Good Morning. I am honored by the opportunity to address this esteemed Commission. I do so with humility and an awareness of my responsibility. I am not a China specialist. I retired from the Armed Forces in 1993, where I spent the bulk of my career as a Russian foreign area officer or FAO, and have continued to work in this field as a Defense Department analyst after my retirement. I am a military analyst with a deep interest in foreign concepts and capabilities. Lately, I have focused on the area of information operations (IO), and to a lesser degree on psychological operations (PSYOP). While I studied Russian IO and PSYOP, I decided to take a comparative look at China's capability in this area. I found articles on this subject by Chinese writers, but little analysis. For that reason I decided to take a look at IO and PSYOP myself. I was pleased to find lots of material available, especially from FBIS translations. Some of the Chinese material is produced, as you know, by "propaganda" centers and newspapers for the masses, and thus separating truth from fiction became a problem. However, some authoritative journals and books offered key insights. I recognize my limitations, both culturally and linguistically, with regard to the People's Republic of China. I appreciate the depth of knowledge that each of you and the other China panelists here today possess. Nevertheless, I will do my best to bring those Chinese issues to your attention where I feel competent. I promise to stay in my lane.

Russian area specialists tried to handle many of the same questions during the years of the Cold War that your commission is asking today. How Russia viewed the U.S.-- as an enemy or in some other fashion-- was a frequently asked question. To answer such questions we tried to understand Russia's "threat assessment methodology", thought patterns (the dialectic), the impact of military science on policy, and other issues affecting decision-makers (demographics, geopolitics, economics, etc.) as well as the decision-making process itself. I believe that China's Comprehensive National Power Index Framework (CNP) offers an insight into this process, although I am unaware of other tools that China analysts are using to "think Chinese." The paradigm one uses shapes the product.

A critical issue is to find an analytical process that will help prevent us from merely "mirror imaging" our object of analysis. A text that illuminated this problem like none other for Russia, yet possesses a methodology that will work for China, was the late Robert Bathurst's Intelligence and the Mirror. As the jacket of the book notes:

It is the dilemma of an analyst in any culture that he or she cannot reliably see beyond his or her own cultural walls. One's own culture defines what is 'real' or 'not real.' That is why so many military analysts make such mistaken predictions. They assume that the enemy sees what they do.

The book provided a checklist of anthropological, cultural and behavioral factors that filter military and political predictions. Perhaps a checklist based on all those factors that represent China's particular method of viewing the world exists, and I just don't know about it. If not, it would be worth pursuing because the process greatly helped Russian analysts to understand the differences between high context cultures (China and Russia) and low context cultures (the U.S.). This difference is most evident in the area of terminology. For example, why do U.S. policy makers talk about asymmetric threats when they have practically no idea what they mean? Joint publication 1-02, the core document for defining military terms, does not define asymmetry. And, without a doubt, the most asymmetric force on the face of the earth is the United States yet we don't even talk about that. Adding to the ambiguity, Joint Publication 1-02 does not define war or warfare. How can we discuss China's asymmetric and IW capabilities when we don't know what we mean by the terms? When we first discussed IO terms in this country we sent confusing and unintelligible signals to nations around the world. We should try to minimize misunderstandings in terminology in the future whenever possible.

This methodology took me into my look at Chinese IO and PSYOP in 1999. I asked why the Chinese talk in terms of "three represents," "four looks," and other such phraseology. All of you understand this, but I had to find out. Then I asked myself how those historic stratagems and sayings imbedded in Chinese culture, and the Chinese understanding of military science, affect Chinese thinking in the information age. And I was surprised to find that few had given this area as much thought as I assumed they would have. Analysts appeared more consumed with what China was doing today than how China would use its past or its tradition of military science to shape the present. Undoubtedly, a few historic Chinese phrases are thrown around when attempting to "get close" to the Chinese mentality in official speeches and even during an analysis of strategy and tactics, but I found precious few analysts had applied those strategies and concepts to electrons. Maybe that is because it is more difficult to measure the intent of an electron than it is to measure the intent of a tank.

