental, but Beijing's disproportionately large contribution to African missions over others hints otherwise. As demonstrated, China has a vested interest in the strategic security and stability of the African continent, and its involvement in peacekeeping missions should be expected to continue.

The operational value China gains by peacekeeping in Africa

With little power projection capability and a policy not focused on overseas deployments at the present time, UN peacekeeping operations represent one of the most important ways China can gain valuable overseas operational experience. With these deployments, the Chinese gain exposure to the operational practices and methods of foreign military forces as well. The knowledge gained also has several benefits in the form of operational logistics, multinational operations, combat and civil engineering, and a working knowledge of the operational environment to which they are deployed.

Moving a battalion or large echelon of personnel overseas with all of the pre-deployment training, support requirements, and logistics required is not a simple feat. Operating in a hostile or austere environment is also challenging, and the preventive medicine and security measures necessary to safeguard the force are not intuitive. The value gained by being on the ground of a foreign territory for an extended period cannot be easily duplicated, and experiences such as this are more valuable and practical than any other

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foreign area training imaginable. Unit cohesion is also an immediate benefit of any unit that deploys together overseas. The fact that Chinese units are redeploying multiple times to Africa means they are building a ready force of African operational experts – *something the United States does not have.*

This last point is very important. PRC troop deployments in support of UN missions such as those in DROC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan are giving Beijing an advantage in operationally deploying to these vastly different and challenging countries. This includes invaluable knowledge gained about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communication, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local atmospherics and modus operandi, and on how to sustain forces in Africa over prolonged periods. Chinese UNMOs who command at any level of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa are privy to a unique operational opportunity few non-African officers in the world can duplicate. This alone is an invaluable operational commodity derived from UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

The tactical value China gains by peacekeeping in Africa

Chinese peacekeepers who serve in Africa on UN missions also enjoy a unique opportunity as well: nothing can replace boots on the ground knowledge gained from such missions. Any UNMO who has GPS-navigated across thousands of kilometers of desert, talked to local Bedouin, and survived the harsh weather extremes and challenging austerity of the Sahara, will have a decided advantageous knowledge of that operational environment. Besides the local Africa lessons learned, the knowledge gained from these missions might well have applications elsewhere in other overseas deployments, whether UN-related or not.

Repeated deployments to UN missions in Africa by China will enable the PLA to build an extensive knowledge base. A Chinese major who served with me in the MINURSO mission in the Western Sahara returned to Africa in 2007 for another one-year deployment, this time as a colonel serving in Sudan. He has likely already exponentially increased his knowledge base over me on all things pertaining to African operational missions.

Now imagine the thousand personnel China is rotating through missions every year in support of UN peacekeeping in Africa; this effort is outpacing Washington's efforts dedicated to operations in Africa. Conceivably, the United States will one day turn to the Chinese military to ask them for help and expertise for missions in Africa.

The Ramifications of Chinese Influence in Africa

Chinese and American influence in Africa is not a zero-sum game in the near term; however, the long term stakes are high with respect to strategic objectives. U.S. strategic objectives in Africa are intended to promote good governance, market reform, and stability and security, which in turn helps limit the spread of the GWOT and maintain U.S. access to the continent. China's influence, gained through its independent foreign policy, ostensibly undermines U.S. attempts to effect positive change in Africa and achieve its strategic objectives. If China's influence in Africa grows without a concomitant counterbalancing increase in U.S. influence, the United States risks losing strategic flexibility and freedom of action on the continent.

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The conflicts in Sudan and Zimbabwe demonstrate China's willingness to circumvent, if not completely ignore, international pressure and underscore the potential injuriousness of its actions and the ramifications to U.S. policy in Africa.

