US-China Commission
Hearing of Panel of Experts
October 12, 2001
China's Role in Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
Testimony of Rodney W. Jones
Preliminary
It is an honor and privilege for me to appear before the Commission to talk
about China's role in global proliferation problems, and I thank you for this
opportunity.
In addition to my prepared remarks for today, may I request that my chapter
on China in Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, done in mid-1998 at the Carnegie
Endowment, be attached as part of my submission for the record ñ if that
is permissible. That chapter records how far China has traveled towards nonproliferation
objectives over the last two decades.
Before addressing the written questions about China, I'd like to take a few
moments to share my perspective on how China has evolved since the 1970s and
what I believe our longer term security interests with China involve. Evaluating
proliferation behavior requires context.
China Yesterday and Today
It is easy to paint a very dark picture of China and much of that has been highlighted
in the media over the last few years. In fact, since the Tienanmen Square crackdown
in 1989, it is not altogether an exaggeration to say that China has been climbing
out of our doghouse. Beijing today is very much under the microscope.
Since 1989, we've had the 1996 US naval showdown over China's missile posturing
across the Taiwan strait, the Loral satellite launch controversy and more recent
Cox Committee findings -- suggesting Chinese espionage of advanced US nuclear
warhead information and missile guidance technology. We've had the far-reaching
emotional flap in China over our accidental bombing of their embassy in Belgrade,
and the PLA air force collision with our surveillance airplane that had to make
a forced landing in Hainan. Reports suggest that China managed to seduce Russia
(or vice versa) to sell advanced conventional arms and sensitive technology,
possibly including engineering information on how to deploy MIRV payloads on
ICBMs. Internal political change in Taiwan with hints about two independent
Chinas has greatly heated the atmosphere.
And China remains a one-party communist dictatorship, suppresses nascent opposition
parties, stifles any politically significant religious minorities, and robs
Buddhist Tibet of political and cultural autonomy.
But against that legitimately troubling backdrop, we ought to remind ourselves
that China has proved over the last twenty years to be a much more moderate
actor than the revolutionary power we fought directly during the Korean War,
and contended with during the early stages of the Cold War. We should not forget
how far China has come towards a constructive role in international affairs,
politically, economically, and legally in the last two decades.
China, for one thing, has not engaged in the export of international terrorism,
certainly not since Deng Hsiao Peng took control. China gives no aid or cover
to global terrorist organizations that do harm to the West. Its behavior does
not resemble North Korea's politically, in domestic or foreign affairs, nor
display the temperament of any of the classical rogue states. And it is hardly
a failing state in any sense of the word. China is not likely to disintegrate
or succumb to civil war.
China took no geopolitical advantage of the Soviet Union when it disintegrated,
nor did it attempt to exploit the chronic weaknesses of the newly independent
Central Asian states. Instead, China worked with Russia and the Central Asian
states to adjust and legally codify borders in areas that had long been disputed.
That was not what we would have expected to see in the 19th century or even
before World War Two. That is behavior more akin to what optimists mean when
they use the term "a new international order."
In the big picture, China opened up after 1975 to international trade and has
gradually given substantial freedom to profit-making entrepreneurs to operate
internally, in agriculture as well as manufacture and commerce. It has a long
way to go, of course, because China's sprawling public sector industries represent
an enormous mortgage on China's economy, and most are not capable of reforming
themselves. Growing wealth is also very unevenly distributed within China.
In contrast to the great lurches and privations of the Maoist period, however,
China's post-revolutionary leadership has managed to grow average domestic individual
incomes to a level of at least $1000/year, and that is not counting Hong Kong.
China has been part of the larger East Asian economic miracle. It is employing
and feeding a vast population. It is in our interest to see this progress continue.
China's taking on new WTO obligations is a key step forward in opening China's
economy to the stimulus of liberalizing forces.
China displays a predilection for stability. At least since the Viet Nam war,
China has not pursued a pattern of destabilizing policies towards Japan, Korea,
or Southeast Asia. Quite the opposite. Furthermore, for more than two decades
it has generally steered clear of confrontation with any big player in the region.
Except, that is, for the United States, due to our special connection with Taiwan.
But that exception proves the rule. Apart from Taiwan, China's principal self-assertion
to the south has been in the South China Sea. That is over access to energy
resources -- an entirely legitimate concern, if pursued without use of force.
