2.2 MISSILE AND SPACE SYSTEMS
Information from U.S. Assists New PLA Nuclear Warheads
Though a debate lingers, in 1999 a bi-partisan commission of the U.S. House of Representatives concluded that the PRC had used information it had obtained through espionage about modern U.S. nuclear weapons to aid the development of current PRC nuclear weapons being deployed on its new generation of solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). From the former Soviet Union the PRC received training for nuclear engineers, help with uranium reprocessing and early examples of ballistic missiles and Tu-16 medium bombers. While the Soviets balked at an agreement to provide an example of an actual nuclear weapon, the PRC was able on it own to test uranium-fueled fission bomb in October 1964 and then a thermonuclear device 32 months later in June 1967. From September 1992 to July 1996 the PRC conducted a series of eight underground nuclear tests as part of its effort to develop new smaller nuclear warheads. While the PRC signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, which would have prohibited future nuclear tests, the PRC is reported to have carried on subsequent “subcritical” low-level nuclear tests and non-nuclear tests, as part of a continuing nuclear warhead development program.[1]
After the 1992 test blast, U.S. scientists working at the Los Alamos laboratories raised suspicions that the PRC’s new nuclear weapon may have made new break-throughs in miniaturization, raising suspicions that there may have been a leakage of U.S. design information. These suspicions grew in 1995 after a PRC citizen, or a “walk-in” later determined to have been controlled by PRC intelligence, delivered to U.S. officials data on the PRC’s new nuclear weapons.[2] This PRC walk-in is reported to have had data about many U.S. nuclear warheads, including the most modern U.S. warhead, the W-88.[3] Regarding the W-88, the New York Times reported that U.S. officials noted that the “Chinese text cited five key attributes of the warhead, including two measurements accurate to within four-hundredths of an inch.”[4]
Revelations in 1998 that PRC space launchers had benefited from U.S. missile technology led the U.S. House of Representatives to form a Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. In the unclassified version of its report, the Select Committee stated that the PRC stole information on the following U.S. nuclear warheads: W-56 on the Minuteman II ICBM; W-62 on the Minuteman III ICBM; W-70 on the Lance SRBM; W-76 on the Trident C-4 SLBM; W-78 on the Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM; W-87 on the Peacekeeper ICBM; and the W-88 on the Trident D-5 SLBM. The Select Committee also stated that the PRC stole “classified information on U.S. weapons design concepts, on weaponization features, and on warhead reentry vehicles.” It also noted that the PRC had in the late 1970s stolen classified data on the W-70, which was an early version of an enhanced radiation, or “neutron” weapon. Furthermore, the Select Committee stated that the PRC “may have also acquired classified U.S. nuclear weapons computer codes from U.S. national weapons laboratories.” [5]
This bi-partisan committee reached stark conclusions on the impact of U.S. technology on new PRC nuclear warheads: “The Select Committee judges that the PRC’s thermonuclear warheads will exploit elements of the U.S. W-70 or W-88 Trident D-5 warheads. While the PRC might not produce replicas of these U.S. thermonuclear warheads, elements of the PRC’s device could be similar.”[6] The Select Committee judged that the PRC preferred following U.S. nuclear warhead design priorities, which stressed innovative designs and lighter weight warheads. The information that the PRC obtained from the U.S. “saved the PRC years of effort and resources in developing its new generation of modern thermonuclear warheads.”[7]
The findings of the Select Committee created a sensation in the PRC and the United States. Beijing furiously denied that it had stolen U.S. nuclear information and asserted that it did not need such assistance to build its own new warheads. In the U.S. many critics challenged the Select Committee’s conclusions. Some contended that the “watermelon” shape of U.S. modern nuclear warhead explosives, and the sharp shape of the warhead, are not unique to the U.S. and are dictated by physics, meaning the PRC could also design them.[8] The Select Committee Co-chairmen responded that it was given information from the U.S. government that new PRC warheads benefit from U.S. design information.[9] And in September 1999, the National Intelligence Council, reflecting the consensus view of the U.S. Intelligence Community, stated that new PRC land and sea-based mobile missiles will have “smaller warheads—in part influenced by US technology gained through espionage.”[10]
Regardless of how the PRC came to possess the knowledge to build modern nuclear warheads, in 1998 the PRC released new data which confirmed the progress of its nuclear warhead development. At the 1998 Zhuhai Airshow the Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics, which conducts very high speed and low speed aerodynamic research, released a brochure that contained illustrations of old and new PRC nuclear warhead shapes.[11] Old PRC warhead shapes were almost semi-circular, and thus rather inaccurate. New warhead shapes were sharp and conical as in modern U.S. warhead shapes, and thus, far more accurate. Also of some interest was a photo that appeared to illustrate both old and new U.S. and Russian warhead shapes. The PRC’s new nuclear warheads are believed to weigh about 700 kg, compared to 2,000 to 3,000 kg for the PRC’s older nuclear warheads.[12] They are also believed to have a modern, sharp conical shape that confers far greater accuracy. Such warheads now arm the DF-31 mobile ICBM, 12 of which are reported to be deployed with the PLA’s Second Artillery as of late 2003.[13]
U.S. Information Assists PLA Missiles
Status: U.S. technology has
helped the PLA to develop new ICBMs
DF-5 Mod 1 DF-5 Mod 2
