Prepared for the 1998 AEI Conference on the People's Liberation Army, September 11-13, 1998, Wye Plantation, htmen, Maryland.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the authors and are not to be construed as representing those of the National War College, the National Defense University, or any other Agency of the United States Government.
China's Changing National Military Strategy
China's Military Industrial Capabilities
"Walking on Two Legs": Future Strategy and Operational Concepts
China's military strategists and planners face an increasingly difficult dilemma
as they prepare their defense modernization plans for the twenty-first century.
Even as their armed forces are just beginning to acquire small amounts of the
technologies, weapons and equipment designed for war in the latter part of the
twentieth century, advances in military technology portend a potential revolution
in the conduct of war in the twenty-first century. Extensive publications by
Chinese military analysts amply demonstrate their understanding of the difficulties
facing their armed forces as they grapple with the implications of advanced
technologies for war in the next century.1
Given the openness with which China's military leaders and analysts discuss
the problems faced by their armed forces, this paper will focus on four areas
of inquiry.
First, it will review the implications of advanced technology warfare found
in the assessments of Chinese military analysts in the years since the 1985
revision of China's national military strategy, and particularly following the
1991 Persian Gulf War. Second, it will use the evaluations found in the Militarily
Critical Technologies List Part 1: Weapon Systems Technologies (MCTL), released
by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions and Technology)
in June 1996, to assess China's military industrial capabilities. Third, to
determine the PLA's technological modernization objectives and priorities, we
will combine the results of this assessment with Beijing's acquisition of foreign
military technologies and analyses of the kinds of military operations Chinese
military journals suggest their armed forces seek to conduct over the next decade.
Finally, the paper will analyze what kinds of feasible strategies and concepts
of operations Chinese analysts are contemplating as they search for specific
technologies to offset the advantages of potential adversaries.
We will not assess the implications of advanced technologies for China's nuclear
force modernization. Alastair I. Johnston has thoroughly analyzed the implications
drawn by Chinese analysts of technology advances in this realm for Beijing's
strategic doctrine and strategy.2 Rather,
we shall focus on the implications for China's conventional, general purpose
forces.
Deficiencies in the technologies of warfare are far from a new plight for the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), as all the armed services and their
branches are collectively designated. A major facet of the PLA's doctrinal heritage
is Mao Zedong's principle, developed during the 1930s struggle against a technologically
superior Japanese army, that military forces can successfully compensate for
their inferiority in the tools of war with ingenious doctrine and concepts of
operations. Nonetheless, Beijing's 1985 revision of China's national military
strategy and the implications of the Persian Gulf conflict raised questions
within the PLA as to whether doctrinal and operational ingenuity can compensate
for technological deficiency in the twenty-first century.
Revising China's national military strategy resulted in the most significant
transformation of PLA missions since the founding of the People's Republic in
1949. Until 1985, continental defense against a massive ground assault was the
PLA's primary military mission. PLA strategy and operations relied upon numerically
superior forces conducting protracted, attrition warfare to sap the enemy's
strength and superior technology, leaving him weak and exposed to a counter-offensive
that would eject him from China's territory. In the late-1960s, nuclear deterrence
joined this core strategy as China deployed its first strategic forces.3
The wars China fought in Korea and with India and Vietnam were "just outside
the gate." As conflicts with bordering states they were within the scope
of a continental defense strategy. In this strategy, pride of place was granted
to the ground forces with naval and air forces in secondary supporting roles.
The PLA Navy's (PLAN) primary mission was coastal defense, while the PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) was devoted to air defense of the homeland.
In 1985, the PLA was given radically new strategic direction.4
China's potential military threat was no longer perceived to be a massive assault,
possibly involving nuclear weaponry, designed to conquer China and overthrow
its regime. Beijing's strategic assessment in 1985 saw the most likely future
military threats as potentially intense, but politically and geographically
limited wars fought on China's periphery, including its maritime territories
and claims. It was the requirement to actively defend China's non-continental
territory that brought to the fore a new mission for the PLA -- force projection
across maritime and aeronautical space.
The PLA's Post-Gulf War Self-Assessment5
China's armed forces were wrestling with these new requirements as the Persian
Gulf war erupted. Desert Storm brought about a new awareness of the extent to
which technology had changed the conduct of war. For China's military analysts,
operation Desert Storm manifested the advent of a probable Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) based in large part on evolving information technology, such as
microelectronics, space-based systems and data processing. Following the Persian
Gulf War, the manner in which the PLA characterized its most likely future conflicts
was modified from "limited, local war" to "limited, local war
under high-tech conditions."6
Particularly impressive to China's military analysts were the allies' capabilities
in offensive air operations; surveillance, including space systems and unmanned
air vehicles; precision-guided munitions, including cruise missiles for long-range
over-the-horizon (OTH) precision strikes; and battlefield command and control.
The brief one hundred-hour ground war against Iraq was seen as demonstrating
that numerical superiority is no longer the key to military victory, and that
the offense now has a significant edge over defense in modern warfare.7
Although impressed by the display of military technology, the doctrine and operational
art demonstrated by the coalition forces as they exploited these new technologies
for success on the battlefield was deemed equally salient. For PLA analysts,
the stunning victory of coalition forces was recognized as more than the result
of advanced platforms, weapons, sensors, and improved training and doctrinal
advances. The ability to conduct joint warfare was understood to be the critical
factor making combat effectiveness more than simply the sum of individual service
capabilities.
These analysts find China currently disadvantaged in most areas of the technologies
critical to near-term and future warfare. Also evident is the PLA leadership's
understanding that China will not achieve the same broad-based technological
level as the United States' armed forces and military industrial base any time
in the near future. However, published analyses by Chinese military researchers
evidence a systematic effort to identify more precisely those technologies critical
to the PLA's ability to conduct war successfully in the future. A significant
htmect of PLA research is the attempt to link selected advanced technologies
with the analysis of potential strategies and/or military operations to counter
a superior adversary. Those technologies that could offset distinct advantages
held by the United States, and which also serve to support American allies,
are specifically included in these inquiries.
Despite their understanding that advanced military technologies are changing
the conduct of war, PLA authors continue to wrestle with a "mix" of
technology and ideology. The icons of Mao's military theory, dependency on "the
people" and "people's war” remain even though military strength
is no longer measured in numbers. Despite the new emphasis placed on quality
rather than quantity forces voiced by all of China's military leaders, this
continued obeisance to Mao Zedong suggests no small tinge of the Qing dynasty
reformers as they espoused the principle of zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong --
Chinese learning for essence, Western learning for practical use. Despite widespread
understanding within China's military leadership that extensive reform is required
to transform the PLA into a world-class combat force in the twenty-first century,
military doctrines of the past still constrain reform and tend to place ideology
before training and equipment in assessing combat capabilities.
Advanced Technologies and the Conduct of War
Advanced technologies of greatest interest and concern to the PLA are those
contributing to significantly improved battlespace transparency, command and
control of joint military operations, long-range precision guided munitions,
and information warfare (IW).
These technologies allow the commander to obtain and communicate near real-time
information on enemy forces and permit the engagement of adversary forces at
greater distances with increased accuracy under all-weather and night conditions.
IW technologies are used achieve information superiority over the battlespace
by confusing and hindering the adversary's information collection, processing,
and utilization while simultaneously defending one's own information-based systems
and processes. IW capabilities are often referred to as the "soft"
side of warfare in contrast to the "hard" capabilities of more conventional
attack and defense systems.
These military developments mirror increasingly computer-intensive civilian
communications and financial systems, transportation control networks, and power
grids. Disrupting these nominally civilian processes could well have seriously
deleterious effects on a country's ability to sustain a war. Thus IW has added
a new dimension to PLA analysts' appreciation of technology's role in future
military conflict.
Advances in military technology demand changes in concepts of operations to
exploit fully the advantages of military technology on the battlefield. Desert
Storm's demonstration of technology's increasing importance convinced Chinese
analysts that the "battlefield" had expanded into space. It also showed
that success in war was now crucially dependent on a coordinated plan of joint
warfare that placed very high requirements on command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, and information (C4I2).
These implications of advanced technological warfare set especially serious
demands on the PLA, a military force that lags a generation and more in the
evolution of military technology. Chinese military analysts recognize that their
armed forces must integrate new technologies into concepts of operations, battlefield
tactics, maintenance processes and logistical support without the experience
the PLA might have gained if it had gone through earlier evolutions of these
technologies.
Certainly there are potential benefits inherent in the requirement to make rapid,
dramatic changes. The PLA's very backwardness may ease the leadership's task
in shedding the baggage of entrenched organizational and operational principles.
It may also mean that PLA operational commanders will resist change until the
advantages of new technologies are clearly demonstrated. In either case, PLA
lack of experience in the employment, maintenance and logistical support of
advanced military technologies will exact a double penalty as it transitions
toward a twenty-first century combat force. First, leveraging technology through
military operational capability is especially difficult because technology is
advancing faster than it can be acquired, tested, developed and applied in a
military environment. Second, other nations' militaries will continue to advance,
so PLA modernization efforts face moving technological goal posts.
