The People's Republic of China (PRC) initiated its nuclear weapons program during the 1950s as a result of its political and military rivalry with the United States. Since then, the Chinese government has consistently used its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology as a political lever against the United States.¹ Although China has become a signatory to several international nonproliferation treaties, this paper contends that China will continue to proliferate nuclear weapons and missile technology in the future for political and economic reasons. Moreover, this essay cites key proliferation indicators and provides a methodology to recognize these indicators.

China as a Declared Nonproliferator

The PRC government has consistently stated that China's cooperation with other countries in the field of nuclear energy is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Since the 1970s, Beijing has concluded agreements with as many as fourteen countries on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.² In 1986, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman stated, "The PRC does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation, nor does China assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons."³ A decade later, an MFA spokesman reiterated, "China, as a responsible state, has never transferred equipment or technology for producing nuclear weapons to any other country, nor will China do so in the future."⁴ In August 2001, Minister of Defense Chi Haotian told U.S. Senator Joseph Biden, "On the issue of non-proliferation, China strictly observes international agreements and the commitments it has made, so the U.S. should not make random criticisms based on misleading information. China keeps its word."⁵

In response to international concerns about the PRC's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) over the past decade, Beijing has become progressively involved in several international nonproliferation agreements and has promulgated various domestic export control regulations.⁶hese agreements include the following:

1984: Joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
1992: Acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT);
1993: Signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
1994: Made statements on fissile material production;
1996: Made statement on making only safeguarded nuclear transfers;
1996: Signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
1997: Joined Zangger Committee.⁷

During the late 1980s, China and the United States clashed over conventional missile proliferation, when Beijing began selling antiship missiles to Iran and DF-3/CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia.⁸ By the early 1990s, the gap between the two nations widened as Beijing began providing DF-11/M-11 missiles and components to Pakistan.⁹

As tensions mounted in the Taiwan Strait in late 1995, Beijing issued its first White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament. The 20-page paper, released during the negotiating end game of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and while China was in the process of conducting nuclear tests, attempted to defuse concerns about a "China Threat" and accusations that Beijing was supplying WMD or related technologies to friendly neighbors (i.e., Pakistan and Iran). In July 1998, Beijing published its first defense white paper, China's National Defense,¹⁰ which was followed up in October 2000 with the second iteration.¹¹ These reports summed up China's commitment to conventional arms control by stating,¹²

China respects the right of every country to independent or collective self-defense and to acquisition of weapons for this purpose. China practices strict control of the transfer of conventional military equipment and related technologies, and observes the following principles: The export of weapons must help the recipient nation enhance its capability for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient states internal affairs. In October 1997, the Chinese government published the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Military Products Export. China has been consistently responsible regarding the transfer of missiles. China is not a member state of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has not joined its formulation and revision, but the Chinese government promised to observe the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR in February 1992.¹³ In October 1994, China reaffirmed its promise. In line with the above policy, China has exercised strict and effective control over the export of missiles and related materials and has never done anything in violation of its commitments.

China as a WMD Proliferator

In spite of China's pronouncements denying WMD proliferation, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported in August 1996 that "China was the worst proliferator of equipment and technology associated with WMD."¹⁴ In 1998, the CIA reported:

China was continuing to take steps to strengthen its control over nuclear exports by promulgating new export control regulations covering the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment, as well as the export of equipment and materials associated exclusively with nuclear applications. China also pledged in late 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete work on two remaining nuclear projects--a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility--in a relatively short period of time. During early 1998, Chinese entities provided a variety of missile-related items and assistance to several countries of proliferation concern. Chinese entities also sought to supply Iran and Syria with CW-related chemicals. China has provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's WMD programs, and some assistance continues.¹⁵

In February 2001, the CIA stated,¹⁶

The Chinese have continued to take a very narrow interpretation of their bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the United States. In the case of missile-related transfers, Beijing has repeatedly pledged not to sell MTCR Category I systems but has not recognized the regime's key technology annex. Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan continued to be substantial through June 2000. In addition, during the first six months of 2000, firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Chinese entities have provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear programs. In May 1996, Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out some continued contacts between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China's involvement with Pakistan will continue to be monitored closely.