Are there risks for the future as China's economy grows and its military capabilities
evolve? Of course, and China almost certainly will continue to be a tough partner
in negotiations. But if a strong China operates increasingly within a public
international order of open trade and diplomatic adjustment of security issues,
as has been the positive trend of the last 20 years, those risks, I believe,
will be manageable. The alternatives that could lead us to revert to a China-containment
policy are less palatable and would be very costly. That is something we would
do if we are forced to, but not something to be wished for when better choices
are available.
My analysis of China's behavior on proliferation and non-proliferation matters
fits this general perspective, and is condition also by awareness that no one's
hands are entirely clean in the areas of proliferation and nonproliferation.
Nonproliferation Learning Curve
Our approach to China since the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations has been
to draw it in to the international legal and political commitments that underpin
the nonproliferation regimes -- nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological.
China was altogether outside those regimes in 1975, but has come a long way
since then.
China has come furthest in the nuclear and chemical nonproliferation areas where
its interests and our interests converge most closely, and where the legal instruments
are treaties. It has taken major positive steps in the missile nonproliferation
area as well, but has not come quite as far there. The legal instruments in
that field are not treaties. (The verification htmects of the biological area
are still in negotiating flux, internationally, and I'll leave that aside.)
China's nonproliferation progress is far from complete, but we should not miss
the forest when we are looking at the trees.
As I see it, China's progress in nonproliferation has been based on two primary
incentives. One is a long view if not an altogether enlightened view of its
own security and economic interests. The second is that China places considerable
value on international respectability. Neither of these factors counted for
much in China during its long Maoist period of post-revolutionary turmoil and
of relative international isolation.
China has been on a long learning curve since 1975, when it turned decisively
away from its former international isolation. In the nonproliferation area,
a key theme in its progress has been the gradual acceptance of diplomatic commitments
and institutionalization of export control practices. Foreign affairs professionals
who interacted with international institutions and absorbed their expectations
led this change. Not surprisingly, military and industrial entities, and factions
in the central decision-making bodies of the communist party and of the state,
have pursued parochial interests, so that Chinese export practices did not necessarily
adhere to its earliest nonproliferation undertakings.
But I stress the learning curve. It was not possible for Chinese officials to
fully understand or "take ownership" of the substance of international
standards for their own nuclear export behavior until China joined the IAEA
in 1984. China's IAEA membership was a key watershed in making it feasible for
US administrations and the Congress to devise incentives for Chinese acceptance
of international standards in peaceful nuclear cooperation. It was only in 1992
that China acceded to the obligations of the NPT, which prohibit assistance
to non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons and require that IAEA safeguards
be applied to nuclear exports. These watersheds in China's foreign policy evolution
are not that far back.
Consolidating Nuclear Nonproliferation Commitments
Since joining the NPT in 1992, China's nuclear export practices have tightened
up considerably. A big step forward under US sanctions pressure related to dual-use
equipment, in this case "ring magnets," when China pledged in May
1996 not to provide assistance to "unsafeguarded" nuclear facilities.
China took more comprehensive steps in September-October 1997 by enacting and
publishing formal export control regulations, which correspond closely to those
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China then joined the IAEA's Zangger Committee,
and accepted its export control trigger list. In June 1998, China further upgraded
its nuclear export control regulations for control of dual-use technology. The
key remaining difference between China's policy and NSG requirements today is
that China has not agreed to is to make its nuclear cooperation contingent on
the application of "full-scope" IAEA safeguards. Also in 1997, China
basically dropped all significant nuclear cooperation with Iran, simply because
this was urged by the US, not because it was required by China's treaty or nuclear
export obligations.
As best I can tell, no cases have been brought forward on the public record
since 1997 that charge China with exporting nuclear materials or equipment in
violation of its NPT obligations, or deviating from its 1997-98 nuclear export
control regulations. Its civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with other
states -- including Pakistan, India, and Algeria -- appear to conform to all
international standards, except that of fullscope safeguards.
Our latest official reports to Congress focus on the risk that interaction between
Chinese and Pakistani personnel in nuclear facilities may contribute to Pakistan's
accumulation of nuclear weapons expertise. This is not a matter to be overlooked,
but the residual risk of proliferation through personnel interaction is marginal
by comparison with unregulated trade in nuclear materials and equipment.
