I thank the Commission for the opportunity to testify in front of you today.

At this point, based on the amount of resources dedicated to the military and the apparent operations tempo of the force, I characterize China’s military modernization to be proceeding at a moderate, but deliberate, pace.¹ In the great budget debate, I come down on the side that actual defense expenditure for the entire force is about two to two and a half times the official announced defense budget. I do not know what proportion of that budget is dedicated to the ground forces, but compared to modern, technologically-advanced armies, the PLA ground forces remain under funded for a force their size to be equipped suitably for their various missions and to conduct adequate training to prepare them for such operations.

As I will try to explain, I estimate that while a small proportion of the ground force is currently capable of projecting force outside of Chinese territory, the size of the force would need to continue to be cut and expenditures increased, not by tens of percentage points, but by hundreds of percentage points annually, in order to build a truly significant ground force capable of fighting beyond China’s borders in the next decade. The bottom line question PLA planners must answer for themselves is how much ground force capability is enough, at what expense and in what timeframe, in order to accomplish the missions set before them by the leadership of the Party and the state.

Following the advice of Michael Pillsbury given at a conference at the U.S. National Defense University in October 2000, I also will try to put some of my observations about the PLA into perspective by comparing them to other forces – in this case, I will often compare developments in the Chinese ground forces to those in the United States Army,² since we are most familiar with the U.S. military and the U.S. military can be considered as close to a "state-of-the art" 21st century military force as there currently exists.³ I do this, however, without any intent to imply which force would be more capable in a head-to-head confrontation between the two.

General Assumptions underlying Chinese Military Modernization

Barring a major unexpected, external threat or the collapse domestic stability, several factors that have guided the PLA modernization program over the past decade will likely continue into the foreseeable future:

• National defense will continue to be subordinated to national economic construction, though as China grows richer, the military will expect to receive an appropriate and growing slice of the economic pie. This means that overall military modernization will remain a long-term goal, targeted for achievement in mid-century rather than in the next decade.
• Military budgets, while likely to expand on roughly the scale they have since the late 1990s, will not be increased so much that significant resources are diverted from economic construction.
• The modernization of missile, naval, and air forces will receive higher priority than the ground forces because of 1) their leading roles in Local Wars under Modern High Technology Conditions and 2) the emphasis on deterring Taiwan’s movement to independence as the PLA’s primary military planning contingency.
• Nevertheless, defense of the Chinese mainland and deterrence of foreign invaders will continue to be a major planning factor, which will result in the likely continued predominance of ground force officers in senior military leadership positions. China perceives that it must maintain a significant ground force to provide for conventional deterrence and defense of the mainland.⁴
• PLA ground forces will also remain the ultimate guarantor of domestic stability and Chinese Communist Party survival should the civilian police and paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) fail to maintain internal security. Professional military officers do not seek this role, but the Chinese leadership expends great effort to ensure the loyalty of the PLA to the Party, which in their minds is also loyalty to the country.⁵

Six General Trends

By the late 1990s, six general trends that had developed since the Persian Gulf War were apparent in the Chinese military modernization program.⁶

• Active duty PLA forces will become quantitatively smaller, with an emphasis on technological quality.
• Reserves and the People’s Armed Police will increase in size.⁷
• The PLA will retain many existing weapons and attempt to develop new tactics and techniques to defeat a high-technology enemy.
• Only limited amounts of foreign weapons and equipment will be introduced into the forces; the indigenous Chinese defense industry will be the source of the majority of modern weapons.
• Capabilities will emphasize rapid response and joint operations, focusing on precision attack, air operations, naval operations, information warfare, and space operations.
• Command and control organizations will be reorganized to better manage the requirements of future warfare.

These trends represent the strategic directions the PLA seeks to implement and can be deduced from Chinese publications and speeches. There is no guarantee that the PLA will be successful in achieving all their goals, or that if achieved the results will transform the PLA into a force capable of accomplishing all its missions of deterrence and defense. Of course, the speed and direction of Chinese military modernization may change if the perceived threat to China changes and/or if much larger sums of money are devoted to the task.

If current trends proceed for the next ten years roughly as they have in the past decade, the PLA will continue to be a force composed of a mix of low, medium, and high technology units. Modern equipment will enter the force in limited amounts while the PLA improves its education and training standards. The PLA prefers to "let qualified personnel wait for the arrival of equipment rather than let equipment wait for qualified personnel to operate it."⁸ At the same time China will strive to improve its information warfare capabilities and capitalize on its traditions of speed, stealth, operational security, and deception.