DF-31 DF-31A Stages: 2/liquid fuel 2/liquid
fuel 3/solid fuel 3/solid fuel Range: 13,000km 13,000+ km
8,000km 12,000km Warhead: 1x 1-3 MT Possible Multiple Warheads;
1x 150-350kt 1-3x 150-350kt
4-6, 150-350 KT Operational Status: 20+ in service To replace DF-5 Mod
1 12x reported in service 2005+
by “mid-decade” Both U.S. government investigators
and the House Select Committee have concluded that the PRC was able to use
information obtained during the course of launching U.S. satellites to improve
the reliability of their space launch vehicles (SLV), which in turn could
improve their ballistic missiles. The PRC’s Long March-2 and Long March-3 SLVs
were derived from the DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The
assumption was that any information that would have improved the reliability of
commercial missiles would have also helped the PRC to improve its military
missiles. Both ICBMs and SLVs contain interchangeable elements like engines,
structure, staging, guidance, system integration and payload deployment.[14]
To wit, in 2002 the Pentagon revealed that the PLA was to field a new
longer-range version of the DF-5, called the DF-5 Mod 2. The Pentagon also
noted this missile might be the first to be equipped with multiple nuclear
warheads.[15]
It is very likely that the DF-5 Mod 2 has benefited from the knowledge that the
PRC was able to obtain to improve its SLVs via its interaction with U.S. companies. It is also possible that this missile may have benefited from Russian and
Ukrainian missile technologies. U.S. use of PRC space launch
vehicles was born of the Shuttle Challenger disaster after which
President Ronald Reagan agreed to allow U.S. satellite companies to use PRC
launchers to ease growing commercial demand. These launches began in 1991 and
about 25 U.S. satellites were launched in the PRC up to mid-1999. But
sanctions placed on satellite launches after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre
required that the President issue waivers to allow U.S. companies to use less
expensive PRC launchers.[16]
President George Bush issued three such waivers while President Bill Clinton
issued ten. Concern about the possibility of
illegal technology transfers to the PRC started after the repeated failures of
the Long March rocket, the main PRC space launch vehicle (SLV). Long March
rockets exploded while carrying American-made satellites manufactured by Space
Systems/Loral and Hughes Space and Communications International Inc. It was
reported that in the course of analyzing a February 1996 Long March failures
that Space Systems/Loral and Hughes Electronics may have given the PRC
sensitive information on how to improve its missiles. The Pentagon’s Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA) is reported to have approved an Air
Force Intelligence finding that the Loral crash review could have helped
improve PRC missile guidance. DTSA is said to have concluded, “United State s national security has been harmed.”[17]
The Select Committee found that in
1993 and 1995, Hughes Electronics, which was one of the companies that was
involved in launching satellites in the People’s Republic of China, showed the PRC how to improve the design and reliability of its military space
launch vehicles, and, specifically, the Long March 2 rocket. Specifically, in
connection with the launch failures of two Hughes satellites, Hughes gave
information to the PRC that could help it improve rocket fairings and to
diagnose launch failures.[18]
That technical assistance may be useful in advancing design and improved
reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles. In the view of the Intelligence
Community and the military services, this last type of information—failure
analysis—was seen as potentially one of the most valuable things the PRC
obtained. In addition, the Select Committee also found
that in 1996, Loral principally, but with Hughes also participating, showed the
PRC how to improve the design and reliability of the guidance system used in
the newest Long March-3 rockets. This device may also be useful for design and
improved reliability of elements of future PRC ballistic missiles. Loral as
well as Hughes acted without the legally required licenses although both
corporations knew that a license was required.[19]
Among the information—the technical information
that was militarily sensitive—communicated outside the constraints of export
rules and regulations—was information on missile design, design analysis and
testing procedures, and the application of technical know-how to particular
failure analyses. The United States has also lost some military satellites in
launch vehicle failures, which costs us billions of dollars and delay our
military intelligence or communication programs by years. Some critics of the
Select Committee noted that it is actually in the U.S. interest to improve the
PRC’s space launch capability.[20]
However, given the possibility that the PRC could use force against a U.S. friend, Taiwan, it is indeed worth questioning whether the U.S. should be improving the
People’s Republic of China’s military space lift capability. In January 2002
Loral agreed to pay a $14 million fine for violating U.S. export control laws.
Then in January 2003, the State Department formally charged Hughes, whose space
division was purchased by Boeing in 2000, with violating U.S. export control laws in giving missile information to the PRC.[21]
There are also concerns that Lockheed and
Motorola may have helped the PRC improve their ability to launch future
multiple warhead busses as a result the PRC’s development of a new satellite
“Smart Dispenser.” As part of its successful effort to win contracts to launch
Motorola IRIDIUM communication satellites, the PRC developed the Long March
2C/SD with a Smart Dispenser capable of launching two satellites. While the
Select Committee did not conclude that U.S. companies provided any direct
assistance to the PRC to develop a multiple warhead capability for its ICBMs,[22]
at least one former Chinese solid-rocket engineer has asserted that “Our U.S.
