United States-China Relations and Strategic Perceptions
Testimony before the U.S.-China Commission,
August 3, 2001
Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D.
Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation
This testimony draws on my own previous testimony and publications as well as
other published materials dealing with the strategic implications of ongoing
programs and bilateral relations between the U.S. and China. The testimony is
keyed to respond to questions in the Commission's letter of invitation to testify
dated July 17, 2001.
How does the Chinese Government see the United States? Are we automatically
an enemy? Do they envisage the possibility of peaceful relations, even strategic
cooperation?
China has taken a two-pronged approach to security relations: On the diplomatic
front with the United States, Beijing does the very minimum it must to avoid
being perceived as an adversary and to gain access to U.S. doctrine, technology,
and manuals. Meanwhile, China is engaged in a diplomatic effort designed to
de-couple the United States from its alliances and a military effort to build
up a force of ballistic missiles that it can use in the region.(1) There are
signs that some within China believe that armed conflict with the United States
is inevitable in the long term, especially over Taiwan. In the short to mid
term, though, China must maintain a peaceful environment- and good relations
with the United States in order to develop its economy, S&T base, and military
force."(2) The leaders of the PLA tell us that they admire the United States
and its armed forces. General after general in the PLA repeats the mantra that
"the PLA has a lot to learn by studying the U.S. military." I suspect,
however, that what they seek to learn is how to fight against American tactics
and equipment, whether employed by Taiwan, any other nation, or the United States,
and to adopt the U.S. way of war for the PLA. Notwithstanding the statements
of peaceful intentions, the PLA is working very hard to prepare itself to fight
the United States, if it must.(3) As on Chinese strategist put it, "China
must pay close attention to those countries that are opposed to American interests,
or are potential strategic enemies. It must be borne in mind that the enemies
of enemies are one's own allies."(4)
The major examples of China's views of the United States as a major obstacle
or competitor in the international arena are in China's own national security
strategy documents. Whether one looks at the statement of strategic cooperation
and partnership with the Shanghai Five: countries, the new treaty of peace and
cooperation with Russia, or at Beijing's own State Council July 1998 White paper
"China's National Defense," a security concept is offered that runs
directly counter to that of the United States in many area. First, China seeks
to place itself at the center of a web of strategic partnerships in Asia and
around the world designed to weaken United States alliances and American leadership.
How does the Chinese government see its role in the world and in the Asia Pacific
region? What are its global and regional goals and htmirations?
China htmires to be a major international power that cannot be intimidated by
any other power or consortium of powers. It seeks to maximize its own "comprehensive
national power" while maintaining a peaceful external environment. By "comprehensive
national power," China's strategists mean economic power, political/diplomatic
power, propaganda or "informational power" and military power. Beijing's
strategists believe that given strong power in these areas, China will have
the "power to compel" (qiang zhi li) other nations to do its bidding.
China is expanding its global reach into the Western Hemisphere. Beijing is
expanding its reach into the Western Hemisphere to gain economic advantage.
Among Beijing's goals are to diversify its sources of natural resources, including
fishing grounds; to undermine support for Taiwan by Central American countries;
to improve its intelligence collection and monitoring against the United States;
and to diversify its sources of petroleum products. China has invested about
US$60 million in oil exploration and production in Peru, with even more invested
in Venezuelan oil production.(5)
China has a clear set of goals in its actions on the Korean Peninsula: maintaining
a peaceful periphery to facilitate foreign investment and the modernization
of its arms and combat forces; reducing the likelihood that missile defenses
will be deployed in the region; creating a buffer from financial crises that
might retard science and technology modernization; replacing American alliances
with regional security dialogues; and creating a web of strategic partnerships
as a means to place itself at the hub of inter-state diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific
region.(6)
Beijing's preference for a "mullet-polar world" is another way of
saying that China seeks to create a world that is able to reject the particular
type of values-based leadership exercised by the United States. Beijing seeks
to shape a world in which the U.S. position is much weaker and U.S. policy is
changed to take into account the other poles of power."(7)
What are current and potentially future Chinese views of the United States (e.g.
strategic regional, military, economic, commercial, financial)?
