Testimony of Charles W. Winwood
Acting Commissioner
United States Customs service

Before the U.S.-China Commission
August 2, 2001
Washington, D.C.


Commissioner Becker, Chairman D'Amato, members of the Commission, thank you for your invitation to provide a statement on the work of the U.S. Customs Service in China.

As part of its worldwide network of representative offices, U.S. Customs maintains an active presence in Beijing, China. As in all our foreign posts, Customs personnel in China serve as part of America's diplomatic team. Our staff coordinates its work closely with the State Department and other U.S. officials in country. We serve at the invitation of the Chinese government, and work in cooperation with Chinaís trade and law enforcement personnel.

Our representatives in China cover a range of enforcement issues that include, but are not limited to: prison and forced child labor investigations; export controls; intellectual property rights; dumping; textiles; commercial fraud; and other transshipment cases.

Staff in Beijing are assisted in their work by employees based in our Office of Investigations here in Washington. Two Customs special agents and one intelligence research specialist support our global forced labor program, to include China, from Headquarters.

Turning to matters of specific interest to this Commission, as you are aware, the U.S. Customs Service is the lead law enforcement agency for investigations involving the importation of goods made with forced prison labor into the United States. Our primary authority derives from Section 1307 of title 19, United States Code, which prohibits the importation of goods made wholly or in part with convict, forced, or indentured labor under penal sanctions. In addition, we enforce Section 1761 of Title 18, United States Code, the primary criminal statute prohibiting the importation of goods made with convict labor.

The investigation of allegations of prison labor is a high priority for the Customs Service. At the same time, these cases are often difficult to substantiate, and diplomatically sensitive. This is true not only for China, but for many countries in which Customs investigates charges of this nature.

We continue to work with the Chinese government to gain access to prison sites where the manufacture of goods with convict labor has been alleged. We have a Memorandum of Understanding and Statement of Cooperation in place that governs this process. Under that agreement, Customs must file site visit requests with China's Ministry of Justice. At the current time, we have a number of these requests pending.

As long as this situation remains, Customs has adequate resources in place in China to manage our workload there. However, should the number and/or geographic span of cases increase, we would likely be in a position to seek additional funding to meet our mission needs.

This has been the case, for example, in the area of child labor investigations. Customs has received resources from the Congress to post additional special agents at select foreign posts around the world as our activities in this field have expanded.

To date, we have substantiated three allegations of forced prison labor in China. The first involved the E.W. Bliss Company of Hastings, Michigan, which in 1992 pled guilty to charges of knowingly importing machine presses made with prison labor. The company forfeited the merchandise and paid a $75,000 fine.

In November 1994, the Court of International Trade ruled in favor of the U.S. government in a suit brought by China Diesel Imports. That company, which imported diesel engines produced by the Yunnan Machinery Company of China, was protesting the exclusion of its products by U.S. Customs, which had found evidence of prison labor in their manufacture, in violation of section 1307.

This past year, Customs investigated Officemate International Corporation of Edison, New Jersey, and a sister company, Allied International Manufacturing Corporation, or ìAIMCO,î located in Nanjing, China. The individual who owned both companies and several senior managers were convicted of transporting over a hundred million paper binder clips assembled with prison labor in China into the United States.

The AIMCO case highlighted another vital htmect of our prison labor investigations, one that is equally or more important to our success than resource issues. That is our need for reliable investigative leads, including those provided by outside sources.

In this particular case, Customs was approached by a private businessman, the owner of a U.S. manufacturer of binder clips, about the use of prison labor by a competitor. He provided video footage, shot in China, to support his claim. That footage enabled Customs to launch its investigation, which was conducted mainly by our Newark, New Jersey office. Without this initial lead, the case might never have been opened.

For this very reason, Customs maintains a strong relationship on forced prison and child labor issues with a broad array of international partners, from private companies operating overseas to non-governmental organizations. We are ready to act but we cannot do it alone. We need solid, credible information to open and advance our investigations.

Again, the Customs Service is committed to enforcing the laws that prohibit the importation of prison labor goods into the United States. In China, and elsewhere, we will continue to pursue these investigations vigorously, along with the host of other enforcement priorities managed by our foreign teams.

I want to thank the Commission once again for this opportunity to appear today. I regret that I must depart immediately, but Don Shruhan and Lesleyanne Kessler of my staff will remain to answer any questions you might have.