partners gave us the specifications and technical assistance to produce the
dispenser.”[23]
The PRC also developed a dispenser capable of launching 12 Loral GLOBALSTAR
communication satellites, but did not obtain the launch contract. A December
1996 U.S. Intelligence assessment concluded, “…the SD [Smart Dispenser] can be
considered a “technology bridge” to a credible PBV [post-boost-vehicle for
multiple warheads].”[24] One other area in which U.S. missile technology has aided the PRC was that of solid rocket fuel. As part of the
same effort to launch IRIDIUM satellites, the former Martin Marietta
Corporation is accused of having helped the PRC perfect large solid rocket
motor engines. According to previously cited Chinese engineer, who worked with Fourth Academy of the China Aerospace Corporation responsible for solid rocket motors, “Before
we received this help from the United States, China had never succeeded in
developing propellants powerful enough to be used for strategic-range
solid-fuel rockets.”[25]
This engineer also recounted how this technology was used to modify the solid
rocket engines on DF-21 IRBMs to make them reliable. In early 2000 the U.S. fined Lockheed, which had by this point purchased Martin Marietta, $13 million for violating U.S. export control laws in relation to this case.[26] It is probable that this same information was
used to make reliable engines for the new DF-31 and DF-31A mobile ICBMs. In
1999 the PLA had at least four DF-31 TELs that were assembled for the October
anniversary parade in Beijing. By late 2003 one report notes that the first
unit of 12 DF-31 ICBMs had been deployed by the PLA. In 2002 the Pentagon
noted that a longer-range version of the DF-31 was to be deployed later in the
decade. At the 2002 Zhuhai show the PLA displayed its future KT-2A solid-fuel
SLV. Inasmuch as officials at the show stated that the slightly smaller KT-2
SLV was based on the DF-31 ICBM, it is likely that the KT-2A is analogous to
the longer-range version of the DF-31, also called DF-31A. Possible Russian Sources For Cruise Missile Technology
Raduga KH-65SE/SD Status: Reports that Russia has tried to sell to this
cruise missile to China Length: 6m (19+ ft) Diameter: 514 mm (1
ft, 8.25 in) Weight: 1,650 kg (2,755 lbs) Range: SE: 600 km (360 mi); SD: 300 km (180 mi) Payload:
410kg warhead Guidance: inertial, GLONASS, terrain matching, TV-guidance Novator 3M-54E1 CLUB
Anti-Ship and Land Attack Cruise Missile Status: May be purchased in conjunction with new KILO
submarines Length: 6.2m Diameter: 533cm Weight: 1,780kg Range: 300km Payload: 400kg warhead Guidance: inertial, active radar homing The PLA has long sought to develop a
strategic land attack cruise missile.[27]
In early 2003 Internet source photos of a PRC cruise missile fuselage in a
stress testing rig appeared to confirm reports that the PLA had been making
substantial progress in developing cruise missiles.[28]
Taiwanese sources expect the PLA will begin deploying a long-range land-attack
cruise missile by 2005.[29]
When this new cruise missile enters PLA service it will serve to accelerate an
already growing threat to Taiwan and other U.S. allies in Asia. This new
land-attack cruise missile will very likely eventually be produced in ground,
air, ship and submarine-launched versions. According to Third Academy of the China Aerospace Corporation, it will also have multiple guidance systems, like
terrain-following (TERCOM) and satellite navigation systems[30]
that will enable very high accuracy. And due to their lower cost compared to
ballistic missile, it can be expected that the PLA will rapidly build up
hundreds by the end of the decade. From Russia the PLA has had several cruise
missile technology opportunities. In 1997 sources in Taiwan reported that Russia had marketed its Kh-65SE cruise missile in China.[31]
This would be consistent with the fact that the Kh-65SE has been displayed at
airshows in Russia and abroad for sales promotion purposes. In recent years,
however, China has not displayed this missile. It did not appear at the 1997
Moscow Aerospace Salon (MAKS 97) and the Raduga spokesman did not want to talk
it up. It is not clear that China has indeed purchased this missile. The Kh-65 is a proposed short-range version of
the Kh-55 (AS-15 ‘Kent’) 3,000 km-range strategic cruise missile. It is not
yet known to be in production. The Kh-55 has been in Russian service since
1984 as a nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile. The Kh-65SE, which was
first displayed in 1992, appears to have been derived from the AS-15B. They
have the same inertial and terrain-following guidance but the latter may also
have Glonass satellite navigation capability.[32]
Both missiles have triangular fuselage attachments which appears to hold more
fuel.[33]
The medium-range SD version was revealed in 1995. From the Kh-65SE China could obtain several technologies to build Tomahawk-like cruise missiles with
potentially as much tactical flexibility. China would gain much desired cruise
missile design, engine, fuel and guidance technology. A second opportunity for cruise missile
technologies would be the Raduga Kh-59ME, which the PLA apparently is
purchasing as part of the weapons package for its Sukhoi Su-30MKKs. While not a
long-range cruise missile, its small Dvigatel engine would provide some
additional technology that could assist PLA cruise-missile engine design. Third, the PLA may purchase the Novator 3M-54E1
300km-range anti-ship missile as part of the “CLUB-S” package for its new batch
of KILO submarines. This is a cruise missile that while smaller, resembles the
U.S. TOMOHAWK in shape. And though an anti-ship cruise missile, it can likely
be modified for land-attack missions. It is also possible for the PLA to gain
significant cruise missile technologies from the version it is reportedly
purchasing, the 3M-54E. Sale of Israeli Technology that Could Assist
Cruise Missile Development
IAI DELILAH Anti-Radar