Uneven Status of Missile Undertakings
The missile nonproliferation area has been a much tougher nut to crack. Our
diplomatic strategy with China has been to seek its adherence to the MTCR guidelines,
beginning in the late 1980s, after those non-treaty guidelines were first published.
China had transferred CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia
in 1988 and was marketing a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, such as the
Silkworm, to Iran. These understandably grabbed US attention.
China resisted adhering to the MTCR guidelines then, and to this day declines
to become a full partner in the MTCR arrangements. But China has moved forward
incrementally, with several public pledges, to adhere to the basic 1987 MTCR
guidelines. It is true that China insists on its own interpretation of the language
in those guidelines and does not necessarily accept the listing of each component
in the Annexes or the amendments to the guidelines made in 1993.
Satisfying procurement agreements from the 1980s, China reportedly delivered
some 34 complete M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan in 1992. China
also held the position that M-11 missiles were not MTCR-class. But China agreed
in late 1992 not to sell complete MTCR-class missiles thereafter, and may have
decided in that context to consider M-11 missiles as a restricted item. Sales
of M-11 missiles to Iran and Syria were cancelled even though, in Syria's case,
it had prepaid part of the bill. As far as I know, since that time China has
not transferred complete M-11 or M-9 missiles to any country.
But China evidently continued to provide ballistic missile components or technologies
and related production information to Iran for short-range CSS-8 battlefield
missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, and to Pakistan for M-11 type missile
technologies. Nevertheless, under continued discussion with the US, in November
2000, China pledged not to assist states to develop MTCR-class ballistic missiles,
which would preclude China continuing to transfer production technology for
MTCR-class missiles, presumably including M-11 and M-9 type missiles.
In the meantime, however, Pakistan apparently has been able to develop sufficient
capability to produce solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missiles itself, and
Iran reportedly has obtained significant assistance in the same field from Russia
for its Shahab program.
Chemical Weapons
In the early 1990s, Chinese chemical exports were a source of serious concern.
Evidently a large number of smaller Chinese companies became active in marketing
chemicals to Iran and Syria. After attention was focused on certain chemical
export transactions, China again moved step by step into conformity with international
expectations by signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, and it
subsequently ratified the CWC. In 1995 and 1997, China promulgated export control
regulations, with licensing and approval procedures for specified precursor
chemicals, and began implementing them.
China had difficulties with the compliance of companies that previously were
unaccustomed to getting export approvals. Both China and India, however, exported
unsafe chemicals to Iran between 1996 and 1998. Both had to upgrade their regulations
and work harder to ensure internal industrial compliance. The dual-use problems
of chemical feedstocks that can be used for legitimate agricultural chemicals
and plastic goods but that also may be converted into chemical weapons or their
precursors is a difficult area for many countries to come to grips with, not
China alone. The evidence is that China is endeavoring to comply with its CWC
obligations.
Nonproliferation Bottom Line
In short, the secular trend in China towards enforcing its own nonproliferation
undertakings has been overwhelmingly favorable. If you look at the wide range
of countries to which China formerly sold nuclear equipment or materials in
the 1970s and 1980s (including countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle
East, and Southwest Asia, as well as North Korea) and compare them with the
recipients that remain today, it becomes clear that China's contribution to
nuclear proliferation has narrowed drastically to a small handful of countries,
and mainly to dual-use areas of technology. It has adopted export control laws
that meet recognized international standards in the nuclear and chemical weapon
areas, reducing the scope for misbehavior primarily to implementation. Differences
remain in policy and obligation in the missile export area, but those differences
have shrunk drastically too.
China's Strategy and Motivations
One of the written questions relates to motivations. I would offer a few brief
points on this question, bearing in mind that Chinese motivations for pursuing
proliferation-sensitive activities earlier need to be compared with the restrictions
China operated under at the time. The goalposts have been moved more than once.
A large part of the explanation for China's sensitive nuclear, missile and chemical
exports in the 1970s and 1980s was its interest in commercial and foreign exchange
earnings. These grew in importance after 1975, as China opened up to international
trade. China's export competitiveness was greater in items of strategic trade
than other commodities, particularly where Western countries lost ground, as
in Iran after the fall of the Shah, and in such niche items as ballistic and
cruise missiles, which Western states declined to sell to problem countries.
A second factor of high importance for China's "strategic trade,"
especially nuclear and missile exports, was cultivating favor in energy-producing
countries in the Gulf and Middle East. This factor will increase in importance
over time, as China becomes more dependent on energy imports. This is one of
China's strategic concerns for the future.