Similar problems confront China's weapon design teams and defense industries
when they contemplate production of advanced technology weapon platforms, sensor
systems, and munitions. Design teams must integrate the various processes and
technologies into coherent weapon platforms, such as ships, aircraft, tanks,
etc. Systems and technology integration is a complex, demanding requirement
and the heart of technologically advanced military effectiveness. Only slightly
less critical is the precision required to manufacture advanced technology systems,
a capability is not well established in China's industrial base.
China's defense industries parallel the PLA's experience by lagging a generation
and more behind in the requirements for manufacturing advanced technology military
systems and munitions. These deficiencies can be overcome, but it could be many
years before China's defense industries develop the consistent quality and precision
in manufacturing required to move advanced technology military items from the
drawing board to the battlefield.
Can the Chinese military industrial complex (CMIC) build what the PLA thinks
it needs for next century's high technology warfare? The question is simple,
but the answer is not. Mark Stokes has prepared what may be the definitive monograph
on what China's military research centers are undertaking to fill the military's
requirements,8 but the question remains. Two
decades of reform have sought to rationalize the CMIC and its associated research
centers and universities, but priority has been placed on reducing China's defense
burden, not on building a modern, effective defense research, development and
industrial base. Today, perhaps no more than 10 percent of the defense manufacturing
plant is actually used for military production, with the remainder either idle
or devoted to producing goods and services for the civilian market.9
Despite reforms initiated in the early 1980s, the CMIC remains the huge, lumbering,
obsolescent behemoth built with Soviet assistance in the 1950s. Consisting of
more than two thousand enterprises, each with multiple factories employing three
million workers, and encompassing more than 200 hundred major research institutes
with 300,000 engineers and technicians, the CMIC has even yet to approach the
research and production capabilities that mark a major military power.10
Placing national defense fourth in the "Four Modernizations" investment
priorities established in 1978 took its toll on the defense industries as well
as the PLA. As late as 1994, Chinese sources state that 81 percent of military
producers were losing money.11
The Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND),
as successor to the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, was
established to provide the cornerstone linking the PLA and the CMIC. COSTIND's
failure is evident as military research, development and production remains
weighed down by a lack of centralized coordination and fragmented, almost feudatory
CMIC fiefdoms. This condition hinders the process of translating technological
innovation into useable weapons and equipment.12
Defense conversion has not resolved this problem, and may even have exacerbated
it as the CMIC entered the world of competitive civilian markets. Furthermore,
by the early 1990s, defense conversion policies had created the situation where
many plants no longer even wanted to undertake defense production. Peacetime
military manufacturing in China involves small quantities with high production
costs that leave the producer with little or no profit. Defense contracts often
have to be subsidized with revenues from civilian production, which has led
to PLA complaints that production plants seek to "guarantee profit, not
military interests."13 Defense research
centers also suffered as central government funding was sharply reduced and
institutes formerly restricted to defense-related research were required to
commercialize their services. Frequently, civilian research and development
projects had to subsidize military research.
14
Despite the priority the PLA places on acquiring sophisticated military technologies,
it should not be assumed that research and manufacturing employing advanced
technologies for civilian products, including imported technologies, automatically
leads to "spin-on" for military applications. Infrastructure deficiencies
combined with the lack of experience in transforming dual-use technologies to
military purposes slows down whatever spin-on exists from civilian or dual-use
technologies. No doubt spin-on is taking place, but COSTIND's own daily newspaper
has complained as late as 1998 that converting defense industrial plants to
civilian production in a very competitive market has not resulted in centralized,
coordinated program to exploit civil and dual-use technologies.15
While there may well be advances in specific research areas and production capabilities,
sometimes referred to as "pockets of excellence," what remains to
be determined is whether this progress is the result of a focused, planned response
to twenty-first century military requirements or simply research centers acting
independently, without direction or coordination.. Here again assessment is
difficult because failed projects are the norm in this kind of research activity
and it takes many years, especially in the CMIC, to transform development projects
into deployed systems.16 Reorganization of
COSTIND mandated at the 9th National People's Congress in March 1998, and the
formation of a new General Armament Department (GAD) to constitute a fourth
General Department of PLA, implicitly acknowledges COSTIND's failure.17
Given the evidently poor state of China's indigenous research, development and
production capabilities18 other than ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons, the quickest way to embark on acquiring advanced
military technologies is foreign procurement. Israel and Russia are currently
Beijing's principal suppliers, with Moscow providing the most. Israel is contributing
to the J-10 advanced fighter project, while Russia has provided a wide variety
of weapon systems and military technology. The most visible signs of an expanding
military technology linkage with Moscow are the sale of four Kilo-class diesel-electric
submarines, a reported contract for two Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers,
and the recent agreement granting licensed production of Su-27 multiple-role
fighters following the sale of some 50 completed aircraft.19
These technologies and production capabilities are, however, at best 1980s genre.
Entering the realm of twenty-first century technologies is far more complex
-- and expensive. This is especially so in the realms of digitization, information
technologies and the technologies required for military space operations. Yet
it is in precisely these areas that many facets of twenty-first century warfare
require the highest degrees of production precision and reliability. For example,
any computer or artificial intelligence technologies in space-based reconnaissance
systems providing real-time intelligence to battlefield commanders are not available
for maintenance or repair once deployed. Furthermore, these technologies have
to function in an extremely harsh environment after surviving the shock and
vibration of the launch-phase of deployment. To what extent China is receiving
foreign assistance in these obviously strategic technological capabilities is
unknown, but even Moscow may be reluctant to provide assistance in such realms.
Assessing China's Military Technology Capabilities.
The Department of Defense (DoD) process for assessing militarily critical technologies
for the MCTL involved fifteen technology working groups (TWG)20
which reviewed more than 6,000 technologies and identified 2,060 as militarily
significant. Significance was determined by two sets of criteria: those that
could a) enhance threats by potential adversaries of the United States, and
b) provided a measurable advantage to U.S. military systems. Ultimately, 656
technologies met the "militarily critical" criteria. Within the limits
set by data availability, all the world's significant defense industries were
evaluated. Although the MCTL is not a classified document, because each TWG
included representation from the intelligence community as well as those from
industry and academe, its sources may be assumed to include "sanitized"
classified data.
The TWGs assigned a numerical grade ranging from "0" to "4"
reflecting their assessment of an industrial base's capability to produce a
specific technology:
"0" indicates that a state has no capability or that the TWG could
not reach a consensus.
"1" indicates a capability in only a limited set of the critical elements
of a technology.
"2" indicates a capability in some critical elements.
"3" indicates a capability in a majority of the technology areas critical
elements.
"4" indicates that a country is believed to have the production capability
in all elements of a technology area.
Only the United States is assessed as possessing all but two of the 84 production
elements for the eighteen technology areas critical to the development and production
of superior weapons.21
Of the countries included in the MCTL, we have selected five in addition to
the United States with which to compare China. Selection was based on the principle
that each of the countries selected must possess the range of technological
capabilities China is seeking to obtain. Japan, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (UK) fit this criterion. Russia was included because its military technologies
and defense industries were subject to considerable investment during the Cold
War and could provide the technologies China's defense establishment desires.
Compared with the other countries selected, China is relatively new to advanced
military technologies, for it did not begin to develop a defense research and
industrial base until the mid-1950s. This first step toward a modern defense
establishment came to an end in 1959-1960 when the former USSR essentially terminated
all of its assistance. With the exception of the nuclear weapon, ballistic missile,
and nuclear-powered submarine programs which had special status, internal political
dislocation associated with the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution left China's defense research and industrial base essentially
stagnant. By 1978, when Deng Xiaoping as China's "paramount leader"
initiated his reform programs, the defense industrial base was capable of placing
only Soviet technologies from the 1950s into series production. The DoD's assessment
of June 1996 therefore evaluated a defense technology capability that with few
exceptions has emerged since 1978 -- less than twenty years. Thus China's defense
industrial base does not have the depth and experience in developing and producing
advanced military technologies present in the other five countries used in this
analysis.
We must note at the outset, however, that Beijing's deliberate lack of transparency
in all matters relating to China's military capabilities means that any assessment
of the CMIC must be viewed as tentative. Evaluations provided for the technological
capabilities of more transparent states, such as Germany or Japan, will be more
reliable than those provided for China. CMIC data are recognized as being somewhat
"squishy." Thus, although we use MCTL assessments of individual technologies,
we will be appraising the pattern of technological strengths and weaknesses
as they relate to generic combat missions, weapons and platforms. Furthermore,
an assessment published in 1996 most probably reflects data collected in 1994-95.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the CMIC's capabilities have increased dramatically
in any areas of technology included in the MCTL.
China's Production and Development Capabilities in Overview
China's overall comparative standing can be seen in Table 1. In most of the 84 technology areas critical to the development and production of advanced military weapons China is weak, having all production capabilities only for nuclear weapons and nuclear materials processing. Those areas where China has a majority of the production capabilities are in armaments and energetic materials, chemical and biological systems, materials technology, power systems technologies, and in theoretical models for signature control technology. In essentially all other areas of critical military technologies China is extremely deficient.
Table 1: CAPABILITIES
IN THE 84 CRITICAL MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AREAS
Table 2 provides another overview of China's capabilities to produce advanced
military hardware. In none of the technologies essential for the manufacture
of advanced military equipment does China rank higher "some" production
capabilities.