Beijing seeks to shape a world in which America's position is much weaker than
it is today and where U.S. leadership is weakened to accommodate the desires
of other competing poles of power, specifically the desires and interests of
China.(8) One of the greatest dangers that stems from China's views of the United
States is the belief that fundamentally, the United States will not and cannot
sustain casualties even in pursuit of vital interests. The consequence of this
belief in Beijing is that, while China's armed forces may not be as powerful
as those of the United States, or as able to project power at distances as great
as the United States, Beijing may calculate that it can achieve its goals by
limited aggression against U.S. forces.(9) In particular, according to some
of the most astute American analysts of the Chinese military:
• China is devoting considerable resources toward preparing for potential
conflict with the United States, especially over Taiwan. Despite its overwhelming
victory in the Gulf War, Chinese analysts have concluded the U.S. military has
vulnerabilities which can be exploited. (10)
• According to Chinese analysts, the world order is currently characterized
by slowly emerging poles of power and influence but dominated by a sole superpower-
the United States. (11)
• China calculates power ratios and predicts American decline. Ancient
Chinese statecraft from the Warring States era emphasizes the need to calculate
future power ratios mathematically. Chinese national security research analysts
have quantitatively analyzed the relative power of the nations of this inevitable
new "world structure" in which the United States will decline economically,
socially, militarily, and internationally to become one of five "poles"
in a "multipolar" world. (12)
• Chinese authors today apparently believe the United States is this kind
of hegemon, which, if provoked, will attack or "contain" China to
preserve its hegemony. (13)
• The United States is exploiting Russian weakness by enlarging NATO in
order to increase its domination of its European NATO allies.(14)
• The United States is forcing Japan to increase its financial support
for U.S. bases and forces in Japan under the guise of the defense Guidelines.
(15)
• The United States arranged the Bosnian settlement at Dayton to dominate
further its European allies. (16)(Pillsbury China debates 7)
• NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in spring 1999 were a part of U.S.
plan to gain control over Eurasia. (17)
• While the United States, together with other Western countries, is trying
to stop the expansion of weapons of mass destruction, they are at the same time
doing their bets to develop high-tech conventional weapons and have sold a large
quantity of modern arms and equipment to Third World countries. (18)
Given the current state of flux in the U.S.-China relationship what do you believe
are Chinese perceptions of future U.S. actions and what policies or strategies
China is discussing/implementing to counter those actions?
China views the United States as a major trade partner that is importing over
$100 billion a year of its products, as a source for capital and advanced technology,
and as a force that contributes to the stability of Northeast Asia. At the same
time, however, in what seems to be contradictory logic, China sees the United
States as the main threat to its Marxist-Leninist, single-party dominance of
society, as the major obstacle to its own ability to be the dominant power in
Asia, and as a major rival for leadership in the world.
As Dr. David Finklestein has pointed out in his own analysis of China's security
concepts, broadly speaking, the "New Security Concept" is a Beijing's
reaction its assessment that, in the long term, the U.S. will maintain or increase
its lead in developing and fielding the military forces and advanced technological
weaponry needed to underwrite and sustain Washington's status as the sole superpower
for the foreseeable future. (19
)
With respect to the Bush Administration, Beijing's initial refusal to accept
the Administration's expressions of regret over the loss of the Chinese pilot
in the EP-3 collision near Hainan Island in April, 2001, reflected Beijing's
attempt to 1) exert pressure over the Administration's decisions to sell defensive
arms to Taiwan, 2) emphasize Beijing's own interpretation of the United Nation's
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the right of innocent passage in Exclusive
Economic Zones, and 3) create conditions where the Administration is forced
to respond to Beijing's coercive and threatening behavior by modifying its own
principled positions on China's sovereignty. (20)
China is also preparing to respond to U.S. forces, if necessary, by developing
the capacity to control sea lines of communication near China, project regional
force, and deter the United States and other potential adversaries in creative
ways without matching forces. (21)
Through its own military purchases- including some from traditional U.S. allies
and partners like Israel and Great Britain- China is developing an over-the-horizon
capability for its cruise missiles that could strike U.S. naval forces and the
air-to-air refueling capability needed to extend the range of its aircraft.(22)
Beijing is also developing what it sees as its own necessary defensive measures
against what it fears could be future information warfare attacks, including
raising computer security awareness in the armed forces creating security filters
for imported electronic equipment, and conducting research on computer viruses.(23)
According to Zhang Wenmu of the China Institute for Contemporary International
Research, the United States is involved in a conscious strategy to interfere
in internal affairs in China such as the Tibet issue as part of a larger scheme
involving the enlargement of NATO and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Defense
Guidelines. All of this is designed as part of a broad American strategy to
"contain China". (24)
China's arms purchases from Russia and many of its own indigenous defense programs
are aimed at improving China's own power projection capabilities and deterring
the U.S. armed forces from actions around China. (25)
Clearly there are scenarios that might lead to conflict, most notably Taiwan.