The third factor has been maintaining stability on China's periphery. China's
military cooperation with Pakistan, for example, has been important to China
in several ways. During the Cold War, Pakistan was a buffer against further
Soviet expansion to the south, that is, to China's rear. Pakistan was an important
intermediary for China in opening up rapprochement with the United States. As
a moderate Islamic country, Pakistan was also a listening post and a friend
willing to put a good face on Chinese diplomatic openings in the Middle East.
Insofar as India had great power and nuclear ambitions and was an unwanted distraction
to China, investing modestly in India's local rival strengthened Pakistan's
capacity to act as a natural counterweight. Each of these interests in Pakistan
fit China's perspective on stability in neighboring regions.
Fourth, and rising in importance today, China's proliferation capability engages
the concern of the United States and most Western countries and presumably generates
diplomatic leverage. China can and does link these concerns to its own opposition
to major US arms transfers to Taiwan. This Taiwan linkage is more to China's
missile export activities than to its nuclear cooperation policies. Linkage
is not evident in the chemical area. It is clear, however, that China is as
intensely opposed to transfers of sophisticated fighter aircraft and AEGIS ships
to Taiwan as we are to missile proliferation in problem countries.
A fifth factor should be mentioned in light of the present US interest in ballistic
missile defense. We now all know that China is vocally opposed to US deployment
of strategic and regional ballistic missile defenses. Its twin concerns are
that US missile defenses of the homeland will impair the credibility of China's
strategic nuclear deterrent, and regional missile defenses may encourage Taiwanese
independence htmirations. China's linking proliferation acts deliberately to
these concerns is not China's most obvious choice -- alternative and more easily
justified courses of action are open to China -- but linkage is a risk.
Policy Implications
Do no harm: Since China has institutionalized the implementation of its nonproliferation
obligations and commitments through published export control regulations, a
case can be made that it is more important today to consolidate China's progress
and to dissuade China from backsliding than to insist on immediate closure of
all remaining loopholes. To put it another way, persuasive measures steadily
applied are more likely to be productive than punitive sanctions on China in
eliciting further progress. Sanctions against specific Chinese trading firms
for future acts of illicit behavior would still be warranted when the evidence
is clear.
Consistency of US nonproliferation commitments: Recent US policy shifts that
court India as a favored strategic partner despite its 1998 nuclear weapon tests
and induction of nuclear weapons evidently is regarded by China as an expedient
softening of America's own commitments to nuclear nonproliferation. Should China
conclude that this also damages Chinese security interests and strategic stability
in Asia, it may reevaluate the value of its own nonproliferation undertakings
and adopt a lower standard. The US would be wise to think through the ramifications
and tradeoffs before it moves irrevocably down such a path.
Engagement - stay the course: China's direct incentives for adherence to nonproliferation
undertakings are the general security and stability benefits that stem from
widespread adherence to nonproliferation regimes, and the international standing
China gains from meeting its own commitments. But China's overall gains from
ordinary political and economic exchange may be crucial in offsetting the short
term sacrifices that can and do result from strictly observing nonproliferation
undertakings. Engagement principles remain the proper overall framework to pursue
China's comprehensive adherence to nonproliferation standards and the broader
range of US interests.
Measures on Taiwan: Peacefully resolving the future status of Taiwan will continue
to test Chinese patience and US political and diplomatic skills. The strategic
sensitivity in Beijing of the contemplated transfer of advanced US arms to Taiwan
should not be underestimated. China's implicit linkage of this matter with proliferation
is not something we can agree with and is inappropriate in any case, but neither
should we dismiss the depth of Chinese concern or be surprised by linked behavior.
Regional security cooperation: Steady support for and creative enlargement of
the functions of APEC in matters of regional security may provide new incentives
for China and working relationships with Chinese officials that could, in turn,
strengthen China's confidence in nonproliferation commitments China's perceived
benefits in compliance.
Energy assurances: As China modernizes and per capita consumption increases,
assurance of energy supply will assume an increasing strategic importance in
China. While the market and maintenance of international security are the critical
underpinnings for assured energy supply, this is an area in which proactive
great power cooperation could yield benefits that make the management of nonproliferation
undertakings easier.
• Rodney W. Jones is President of Policy Architects International,
Reston, VA, and the principal author of Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide
in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).