Table 2. MANUFACTURING
& FABRICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Looking at China's technological capabilities in greater detail, Table 3 lists
those areas where China is evaluated with a production capability of "3"
or "4." Table 4 indicates those technology areas where China is evaluated
as possessing less than a majority of development and production capabilities
("1" or "2").
Table 3. CHINA'S STRENGTHS
Table 4. CHINA'S WEAKNESSES
Our analysis, however, is not concerned primarily with the CMIC's overall development
and production capabilities, but with assessing China's advanced technology
capabilities in areas of expressed interest to the PLA: those that contribute
significantly to improved battle-space awareness, long-range precision strike
munitions, command and control of joint military operations, and information
warfare. These capabilities can be assigned to three broad operational areas
generic to all combat operations -- detection, location, and effective engagement,
especially in a target rich environment.
Detection technologies may soon be able to provide near real-time information
on the total battle area from space through air to surface, to below the ocean's
surface. Knowing precisely where the adversary's forces and command and control
facilities are located allows a commander to prioritize and select targets.
Locating forces and facilities of the greatest significance to the battle allows
him to employ joint forces in space and air, and on land and sea to engage the
adversary at the most advantageous time and place and with the most appropriate
weapons.
Detection and location capabilities can place the adversary in a disadvantaged
position, especially when they create a relatively transparent battlefield,
which permits a commander to know engagement results in near, real-time. Each
of these mission areas and their associated technologies will be expanded upon
as our analysis proceeds.
The three sets of technologies associated with these operational mission areas
as defined in the MCTL are:
Detection:
Space Systems Technology
Sensors & Laser Technology
Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Technology
Location:
Sensors & Laser Technology
Guidance, Navigation & Vehicle Control Technology
Information Technology (C4I2, etc.)
Engagement (joint warfare):
Information Technology (C4I2, etc.)
Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Technology
Information Warfare Technology
Aeronautics Systems Technology
Marine Systems Technology
Signature Control Technology
In several areas, specific technologies fit more than one mission. Additionally,
the technologies listed apply equally offensive and defensive operations.
China's production capabilities in space systems are assessed in Table 5. Space
surveillance provides the military commander with critical information and capabilities.
Beyond target detection and location, of particular value are weather information,
the ability to provide precise navigation data, and robust command and control
for operational forces. The critical components of space reconnaissance are
optronics, for these technologies determine the parameters for detection, identification
and resolution of targets. Where conditions do not permit sufficient clarity
or detail, electro-optic sensors join with laser illumination to provide the
essential data.22
Table 5. SPACE SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
Although China's interest in military surveillance systems is unquestioned,
its ability to design and produce the space sensors central to wide area reconnaissance
is clearly limited. Beijing yet defines its military reconnaissance satellites
as "experimental." China's first generation of recoverable photo-intelligence
satellites (FSW-1) of the mid-1960s had an operational life of seven to ten
days. A later model, the FSW-2, could remain in orbit for up to sixteen to eighteen
days. Two FSW-type were launched into low earth orbit in 1994. In March 1996,
however, an FSW-type satellite did not return to its Sichuan basin recovery
area, but made an uncontrolled entry into the South Atlantic.23
There may be more progress with the Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1). This commercial satellite
joint venture with Brazil is scheduled to be launched in 1998 with an estimated
orbit life of two years. Given China's practice of combining civil and military
functions, it should be assumed that this satellite system will have military
missions. The ZY-1 with three remote sensors has a real-time transmission capability
and a ground resolution power of 19.5 meters. This far less than a U.S. KH-12,
which has a resolution power of 1.5 to 3 meters. Thus, despite its 30-year experience
with satellites, China's ability to successfully deploy space systems with the
ability to detect and locate targets in a wide battle area and provide real-time
intelligence to commanders is evidently some years away.
As Table 6 indicates, nor are China's sensors for air, ground, and maritime
platforms particularly advanced. PLAN anti-submarine warfare capabilities (ASW),
now referred to as Under Sea Warfare (USW) by the U.S. Navy, are limited by
evident weakness in acoustic and other sensors. Similarly, China has only a
limited capability in the electro-optical sensors used for terminal guidance
in "smart" and more advanced "brilliant" munitions. In sum,
the CMIC is demonstrably weak in essentially all areas of technology associated
with precision locating and targeting.
Table 6. SENSORS
AND LASER TECHNOLOGIES
Similar deficiencies in providing precise location of China's own and enemy military platforms are equally evident, as indicated by Table 7. In twenty-first century warfare, continuous accurate position data is required to maintain real-time reconnaissance of enemy forces, and to permit effective coordination of highly mobile military forces in joint, non-linear warfare. China is deficient in these technology areas. Furthermore, both conventional and nuclear munitions rely upon precise guidance technologies for the accuracy required to fit the weapon's footprint to the target. Yet, here again China is lacking.
Table 7. GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION & VEHICLE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
Deficiencies in navigation and guidance are exacerbated by poor command and control technologies, without which effective engagement of joint forces becomes extremely problematic. Table 8 indicates that China's mastery of command and control technologies is inadequate.
Table 8. COMMAND & CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES
Reliable and secure C412 systems are essential in military operations. Today
and in the next century, the seamless integration of communications, intelligence
and information complements battle-space awareness, providing the commander
with real-time decision-making capabilities. This is particularly significant
because near real-time assessment of the results of an engagement is now becoming
critical to dominating the battle-space and in gaining tactical and operational
advantage over an adversary. China's continuing deficiencies in this critical
area are reflected in the failure of its most recent second generation military
communications satellite, the DFH-3. Built as a joint venture with Germany's
Daimler-Benz company using some U.S. components, the satellite failed to become
operational following its May 1997 launch. This was the second DFH-3 malfunction,
the first occurring in 1994 when the satellite failed to achieve proper orbit.
Because of these failures, COSTIND leased two receivers on the commercial Apstar-1A
for military use. The Apstar communications satellite was built by Hughes Electronics
and sold to a commercial communications company, APT of Hong Kong.25
PLA use of commercial satellites for both reconnaissance and communications
demonstrates the overall pattern of weaknesses in China's military space capabilities.
Thus, when command and control deficiencies are combined with detection and
location frailties, China's hopes for achieving early in the twenty-first century
the capabilities demonstrated by the United States in the early 1990s are slim
to none.
Countering High Technology Adversaries
With these collective disadvantages, it is important to assess the ability
of Chinese forces to disrupt the advantages held by technologically superior
forces. Such an approach to future conflict not only fits the PLA's deeply held
doctrinal and operational tradition, but can also be ascertained from Chinese
assessments of their future strategy.
Of particular interest to China are the capabilities of high energy lasers (HEL).26
HEL systems can deliver energy at the speed of light and show promise of being
able to provide rapid retargeting of platforms ranging from satellites to ballistic
missiles to aircraft.27 To achieve this promise,
design is now focused on supporting technologies that will permit HEL systems
to acquire and track targets, conduct "kill" assessments, and then
to move quickly and accurately to new targets. To achieve these capabilities,
the supporting technologies must allow the system to track one or more targets,
sustain the beam on target long enough to harm it, evaluate the damage produced,
and then, if the level of damage is sufficient, reorient the beam to another
target.28 These are very complicated technologies
to design, manufacture and integrate into weapon systems. As Table 9 indicates,
China's assessed production capabilities in both chemical lasers and the supporting
technologies essential for effective engagement are low, although clearly some
progress is being made.
Table 9. DIRECTED ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
Chinese analysts also show a high interest in information warfare (IW),29 sometimes referred to as "soft" warfare. IW is a combination of old and new missions linked to emerging information technologies, and have both offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive missions seek to harm adversary information, information-based processes and systems, and computer-based networks. The modes of attack used to execute such missions are electronic warfare (EW), command and control warfare (C2W), physical destruction, and deception. Although "hackers" have demonstrated the capability to break into unprotected computer-based information systems, disrupting protected, hardened military systems is many times more difficult. Table 10 indicates China's IW technological capabilities are limited.
Table 10. INFORMATION WARFARE TECHNOLOGIES
What is not evident from the available data are China's capabilities to attack unprotected systems, such as power grids, civilian telephone systems, transportation networks, financial networks and other increasingly information and computer-dependent sectors of civil society. Table 11 provides a broader assessment of China's information capabilities and exposes an even wider set of limitations.
Table 11. INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
There is a wide swath of technologies involved in information systems (IS) simply because these technologies are applied over an extensive range of military applications. The applications include IS systems as part of "smart" and "brilliant" weapons, aircraft, ships, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, communications systems and networks, including hand-held devices. Equally important are the human systems interface with these technologies, as well as the ability to model and simulate the engineering and manufacturing processes. Human interface with the technologies is central to increasing reaction time in increasingly complex platforms, such as combat aircraft and attack helicopters, and in the ability of the operator and/or user to handle high levels of information and make decisions in high stress combat situations. Here again, China's deficiencies are extensive and the speed with which its scientists and engineers can reach the level of advanced industrial and post-industrial states is questionable.