For purposes of this paper, the author makes the assumption that China will continue to proliferate WMD as a matter of official policy, regardless of what international agreements have been signed. In addition, certain organizations will attempt to circumvent the government's policies and export regulations by providing WMD technology and equipment to proliferating countries.

Since the early 1980s, China has tried secretly to provide nuclear technology and/or missiles to several countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Algeria, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia.¹⁷ China's relationship with Iran also includes alleged cooperation on chemical weapons. The following paragraphs describe several driving factors within China's foreign, domestic, and economic policies for this proliferation activity.

Foreign Policy Considerations. The assumption is made that China will continue to support its long-standing relations with Pakistan and Iran by providing WMD technology and equipment for existing programs, as well as for new programs in the future. For example, an August 1999 Reuters article states, "China has signed an $11 million deal to improve Iran's anti-ship missiles, raising questions about its 1998 vow not to supply Tehran with cruise missiles or related technology."¹⁸

The PRC's relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan have also been a factor in China's WMD proliferation. During the 1980s, the PRC's competition with the ROC for diplomatic recognition with several key states, such as South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, probably contributed to Beijing's calculations concerning its proliferation activity. Today, however, the ROC does not have diplomatic relations with any states of similar stature where the PRC could use WMD proliferation as an enticement to switch recognition.¹⁹

Unenforceable Compliance. While the Chinese government still officially sanctions some proliferation with countries like Pakistan and Iran, it does have and will continue to have problems implementing and monitoring compliance from certain suppliers. The best case in point is the sale of 5,000 ring magnets to the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, sometime after 1994. The ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, were sold for $70,000 by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), a state-owned corporation. CNNC reportedly sold the ring magnets directly to the laboratory without receiving approval by higher authorities because the items were not covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affair's (MFA) export control list or the dollar value required for notification. In addition, although China and Pakistan were members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the laboratory was not an IAEA safeguarded facility.²⁰

As China moves further toward a full market economy and defense-related state-owned enterprises (SOE) are required to sell more goods abroad in order to survive, they will be tempted to circumvent the growing list of export regulations and sell restricted WMD technology and equipment secretly to other countries. The decentralization of economic decision-making to the factory level and increasing levels of technology available will further add to the enticement to sell their goods for hard currency.

Indicators of WMD Proliferation

There are various macro-level indicators that can provide clues to China's proliferation of WMD. These indicators include political relations with various countries, particularly the United States and India, and economic factors. China's relations with the United States can be viewed as a barometer of Beijing's WMD relations with other countries. Therefore, when Sino-U.S. relations are on a downward trend, Beijing is more likely to circumvent prior agreements as a means of leverage with Washington. At the same time, loosening of economic controls on individual organizations which must sell goods to survive provides greater opportunities for these organizations to become involved in unauthorized sales of WMD goods and services.

Sino-Iranian Cooperation. The PRC's relations with Iran provide a good example of how China's foreign, domestic, and economic policies combine to promote WMD proliferation. Initial relations in the early 1980s were based on economic factors, whereby Iran was willing to provide hard currency for technology, weapon systems, and the research and development conducted in China for new weapons systems to meet Iranian specifications. Since then, China's need for imported oil has been a factor in their relations. Relations were also important domestically for China, as Beijing reportedly sought assurance from Tehran for Iran's non-interference with Xinjiang's restive Muslim population. As United States' arms sales to Taiwan became more contentious during the 1990s, Beijing has consistently tried to link its arms sales to Tehran with Washington's arms sales to Taipei.

