Hearing of Panel of Experts
October 12, 2001

Testimony

China's Attitudes Towards Proliferation

Comments by
Michael McDevitt, RADM, USN (ret)
Director, Center for Strategic Studies
CNA Corporation

'It is almost an article of faith within the United States that the spread of nuclear weapons is inherently bad and should be opposed. This view has been put in practice over the years by the combined use of America's diplomatic and economic instruments of statecraft to persuade non-nuclear states that possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons to refrain from doing so.

Generally speaking, the combination of economic suasion, public diplomacy, and the Nonproliferation Treaty regime have been successful in arresting the spread of nuclear weapons; given the number of states that have the capability to fabricate a nuclear weapon. But, it must also be said, however, that the U.S. has not been consistent in its non-proliferation policies. There are inconsistencies between declaratory policy and policy in practice. The U.S. has been willing to countenance exceptions to its overall antipathy to the spread of nuclear weapons. The cases of the UK, France are the oldest examples, while India and Pakistan the most recent. Israel is tacitly accepted as residing in the twilight zone of acknowledged but an undeclared nuclear power without apparent US sanction. I make this point not to criticize the United States for what I consider sensible policy decisions, but to provide a context for Chinese approaches to non-proliferation.

From China's perspective the U.S. approach to nuclear proliferation is hypocritical—as is China's—and suggests that the U.S. is not nearly as concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons as long as they are: (1) in the hands of old allies, or (2) budding security partners, like India, that appear to serve long term U.S. strategic interests, or (3) temporary relationships such as Pakistan.

China understands clearly that since the end of the Cold War the U.S. policy theme of nonproliferation has become even more prominent. Les htmin made nonproliferation and its muscular twin, counter-proliferation, a dominant theme of U.S. post-Cold War security strategy. As a result it has an ever more prominent place on the list of issues between the U.S. and China. Despite Washington's bitter acquiescence to the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, it is safe to assert that, as a general proposition, official U.S. policy remains absolutely opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons—especially to countries it deems inherently dangerous. China has no doubts about this. Whatever policy choices China chooses to make regarding proliferation or non-proliferation they will be made with a full appreciation of US policy-inconsistencies and all.

Like the U.S., China has decried the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it is clear that this issue is not as high on Beijing's list of national security priorities as it is in the United States. Unlike the almost theological basis of declaratory U.S. nonproliferation policy, China has a much more pragmatic attitude. For example, China has been somewhat selective in its levels of concern about situations regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Clearly, Beijing's defense white paper of July 1998 implied greater weight of concern to India's actions than to those of Pakistan. Moreover, Beijing has evinced much less concern about the possibility that North Korea might have a nuclear weapons program than has Washington.

This is not to say that China does not appreciate the value of a nonproliferation policy-witness, again, its reaction to India's tests and continued disappointment and concern that Washington has acted with pragmatism rather than its usual dogmatic adherence to nonproliferation (i.e. nuclear roll-back) in subsequent relations with India, and more recently with Pakistan.

China's approach to cooperation on nonproliferation, I suspect, is based more on considering nonproliferation as simply one of a number of security related issues to be addressed as the situation dictates. What makes it important for them is that Washington thinks it is important, and not because of inherent merits of the issue. While this attitude has the effect of nonplussing dedicated U.S. nonproliferation proponents who see proliferation as inherently bad, and who cannot understand why Beijing doesn't share their zeal, it does suggest that there is room for Beijing and Washington to negotiate over nonproliferation. This means an American willingness to either threaten punishment or be willing to "trade" something for nonproliferation cooperation from China. In other words, moral suasion by the U.S. or arguments regarding the inherent "goodness" of nonproliferation will not be enough for Beijing to make lasting agreements.

China's nonproliferation priorities, therefore, will be more pragmatic and less universal than those of the U.S. Nonproliferation will continue to be much lower on the Chinese list of security concerns than it is on America's, unless the potential proliferator is Japan or Taiwan (a declared causus belli). Beijing is likely to continue to see proliferation as a more situational issue. If possession of nuclear weapons by countries on its frontier is believed to contribute to stability, Beijing will not be seriously, except perhaps rhetorically, object. The classic example is North Korea. I believe that Beijing is ambivalent about North Korean nuclear weapons. They only diplomatically support on non-nuclear Korea because they worry that the United States might peremptorily attempt to destroy North Korea weapons and/or launching systems. But, if North Korea somehow winds up in the twilight zone of an undeclared nuclear weapons state Beijing would likely see North Korean nuclear weapons as stabilizing, in that it would be one more "ace" that Pyongyang would have in ensuring regime survival; which Beijing desires. Beijing's nonchalance about this issue rests on its entire attitude regarding nuclear weapons. I have become convinced that Beijing's attitude about nuclear weapons today is much closer to the way the US thought about them in the 1950s—simply another very destructive weapon. Whereas people in the US today argue that nuclear weapons are really politically "unusable" I don't believe that China thinks that way. In fact, Beijing's nuclear doctrine of "no first use" forces them to think this way. No first use essentially means, "We as a country are resigned to absorbing the first nuclear blow."

Even in the hands of potentially powerful foes, such as India, nuclear weapons will only be opposed verbally. On the other hand, Chinese willingness to proliferate with countries the U.S. worries about, like Iran or in the past Pakistan, will be used tactically by Beijing to either "reward" or "punish" the U.S. for what it considers either positive actions Washington takes or transgressions Washington makes in areas that Beijing considers of vital interest. The most important of these litmus tests is Taiwan.

Like virtually every other htmect of Sino-US relations, Beijing's willingness to cooperate on non-proliferation will be linked to US support of Taiwan. Support or non-support of Taiwan, especially arms sales, by the US will be the barometer Beijing uses for shaping its own non-proliferation policies and willingness to comply with US concerns—less US cooperation with Taiwan; more Beijing cooperation on non-proliferation. More US cooperation with Taiwan; less cooperation with the US on proliferation; or more probably, a deliberate ratcheting up of Chinese proliferation activities in order "to punish" Washington. Because they know we care, that gives them a "proliferation" tool to wield against us. I hasten to add I am not implying a perverse US approach to proliferation with China that rests on the "logic" that the best way to have Beijing curb its proliferation activities would be to persuade them we really don't care. Realistically "studied indifference" is not a viable or realistic policy option for the US; nor is cutting off arms sales and other political support for Taiwan. Therefore as long as Beijing sees non-proliferation policy in tactical terms, as opposed to a vital Chinese interest, it is unlikely we will ever persuade, or coerce, Beijing into whole-hearted support.

It seems to me, therefore, that as long as Beijing treats nonproliferation as simply one more issue on its bilateral agenda with Washington, and does not embrace Washington's overarching commitment, nonproliferation discussions with Beijing are unlikely to achieve all that the U.S. desires. This does mean we should stop trying, it just means that non-proliferation policy with China will have a Sisyphean quality.