MCTL data are particularly important for their contribution to evaluating the military operational applications of the technologies assessed. Given that China's national military strategy has shifted from continental defense to peripheral defense, and that maritime territories and claims are now of particular concern, we shall focus on technologies associated with naval and air power, and with cruise and tactical ballistic missile capabilities. Because China's military analysts view future conflicts as potentially involving short duration high intensity combat, the PLA's operational focus has shifted from defensive to offensive operations and the need to gain the initiative early in any engagement. Naval and air power are of particular importance in such operations. Thus, even within a military strategy designed to be defensive, force projection is a major concern of China's military planners.
As Table 12 indicates, the MCTL assigns China low ratings in most of the technologies associated with naval warfare. To recognize the implications of these ratings, the analyst must consider and crosscheck more than one of the technology areas in order to translate MCTL evaluations into useful measures of operational capability in any area of naval technology. No weapon platform as complex as a modern surface or subsurface naval combatant is dependent upon a single set of technologies. Rather, to be effective a warship is a "system of systems" and must integrate a number of different technologies into a single fighting system.
Table 12. NAVAL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGIES
Submarine Technology
Evaluating the military utility of China's submarines demands attention to
a number of related technology areas. For example, despite China's strength
in nuclear systems, weakness in related technology areas impedes successful
completion of a modern, quiet nuclear submarine force. This assessment, together
with the crudity of China's six nuclear-powered submarines (only four of which
may be operational), indicates that China is not able to make operational use
of its strong rankings in nuclear systems technology. Similar deficiencies impede
development of a modern conventionally powered (diesel-electric) submarine force.
To be effective in the 1990s, let alone the twenty-first century, submarines
must integrate a large number of advanced technologies both to conceal its own
presence and detect its opponent. Signature control technology is crucial to
designing a submarine with a low enough "signature" to avoid detection
by opposing forces using submarine, ship, aircraft, space, and ocean-bottom
systems keyed to sense and report audio, visual, magnetic, pressure, and infrared
disturbances to the environment that would indicate the presence of a submarine.
In sum, the less the submarine disturbs the ambient environment -- the lower
its signature -- the more difficult it is to detect and the more effective it
will be operationally. In these crucial areas, China receives a "3"
in theoretical models technique, but only a "2" in materials and design
concepts, and just "1s" in the other five sub-areas evaluated -- not
a strong showing. Furthermore, while minimizing its own signature, a submarine
must also be able to detect opponents. Here China has a "0" rating
in the crucial acoustic sensors area, and "2s" in the active and passive
sonar areas.
Guidance, navigation, and vehicle control technologies directly affect a nation's
ability to design and produce operationally effective submarines. This area
includes the technologies on which are based inertial, radio, and database referenced
navigation equipment, applying both to the submarine's ability to navigate accurately
and to fire cruise and ballistic missiles, with precision. Here, China receives
"2s" in inertial, radio, and data based referenced navigation systems.
In other words, the CMIC is unable to provide the most advanced navigational-locating
systems, which limits submarine navigational accuracy and hence operational
effectiveness. This shortfall can be partially alleviated by access to American
global positioning system (GPS) satellites and the Russian Global Navigation
Satellite System (GLONASS), but the GPS system would certainly be downgraded
by the United States in the event of a military conflict.
Modern submarine construction involves the MCTL area classified as manufacturing
and fabrication technology. Here China is evaluated with capability of "2"
in advanced fabrication and processing, bearings, and production equipment;
and "1s" in both metrology and non-destructive inspection and evaluation.
Without importing these technologies, China will be unable to construct an indigenous
submarine force approaching those of the advanced industrial states.
China's purchase of Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia stems
from these deficiencies. Kilos are advanced craft, more capable than the Chinese-built
Ming and Song classes. The Kilo first went to sea in 1980 and remains one of
the world's better conventionally-powered submarines. It is somewhat dated,
since it does not have an Air Independent Propulsion system, but the Kilo still
presents China with technological sophistication not available in the CMIC.
To increase its stealthiness for both offensive and defensive purposes, the
Kilo's hull is coated with anechoic tiles that reduce its susceptibility to
sonar detection and diminish the noise created by its internal machinery. Submarines
from China's yards, especially the nuclear-powered Han and Xia classes, are
relatively noisy and easy to detect. The Kilo also incorporates competent technologies
for offensive operations, including acoustic sensors, electro-optical sensors,
radar, lasers and wire-guided torpedoes.
Clearly, by purchasing at least four and possibly twenty Kilo submarines in
future years, Beijing is making a significant increase in submarine technologies
available to the CMIC. Will China be able to utilize them in a CMIC-designed
submarine as stepping stones to leap over the development, design, and implementation
time represented by the eighteen years of technological advances that went into
the Kilo since it first sailed? Or will the CMIC, after ten years of laborious
effort, produce a submarine in 2008 that would have been state-of-the-art in
1988?
Surface Combatant Technology
China's newest surface warship is the Luhu-class guided missile destroyer
(DDG), two of which have been placed in commission. Like most destroyers, the
Luhu is designed as a multi-mission ship, capable of conducting naval warfare
over, on, and beneath the sea. The world's most advanced destroyers are also
designed to project power ashore. How well can the Luhu carry out these missions,
all of which draw directly on the technologies surveyed in the MCTL?
In building the Luhu, China incorporated weapons, sensor, and propulsion systems
from several foreign countries, including the United States, the USSR/Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. The most critical of these foreign
components may be the propulsion system, a combined diesel-gas turbine (CODOG)
arrangement built around U.S.-furnished LM-2500 gas turbine engines. Five of
these engines, which the United States uses in several classes of warships and
in the C-5 aircraft, were sold to China before 1989. Four are installed in the
two Luhus.30
Of the MCTL technology area pertinent to marine propulsion, China is evaluated
as having "no" capability in marine propulsion systems and "some"
capability in gas turbine engines. The CMIC apparently has been unable to manufacture
a viable maritime gas turbine engine, although this technology was developed
in Germany in the late 1930s and went to sea in 1962 in a Soviet combatant.
This CMIC shortcoming has presumably contributed to the hiatus in commissioning
additional Luhu-class ships.31
Foreign designs also predominate in the Luhu's sensor-weapons suite. The guns
and associated fire control directors are Soviet design, the torpedoes are Italian,
the missiles and associated fire control systems are French, as are the ship's
two helicopters. Except for the guns and the surface-to-surface missiles, all
were beyond CMIC's capability.
China's reliance on foreign systems in the Luhu's electronic warfare and radar
systems is reflected in the MCTL's evaluations of "1" and "2"
for the six sub-areas in electronics technology.32
These technology areas include sonar, in which the Luhu's medium frequency system
reflects the MCTL's evaluation of China's capability in marine active, marine
passive, and marine platform acoustic sensors as "2." China shows
no better capability in technology areas related to radar development, earning
a "2" in electro-optical sensors, lasers, and radar.
The Luhu also shows no apparent stealth characteristics, a judgment supported
by the MCTL's signature control technology area. Here, China is evaluated as
possessing "some" (2) or limited (1) capability in seven of the eight
sub-areas, with a "3" earned for theoretical modeling.
China's front-line warship, the Luhu-class DDG is multi-mission capable but
with systems based on older technology, and without the ability to project power
ashore. As with the Kilo-class submarine, China is attempting to compensate
for CMIC shortfalls by purchasing foreign ships. An agreement may have been
reached with Russia for the purchase of at least two Sovremenny-class guided
missile destroyers.33 Much larger than the
Luhu, displacing 7,300 tons to the Luhu's 4,200 tons, the Sovremenny has a much
better sea-keeping ability and a larger engagement envelope.
The Sovremenny is a 1980s-era DDG designed to fight as a unit in a coordinated
task force against a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups. These ships were
designed specifically for anti-surface ship role; their anti-air and anti-submarine
warfare capabilities are limited. In Soviet naval doctrine, these DDGs would
be operating in company with ships more capable of defending against air attacks
and hostile submarines.34 But China does not
have the modern combatants to operate the Sovremenny as a unit in a multi-capability
task force. Instead, they would likely be employed as raiders, or as part of
a task group made up of the PLAN's best ships, Luda and Luhu destroyers and
Jiangwei guided missile frigates. None of these ships, however, are any more
capable than the Sovremenny at combating modern air and submarine threats. Hence,
the PLAN would have to operate the Sovremennys very conservatively until they
modify them or acquire other maritime means to operate more capably in a multi-threat
environment.
These ships do, however, represent a significant step in many capabilities for
the PLAN. Most newsworthy is the Sovremenny's anti-ship missile, the SS-N-22,
or Sunburn in NATO parlance. This is an extremely capable missile, with a flight
profile that includes flying altitudes of less than 100 feet over the ocean's
surface, speeds in excess of Mach 2, a range for the most advanced model of
over 65 miles, and possibly intricate terminal flight maneuvers designed to
foil defensive systems.35
China's multiple weaknesses in the projection of air power are widely recognized. Despite their long-standing efforts to acquire them, a central weakness remains the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) lack of operational aerial refueling capabilities and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. These two deficiencies alone limit both the range of China's airpower to the unrefueled distance from land bases and their effectiveness in a variety of critical combat missions. We shall not go over this well trodden ground in our essay. Rather, we will focus on the production capabilities China's combat aircraft industries. Table 13 provides the MCTL's overall assessment of these technologies. Although there is a strong crossover between military and commercial air systems technologies, the MCTL focuses on military-specific technologies representing "the key means to rapidly project fire power against an adversary in the air and on land and sea."37
Table 13. AIR POWER TECHNOLOGIES
Using the MCTL as an indicator of China's relative status in these broad technology
areas requires a narrowing of scope. Of the technologies that pertain to modern
air power, China is evaluated as possessing "a majority" of the applicable
technology in just two sub-areas (airframes and modeling for signature control),
"some" of the technology in thirteen sub-areas, and is credited with
"limited" capability in ten other areas.