Some Basic "Known" and "Unknown" Elements

Any specific discussion of the relationship between the PLA ground forces and the Chinese defense budget is limited by a lack of transparency in the Chinese system and a lack of official, detailed information about both the force and the budget from which to draw conclusions. Let me begin by what is known.

Beijing has released two Defense White Papers, one in 1998 and the second in 2000.⁹ In October 2000, the White Paper gave the size of the PLA to be "less than 2.5 million," but did not give a breakdown of the force by ground, naval, air, or missile forces. It also listed the size and composition of defense expenditures for the years 1998 through 2000, but it did not break out what percentage of this announced budget figure was allotted to specific services of the military, such as the ground forces.

Since 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense has produced four Reports to Congress that address certain elements of Chinese military modernization that are very useful to analysts outside the government. The latest of these (June 2000) provides some specific figures, for example, 2.4 million for the size of the PLA, but it also lacks the detail about the budget and the ground forces necessary for outsiders to make informed judgments about many of the issues of concern to this Commission. Without access to better numbers from China or current U.S. government figures, I use data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 2001-02, except where noted, as the basis for the following analysis.

According to The Military Balance, currently the PLA has a personnel strength of about 2,310,000 of which about 70%, or 1.6 million, are ground forces. The ground forces underwent the bulk of the recent 500,000-man reduction, in which well over 400,000 soldiers were demobilized – and reductions appear to be continuing. ¹⁰

The United States Army presently is composed of about 477,000 soldiers, or about 35% of the total U.S. active duty strength of about 1,370,000. While we do not have figures for what percentage of Chinese military expenditure is allotted to the ground forces, the U.S. Army (which is about 30% of the size of the Chinese ground forces) has a 2002 budget projection of about $80 billion, or about 24% of the entire U.S. defense budget. ¹¹

Two elements of information that would help make an estimate of the ground forces part of the budget possible would be a pay scale table for the Chinese military and a breakdown of the numbers of personnel for each military rank (such information is readily available for U.S. forces). We simply do not know what a Chinese conscript or officer earns or how many privates, sergeants, lieutenants, or generals are in their army.

Comparing "Apples and Oranges"

Unfortunately, comparing Chinese ground force numbers to U.S. Army active duty numbers is not a valid comparison. I must confess, that in reading scores of articles and analyses of PLA capabilities, most of which focus on the size of the standing force, not one foreign observer has taken into consideration a fact revealed by the 1998 Chinese Defense White Paper: "Different from many other countries, China includes…civil cadres…in the overall strength of the PLA." In other words, uniformed civilians in the PLA are considered as active duty soldiers.¹²

The United States does not include its civilian personnel as part of the active duty end-strength. If it did, and U.S. personnel numbers were calculated as are Chinese numbers, the overall Department of Defense would total about 2.04 million and the U.S. Army about 705,000.

Both countries include the costs of civilian personnel in their defense budgets. When both the "apples and oranges" of the PLA and the U.S. armed forces are counted, the overall manpower strengths of the two countries are no longer as far apart as some analysis would suggest.

Reductions Continue, but the Reserves and PAP Expand

If The Military Balance is correct, the active duty strength of the Chinese military is continuing to be reduced beyond the 500,000 announced by Jiang Zemin in September 1997. How low the personnel strength will go is unknown.

In my opinion, the PLA could cut active duty ground forces in half from its current level and not decrease its overall combat effectiveness against a foreign foe, especially if it were allowed to retain its current budget and apply the same amount of money to this smaller force. However, Beijing is unlikely to further reduce the ground forces as much as I estimate is feasible.

There is a certain floor beneath which the Chinese leadership will not be willing to reduce the size of the ground forces. Among the factors used to determine this minimum force size may be:

• China is a continental nation, which, by its own count, borders "more than 20 countries, either contiguous or separated by stretches of sea."¹³ Chinese leaders believe that PLA forces must be positioned throughout the country in numbers sufficient for both deterrence and defense. The difficult terrain in many border areas, a ground transportation network still under development, and limited military air transport slows down the rapid movement of large numbers of troops among widely separated Military Regions. Thus, it is likely that PLA planners will want to ensure that some amount of ground formations are stationed in all corners of the country.
• In addition to conventional military threats that could exist on China’s border, leaders in Beijing also perceive a cross-border or internal threat from "terrorists" or "separatists" which could require the use of PLA forces. For example, in November, Vice Premier Qian Qichen is reported to have told UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson that about 1,000 Chinese Uygurs have been trained in Afghan terrorist camps. Traditional infantry units, which need not be equipped with a lot of high technology equipment, can be effective against this type of threat. PAP forces can also be used in these operations.
• Large formations of the PLA (and the reserves and PAP) are useful to the central and local civilian leadership structures to be employed as "strike forces" in the event of natural disasters in rescue, relief, and humanitarian missions. A manpower-intensive, but organized, mobile, and disciplined, force is suitable for such contingencies. These missions also help improve the image of the PLA in the minds of the Chinese populace.
• China’s leaders may also choose to maintain larger forces than required by military necessity in order to provide jobs for mostly rural youth who otherwise might be unemployed or underemployed and thus a potential for instability.

Chinese military leaders must find the proper balance between active duty and reserve forces for their missions in the 21st century. Properly trained reserves can fulfill many of the tasks listed above, at a fraction of the cost of active duty forces. Many demobilized soldiers appear to be assigned to newly formed units of the reserve force. Much of the older equipment that is being retired from the PLA can be expected to be assigned to the reserve force. Doctrine for integrating the reserves with the active forces likely is under development.

As the ground forces get smaller and equipped with more advanced equipment, they will require more time to train in order to perfect the PLA’s new war fighting doctrine. These operations, which incorporate Special Operations Forces (SOF), helicopters, and armored formations, will be more expensive and harder on equipment than the infantry-heavy operations of the past. Many of the tactics and techniques used on the modern battlefield are not applicable to domestic security operations.

As the active duty PLA contracts in size, the PAP is expanding, with estimates varying from one million to 1.5 million.¹⁴ The PAP internal defense forces are basically truck-mobile, light infantry without most of the heavy equipment operated by its PLA brethren. These paramilitary units cost much less to equip and train than do PLA units. For a Chinese leadership that is very worried about domestic stability, a larger PAP can provide a more cost-effective tool for maintaining domestic stability than does a huge standing army. With specialized equipment and proper training, a capable PAP may be able to avert the needless killings that occurred in 1989 in protest situations that have been a common occurrence in recent years and surely will continue in the future.

New Capabilities will be Expensive

Of the $6.2 billion in deliveries of military equipment from Russia that China received from 1993 to 2000,¹⁵ the ground forces got a few dozen helicopters and SA-15 surface-to-air missile systems. I would not be surprised if some anti-tank weapons and precision munitions for artillery were also included, as well as a few other items. However, the majority of this expenditure was devoted to China’s air and naval forces.

The Chinese defense industries have also provided the ground forces with new equipment, most notably limited numbers of several types of helicopters and a few Type 98 main battle tanks. However, the actual numbers of this new equipment appear to be small for such a large standing force.

As the PLA ground forces transform from an infantry and towed artillery-heavy force into one better suited for mobile, joint and combined arms operations, the weapons and equipment required will be considerably more expensive than in the past, especially if the Chinese defense industries charge the PLA market-value for equipment acquisitions. Expenses for ammunition, fuel, and maintenance will also increase dramatically, as will the cost of realistic training exercises. Savings that result from personnel and force structure reductions and the retirement of old equipment will not be enough to adequately fund a smaller, more technologically advanced ground force. I will use just two data points to illustrate how expensive a modernized ground force can be.

Main Battle Tanks

According to the last two Military Balances, China has somewhere between 7,000 and 8,000 main battle tanks, the majority of which (around 5,000) are the vintage Type 59 series that were purchased under the old central-planning system.¹⁶ While there are also up to a thousand additional more advanced models (Type 80 and Type 88), for the October 1, 1999 military parade, the ground forces could display only 10 of the newest Type 98 tanks, which appeared to be of a generation similar to the Soviet/Russian T-72. It can be assumed that the Chinese defense industries are producing more of this model as it is introduced into the force. The cost of the Type 98, purchased under market-economic rules, will be many times higher than the older models it will replace.

It is extremely unlikely that the new PLA will ever have as many newer model tanks as it did Type 59s. Yet, the actual cost of the new fleet will be much higher than whatever was spent in the past. Just for comparison sake, there are approximately 7,600 M-1 series tanks in the U.S. Army. The cost of maintaining and training this force is obviously a significant portion of the Army budget and the investment many times greater than what has been made in the PLA tank force.