The PRC often signs joint venture contracts with foreign countries for weapon systems that are not necessarily intended for use within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). With the Iran-Iraq war providing a potential arms market, China began developing tactical missiles, such as the M-9 and M-11, for export in 1984 with the hope that the PLA would become interested in the program later.²¹ At that time, China had the technical expertise and facilities and was in search of hard currency, while Iran had the money but was not able to develop and produce new missiles. Although China has not sold complete M-11 missile systems to Iran, as it has with Pakistan, it has apparently provided Iran with the necessary technology for Tehran to continue with its own ballistic missile program.²²lthough these economic and military relationships were good for Beijing and Tehran, they conflicted with Washington's national security interests in the Gulf region. The United States alleges that the M-11 exceeds the MTCR guidelines. While China has denied the reports and has verbally agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines, Beijing has not become a signatory to the agreement and allegedly continues to provide Pakistan with M-11 components.

During the 1990s, Washington's pressure on China and Iran to cease their energy cooperation actually worked to strengthen the relationship between Beijing and Tehran. Although U.S. companies had already been barred from importing Iranian oil since 1987, the United States conducted a campaign during 1995 that focused on disrupting Iran's energy sector further by banning American companies from purchasing oil for resale to third parties. Washington also put pressure on other countries, such as Japan and Azerbaijan, to cease economic cooperation on Iranian energy projects. This pressure, which came at the same time President Clinton authorized Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater at Cornell, provided a backdrop for Beijing to increase its energy cooperation with Tehran. Whereas China needed to import greater amounts of oil, Iran needed Chinese nuclear energy technology for civilian and military uses^.23 Moreover, the PRC government has consistently tried to justify its military equipment sales to Iran by citing the United States' military sales to Taiwan. Therefore, for all of these reasons, China and Iran's independent relations with the United States, as well as complementary energy requirements, will continue to provide a good indicator of the continuing cooperation between Beijing and Tehran on WMD proliferation.

China's Five-Year Plan. China's five-year plans provide the framework for the PRC's official political and economic policies.²⁴ A careful review of these plans gives valuable clues about China's priorities in several areas, including military spending, research and development (R&D), and weapons acquisitions. For example, the ninth five-year plan (1996-2000) laid out several areas where China could cooperate with foreign countries in conventional weapons and WMD. Each plan also gives guidance for economic growth, whereby companies and ministries must meet certain growth targets.

Beginning in the 1990s, the five-year plans have encouraged defense companies to develop military technologies for the PLA through joint ventures with foreign investors and to boost attempts to develop new weapons. Due to attempts to revitalize the defense-related SOE system and the PLA's R&D and procurement system, the Communist Party Central Committee's Military Commission (CMC) has again restructured the entire PLA's weapons acquisition structure. The plan calls for concentrating on only a few key projects but also calls for an increase in spending on overall civilian science R&D from less than one percent of the gross domestic product to three percent. The defense science and technology establishment will benefit from this added funding because its appropriations come from the civilian science budget rather than the defense budget.²⁵

Determining which projects the CMC has decided to focus on provides one of the keys to analyzing which future weapon systems the PLA will receive and China will produce for export. Chinese open source material often identifies various projects as focal points (zhong dian zhi yi), which means that these projects receive the highest political support. This political support, in turn, equates to financial support. Meanwhile, projects not identified as focal points may continue, but they do not receive the same level of political or financial support.

The PLA's Economic Situation. Besides monitoring the five-year plans and defense industry economic indicators, the PLA's economic situation provides valuable clues as to military involvement in WMD proliferation abroad. The military began commercial activities in 1985, following directives issued by the CMC and State Council, mainly as an expression of Deng Xiaoping's economic reform drive. At the movement's peak in the early 1990s, there were an estimated 20,000 PLA-affiliated businesses. One of the driving forces was the PLA's need to supplement its budget. As a result, several large companies, the most notable being the General Staff Department's Poly Technologies, emerged as valuable import and export arms of the PLA. Some of these companies became involved in purchasing foreign military equipment and for selling surplus PLA equipment abroad.²⁷

Poly Technologies is best known for its 1988 sale of DF-3/CSS-2 ballistic missiles from the PLA inventory to Saudi Arabia. There were several issues that coalesced in the CSS-2 sale. First, Saudi Arabia actively sought out China's support. Second, like Iran, Saudi Arabia was able to pay China with much-needed hard currency. Third, China saw the sale as a way of pulling Saudi Arabia away from its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This goal was finally achieved when the PRC and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations in July 1990. Fourth, the PLA's ongoing modernization program led to the availability of the surplus missiles from its active inventory. Finally, the PLA was actively seeking ways to accrue much-needed additional money to supplement its official budget. The entire program was sanctioned by Jiang Zemin, who was Chairman of the CMC, as well as Secretary General of the Party, and President of the PRC.