The CMIC's inability to design and build modern combat airframes and power plants
is compounded by China's deficiencies in essentially all other technology areas
central to modern air forces. In electronics, guidance, navigation, and vehicle
control, sensors and signature control technology China is evaluated as possessing
no more than "some" of the required technologies.
Finally, in the technology area of armaments and energetic materials, which
refers to a nation's ability "to develop and produce in quantity safe,
affordable, storable, and effective conventional munitions and weapons systems,"
China is assessed as having only a "limited" capability.38
For the purposes of air power, these include ammunition, bombs, fusing, and
missiles.
Although Beijing's Soviet-derived combat aircraft from the 1950s and early 1960s,
such as the MiG-19/J-6 and MiG-21/J-7, have all benefited over the past 20 years
from the adaptation of Western military technologies, China's indigenous programs
are best typified by the J-8 interceptor's long and difficult development history.
This aircraft began development in 1964, was first flight-tested in 1969, and
entered service in the early 1980s. Even after a 20 year gestation period, the
PLAAF found the J-8 unsatisfactory, and as late as 1989 yet dubbed it an "operational
test aircraft." PLAAF and PLANAF dissatisfaction with the J-8 spanned a
range of requirements from a new fire control system to a more powerful engine.
China's aircraft industry was unable to satisfy these demands and turned to
Western suppliers for assistance, including the United States. Ultimately, "improved"
J-8-2s began service with the naval air arm in 1992. This is a total of almost
30 years development for what remains below par combat aircraft -- not yet the
equivalent of a 1960s-era U.S. F-4 Phantom. This aircraft began development
in 1964, was first flight-tested in 1969, and entered service in the early 1980s.
Even after a 20 year gestation period, the PLAAF found the J-8 unsatisfactory,
and as late as 1989 yet dubbed it an "operational test aircraft."
PLAAF and PLANAF dissatisfaction with the J-8 spanned a range of requirements
from a new fire control system to a more powerful engine. China's aircraft industry
was unable to satisfy these demands and turned to Western suppliers for assistance,
including the United States. Ultimately, "improved" J-8-2s began service
with the naval air arm in 1992. This is a total of almost 30 years development
for what remains below par combat aircraft -- not yet the equivalent of a 1960s-era
U.S. F-4 Phantom.39
Unable to design and build modern combat aircraft and their power plants, and
facing technology restrictions from Western Europe and the United States, Beijing
turned to Israel and Russia for assistance. Israel is providing design and technology
support for the J-10 multiple-role fighter program. Russia became the source
of military aircraft and power plants, complementing its role as the principal
supplier of advanced naval combatants. Russia's assistance includes provision
for a manufacturing facility in China capable of producing 10-15 Su-27s a year,
with a final inventory goal of 275.40
The SU-27SK model purchased and to be produced by China is a very capable dual-mission
aircraft, designed for both air superiority and ground attack. There is no evidence
that the Chinese have improved their ability to absorb and replicate modern
aircraft, however. Additionally, all of these aircraft reportedly are still
returned to Russia for all but the most routine maintenance.41
Although basically a late 1970s aircraft, the SU-27 embodies technology and
manufacturing techniques beyond the capabilities of the CMIC
When its air power capabilities and characteristics are matched against MCTL
technology areas, Russia earns a "4" in fixed-wing aircraft, China
a "2." Russia also has higher ratings in gas turbine engine technology,
electronic systems "hardening" against electro-magnetic pulses (EMP),
human (crew) interface, and navigation and control systems. By the time China
is capable of producing Su-27s without Russian assistance, it is likely Harlan
Jencks' late 1970s assessment that the China's J-6/MiG-19 was “the most
highly perfected obsolescent combat aircraft in the world” will yet again
apply.42
The CMIC is credited with achieving a "pocket of excellence" in missile technology.43 It is generally assumed that a key objective of China's defense establishment is to achieve a long-range reconnaissance/strike capability. The significance of long-range precision strike was amply demonstrated to the Chinese defense establishment during the Gulf War, especially the U.S. Navy's TLAM Tomahawk successes. It is probable this demonstration contributed to Beijing's decision to employ cruise and ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait military exercises of 1995 and 1996. These weapons are difficult to defend against, and their targets, beyond ships and aircraft, include those critical to coordinating and sustaining high-intensive combat: command and control nodes, air defense systems, and air, naval, and logistic bases. With sufficient accuracy, tactical missiles can replace manned aircraft for precision strike on all of these targets. Table 14 provides the MCTL's evaluations of China's capabilities in fourteen applicable technologies that apply equally to cruise and tactical ballistic missiles.
Table 14. TACTICAL MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES
Cruise Missiles
Cruise missiles have a long history going back to Germany's use of the V-1
in the closing year of WW II. As originally fielded by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, cruise missiles were little more than pilotless
aircraft. Since those early years, this weapon has gained in accuracy and range
and now provides a relatively small, relatively inexpensive, fast "fire
and forget" weapon that can be difficult to detect and shoot down. Cruise
missiles do, however, have drawbacks that include limited warhead size, dependence
on reliable target positioning data in OTH operational situations, the need
for mid-course guidance, and the requirement for precision manufacturing and
careful maintenance .
China makes extensive use of cruise missiles, and as with essentially all other
areas of military technology, the CMIC's cruise missile developments originate
in Soviet technology transfers. China's programs44
are grouped into two families: the Hai Ying (HY - Sea Eagle) and Ying Ji (YJ
- Eagle Strike) series. Both families are given the letter "C" as
a prefix before the number in export versions, as in C-201. China's first success
was with the HY-1 series weapons derived from the Soviet Styx. Attempts to improve
on this missile began in 1974. Typically, gestation was long and the new version
was not "type qualified" until December 1983. "Poor system integration
and quality control" have been blamed for at least part of the extensive
development time.45 These and additional improved
versions are potentially effective weapons, with the HY-2A (C-201) carrying
an 1,129 lb warhead sub-sonic (Mach .9) over medium range (59 miles) using an
infra-red homing sensor. This missile is deployed on the Luda DDG and Jianghu
guided missile frigate (FFG). The air-launched version of the HY-2A (C-601)
has a range of 68 miles and is deployed on PLAN H-6D bombers. An extended range
version of the HY-2, can reach out 84 miles cruising at Mach .8 using active
radar guidance and carrying an 1,100 lb warhead. This system can be both air
and ground-launched.
The PLA's only known supersonic cruise missiles are the C-101 and HY-3/C-301
anti-ship missile. The C-101 has a range of 31 miles, while the ground-launched
HY-3 carries a 1,126 lb. warhead 81 miles using active radar guidance.
China's follow-on generation of cruise missiles, the YJ series, is based on
the French Exocet. The YJ-1/C-801 entered service in 1985, and is smaller and
lighter than China's earlier systems. Although limited in range (25 miles),
it introduced a new capability by being deployed on the Han-class SSN, but a
Han must come to the surface to fire the missile. The YJ-2/C-802 uses active
radar guidance and cruises at Mach .9 with a range of 75 miles carrying a 363
lb warhead. The most recently deployed in this series is the air, land and sea-launched
YJ-8A with a range of about 80 miles at an altitude of 20 meters.
These are capable weapons, but do not match the sophistication of the Soviet-produced
SS-N-22 to be supplied with the Sovremenny. It incorporates several technology
areas evaluated by the MCTL that are more advanced than CMIC capabilities. In
energetic materials, crucial to warhead construction, Russia is credited with
possessing a "majority" of the requisite technologies, while China
is viewed as possessing only "some." In the areas of guidance, navigation
and vehicle control, the missile incorporates Russia's evaluations of "3'
and "4" against China's assessed "2s" in these technology
areas. The MCTL data offer strong indicators that in acquiring the Sovremenny's
SS-N-22 missiles, China is obtaining a weapon significantly more advanced than
the CMIC is able to design, build, and place into serial production.
The extent to which China can both upgrade these capabilities and link them
to the space and other remote sensors that will provide the reconnaissance/strike
package the PLA desires is one of Beijing's most significant development dilemmas.
That China is seeking to achieve this capability cannot be questioned. Indeed,
the PLA has reportedly sought acceleration of the YJ-8A ground-launched land
attack missile's development program. This weapon is believed to the first in
which China is seeking to incorporate GPS/GLONASS and a domestically developed
Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) guidance.46
Tactical Ballistic Missiles
As with cruise missiles, Germany's V-2 flown in 1944 was the first ballistic
missile used in warfare. China's ballistic missile development originates in
Soviet technology transfers in the years 1954-59. PLA tactical missile capability
was highlighted by the use of these systems in its military exercises off Taiwan
in 1995 and 1996. The tactical ballistic missiles deployed by the 2nd Artillery
Corps are M-series family of surface-to-surface solid-fueled systems. The "M"
designation is provided to export models, with "DF" (Dong Feng - East
Wind) designating systems deployed by the PLA. The DF-15/M-9 with a range of
370+ miles carrying a 1,100 lb. warhead and is believed to have an accuracy
in the realm of 300 meters circular error probable (CEP).47
Accuracy for the 180-mile range DF-11/M-11 carrying the same warhead is likely
similar.