Missile Status: Reports of Chinese co-development assistance to Israel Length: for drone: 2.7 m (8 ft, 10 in) Diameter: for
drone: 330 mm (1 ft, 1 in) Payload: for co-developed version: 450 kg Range: for co-developed version, 385 km (est) (230 mi),
could be much longer Guidance: inertial, GPS, TV-guidance Accuracy: 91m
(300 ft) positioning accuracy for drone; cruise missile accuracy likely
higher IAI HARPY Anti-Radar
Drone Status: Sale of “large
number” to PLA reported in 2002 Engine: reciprocating Range: 200mi Guidance: Electro-magnetic and electro-optical sensor In 1995 Flight International reported
that China was providing funding to develop an air-launched cruise missile
based on the TAAS DELILAH anti-radiation attack-drone.[34]
The report noted also that China would be a customer for the new cruise
missile. Reports of this co-development program persist though no official or
unofficial statements confirm that China has yet received the cruise missile
product of this cooperation. TAAS began promoting a warhead-equipped version as
a stand-off cruise missile in 1995.[35]
It is reported that a deep-penetrating warhead is being developed for
the new Chinese version of the DELILAH.[36]
In is also noteworthy that the U.S. Navy may buy a version of the DELILAH to
arm helicopters. The DELILAH is reportedly based on the Northrop
MQM-74 Chukar target drone which first flew in 1965. It has been in
Israeli service since the late 1980s as an anti-radar system. It is powered by
a Williams Co. J400-WR-401 turbojet engine, producing 170 lbs of thrust.[37]
Larger Williams Co. turbojets also power the longer-range Tomahawk and
Air Force ALCMs. Versions of the DELILAH are equipped with
aircraft-simulating features and electronics to trigger enemy radar
transmissions, which are then located and attacked with ECM or chaff. If the DELILAH has been acquired by the PLA, it
would have provided a new electronic attack weapon and another source of
potentially useful cruise missile technologies. If, as reported, the PLA
funded the development of later versions, it is logical to assume that the PLA
was given those technologies. It is possible that the PLA would have benefited
in the areas of design, engines, fuel, and guidance. In July 2002 the Washington Times reported
that Israel had sold its HARPY anti-radar drone to the PLA.[38]
A later report noted that a “large number” had been sold in a $100 million
deal.[39]
This drone, a low-tech cruise missile, is powered by a reciprocating engine and
designed to loiter over a target area for up to two hours and then home in on a
target electronic emission, and destroy that source. It is particularly
threatening to Taiwan’s radar and communications networks. This drone would
assist PLA cruise missile efforts in that it could supply new guidance
technologies that could be applied to future programs. This drone could also
assist future PLA anti-radar and UAV projects. Possible PLA
Cooperation With Russia For Missile Defense In 2002 the Pentagon noted, “In July 2001, Moscow and
Beijing signed a five-year space cooperation agreement pursuant to which: China
and Russia will establish special departments on joint development of a
regional missile defense system…”[40]
The PRC has also sought Russia’s support
in opposing U.S. missile defense plans and their missile defense cooperation
could flow from their July 16, 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and
Cooperation. Russian assistance could range from the outright sale of missile
defense systems to the sale of technology to assist PRC missile defense
development programs. Russian ballistic missile defense technology development
dates back to the 1953 and includes several generations of operational early
warning satellites, long-range early warning radar and very fast interceptor
missiles, designed mainly to defend Moscow from U.S. nuclear missile attack.[41]
For example, Russia could assist the PLA’s development
of space-based early warning satellites and long-range radar, which would be
tied to a national missile defense cueing system. Russia’s Radiotechnical and
Information Systems Concern is offering its 2,000km range MARS mobile phased
array radar for tracking incoming ballistic missiles and guiding interceptor
rockets.[42]
In March 2002 the Radio Receiver Manufacturing Scientific Research Institute
[NIIRP] company was reportedly working on two contracts for the PRC worth up to
$8 million.[43]
Russia is also now marketing its S-400 Triumph SAM, that has an
interception range out to 400km (240mi) and up to altitudes of 30km (18mi).[44]
Russia’s Almaz/Fakel S-300 PMU-1/PMU-2 (SA-10
Grumble) SAM
Status: PLA has likely acquired many hundreds of the S-300
SAM since the early 1990s.
S-300PMU
S-300PMU-1 S-300PMU-2 Missile: 5V55R
48N6E 48N6E2 Speed:
1,200m/s 2,800m/s,
M 6 2,800m/s, M 6 Range vs aircraft:
75km 150km 200km Range vs missile:
35km 40km 40km Altitude:
25km 75km 75km Guidance: TVM
TVM TVM Command and Control
Assets: 83M6E
83M6E2 Target Acquisition Range: 300km 300km Targets Tracked:
300 300 Targets
Detected: 100 100 Targets Attacked
Simultaneously:
6 6 Mobility: road-mobile, 4 missiles on either a truck-towed or
a self-propelled TEL, plus self-propelled Flap Lid, stationary Tin
Shield, Battery said to be operational within 5 minutes of stopping
vehicles To upgrade the regional air defense
capability the PLA has purchased many hundreds of Almaz/Fakel S-300 SAMs. The
precise number is not known but published estimates indicate a potentially
serious number of missiles. In 1991 China reportedly purchased 4 to 6 S-300 PMU
batteries (48 to 72 missiles) and then purchased an additional 120 missiles in
1994.[45]
In 2002 one prominent Russian analyst said Russia has sold the PLA eight
divisions, or battalions of the S-300PMU and in 2001, another four battalions
of the S-300PMU-2.[46]
In Russian terms a battalion has about 12 launchers, [47]or
48 missiles plus spares. Given this assumption it is possible that Russia has sold at least 576 S-300 missiles to the PLA. An early 2004 report notes that