Army Aviation

In the mid-80s, Beijing made the decision to create an army helicopter force. The first units were introduced in the late 80s, and now according to The Military Balance there are 12 army aviation regiments found in the PLA.¹⁷ Using figures supplied by my colleague Luke Colton, the total number of rotary-wing aircraft in the ground forces is currently about 244 of all types, not all of which would be deemed operational.¹⁸ These 244 aircraft are spread among the 12 units throughout the country, averaging about 20 helicopters per unit.¹⁹

The implications of this sort of deployment are readily apparent: only an extremely limited number of aircraft are available at any one time and place for training. Therefore, only relatively small numbers of units of relatively small size (company to battalion size) have the opportunity to train in what we would call "airmobile" operations. Luke estimates that at the end of the decade the helicopter force may reach about 400 – still a very small number compared to the expected size of the ground force.²⁰

Again, for comparison sake, the U.S. Army currently has approximately 4,700 helicopters in the active duty forces. The opportunities, and indeed the requirement, for infantry units to train in airmobile operations are obviously much higher in our forces than for the PLA. Plus, we have been conducting these operations for about 40 years now. Without knowing the exact figures, one can imagine the cost for the maintenance and training of such a large helicopter fleet. Clearly the PLA has not invested even a small fraction of what the United States Army has in helicopter operations.

Eventual PLA Force Structure will be Much More Expensive

By using these two examples, I do not mean to imply that the PLA will structure or employ its ground force in a manner similar to U.S. forces. Helicopter and tank units are only two important pieces among the many elements needed for ground force mobility and firepower. China will build its own force based on its perceived needs and resources available. Rather, I use these examples simply to illustrate how much more expensive a modern force, however constructed, will be to equip and train than the old-style infantry-heavy PLA.

As far as I can tell, the Chinese investment in ground force modernization has been on the scale of several tens of billions of dollars over the past decade. In order to create a force approaching the size and technical sophistication that the United States built in the 1980s, a country would need to spend more on the scale of hundreds of billions of dollars over several years.

If China decided to divert that scale of resources to the modernization of its ground forces, then such spending would be apparent first in the civilian projects it would have to slow down or eliminate in order to fund such a program. Then, after the equipment is purchased, the training necessary to prepare the troops to actually operate their new weapons at peak effectiveness would also be readily apparent to outside observers.

Improvements have been Made

An htmect of PLA ground force modernization that has received little attention is the widespread introduction of trucks to the infantry forces over the past 15 years.²¹ PLA infantry units now have organic ground transportation that allows them to move their men and supplies much more rapidly overland than in the foot-mobile infantry days. This relatively low-tech, low cost improvement gives the PLA much greater mobility and flexibility than two decades ago.

The force structure adjustments of the past decade, the implementation of a new fighting doctrine, the introduction of new training plans and methods, as well as the new equipment that has entered the force, have without a doubt improved the PLA’s operational capabilities. Exactly how capable the PLA is today, or will be in 10 years, will only be proven in combat operations – something the PLA has not conducted for an extended period of time against an external force for over 20 years. Unfortunately, if asked to predict the PLA’s current or future combat capabilities, the only true answer I could give is "it depends on the situation."

With limited air and sea transport available for force projection,²² if ordered to conduct military operations, Chinese military planners will select their objectives carefully to maximize surprise, speed, and deception in their operations. Even with a large manpower advantage on paper, the PLA would seek to concentrate combat power at decisive or vulnerable points that would not necessarily require the movement of large numbers of troops. Chinese operators would probably use the activities of its large forces to disguise the movements of fewer, smaller elements that are likely to be employed. Those who predict the massive use of PLA manpower in the initial stages of future combat operations probably are underestimating the intellectual capabilities of Chinese military planners.

It seems reasonable to conclude that PLA planners would be more confident of their abilities the closer to their borders and the less technically advanced their foes are. However, the farther away from China the PLA must project force, and more technologically advanced the enemy, the less confident Chinese planners would be in their ability to conduct operations successfully with existing forces. In other words, in some circumstances against some foes, China’s large ground force mostly equipped with older weapons would be militarily effective. Without taking into account political factors, ²³ the chart below helps illustrate why the various countries in the region and the world can have different perceptions of the military threat posed by China.

No matter what the situation, should the PLA be ordered to conduct military operations, I believe the PLA will follow the orders of its state and Party leaders and attempt to employ its forces in the optimal manner possible. Since PLA planners know the true state of the readiness of their forces, I also believe that the methods they would use will probably to some extent surprise even knowledgeable foreign observers. Nevertheless, I still cannot predict their chance of success.