Tactical ballistic missiles with conventional warheads have limitations similar
to cruise missiles: limited warhead size, dependence on reliable target positioning
data and terminal guidance; and the requirement for precision manufacturing
and maintenance. Once again, China's limited capabilities in all of these technologies
combined with remote sensor weaknesses make progress toward a long-range reconnaissance/strike
force a difficult task. The most likely source for improving China's capabilities
in these technology areas is Russia, but the extent to which Moscow is willing
to provide Beijing the extensive support the CMIC requires is an open question.
The militarily critical factors for the employment of both cruise and tactical
ballistic missiles are target location and missile guidance. Real-time location
is essential for moving targets and must be determined by either space or other
remote sensing systems. Of the two space-based systems available to China, a
commercial receiver using GPS can determine its position within 100 meters.
U.S. military receivers receive encrypted signals that can determine their position
within 21 meters. This system can be augmented by Differential GPS (DGPS), providing
an accuracy of less than one meter. It is possible for China to use GPS/GLONASS
commercial positioning data to adjust a cruise missile's flight to the target.
Both cruise and ballistic missiles can use terminal guidance to identify a specific
point in a target area. Terminal guidance can use a variety of technologies,
including radar, imaging infrared, electro-optical, laser, and DSMAC when the
precise location of a fixed target is known and, for DSMAC, when satellite imaging
assets are available to provide the necessary scenes.48
To what extent the CMIC has mastered these technologies is questionable, given
that MCTL assessments grant China only "limited" or "some"
capabilities in these technology areas (see Table 14.). Nonetheless, GPS/GLONASS
assisted guidance is almost certainly within China's capabilities and is one
of the technology areas the CMIC is attempting to apply to its missile development
programs.
China's strategists recognize that achieving their current military security
objectives in the next century will require continuing technological innovation,
reorganization of PLA's force structure, and continual assessment and development
of doctrine and concepts of operations. Unless Beijing is willing to dramatically
increase its defense expenditures, the CMIC's extensive deficiencies cannot
be quickly overcome, but only partially alleviated. Assuming no dramatic improvements
in overall PLA capabilities over the next decade, how is China planning to employ
an early twenty-first century PLA?
Beijing's shift in strategic scenarios from continental defense to limited high-tech
wars on China’s periphery is unlikely to change. Therefore the PLAN and
the PLAAF will continue their current focus on establishing and maintaining
control of Beijing's maritime territories and claims, including the air space
above them, and the ability to project power into these areas. Their primary
objective will be to overcome what China's analysts refer to as the PLA's "short
arms and slow legs."
Organizationally, the PLA will continue following two complementary paths: manpower
and equipment cuts, and force structure modifications essential to conduct joint
operations. Reducing manpower and equipment stocks will cut the cost of sustaining
what is now a bloated personnel base and obsolete arms. The force structure
that emerges over the next decade will be "leaner and meaner." It
will also reflect a more appropriate balance among the services because China's
strategic planners recognize the value of joint operations. PLAN and PLAAF manpower
may not increase, but their status within the PLA will be enhanced and their
share of the budget increase as their training and armaments bridge the transition
from defensive operations supporting continental defense to missions critical
in the force projection capabilities required by China's revised military strategy.
Operationally, to use a phrase from Mao's years, China’s strategists appear
to be "walking on two legs" by following paths set by two distinctly
different potential scenarios. Beijing’s most politically sensitive territorial
claims – Taiwan and the South China Sea – require China to field a
PLA able to achieve its military objectives in the face of possible U.S. opposition.
The other scenario embodies conflicts where the United States would not necessarily
be directly involved, such as potential confrontations with Vietnam or India.
These possible conflict scenarios create two diverse but complementary approaches
to military operations.
For conflicts not likely to involve the United States, Beijing will not hesitate
to employ a strategy of force-on-force. For such scenarios, the PLA places great
emphasis on developing classic force-on-force capabilities emphasizing speed,
mobility and lethality in joint offensive operations. Here, many of the technologies
associated with the RMA come into play, especially battle-space transparency,
command and control, long-range precision strike, and information warfare. Without
direct U.S. involvement in a military confrontation, China's probable technological
advances over the next decade or so combined with a revised force structure
and improved training, will make the PLA a close match or superior to any potential
single Asian adversary not under the American defense umbrella. Japan is in
secure position of being both superior to China in advanced military technologies
and allied with the United States.
The PLA and Asymmetric Warfare
In conflicts potentially involving the United States, PLA analysts draw upon
one of their strongest doctrinal traditions when delving into the dilemmas of
defeating an adversary superior in arms and technology. They warn against the
PLA developing technophobia as it faces the challenges of twenty-first century
warfare. In particular, they concentrate on the potential frailties of advanced
technology weapons and equipment, and the extent to which China's armed forces
are capable of offsetting the technological advantages of potential adversaries.
The U.S. term of art for this approach to the conduct of war is "asymmetric
strategy."
Intriguing as analyzing and predicting the consequences of asymmetric strategy
may be, all competent armed forces seek to develop capabilities, strategy and
military operations to offset an adversary's strengths. Thus, asymmetric warfare
is not a magic formula known to only a few or unique to China’s military
culture. Asymmetry in the conduct of war spans the history of military conflict
and has been applied by armed forces across the technology spectrum. Surely
the most dramatic asymmetric operation of recent wars was the United States'
use of atomic bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending WW II. The United
States exploited its unique possession of atomic weapons. The reverse of technology-dependent
asymmetry is Mao Zedong's strategy of "people's war" and the strategy
conducted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against French colonial forces
and later against the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and the United
States.
Asymmetry in warfare therefore falls into a pattern where technologically inferior
forces base their asymmetric strategy on the exploitation low-technology principles,
and forces from technologically advanced states base their asymmetry on technological
advantage. Those equal in technology seek to enhance or develop specific technologies
that an adversary has not cultivated, and introduce more effective methods of
applying these technologies through new concepts of operations and organization.
American and Japanese development of offensive aircraft carrier operations,
and Germany's refinement of tank technology and the development of blitzkrieg
operations in the interwar period are but two examples.
Similarly, military-technical transformation in the conduct of war is a central
component of warfare's history.49 The possibility
that a new technological transformation will create another revolution in military
affairs has attracted the attention of most major military powers because of
the implications for the future conduct of war. The United States as the world's
richest, most powerful and technologically advanced state has moved the furthest
forward in developing and evaluating these technologies for their military utility.
The USSR initiated inquiry into the potential for a military-technical revolution
in the 1980s and was PLA analysts' first guidepost. Since the Soviet demise
and the Persian Gulf War, China's military researchers have looked to the United
States for concepts of how to apply these emerging technologies to strategy
and operations.
Precisely what capabilities do PLA analysts seek to neutralize, and what technologies
and methods do they seek to employ? Beijing's security analysts have been declaring
for more than a decade that any war in which China is likely to be engaged will
not be total but a conflict limited in geographical scope and political objective.
Beijing's advanced technology focus appears to be on those that will hinder
an adversary's ability, even if only for a limited period of time, to project
and sustain military power in areas of high political and security value to
China. The implications of this focus are that in facing a technologically superior
adversary in a limited war, the PLA will seek to:
i. Hinder an adversary's capability to dominate the battle-space with superior
detection, location and command and control technologies.
ii. Deny any navy freedom of movement in waters where they can threaten China
--
a sea denial strategy that includes the airspace above the oceans.
If the PLA could accomplish these goals, they would serve as a deterrent should
a potential adversary not hold political objectives important enough to warrant
the risk of military conflict with China.
The potential adversary of most concern to PLA analysts is the United States,
either alone or in coalition with its allies. The most likely military confrontation
with the United States would occur over Taiwan or the South China Sea. In both
cases, the PLA would confront the joint operational capabilities of United States
naval and air power. Given the seemingly overwhelming technological advantage
held by American armed forces, an advantage the United States is intent on sustaining,
what options are available to the Chinese armed forces over the next decade?
It is extremely unlikely that Beijing would once again contemplate a bolt out
of the blue assault on unprepared American forces. First, U.S. reconnaissance
capabilities now make a repeat of China's unannounced entrance in the Korean
War extremely difficult to prepare and undertake. Second, the consequences for
China of such an act of war could be devastating. Thus, our assessment will
assume the usual high level of alertness sustained by Chinese and American forces
operating in a high threat environment, even if not directly engaged in hostilities.
Choosing submarine warfare as a primary instrument would immediately face USN
undersea warfare (USW) conducted by ships, aircraft and submarines. Even with
the Kilo's advantages, China's submarine warfare capabilities now and over the
next decade will be unable to match or defeat those of the United States. Should
the PLAN assemble a threatening task group of surface and submarine combatants,
it simply could not survive in the face of U.S. detection, location and engagement
capabilities.