Russia has only sold eight units with six launchers each,[48]
meaning a possible sale of only 192 missiles. These estimates do not include
reloads, so both could be much higher. There are occasional references,
usually in Jane’s publications, that the S-300 is being co-produced in
the PRC as the HQ-16 but this cannot be confirmed. The S-300PMU-1 is usually described as having
capabilities similar to the U.S. PATRIOT. Some reports note that Soviet spies
managed to steal the PATRIOT’s critical “track-via-missile” (TVM) technology[49]
which is used by the S-300PMU-1. With TVM the intercepting SAM has a seeker
that homes in on the very narrow beam signal of a phased array radar reflected
off the target, while that radar is also providing updated guidance cues to the
missile.[50]
Both the very narrow beam of the phased array radar and its reflected signal
are extremely difficult to jam. Commenting on the challenge of this technology
after the 1999 Kosovo Air Campaign, noted Russian weapons and missile expert
Steven Zaloga stated, “The Kosovo air campaign would
have been a far more painful experience for NATO had there been even a single
battery of S-300PMU in operation. There have never been any air operations
carried out against an opponent defended with a missile system using
contemporary track-via-missile guidance.”[51] The S-300 series has had an improving
anti-missile capability. One report notes the S-300PMU was tested against a
SCUD missile.[52]
At 1997 Moscow Airshow Fakel unveiled its S-300 PMU-2 Favorit, and at
that time the PLA is said to have expressed its interest.[53]
This system includes a new missile with a 200 km (120 mi) range, better missile
warhead, a new 96L6E three-dimensional radar with a range of 300 km (180 mi),
plus improved ECCM capabilities.[54]
The Favorit is said to approach the S-300V in its anti-missile
capability, having solved radar beam algorithm problems that prevented the
S-300PMU-1 from better intercepting missiles.[55]
In Chinese service the S-300s are operated by
the PLA Air Force and are said to have been deployed around Beijing and in
defense of air bases--presumably SU-27 bases. During the 1996 exercises
several S-300 PMU launches were featured on Chinese TV. From this coverage it
is possible to see the Flap Lid and Tin Shield radar systems. In
combat these systems should be widely disbursed, so the 1996 exercise was
either for show or potentially indicative of poor tactical utilization of this
SAM. In 2000 Taiwanese sources noted that the PLA had plans to station S-300
SAMs along the Taiwan Strait in three locations.[56] Nevertheless, China’s obtaining the S-300 marks
a major upgrade in its SAM capabilities. It is not known openly, and can be
presumed doubtful, that Taiwan has the ability to jam these missiles.[57]
Their usage in a Taiwan scenario may cancel out retaliation attacks by the
Taiwan Air Force unless they could first be located and destroyed as one of the
earliest retaliation measures. And to secure its air forces over the Strait,
the U.S. would have to employ long-range attack munitions to take out the S-300
sites or it could not be sure of establishing air superiority. Antey S-300V/VM (SA-12A Gladiator/ SA-12B Giant)/
Possible ABM technology
Status: Apparent ongoing negotiations regarding China’s purchase of this missile Launch weight: S-300V, 2,500 kg , S-300VM, 4,600 kg Performance: SPEED, S-300V, 1.7 km/sec , S-300VM, 2.4 km/sec,
S-300VE, 4.5km/sec RANGE, S-300V, 75km, S-300VM, 100km, S-300VE, 200km Guidance: surveillance radar, 9S15 Bill Board,
range, 200km, 9S19 High Screen sector radar, range, 175km, 9S32 Grill
Pan engagement radar, range, 150km Mobility: road and rail mobile, air mobile only in large
transports such as the AN-124 That China eventually would seek, at a
minimum, access to S-300V technology would follow logically on its investment
in the S-300 PMU. In 1997 an Antey official noted cryptically that China’s purchase of the S-300V was “a matter of commercial negotiations.”[58]
Antey has spent much of the last decade marketing this SAM system in Asia but has not met much success. There are unconfirmed reports that in 1995 the PLA did
purchase a small number of S-300V SAMs. This is possible inasmuch as the PLA
would want to gain greater insights into this missile’s specific technologies.
This curiosity reportedly drove the U.S. to purchase a small number of S-300Vs
in the mid 1990s.[59]
The failure to produce an advanced derivative of the S-300/HQ-9 might also
drive a purchase of the S-300V. Of potential greater importance, however, is the
technology the S-300V could offer the PLA toward developing defenses against
longer-range U.S., Indian and Russian missiles. What the S-300V may lack in
terms of necessary engagement speed can me made up slightly with longer-range
radar or satellite cueing, faster targeting computers, and larger fragmentation
warheads. What China would gain by simply buying several batteries of the
SA-12B would be an immediate defense against missiles with a 3,000 km range.[60]
This would be useful against the Indian Agni missile, for instance. Foreign Technologies Contributing to the
HQ-9/HQ-15/FT-2000 SAM
Status: New generation PLA SAM reported to have benefited
from U.S. and Russian technology, reported in limited PLA service Length: 6.8m Diameter: .47m Weight: 1,300kg,
130kg warhead Performance: SPEED: 1.3km/sec, RANGE: 100km ALTITUDE: 18km Missile Guidance: Inertial guidance with passive homing seeker for
FT-2000A, but active seeker planned for later models Ground Guidance: Passive ESM for FT-2000A; for later active
versions, HT-233 active phased array radar, RANGE: 120km detection, 90km
tracking, track up to 100 targets, simultaneously attack up to 3 targets
with 6 missiles At the 1998 Farnborough Airshow the PLA
revealed a new SAM, the FT-2000. It was advertised as a “passive” seeking SAM
designed to engage both AWACS and jamming aircraft within its 100km range.