The 1988 situation may be replayed over the next few years, following Jiang Zemin's 1998 ruling that the PLA must divest itself of its non-agriculture and industrial production companies. Although the State Council has reportedly increased the PLA's annual budget, the PLA might seek ways to supplement this budget with further WMD sales abroad—either officially or unofficially.

High-level Exchanges. Delegation visits provides one indicator of possible involvement between China and various countries. Initial, as well as on-going, indicators for official government involvement in WMD activity include exchanges by high-level officials, as well as visits by officials from the nuclear industry, defense industries, and military. While China's official government media (Xinhua) may cover the existence of high-level visits, visits by lower-level officials will most likely not be covered. These types of visits may, however, be reported in local newspapers or in factory or ministry newsletters. Cross-referencing multiple sources often gives a good indication of the people and organizations involved. Some of these local papers are now available on the internet.

Another indicator of official activities involves the use of military aircraft to transport Chinese delegations abroad or foreign delegations around China. When transporting Chinese delegations abroad, these aircraft will most likely make stops in various locations around China, in order to pick up or drop off passengers. Once negotiations have begun in earnest, these flights may become routine.

Absence/Presence of Key Officials. Although the negotiation process will be largely concluded in secrecy, one possible indicator is the unexplained absence or presence of certain key people for extended periods of time. Key people include ministers, vice ministers, factory managers, military procurement officers, scientists, import/export company representatives, and interpreters.

If negotiations are handled through the Chinese Embassy abroad or the foreign embassy in Beijing, the permanent or temporary assignment of a new embassy official often provides an indication of ongoing, long-term negotiations and contract implementation. If the PLA is involved, the PLA may assign military representatives from the appropriate organization, such as the newly-established General Equipment Department, to the defense attaché office. These officers will not participate in normal military attaché functions, but will be responsible for the military sales or assistance program. This was the case when the United States had four foreign military sales (FMS) programs with China during the 1980s. At that time, the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) had uniformed military representatives assigned to the PRC Embassy in Washington.

Many Chinese ministries have established branch offices of their import/export companies in foreign countries. These representatives are posted abroad to establish business links, facilitate contract negotiations, and to conduct follow-on support for existing contracts. The addition of new representatives to these offices or an unusual number of visitors from China provide indicators of negotiations or completed contracts.

Equipment Support: When the Chinese provide any type of major equipment abroad, they also provide training and follow-up support either in China or in the host country for that equipment. This training may be conducted for several years in some cases. Thus, the continuing presence of large numbers of Chinese in key cities or weapons-related areas is a valuable indicator of on-going activity. Since the Chinese do not readily publish lists of key personnel or organizational structures, it is often difficult to know who the key personnel are. Therefore, it is important to compile organizational data as it becomes available, so that names can be cross-referenced later.

Monitoring Contract Implementation: Information gathered from reconnaissance satellites provides classic indicators of impending, ongoing, or previous sales or acquisition of WMD. These indicators include communications, electronic emissions, and photography of production facilities, deployment areas, and transportation hubs.

Each ministry or corporation has its own import/export company, which is responsible for arranging the negotiations and monitoring the contract. These companies also arrange the transportation for components and full systems, and use their warehouse and loading facilities along the route, regardless of whether the goods are transported by road, rail, or sea. Because they generally use the same shipping companies, monitoring these facilities could provide indicators of deliveries.