Similarly, references to saturating an American carrier battle group (CVBG)
with a massive missile assault50 do not appear
to recognize that threatening PLAN surface and submarine combatants could not
survive to launch their cruise missiles. U.S. space-based, airborne and ship-borne
detection and location sensors would identify their targets long before any
PLAN combatants came within engagement range of their missiles. If a ship did
survive, it would fire only once, because the missiles' launch and flight signatures
would provide immediate targeting data to U.S. naval and air forces.
Should the PLAN or PLAAF seek to engage within the range of land-based aircraft,
these aircraft would be detected, targeted and destroyed by the USN's aircraft
and long-range air defense missiles before they could approach the effective
range of their stand-off cruise missiles. Similarly, land-based tactical ballistic
missiles would have great difficulty detecting and locating a CVBG with sufficient
accuracy, for the battle group would be operating at speed with evasive maneuvers.
What assets does China plan to develop and deploy to offset U.S. detection,
location and command and control capabilities that provide so much of the American
advantage? Destroying or simply eroding U.S. space-based reconnaissance and
communications systems is one potential option. MCTL assessments indicate, however,
that China does not have the supporting technologies that would allow either
directed or kinetic energy systems to locate, track and engage the proper target
and assess the damage done.
Anti-satellite space systems (ASAT) face similar problems, which is why China
terminated its ASAT program in the 1980s. Once again, and despite access to
GPS/GLONASS systems, the combined technologies involved in successful detection,
location, engagement and damage assessment required to successfully attack U.S.
space-based assets are not present in the CMIC, and will not be for many years
without significant foreign assistance.
Information warfare (IW) is the darling of evidently an entire school of Chinese
military analysts. Is IW the "killer" asymmetry -- the magic weapon
of a future people's war? Here again, the MCTL working groups found only extremely
limited Chinese capabilities in both IW and information systems (IS) technologies.
Furthermore, IW damage assessment is an extremely difficult undertaking. A decade
from now American capabilities to defend against IW attack and use its own capabilities
in such areas a command and control warfare will almost certainly continue to
exceed those of the PLA. Engaging USN/USAF forces under the assumption that
IW has significantly their eroded their detection, location and engagement capabilities
would be an extremely risky endeavor, especially for the PLA, which would be
required to attack and defend against forces far more capable in all htmects
of warfare.
Focusing on joint operations and power projection has raised the PLA's priorities
in the realms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance central to battlespace
awareness and command and control. The emphasis on power projection and mobile,
fast reacting offensive capabilities -- even within a defensive national military
strategy -- demands greater speed, range, and precision in military operations
than the PLA has used in the past. These critical factors are in turn based
on advanced technology. The problem faced by the PLA is not only developing
or importing modern technology, but also applying that technology to military
platforms.
Recognition of this problem has not led to a clear decision on how to resolve
the issue. Instead, the CMIC is pursuing multiple avenues to modernize PLA hardware:
building, importing, and reverse-engineering platforms and systems. China's
current and potential strength across the board of militarily critical technologies
is beyond doubt, but it is a mile wide and an inch deep. When and to what degree
the CMIC's potential will be fulfilled is difficult to determine, but it will
not be in the coming decade.
Within the scope of the technologies we have briefly reviewed, MCTL data indicate
that China possesses and is in the process of acquiring or developing a broad
sweep of those necessary to generate effective operational military power in
submarines, surface combatants, missiles, and aircraft. But in none of these
technologies does the CMIC appear able to design and manufacture the systems
necessary for China to achieve effective modern status in any of the conventional
military environments. Those areas where the CMIC will improve are, and will
remain, heavily dependent on foreign production technologies. Even more striking
is China's apparently still basic level of capability in the crucial twenty-first
century military "theaters" of space and information warfare.
Information systems provide the linkage between contemporary and twenty-first
warfare. IS technologies provide the critical components for detection, location
and engagement whether they are used for "soft" or "hard"
attack. As China's analysts investigate the implications of these technologies
for the conduct of war, IW theorists primarily repeat what they have learned
from U.S. sources.51 China's own capabilities
are always viewed as future developments. In each category of IS technology,
Chinese analysts focus on the need to build and design future systems.52
In this the IW articles reflect the same future-oriented pattern as those focused
on high technology conventional arms and equipment. There is also a similar
sense of urgency in much of the writing, with a 1997 essay declaring:
The strong momentum of the world's military development undoubtedly
represents a grim challenge for our units' quality building and military
preparations against war.53
This sense of urgency is compounded by the connotation in all of these essays
that not enough is being done; that the PLA lacks common agreement on its priorities
as it prepares for the new era in warfighting. General Fu Quanyu, the PLA Chief
of Staff, raised this specific complaint as late as April 1998 in the communist
party's principal journal Qiushi.54 General
Fu Quanyu's frustration can be seen in his plea that the CMIC concentrate its
human, technological and financial resources on "coming up with several
'killer weapons' that can effectively stifle the enemy."55
Typically, no sense of strategic direction for the development of such weapons
was provided.
PLA technology priorities clearly include the capabilities to deny any adversary
information dominance, improve battlespace transparency and command and control,
and develop long-range precision strike capabilities. These are not easy goals
to achieve. It is critical not to underestimate the CMIC's future capabilities,
but it is equally important not to exaggerate its strengths and raise the image
of an emerging military superpower.
Currently, the PLA faces national military objectives driving it toward developing
capabilities across the spectrum of modern warfare addressed in this essay.
These areas include space, aeronautics, shipbuilding, ordnance technology, materials
engineering, precision manufacturing, and information warfare technologies.
Recognizing Beijing's lack of transparency, the MCTL is chiefly valuable because
it offers carefully qualified data based on multiple, repetitive observation
and evaluation, providing indicators of where China's military stands in relation
to world-wide development of the basic technologies necessary for twenty-first
century warfare. Here, MCTL assessments combined with analyses of the CMIC's
progress offers very limited support for observers who conclude that the Chinese
are ten technological feet tall, or are about to leap ahead into the nether
reaches of the RMA.
MCTL assessments, however, provide only technology indicators. They do not,
for instance, enable the observer to estimate the status of the equally important
non-technological developments steps necessary to PLA modernization, such as
the evolution of modern doctrine, training, and logistical support.56
While there appears to be emerging doctrinal thought in the PLA about the role
of information warfare, precision strike, and stealth-counterstealth, for instance,
documents such as the MCTL only very indirectly indicate progress in such areas
as joint doctrine and training. Expertise in these non-technical areas is necessary
to make even the most up-to-date technology operationally effective.
The MCTL tells us that China is joining the world powers in those technology
areas most likely to offer its armed forces the opportunity to participate in
a revolution in military affairs, should such a revolution come to pass. The
CMIC's substantial and widespread deficiencies, however, do not justify the
conclusion that China is capable of somehow leaping ahead, either generally
or in "pockets of excellence." If the recent past is any indicator,
what should be anticipated is a slow and sometimes erratic expansion of CMIC
capabilities in technologies applicable to areas viewed as critical in future
warfare.
_______
Endnotes
1. See, for example, Lieutenant General Chen Bingde, Commander of the Nanjing
Military Region, "Intensify Study of Military Theory To Ensure Quality
Army Building," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 3 ( March 6, 1998), in
FBIS-China, March 10, 1998.
2. Alastair I. Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization:
Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control," in David S. Shambaugh
and Richard H. Yang (eds), China's Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997), pp. 284-312.
3. For a classic statement of this strategy see, "Nieh Jung-chen's (Nie
Rongzhen) 4 August Speech at the National Militia Conference," Peking (Beijing),
NCNA (Xinhua) Domestic Service, August 7, 1978, in FBIS-PRC, August 9, 1979,
pp. E1-10.
4. For analyses of this revised national military strategy, see Nan Li, "The
PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese
View," and Paul H.B. Godwin, "From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine
Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000," both in Shambaugh and Yang, China's
Military in Transition , pp.179-223.
5. In his August 6, 1993, Jiefangjun Bao essay, "Unswervingly March
Along the Road of Building a Modern Army With Chinese Characteristics,"
General Liu Huaqing, China's then senior serving officer, specifically measured
the PLA's capabilities with those of the United States armed forces demonstrated
in Gulf War. General Liu's assessment was that the PLA weaknesses went far beyond
those associated with arms and equipment, but were equally evident in operational
doctrine, joint warfare, training, and in the comprehension of modern warfare.
In FBIS-China, August 18, 1993.
6. One of the most useful essays analyzing Chinese doctrinal shifts published
in a U.S. journal was prepared by a researcher at the PLA Academy of Military
Science: Colonel Yao Yunzhu, "The evolution of Military Doctrine of the
Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,
Vol. VII, No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 57-80.
7. See, for example, Senior Colonel Huang Xing, "Holding the Initiative
in Our Own Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Advantages
to Defeat Our Enemy -- A study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine
of Our Army, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4 (November 20, 1996), in FBIS-China,
November 20, 1996.
8. Major Mark A. Stokes, USAF, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Security (unpublished manuscript completed for the USAF Institute
for National Security Studies, October 1997).
9. John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing
Chinese Defense Industries," in David Shambaugh and Richard Yang (eds),
China's Military In Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 132.