Later that year at the Zhuhai Airshow PRC officials stated that they were
developing future “active” guided versions and that eventually it would have an
anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability.[61]
While the Pentagon has reported that the FT-2000 may not be in PLA service, a
surprisingly detailed early 2003 Malaysian report on the FT-2000 suggested that
it was in limited PLA service in the Fujian area.[62]
With the impending Indian purchase of the Israeli PHALCON AWACS there are
reports from Pakistan of a growing interest in acquiring the FT-2000 SAM. The FT-2000 is also called the HQ-15. In
addition, the FT-2000 is very likely related if not a derivative of the PLA’s
HQ-9 SAM program. This program, in turn, is thought to have benefited from
access to U.S. and Russian SAM technology. In early 1993 Aviation Week and
Space Technology reported, quoting unnamed Pentagon officials, that Israel had transferred a PATRIOT missile or missile technology to the PRC.[63]
It is not clear when the missile was transferred. Israel vehemently denied
having sold the PRC this missile and pro-Israeli analysts have suggested to the
author that Germany might be the source of the PRC’s missile. Nevertheless, a U.S. source has told the author that indeed, the PRC does have at least one PATRIOT missile.[64]
In 2001 a report cited a U.S. official noting that the U.S. sent a team to
Israel, perhaps in 1991-92, to investigate the PATRIOT loss “but they couldn't
prove that a missile went to China,"[65] According to one U.S. source, the HQ-9 utilizes
technology from the missile guidance equipment in the PATRIOT combined with a
Chinese designed missile motor, in addition to search and guidance equipment
derived from the Russian S-300PMU. In a 1997 report ONI noted, “Technology
from advanced Western systems may be incorporated into the HQ-9.”[66]
A Russian source interviewed in 1997 noted that the HQ-9 would use the same
guidance frequencies as the PATRIOT.[67]
In 2001 a U.S. government source indicated the HQ-9 would use TVM guidance
technology pioneered by the PATRIOT.[68]
The Malaysian report contained pictures of the HT-233 radar which suggest a
close similarity to the radar used by the U.S. PATRIOT, also suggesting the
FT-2000 uses the difficult to jam TVM guidance. The printing of the detailed Malaysian article
in early 2003 indicates that the PLA is eager to sell the FT-2000. This may
indicate that the missile is mature enough to support foreign sales, or to the
contrary, it requires additional foreign investment to reach its next
development stage. While the PLA’s developing such a missile, especially if it
uses TVM, presents a new challenge to U.S. and Taiwanese aircraft, perhaps the
more disturbing lesson of the FT-2000 is the distinct possibility that PLA
engineers may be gaining insight into the very complex skill of melding
technologies from different countries to make completely new weapons. Russia has made fundamental
contributions to the PRC’s manned space program, which in turn has initiated
the PLA’s military manned space program. Since the beginning the PLA has been
in charge of the PRC’s manned space program, which as a consequence stresses
military missions. Originally proposed by the Shanghai Astronautics Bureau, the
921-1 project was revamped in 1994 following former President Jaing Zemin’s
visit to Russia, which led to a 1995 agreement to transfer Russian manned space
technology. China purchased a Russian Soyuz space capsule, life support and
docking technology, space suits, and astronaut training.[69]
While the PRC has boasted that it was responsible for the design and production
of its subsequent space craft, it is clear that Russian technology has made
possible the PRC’s first manned space program. The PRC was careful to release
scant details about its manned space capsule, but at the 1998 Zhuhai Airshow a
picture was observed of an aerodynamic shape resembling a slightly larger
Russian Soyuz-style re-entry capsule. For its November 20, 1999 test
flight, Jiang renamed the Project 921-1 space capsule the “Shenzhou,” or
“Divine Vessel.” To wit, the 921-1 craft revealed in 1999 was a scaled-up
Soyuz, featuring the same three-part design: orbital module; descent module;
and propulsion module. The 921-1, however, at a weight of 7800kg, and a length
of 7.79m is about 550 kg heavier and over a meter longer than the Soyuz.
Unlike Soyuz, the 921-1 has a cylindrical orbital module that has its own solar
panels and thrusters, making it capable of independent operation. All Shenzhou
flights have entailed extended orbital module missions following the return of
the manned reentry capsule. The first flight in October 1999
lasted only 21 hours, but a second unmanned test flight on January 9, 2001
lasted six days, and featured an extended flight for the orbital module that carried
experiments. The mission also reportedly featured an unexpected hard landing
for the descent module, likely due to a parachute foul up. There is
speculation that any occupants would have died.[70]
A third mission from March 25-April 1, 2002 saw the testing of a fully
man-rated capsule. This mission carried two dummy “Yuhangyuans” or astronauts
that simulated most human functions, plus upgraded video an voice communication
systems. A fourth test mission took place from December 31, 2002 to January 5,
2003, carrying dummies and science experiments. The fifth mission took place
on October 15, 2003, in which the first Chinese astronaut, PLA Air Force Lt.