Things to Watch For

As highlighted above, the growth and training of the PLA’s armored forces and helicopter units are important to be monitored in the coming years. These forces are often part of what have been identified as "Rapid Reaction Units," which comprise a small (but growing) proportion of the force and are found in all Military Regions.

Just as important to monitor is the growth of the air and naval assets that would project these forces beyond China’s borders and the training exercises that demonstrate the PLA’s ability to move forces from one Military Region to another. Ground force units are known to have moved personnel by air into Tibet on normal troop rotations and there have been reports of moving a division headquarters by aircraft as well. But to my knowledge, the PLA has not yet moved large ground force units and their major weapons and equipment in an exercise situation using PLA Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft. ²⁴ This sort of heavy lift operation would be an important part of many force projection scenarios.

Special Operations Forces are one element of the ground forces that have been emphasized in the past decade and will likely be a major ground force contribution to any Local War scenario. SOF units should currently be considered capable of being deployed beyond China’s borders with existing PLA Air Force or army aviation assets. (The 300 Y-5 biplanes in the PLAAF would be an appropriate mode of delivery for small SOF teams.) Some Chinese SOF units may have grown out of previously existing reconnaissance units, but others are likely to have been recently formed in addition to the pre-existing recon units. Still, it is likely that these SOF soldiers so far number only in the low thousands.

New equipment inevitably will continue to be introduced into the ground forces. However, it is very difficult for outsiders to determine the extent to which the new gear has been issued to the forces. News reports, especially internet sources, and sales promotion material describing new systems produced weapons manufactured by the Chinese defense industries should be read with a note of caution. Often a few weapons or vehicles of one sort or another are produced, photographed, and offered for foreign sales. A few prototypes may be tested by the forces and the implication is made that the weapons are in service in the PLA. Many of these weapons never actually are deployed to the forces in any significant number. The many variations and modifications of weapons and the various nomenclatures that they are known by compound the confusion.

Final Thoughts

The modernization of the Chinese ground forces deserves careful monitoring and examination by the United States and China’s neighbors. The debate in America about "the China threat" would be better served if both the governments of the United States and China released more information about Chinese military modernization.

Contact between the defense establishments of the both countries is essential for greater understanding of China’s modernization. Many questions of interest to the Commission can be answered, at least in part, through direct contact with the PLA itself.

It is my experience that when overall relations between the United States and China are good, military to military ties also improve and the PLA is granted permission to allow US attachés and visitors greater access to PLA personnel and facilities.²⁵ But we also need to be mindful of what can be realistically expected out of the mil-to-mil relationship. There are many examples that illustrate that one or two meetings between high ranking officials will not produce the kinds of personal relationships that often occur with other militaries and can be called upon in times of emergency.

In conclusion, while I have used U.S. forces as a point of comparison, I hope my testimony has in some way demonstrated that Chinese civilian and military leaders have different social, economic, and political factors from the United States as well as different military missions to consider when making the strategic decisions necessary to fund the modernization of their armed forces. To state the obvious, what might seem logical to us may not be applicable to the Chinese situation. I give the Commission great credit for attempting to work through what can be a very frustrating problem due in large part to the lack of credible and verifiable information.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear here today.