10. John Frankenstein, "China's Defense Industry Conversion: A Strategic
Overview," in Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein (eds.),_Mixed
Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China (Boulder, CO.:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 14-15._
11. Frankenstein and Gill, "Current and Future Challenges," p. 132.
12. Richard A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare?
Chinese and Taiwanese Defense Modernization and the Implications For Military
Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 1996, p. 17; and Frankenstein
and Gill, "Current and Future Challenges," pp. 134-143.
13. Ka Po Ng, "Defense Conversion in the Chinese Press," in Brommelhorster
and Frankenstein, Mixed Motives," pp. 92-93.
14. Ibid., p. 92, and Richard D. Latham, "A Business Perspective,"
in Brommelhorster and Frankenstein, Mixed Motives, pp. 165-166.
15. These issues are raised by Jiang Wanjun, "Evaluation and Analysis of
the International Competitiveness of China's Science and Technology," Keji
Ribao, February 14, 1998, in FBIS-China, March 25, 1998. It should
be noted that Keji Ribao is published jointly by the State Science and
Technology Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the State Commission
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. See also, Bitzinger
and Gill, Gearing Up For High-Tech Warfare, p. 20; and Frankenstein and
Gill, "Current and Future Challenges," pp. 154-155.
16. Frankenstein and Gill, "Current and Future Challenges," p. 157.
17. The other three general departments are the General Staff, Political and
Logistics Departments
18. Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of China," in SIPRI
Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 395.
19. For a judicious analysis of Russian transfers see Dennis J. Blasko, "Evaluating
Chinese Military Procurement from Russia," Joint Forces Quarterly,
Autumn-Winter 1997-98, pp. 91-96
20. For Part 1, Weapon System Technologies, the TWGs evaluated the eighteen
technology areas of Aeronautics Systems; Armaments and Energetic Materials;
Chemical and Biological Systems; Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems; Electronics;
Ground Systems, Guidance, Navigation, and Vehicle Control; Information Systems;
Information Warfare; Manufacture and Fabrication; Materials; Marine Systems;
Nuclear Systems; Power Systems; Sensors and Lasers; Signature Control; Space
Systems; and Weapons Effects and Countermeasures. Each of these technology areas
is further divided into specific technology groups, which total 84 subsets.
21. In the relatively simple technology of "obscurants" the United
States is evaluated at level "3." China is assessed at level "4."
MCTL Sensors and Lasers FTA Summary, Figure 15.0-2 p. 15-2. The United
States is evaluated at level "3" in the "optronics" group
of Space Systems Technology. China is assessed at level "2". MCTL
Space Systems FTA Summary, Figure 17.02, p. 17-2.
22. MCTL, pp. 17-5 and 17-11.
23. Jane's Special Report, China's Aerospace Industry--The Industry and Its
Products Assessed (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, Inc.,
March 1997), pp.135-136.
24. Chou Kuan-wu, "China's Reconnaissance Satellites," Kuang Chiao
Ching (Hong Kong), No. 36 (16 March 1998), in FBIS-China, 8 April
1998. [Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle) is reputed to have close ties with China's
defense establishment.
25. Jeff Gerth, "Reports Show Chinese Military Used American-Made Satellites,
" The New York Times, June 13, 1998, pp. A1 &A8.
26. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, Appendix Four (no page numbers)
27. MCTL, p. 4-1.
28. Ibid., p. 4-5.
29. Over the past five years and more there has been a flood of essays in Chinese
military, industrial and other professional journals analyzing the implications
of information warfare. Most of these essays reflect the analyses found in U.S.
military and academic publications. A more recent example is Dai Kouhu, "Accepting
the Challenge: China's Defense Information Modernization," Zhongguo
Dianzi Bao (China Electronics News), October 24, 1997 in FBIS-China,
January 12, 1998.
30. The fifth LM-2500 is likely on a test stand for reverse-engineering purposes,
used for shore-based training or a source of spare parts, or has been accidentally
destroyed.
31. Jane's The World's Warships 1997, v. 1 (London: Jane's Publishing
Group, 1998), p. 520, reports that China is attempting to procure marine gas
turbine engines from Ukraine.
32. The material technology area is also pertinent to capability in weapon guidance
systems, surveillance, sensors, and electronic warfare systems. In the six sub
areas evaluated, the MCTL (p.11-2) assesses China with four "3s" and
two "2s".
33. Jane's identifies these as two ships laid down in 1989 and 1990 and scheduled
for commissioning in 1997 and 1998. Availability of Sovremennys may take several
different paths, however. The Chinese may be ordering completely new ships,
which would be the most expensive path, but would give the PLAN the most control
over the vessels' characteristics and quality. They may be purchasing ships
built for the Soviet/Russian navy that have already served as fleet units; this
would be the quickest and least expensive path for the PLAN to acquire Sovremennys,
but would also give very little flexibility in customizing the ships and they
would also be obtaining ships that are "used," having been subjected
to unknown stresses that may have incurred significant but difficult to detect
material defects. Finally, China could, as reported by Jane's, buy ships that
have been under construction for the Soviet/Russian navy. This would be cheaper
than building ships from the keel up and would allow flexibility in customizing
the vessels, but would likely result in the PLAN receiving ships that have been
laying idle on the building ways for several years, a factor which normally
results in many defects.
34. The Sovremenny's role in this task force was to attack American capital
ships using surface-to-surface missiles. The carrier was, of course, the most
desirable target, but Aegis cruisers were also valuable, for their operational
destruction would create a void in the battle group's air defenses, potentially
exposing the carriers to "stream raids" by Soviet aircraft.
35. Jane's Naval Weapons Systems: 1997 (London: Jane's Publishing Group,
1998),
"Surface to Surface Missiles," p. 15, also mentions a version with
"an extended range" beyond 65 nm. Jane's 1995-96 Major Warships
gives this range as 88 nm, but this figure is not reported in later editions.
Nor is Jane's 1995-96 claim that the SS-N-22 is capable of carrying a nuclear
warhead reported in later volumes. See, CRS Report for Congress, China: Ballistic
and Cruise Missiles (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress,
97-391 F, March 21, 1997), p. CRS-11.
36. For a thorough analysis of China's air power history and development through
the early 1990s, see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krummel, and Jonathan D. Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters The 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1995).
37. MCTL, p. 1-1.
38. MCTL, p. 2-1.
39. For details, see Allen, et. al., China's Air Force.
40. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1997-1998 (London: Jane's Information
Group, 1998), p. 438; Joseph C. Anselmo, "China's Military Seeks Great
Leap Forward," Aviation Week & Space Technology (12 May 97), p. 69.
Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 June 1998, provides the 10-15 annual production
figure, which seems a more likely number than the 50 reported by Jane's All
the World's Aircraft, 1997-1998. When its air power capabilities and characteristics
are matched against MCTL technology areas, Russia earns a "4" in fixed-wing
aircraft, China a "2." Russia also has higher ratings in gas turbine
technology, electronic systems "hardening" against electro-magnetic
pulses (EMP), human (crew) interface, and navigation and control systems.
41. Kenneth W. Allen, "PLA Force Logistics: What has changed?" (Unpublished
manuscript).
42. Harlan Jencks quoted in Allen, et. Al., China’s Air Force, p.
148.
43. The term "pockets of excellence" characterizing China's selective
approach to defense modernization was used by Chong-pin Lin, "The Power
Projection Capabilities of the People's Liberation Army, " in C. Dennison
Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu (eds), Chinese Military Modernization
(London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), p. 110.
44. Unless otherwise noted, the data for these missiles are drawn from Shirley
Kan and Robert Shuey, CRS Report for Congress, China: Ballistic and Cruise
Missiles (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 97-391
F, March 21, 1997).
45. Jane's Naval and Weapon Systems(1997), "China: Surface-to-Surface
Missiles," Issue 21.
46. See Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization, Part III, Cruise Missiles
(no page numbers).
47. China's Aerospace Industry: The Industry and Its Products Assessed
(Jane's Information Group: Coulsdon, March 1997), p. 133.
48. Kan and Shuey, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, pp. CRS-14-
CRS-15.
49. See, for example, William H. McNeill, "The Structure of Military-Technical
Transformation," delivered at the Sixteenth Military History Symposium
of the United States Air Force Academy (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy,
The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 37, 1994).
50. Sun Zian, "Strategies to Minimize High-Tech Edge of Enemy," Xiandai
Bingqi, No. 8 (August 8, 1995), in FBIS-China, February 22, 1996, pp. 29-30.
51. This was frankly admitted in 1998 by Dai Kouhu, "Accepting the Challenge."
52. See, for example, Liang Zhengxing, "New Military Revolution, Information
Warfare," Zhongguo Dianzi Bao, 24 October 1997, in FBIS-China,
1 January 1998.
53. Editorial, "Implement Military Strategic Principle for the New Period,
Vigorously Push Forward Army Quality Building," Jiefangjun Bao,
1 April 1997, in FBIS-China, 4 April 1997.
54. General Fu Quanyu, "Aggressive Exploration and Deeper Reforms to Promote
the Comprehensive Development of Military Work," Qiushi, No. 6 (16
March 1998), in FBIS-China, 13 April 1998.
55. Ibid.
56. For a careful overview of PLA training exercises over the period 1990-1996,
see Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett, Jr., "Training
Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks, " in Shambaugh and Yang (eds), China's
Military in Transition, pp. 224-260.