Studying the military in Russia over the past ten years impressed upon me their interest in the subject of IO. The rationale was compelling: we are deep into the information age, and we must pay attention to how it is affecting militaries worldwide. IO is a product of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and its emphasis on automated control systems, precision strike, and weapons based on new physical principles. Much of the early thinking on this subject was by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov of the USSR, and the Chinese often site him as the main motivator behind the RMA. The Russians, working through their own paradigm, interpreted IO much differently than did the United States. For example, one Russian officer asked why IO theorists focused on information war and not on information peace? He believed that the very lexicon we had developed was predetermining nations to view the subject incorrectly. Russia's military history and understanding of military science strongly affected their understanding of IO. For example, military science in Russia is divided into principles, categories, laws, forms, and methods. This framework is also used to develop and expand on a topic such as information war, but we lack this methodology in our armed forces. One should use this paradigm to study Russian IO.

Luckily for me, China's National Defense University is still teaching Marxism-Leninism, and thus an analytical framework prevails in China that is similar to Russia's, to include an acute interest in military science. One Chinese IO strategist divided IW into distinctions, features, principles, forms and methods, not much unlike the Russian framework. China's approach to IO is unique, different than that found in the U.S., and different than that found in Russia. Chinese analysts have taken the best from both, and applied these lessons to China's own unique case. Whereas the U.S. looks at information superiority as a main goal, and so do the Russians and Chinese, the latter two also focus on disorganization and control, respectively, as well.

What can I offer the Commission? I feel I can make worthwhile contributions to questions five, six, and seven in particular regarding Chinese views of asymmetric war and information war, and China's relations with Russia. My answers to questions one through four will be less useful. I hope to offer an interpretation of some issues on which the other panelists have not focused, narrow as my interpretation may be. This would include such issues as:

- A reinterpretation of People's War to fit the Information Age.
- A look at acupuncture war, information weapons, and electronic strategies, with associated economic and commercial consequences.
- An examination of Chinese views of "information sovereignty" and other issues which surely will be presented at the United Nations in the near future.
- A look at the three Internet battles in which China has participated to date.
- A look at the new correlation of forces from a Chinese viewpoint, that is systems reliability, comms capacity, etc.
- Russia's rational for establishing strong relations with the Chinese.

There are some real threats and some not so real threats that comprise the operating environment in which we make decisions with regard to China in the IO area. An overall assessment of Chinese intentions must take these factors, and much, much more, into account.

As a Russian FAO I have written on a variety of issues; the Chtmian Sea region, civil-military relations, the ongoing war in Chechnya, psychological operations, peacekeeping, and, for the past two years, information operations. Certainly, the Chtmian Sea region is now of interest to China, as the recent Shangai Six meetings indicated. China is now a recognized player in the security of Central Asia and, after the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty, an interested party in the region's oil and gas. At the same time, the Russian elite appears to be very worried about the potential movement of Chinese into Siberia and the Far East. They often say that "nature abhors a vacuum" and that is what those vast regions represent to China's population. Tied up in the Caucasus and too weak to confront China, Russia sells arms to the PLA, which could in the future be used against Russian interests and justifies such sales as a tool to counter U.S. global hegemony and as an insurance against a U.S.-PRC condominium in the Far East at Russia's expense. In spite of the risks of their own policy towards China, Russia fears a renewal of the Sino-American strategic partnership of the 1980s. Moreover, Russia is well aware of the impact of China's economic development upon the strategic balance between Moscow and Beijing over the next two decades, as Russia's population declines and its economic growth remains slow. The Sino-Russian partnership, while based upon shared interests in Central Asia in the short term, is fragile in its global context. Russia may be a Eurasian power, but it sees its primary destiny in a Europe that will accept it. Driving Russia out of Europe strengthens the appeal of a China-based Eurasian policy.

At this crucial time in world affairs, I see my presence here as an opportunity to underscore something quite obvious, yet often overlooked: namely, that U.S. analysts studying Russia and China should embark on some joint studies of the processes underway. If we do not, we are missing a chance to cooperate on an area vital to our nation's security. We cannot perform our analysis in isolation if we are to properly evaluate what the "friendship forever" pact means.

China is emerging from its "years of humiliation" and we must be sensitive to that mood, respect it, and study it deeply but not to the point of shunning our own interests. The Chinese equate intimidation with power, and they will have to understand this doesn't always produce results or eliminate room for compromise. I appreciate your invitation to participate in this forum and look forward to your questions.