_________

ENDNOTES

1. I intentionally use the terms "moderate" and "deliberate" to characterize China’s military modernization program to differentiate between my judgments and those analysts who commonly use the adjectives "massive" or "rapid" to describe China’s military modernization. I believe those words exaggerate the true nature of Chinese military development.
2. My primary source for information on the U.S. military is the DefenseLINK website, with some help from The Military Balance.
3. Perhaps a more enlightening comparison for this stage of PLA ground force modernization could be found in the size, level of technological sophistication, training regimen, and operations tempo of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) in the early 1980s. At that time, the T-72 generation of tank was being introduced into the forces while older T-55 and T-62 remained in service, helicopter-borne air mobile operations were under development, and the concept of the operational maneuver group was being born.
4. For a recent Chinese military officer’s perspective on conventional deterrence, see "PRC Military Journal Examines Conventional Deterrence" from Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, September 30, 2001, pp. 88-93 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) CPP20011106000255, November 6, 2001.
5. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the PLA and the PAP in domestic security, see John F. Corbett, Jr. and my article, "No More Tiananmens: The People’s Armed Police and Stability in China, 1997," in China Strategic Review, Spring 1998.
6. The trends outlined in this paragraph are discussed in detail in my "A New PLA Force Structure," in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, Conference Proceedings published by RAND, 1999.
7. For the past two years The Military Balance has listed the numbers of reserves between 500 and 600,000 personnel; in 1998, it held 1,200,000+ in the reserves. The 2000 DOD "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China" lists approximately 1.5 million in a "reserve-militia component." The Chinese language press often reports on new reserve units that continue to be formed. While I cannot say exactly how many personnel currently are in the Chinese reserve force, it seems reasonable that they would be expanding as the active duty force declines in number.
8. Kuan Cha-Chia, "Military Authorities Define Reform Plan; Military Academies To Be Reduced by 30 Percent," Kuang chiao ching, No. 306, March 16, 1998, pp. 8-9, in FBIS-CHI-98-084, March 25, 1998.
9. A White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, which was issued in November 1995, also contains considerable information about the Chinese military.
10. One newspaper article out of Hong Kong reports that in addition to the 500,000-man reduction, "the PLA might cut 100,000 or more personnel each year through much of the next decade." Total numbers would bottom out around 1.75 to 2 million by 2010. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "New-look PLA plans more cuts," South China Morning Post, June 30, 1998.
11. I am reluctant to guess that a similar 24% of the Chinese defense budget goes to the ground forces because, whatever the Chinese percentage is, its much larger proportion of overall manpower strength and less technologically-advanced equipment skew the numbers so that mirror-imaging would not be appropriate.
12. Civilians in the PLA perform many of the same sort of functions DOD civilians do, primarily in headquarters, hospitals, research institutes, and educational facilities. China has not officially said what percentage of its active duty force are civilians. One PLA civilian gave me an estimate that perhaps 20 to 25% of the PLA is civilian, which would be considerably less than the additional 48% that would be added to U.S. active duty numbers.
13. Year 2000 China Defense White Paper
14. The 2000 DOD Report to Congress lists the size of the PAP as both one million and 1.3 million; The Military Balance 2001-02 estimates it at 1,500,000.
15. Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000," August 16, 2001, p. CRS-59.
16. The Type 59 is equivalent to the Soviet T-55, which we have recently seen in action on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Under the proper conditions even a 40 to 50 year-old weapons system can be effective on a contemporary battlefield. From viewing television news reports, however, in Afghanistan the T-55s appeared to be employed more as mobile artillery, firing from prepared dug-out positions (or as troop carriers along the roads) than in maneuver warfare that would allow them to maximize their speed, mass, and shock value. The limitations of the Afghanistan terrain and proficiency of Northern Alliance tank crews probably were major factors contributing to the manner in which they were utilized.
17. This number represents a growth of five over the previous edition of The Military Balance and probably represents the acknowledgement of a few training units and units directly subordinate to the General Staff Department. Each Military Region is known to have at least one helicopter unit assigned to its area of responsibility.
18. In 2000, The Military Balance counted 212 helicopters of all types in the PLA ground forces. This year it reduced that number by not including the 30 Mi-8s it previously had included in the inventory.
19. The PLA is known to retain equipment in its inventory well beyond their effective life cycles. It also has a tendency to skimp on maintenance and the purchase of spare parts, though that trend may be in the process of change. Furthermore, as a general rule, PLA aircraft are flown a considerable number of fewer hours than their Western counterparts. These three factors help keep the cost of the helicopter fleet down, but limit the operational proficiency of the force. Changing such practices would significantly increase the cost of the force.
20. This is an estimate based on trends of the past decade or so. We simply do not know what are the actual Chinese plans for helicopter production and army aviation force structure. As stated earlier, trends of the past could be changed if China perceives a greater need due to a more proximate threat and/or if more resources are devoted to military modernization.
21. The 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency Handbook of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, lists only 30 cargo trucks in a single transportation company for an infantry regiment of 2,817 men. While I do not have an exact figure for the current number of trucks in an infantry regiment, each infantry company is likely to have at least four trucks which would triple the total number of trucks in an older regiment.
22. China retains the option of mobilizing civilian aircraft and ships to support military operations. While such an effort will increase transport capacity, it will also be readily visible and likely compromise strategic surprise.
23. Political factors may be external, such as the role of alliances, or domestic, such as historical or internal pressures.
24. I stand ready to be corrected if this, or any other statements in my testimony, can be updated with current data.
25. See David M. Finkelstein and John Unangst, "Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United States," The Center for Naval Analyses, October, 1999, particularly Chapter 5 for a description of the elements of the Chinese government involved in decisions about the mil-to-mil relationship.