Monitoring of China's ground and sea transportation systems can also provide potential indicators of delivery activity. Since almost all of China's goods are moved by rail at one time or another within the country, unusual rail movements may provide important clues to the transfer of equipment. As China's economy grows, competition for cargo space is becoming more intense. The PLA must submit requirements through the proper military and railway ministry channels anywhere from three to twelve months in advance, depending on the situation. When hazardous cargos, such as munitions, are carried on trains, the amount of coordination and limitations increases exponentially. The cargo must be delivered immediately and is not allowed to remain in one spot for more than 24 hours. The shipping organization must notify public security organizations en route to ensure that there are no problems.²⁸ Occasionally, a local newspaper may carry an article describing the role the local police or other organizations played in the train's movement or shipping of the goods.

Even nonhazardous cargo oftentimes receives local media attention. For example, during 1988, the Ministry of Aviation's weekly newspaper described the transfer by road of a Y-8 transport aircraft from the production facility in northern Sichuan Province to the flight test center at Xian. The planning process took nearly a year and involved the police in every small town en route. Local newspapers may also carry similar articles covering activities at facilities involved in WMD.

The difficulty comes when nonhazardous cargo containing items such as weapons or nuclear components rather than entire systems are shipped by rail or sea on a non-urgent basis. There would most likely not be any specific indicators of this activity other than by monitoring the place of origin and destination.

International Exhibitions and Symposia: A review of industry literature and information provided at international exhibitions and symposia may render clues to ongoing domestic and foreign programs. Chinese attendance at international symposia provides a good indication of China's interest in certain technologies. Chinese hosting of international exhibitions and symposia enables them to set the agenda and invite foreign scholars and scientists who have information tailored to China's needs and interests. Furthermore, hosting these exhibitions provides the most cost-effective means of obtaining information, since the Chinese normally charge foreign companies high prices for exhibition space.

Summary

In summary, it is the author's opinion that the PRC, for political and economic reasons, is likely to continue as a WMD proliferator regardless of what international regimes Beijing as agreed to. Sales of WMD technology and equipment abroad will be done officially and unofficially, involving the defense industry and the PLA. China is constantly seeking markets for its WMD technology and equipment. Although Beijing might not be able to provide everything these proliferator countries are seeking, PRC companies, whether legally or illegally, might be willing to sell what they have available for the right price. Monitoring activities with specific countries where China could fulfill some or all of their WMD requirements could provide an indicator of at least the potential for China to become involved in WMD proliferation there.