As you know, Sudan's internal conflict has been roiling for decades. This seemingly intractable domestic conflict with age-old roots has become genocidal in nature and the international community, collectively sworn not to allow another Rwanda-type massacre, is finding solutions to be elusive. Worsening the situation is China's refusal to yield to international pressure and condemn Sudanese actions, citing Sudan's right to govern its own internal affairs irrespective of the ongoing genocide (falling back on its "independent foreign policy" disclamation). The disturbing reality is that China is heavily invested in Sudan whence 20 percent of its African oil comes, and Chinese oil firms are deeply entrenched. Over 10,000 Chinese workers and 4,000 Chinese paramilitary live and work in the Sudan. Instead of using its considerable influence in Sudan to call for a solution, China has, until very recently, cast a blind eye on Sudanese inaction and complicity - all but endorsing its actions. Chinese refusal to more directly address the situation in Sudan is a contributing reason for ineffective U.N. resolutions and the failure of international pressure to work.

The injurious effects of China's implicit support to Sudan are many, manifest not only in Sudan's ability to ignore international outcry or its perceived imperviousness to sanction, but in the resultant destabilizing effects the genocide is having on neighboring states. Both Chad and the Central African Republic, two fragile countries that can ill-afford destructive influences, are being affected by Sudan's internal unrest.

In the case of Zimbabwe, currently subject to U.S. and European Union sanctions, China openly backs President Mugabe despite his human rights record, corrupt regime, and internal unrest that are affecting regional stability. China sold Zimbabwe over \$200 million in military arms, signed lucrative contracts for resources, and provided it with much-needed financial and international support. As Mugabe exclaimed, "As long as China walks with Zimbabwe, it will never walk alone."

China's questionable relationship with Zimbabwe challenges U.S. and international attempts to isolate such regimes and weakens the impact of policies geared to encourage the better future for African countries envisioned in our National Security Strategy. There are many other examples of Chinese actions enabling African nations to flout international pressure, to include countries in which the United States has considerable interest, such as Angola and Kenya. These are not isolated instances for China, but instead demonstrate a determined pattern of enabling behavior brought about by its foreign policy. As China continues to expand operations in Africa, the likelihood of Chinese and American policies clashing in the future will increase, possibly forcing underlying tensions into open conflict.

China's inroads into Africa: A model of success for other nations?

Right or wrong, Africa has historically been viewed as Europe's back yard, its contemporary landscape having been shaped by aggressive colonialism by the latter. The vestiges of this colonial history remain, with varying degrees, and still largely shape the prism through which we look at security cooperation with African nations today. The United States' cyclical interest in Africa has risen and fallen since World War II based

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upon Africa's strategic relevance and within the context of international shifting balances of power. China actually has a long trading relationship with African nations, dating back to the Middle Ages. More recently, Maoist-driven revolutionary movements in the 50s and 60s elicited Chinese backing and supplying of arms which proved largely ineffectual (the exception being China's early backing of Zimbabwe's winning side). However, what China is doing today is fresh and bold, representing a type of engagement that is enticing to African nations weary and wary of their older ties. China has experienced local backlashes to some of its methods in Africa, but for the moment it has gained significant momentum and seized the strategic initiative. Anthony Lake, in the Council for Foreign Relations study entitled, *More than Humanitarianism*, captures this sentiment with the following words:

China comes to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for natural resources but also with the financial resources and political influence to pursue its objectives vigorously. China has altered the strategic context in Africa.

Other nations are watching China's methods and the successes it has registered. In the same report I cited above, and in other sources, there is strong evidence of countries that are adopting the same tactics with their own successes in a new "scramble for Africa." These countries include India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and North Korea. Although Africa as a continent is immense, we will find ourselves in the future bumping into this same shortlist of actors in the same countries due to similar, competing interests.

We're going to wake up one day wondering how these nations managed to gain so much influence in Africa, seemingly overnight. We need only look at China's example in Africa to understand how this influence is being manifested. This is happening under our watch, Gentlemen.

With that, I complete my prepared remarks, and look forward to answering any questions that the Commission may have for me.
Thank you.