Col Yang Liwei, circled the Earth for 21 hours and 23 minutes.[71]
As it is now known, all of the
practice flights and even the first manned Shenzhou flight performed military
missions. Shenzhou 1 and 2 very likely performed ELINT missions. This
observation was made by Swedish scientist Sven Grahn.[72]
The orbital module for these first two practice missions had external Yagi-type
antennae mounted on three extendable poles, construction that is consistent
with ELINT missions. A Chinese space flight official indicated in early 2003
that Shenzhou 4 conducted ELINT missions, perhaps indicating that Shenzhou’s 2
and 3 did so too. This same official also noted that Shenzhou 4 carried a
“microwave” sensing device, very likely a prototype radar satellite.[73]
In addition, the orbital modules for Shenzhou’s 3-5 all have box structures
that resemble cameras. In fact, close up photos of the orbital module for
Shenzhou-5 reveal an external box which very likely contains a camera, and an
aperture in the orbital module itself, very likely for a second camera. This
could mean a hyper-spectral and a close-up camera were included.[74]
According to a Hong Kong report a PRC scientist claimed the Shenzhou-5 camera
had a resolution of 1.6 meters.[75]
Mark Wade, chronicler of the Encyclopedia Astronautica web page,
concluded, “…it may be inferred that the main mission
of China's first manned spaceflight will be military imaging reconnaissance.”[76] In a
historical context, the PLA is apparently pursuing a military manned space
program in contrast to the U.S. and Russia, which after some consideration, and
brief experimentation by Russia, decided to allocate military missions to
unmanned space vehicles. But while the Soviet Union chose not to pursue a
manned military presence in space, it did have many military space programs and
many of them involved modifications of the Soyuz spacecraft design.[77] These include manned military
reconnaissance, laboratory and even armed military versions. There were also
unmanned versions of the Soyuz design that would perform reconnaissance and
even military interception. Most of these projects never advanced beyond
planning stages but presumably many of their files remain in some cabinet. It
is reasonable to speculate that the PLA has purchased some of these files. The PRC willingness to make
military missions an integral part of its “civil” space program serves to raise
questions about possible military roles for its future planned larger space
station—for which the PRC is also seeking foreign technical assistance. The
Project 921-2 space station was proposed in conjunction with the 921-1 manned
space capsule, but reportedly was not approved for development until February
1999. For the PRC a space station adds to national prestige and provides a
platform for space science, manufacturing and materials development. Investing
in this space station also sustains a production base and space skills
necessary for other military programs. In 2000 the Russians made an attempt to
interest the PRC in purchasing their faltering Mir space station. Beijing, however, declined, apparently in favor of seeking Russian technology to assist
their own space station program.[78]
At the October 2000 Hannover Expo,
the PRC displayed a concept model for its future manned space station. It did
not resemble a Russian concept such as the Salut, which is built around a
single large module. Instead, it featured multiple modules, each about 3
meters long and about 2.2 meters in diameter, with a central solar power
structure and two outside trusses mounting supporting communications gear. This
station would have a total length of 20 meters and total mass of 40 tons. The
individual modules could easily be lofted by the uprated Long March CZ-2EA,
though this launcher would allow for even larger modules than shown in the Hannover model.[79]
At the 2000 Zhuhai Air Show an official of the European Space consortium
explained that PRC officials were influenced by a previous European Space
Agency concept for a space station. Astrium, the official disclosed, was also
trying to sell the PRC space station life support technology.[80]
In light of a new 2002 broader EU-PRC agreement to pursue much more vigorous
cooperation in space, it is likely that the EU may be a more active participant
in the PRC’s future space station. The Europeans are also eager to
have the PRC participate in the International Space Station (ISS).[81]
At the 2000 Zhuhai Airshow European officials noted that the Chinese were
reluctant to join the ISS due to U.S. opposition and a desire to first build a
PRC space station.[82]
However, by late 2001 PRC space officials were telling reporters that the PRC
wanted a role on the ISS.[83]
By early 2002, the Director of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Sean O’Keefe and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage were
reported to be actively considered expanding cooperation with the PRC to
include inviting ISS participation.[84]
The idea was soon downplayed. However, with the Europeans intent on securing
more space business with the PRC, particularly in manned space technologies,
they may continue to push this issue. For its part, the PRC may view this as
one more wedge issue to drive between the EU and Washington. Yet, the PRC’s clear military
priorities for its manned space program means that the PRC will seek to apply
any knowledge gained by ISS participation to improve its military-space
capabilities. Given the PRC’s brazenness in making its first manned space
flight a military intelligence gathering exercise, it should not be surprising
that a much larger manned space station might incorporate more sophisticated
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These could be directed toward
terrestrial or space-borne priorities. The latter raises the possibility of
the PLA actually arming such a space station. For if the PLA decides to
militarize its space station, thereby making it a target, the PLA may also
decide to equip it with systems for defense. Potential
Foreign Technology for a PLA’s Project 921-3 Space Shuttle In addition to a space station the PLA
has a long-term program to build a small manned space shuttle craft, which
could benefit from Russian or European technology. This program, known as
“Project 921-3” was reportedly started in 1989[85]
and approved in April 1992.[86]
Such a craft would be desirable because it would be able to carry a variety of
payloads and have high maneuverability in orbit. Such a capability would be
essential for active military missions such as attacking other satellites. At
the 1996 Zhuhai Air Show, a brochure from the Beijing Institute of Aerodynamics
featured two pictures: one of a wind tunnel model of a shuttle like craft that
resembled the Japanese “Hope” unmanned space plane; and a second that showed
shock waves around a U.S. Shuttle-like craft that did not have a vertical
stabilizer.[87]
Then, at the October 2000 Hannover
Expo, the PRC displayed a concept model for its future reusable space shuttle.
The model is estimated to be about 12 tons in weight, with a length of 12
meters and a span of 8 meters.[88]
This is judged to be small enough for launch from a Long March CZ-2E launcher.
This craft bears more of a resemblance to the abandoned European “Hermes” space
plane. The PRC could also be developing a larger shuttle that would weigh 22
tons and be able to carry a 3.5 ton payload.[89]
It is possible that the PRC has benefited from Russian advice for this project,
as the former Soviet Union had several space plane projects, including small
craft designed mainly for military missions. Given the interest of European
companies in helping with the space station program, it is logical that they
would also seek a role in the PLA’s space shuttle program. Again, given the
willingness of the PRC leadership to commit their first manned space program to
military missions, it stands to reason that their future space shuttle will be
configured to carry out military missions too. The PRC’s space shuttle could be
equipped with either sensor packages for reconnaissance, surveillance or
electronic attacks, or with future directed energy weapons, or
nano-satellite-based interceptors for anti-satellite missions. British Technology for Future PLA Micro Satellites with
ASAT Applications It is clear that the PLA recognizes the
future value of ever smaller Micro (less than 100kg) and Nano (less than 10kg)
satellites, and obtained from Britain a useful boost in this emerging
technology. Micro satellites are viewed as an important tool for future warfare
in that they offer the advantages of greater stealth and they lower the cost of
putting a variety of satellites into space.[90]
Micro and nano satellites can easily be transformed into interceptor
satellites, or can be placed covertly in co-terminus orbits to act like mines.