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Endnotes

1. In this context, missiles include complete systems, technology, or components.
2. "China Calls for Promoting Peaceful Nuclear Use," Xinhua, 24 April 1995. The article did not specify what the fourteen countries were.
3. "China's Cooperation with Other Countries in Nuclear Energy Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes, Says Spokesman," Xinhua, 26 September 1986.
4. "Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman on China's Nuclear Position," Xinhua, 15 February 1996.
5. "NMD Development Unjustified: Chinese Defense Minister," Xinhua, 8 August 2001.
6. "China Reiterates Policies On Control Over Nuclear Export," Xinhua, 16 October 1997. "China Against Proliferation Of Mass Destruction Weapons, Xinhua, 14 October 1998.
7. The Vienna-based Zangger committee, founded in 1971 and consisting of thirty-three nuclear or nuclear-related export countries, is the first international organization formed on control over nuclear technology. The committee's goal is to strengthen consultation and cooperation on issues of nuclear nonproliferation and export control under the principles of the NPT.
8. China shocked the world in 1988 by exporting 30-35 DF-3/CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988. For the origins of the DF-3 sale see Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997,) p. 113-117; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991.
9. Pravin K Sawhney, "Pakistan Scores Over India In Ballistic Missile Race," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 12; No. 11, 1 November 2000.
10. China's National Defense, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, July 1998), 32-34. The 1998 defense white paper was not Beijing's first attempt at military transparency. In 1985, the PLA began publishing the Shijie Junshi Nianjian [World Military Yearbook], which provided an overview of militaries around the world. The section on the PLA was only seventeen pages and provided almost no useful information. Each subsequent yearbook, published about every two years, has provided greater amounts of detail on matters like organization and training. The Academy of Military Science has also published journals with numerous papers on military trends and how they affect the PLA.
11. "China's National Defense in 2000," Xinhua, 16 October 2000.
12. China's National Defense, (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, July 1998), 32-34.
13. The MTCR group was originally established in 1987 with nine member nations. There are currently twenty-nine countries, including Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The MTCR has two primary restraint categories. Category I items have the greatest restraints. These items include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target and reconnaissance drones) with capabilities exceeding a range of 300 kilometers and a 500 kilogram payload threshold; production facilities for such systems; and major sub-systems including rocket stages, re-entry vehicles, rocket engines, guidance systems, and warhead mechanisms. Category II items include complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones) not covered in Item I, capable of a maximum range equal to, or greater than, 300 kilometers. Also included are a wide range of equipment, material and technologies, most of which have uses other than for missiles capable of delivering WMD.
14. Paul Mann, "China Alleged Top Trafficker in Mass Destruction Weapons," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 147, No. 5, 42.
15. "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 1998,î Director of Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center, Internet. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian.html#china.
16. The CIA's newest version of the biannual unclassified report on global proliferation activities, covering the period from 1 Jan to 30 June 2000. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian feb 2001.htm
17. See China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States, Conference Report, 5 November 1999. Conference sponsored by the National Intelligence Council and the Federal Research Division.
18. "China Set to Upgrade Iran Missiles," Reuters, 19 August 1999.
19. According to the 2000 Republic of China yearbook, Taipei has diplomatic relations with the following 30 countries: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome e Principe, St. Vincent and the Grenadines St. Christopher and Nevis, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Liberia, Macedonia, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Senegal, Solomon Island, Swaziland, Tuvalu, and the Vatican. However, Taiwan has "trade offices" in many countries around the world similar to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative's Office (TECRO) present in the United States.
20. Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, CRS Report for Congress, IB92056, 23 March 1998.
21. Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis, CRS Report for Congress, 96-767 F, 13 September 1996. The Chinese have also developed other systems, such as the 8610/M-7 (CSS-8) SRBM, solely for export. The 8610 is a HQ-2 surface-to-air missile that the PRC modified for Iran. Shirley A. Kan and Robert D. Shuey, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, CRS Report for Congress, 97-391 F, 27 May 1998. The 8610 refers to the date the program began B October 1986. This is a common practice in China for designating various weapons systems. Since this missile was developed for export, China has openly provided information about its capabilities. Other examples include the K-8 trainer aircraft and FC-1 fighter joint ventures between China and Pakistan. These aircraft programs were developed for the Pakistan Air Force, not the PLA Air Force, with the hope that the PLA would become interested in the program and purchase some of the aircraft at a later date.
22. Given the similarities of various ballistic missile systems available in China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan, it is clearly apparent that the ballistic missile community in those countries have at least bilateral working relationships with each other on these programs.
23. Dr. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Liquid Lifeline," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 September 1995.
24. The 1st Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) effectively served as the blueprint for industrialization. The 2nd through the 5th plans (1958-1980) were all interrupted by political upheavals and had little influence. As a result of Deng Xiaopingís guidance for opening China's economy, all of the plans since the 6th, that began in 1980, have provided the necessary policy guidance for China's economic and military development. Source: Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan, editors, China: A Country Study: 1988, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Foreign Research Division, 1988, p. 240.
25. "Post-2000 Delays to China's Arms Goals," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 January 1998.
26. "China Moves to End PLA's Commercial Interests," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 September 1998.
27. During the late 1980s, aviation ministry personnel cited instances where the PLA would circumvent the spirit of the law by purchasing a new piece of equipment from a factory and then have this "surplus" equipment delivered directly to an overseas customer. See James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978-1998, Armonk, New York; London, England: M.E. Sharpe. 2001.
28. This information is based on interviews with Chinese personnel.