In that event, do the Chinese believe they can win? And if so how? What are
Chinese views of Asymmetric Warfare and Information Warfare?
Over the past 10 years, the PRC has deployed over 300 new short-range ballistic
missiles against Taiwan. Its Dong Feng-6 and Dong Feng-7, with ranges below
300 miles, are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and can be transported on
mobile launchers. If fired with conventional warheads, they could wreak havoc
on the Taiwanese population. My view is that Beijing believes that with the
proper mix of these new weapons, a naval and air blockade, and a rapid strike
it could collapse the will of the people of Taiwan to resist a coordinated,
mass military action. The real danger is that China may calculate that the United
States will not come to the assistance of Taiwan, or even act to "preserve
the peace and stability of the Western Pacific," as required by the Taiwan
Relations Act. There is good reason to exercise prudent caution and be concerned
over the strengthening of the PLA. Of all the major militaries in the world,
it's the only one openly developing new war-fighting doctrine and acquiring
new equipment with the specific objective of preparing to fight and defeat the
U.S. armed forces. (26)
In addition to Taiwan, there is a some potential for conflict between China
and the United States in the South China Sea, if China seeks to resolve its
expansive territorial claims through the use of military force. Also, on the
Korean Peninsula, in the event of either a collapse of North Korea or North
Korean aggression, should the United States move forces into North Korea adjacent
to China along the Yalu River, Chinese military leaders have said that China
might intervene militarily.
Chinese military thinkers regularly publish treatise on how to defeat the United
States in the event it intervenes if China makes good on its threats to turn
Taiwan into a "sea of fire". (27)
China has concluded that it cannot match U.S. military capabilities. Every PLA
leader tells us this. But the U.S. armed forces do not have a clear picture
of what the Chinese can do. (28)
One of China's stated military goals is to be able to knock out an American
aircraft carrier. The Chinese believe that the United States people lack the
will to sustain casualties. That is a very dangerous belief because it could
lead them to conclude that they can successfully attack a U.S. ship. (29)
Information and Asymmetric Warfare:
Chinese strategists are studying a newly emphasized form of warfare that focuses
on gaining and exploiting information, attacking the information available to
an adversary, and defending against attacks on one's own information and information
systems. (30)
While the Gulf War did not initiate Chinese thinking about future warfare, the
conflict apparently stimulated the 1992 decision by PLA leaders to focus on
preparing China's armed forces to wage high-tech warfare. (31)
Major General Wang Pufeng, former director of the strategy department of China's
Academy of Military Science, believes that "in the near future, information
warfare will control the form and future of war. We recognize this developmental
trend. . . and see it has a driving force in the modernization of China's military
and combat readiness. This trend will be highly critical to achieving victory
in future wars." (32)
Chinese military strategists continue to study the transformation of the US
military in the wake of the Gulf War. Since the United States is seen to be
a the pinnacle of advances in high-tech warfare.
There is an influential segment within China's defense-industrial complex which
is concentrating on the development of doctrine and systems designed to enable
targeting of adversarial strategic and operational centers of gravity, and defend
its own, in order to pursue limited political objectives with an asymmetrical
economy of force. (33)
Since the mid-1980s, the PLA has placed special focus on certain enabling technologies
which, short of resorting to weapons of mass destruction, would allow it to
give play to its own strengths and exploit adversarial "Achilles heels".
(34)
PLA leaders want to develop a rapid reacting, information-based Army supported
by sensor-to-shooter systems, precision weapons, and modern combat platforms.
PLA leaders want a world-class, secure and reliable command, control, communications,
computer and intelligence (C4I) system. (35)
Are the Chinese strategies plausible? What effects would they have? Could they
win a limited conflict with us?
I believe that the United States armed forces would prevail in any conflict
with China that does not involve a major ground invasion of the Chinese mainland.
And I do not see any scenario under which the United States would seek to invade
and occupy China. However, Chinese strategies are quite plausible given their
limited means. That is, they could attack one or more U.S. cities with nuclear
weapons; they could mass forces and attack a forward-deployed naval formation;
they could attack U.S. aircraft. Even if they misjudge the likelihood of their
own success, any such actions on the part of Beijing will necessitate an American
response and could lead to war.
The PLA has well-disciplined soldiers and tough leaders who are thoroughly devoted
to their nation. Individual soldier skills in the PLA are excellent, and that
includes in the strategic rocket forces, the Navy and the Air Force. Even if
soldiers cannot operate well in the complex and changing environment of a joint
force, in which a great deal of initiative is required, they have been drilled
on their specific tasks until they can accomplish them blindfolded. The PLA
soldiers will follow orders, and that is perhaps what makes it a dangerous force.
(36)
U.S. military advantages over China are narrowing in such critical areas as
nuclear weapons, space technology, and information warfare. (37)
Asymmetric warfare can be cheap, low tech, readily available, and devastatingly
effective. US advantages in military capabilities based on space and information
systems have increased US reliance on these assets and correspondingly increased
its vulnerabilities to their degradation or destruction. Reported Chinese research
in anti-satellite systems and China's progress in information warfare capabilities
may allow it to stand up successfully to a technologically advanced adversary.
(38)
China believes that the United States is entirely too dependent on the electromagnetic
spectrum for surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting and command and control.
PLA military leaders are studying effective means to attack U.S. sensor and
communication systems, and they should achieve some success in this regard.
____________________
(1) Larry M. Wortzel, China's Strategic Intentions and Goals, Testimony for
the Committee House Armed
Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session,
June 21, 2000.
(2) Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 140.
(3) Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle,
PA: AEI and SSI, December 1999), p. 217.
(4) Michael Pillsbury, ed., China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. xliv.
(5) Stuart M. Butler and Kim R. Holmes, ed., Issues 2000 The Candidate's Briefing
Book (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2000), p. 679.
(6) Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Washington, D.C.:
SSI, 2001), p. 220.
(7) Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle,
PA: AEI and SSI, December 1999), p. 231.
(8) Larry M. Wortzel, China's Strategic Intentions and Goals, Testimony for
the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress,
1st session, June 21, 2000, p. 4.
(9) Larry M. Wortzel, Technical Briefing on Security Issues, U.S.-China Security
Commission, May 2, 2001.
(10) Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 141.
(11) David M. Finkelstein, "China's New Security Concept: Reading Between
the Lines," Washington Journal of Modern China, Spring 1999, p. 41.
(12) Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. xxv.
(13) Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. xxxix.
(14) Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. 7.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. 8.
(18) Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.:
NDU, 1996), p. 79.
(19) David M. Finkelstein, "China's New Security Concept: Reading Between
the Lines," Washington Journal of Modern China, Spring 1999, p. 43.
(20) Larry M. Wortzel, "How To Respond to China's Coercive Behavior,"
The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1431, April 18, 2001, p. 1.
(21) Larry M. Wortzel, China's Strategic Intentions and Goals, Testimony for
the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress,
1st session, June 21, 2000, p. 5.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Kathryn L. Gauthier, "China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear
Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare," Air War College Maxwell Paper
No. 18, July 1999, p. 21.
(24) Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington,
D.C.: NDU,
2000) p. x.
(25) Start M. Butler and Kim R. Holes, ed., Issues 2000 The Candidate's Briefing
Book (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2000), p. 677.
(26) Larry M. Wortzel, "Yes," in Should The United States Feel Threatened
by China's Growing Role in the International Military/Political Arena?",
Retired Officer, December 2000, p. 36.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Larry M. Wortzel, China's Strategic Intentions and Goals, Testimony for
the Committee House Armed
Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st session,
June 21, 2000, p. 5.
(29) Larry M. Wortzel, Technical Briefing on Security Issues, U.S.-China Security
Commission, May 2, 2001.
(30) Kathryn L. Gauthier, "China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear
Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare," Air War College Maxwell Paper
No. 18, July 1999, p. 18.
(31) Ibid.
(32) Kathryn L. Gauthier, "China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear
Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare," Air War College Maxwell Paper
No. 18, July 1999, p. 19.
(33) Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States (Carlisle, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 1.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (Carlisle,
Pa.: AEI and SSI, December 1999), p. 221.
(36) Larry M. Wortzel, China's Strategic Intentions and Goals, Testimony for
the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Congress,
1st session, June 21, 2000, p. 3.
(37) Kathryn L. Gauthier, "China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear
Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare," Air War College Maxwell Paper
No. 18, July 1999, p. 29.
(38) Ibid.