Multiple satellites can be lofted on one conventional launcher and their small
size means they can be launched by smaller mobile launchers. The U.S. envisions reconnaissance and communication missions now concentrated in a few large
satellites being distributed in many or scores of micro-satellites that are
less than 200 lbs. Even smaller are nano-satellites that weigh 25 lbs or less,
which are also envisioned for reconnaissance and communication missions. For the PRC micro-satellites and nano-satellites
have been pursued as part of the “863” program.[91]
Institutions researching microsats include the No. 5 Research Institute of the
China Aerospace Science and Technology Co., Chinese Academy of Sciences, the
Aerospace Tsinghua Satellite Technology Co., and the Harbin Institute of
Technology. China launched its 748 lb SJ-5 satellite in 1999, compared to the
5,000 lb DFH-3 communication satellite. But China jumped into the forefront of
micro-satellite technology in October 1998, when Tsinghua University entered
into a contract with Britain’s Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.,[92]
perhaps the world’s leading microsat firm, to co-develop micro-satellites. In
March 1999 this was extended to a 25-year joint venture that would be 75
percent owned by the PRC side, and 25 percent by Surrey.[93]
Surrey trained ten Chinese engineers and scientists for a year and installed a
space mission control center at Tsinghua.[94]
Within two years, on June 29, 2000, China launched its 50 kg (110 lb)
Tsinghua-1 micro-satellite on a Russian launcher. At the 2000 Zhuhai Airshow Hangtian
officials said six Tsinghua-1 size communications satellites could sustain
communication links between Beijing and Southern China.[95]
Hangtian plans its own family of 10 kg (25 lb) nano-satellites for
communication and imaging missions.[96]
Early experiments will be carried out in communication between nano-satellites.[97]
This capability is critical in order to loft “swarms” of nanosats that would
perform reconnaissance, communication, or interception missions. It is likely
that the PRC is again being aided by Britain’s Surrey in this regard. The PRC
is part of the Surrey-led Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC) which links
eight nations which will each build a micro satellite with multi-spectral
imaging resolution of 32 meters and a panchromatic resolution of 4 meters. On
October 21, 2003, along with the PRC-Brazil CBERS-2 imaging satellite, the PRC
launched the Chuangxin-1 micro-satellite. Said to weigh less than 100kg, this
satellite was reported by the PRC press to be engaged in testing new
communication technologies.[98] As already mentioned, micro and nano-satellites are
ideal platforms for satellite interceptors which can be launched directly into
collision orbits. This is called a “direct- ascent” type of anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapon. The 2003 Pentagon report on the PLA states, “China is believed to be conducting research and development on a direct-ascent ASAT system
that could be fielded in the 2005-2010 timeframe.”[99]
At the 2000 Zhuhai Airshow the PRC revealed its Katzoouie or “Pioneer” KT-1
solid-fuel mobile SLV. At the 2002 Zhuhai show the PRC displayed a model of
the KT-1 and two larger mobile SLVs, the KT-2 and KT-2A. PRC officials at the
show acknowledged that the KT-1 was derived from the DF-21 IRBM and that that
the KT-2 was derived from the new DF-31 ICBM.[100]
Due to its similar but longer shape, the KT-2A can be assumed to be analogous
to the new longer-range DF-31A ICBM. Such mobile SLVs when paired with
micro-satellite interceptors would make the “direct-ascent” ASAT. Mobile SLVs
have an advantage in this role in that they can be pre-positioned to match the
expected orbits of enemy satellites. In contrast, fixed SLVs have to wait for
the target to come within range. PLA Access To Foreign-Made
Communication Satellites and Technology The PLA benefits from access to
satellites controlled by “civilian” companies in which PRC government or
PLA-affiliated companies have a major interest. In addition, the PLA is also
launching a communication satellite largely dedicated to its use that may be
based on foreign technology. Companies that are either controlled by PRC
entities, like the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, or companies based
in Hong Kong or Singapore with significant participation by PLA-related
entities, have launched 12 U.S.-made communication satellite on PRC launchers.[101]
Since at least 1996, according to U.S. officials, the PLA has used a Hughes
HS-376 communications satellite, called Apstar-1A, owned by the Hong Kong company Asia Pacific Telecommunications (APT) Satellite Holdings Ltd. The China
Aerospace Co. is a prominent investor in APT. The PLA has used Apstar-1A to
transmit coded messages.[102]
In 1998 the Clinton Administration suspended the sale of a Hughes communication
satellite over fears that it would be used by the PLA, and that its modern
antenna could be used for intelligence gathering purposes. In early 2002 Israeli Aircraft Industries
(IAI) concluded a deal to sell the PRC two IAI AMOS communications satellites,
with the possibility of selling 8 to 10 more.[103]
The deal was concluded through the Hong Kong Satellite Technology Group, which
is partnership between IAI, the China Aerospace Corporation and the
Sino-Satellite Communications Co. Israel’s goal was to ensure the satellites
had no U.S. content so that they would not be affected by U.S. high technology export controls.[104]
Originally designed for the Israeli military, the AMOS satellites are expected
to have 20 Ku-band transponders, which can carry television, data and voice
signals. However, in early 2003 the Hong Kong Satellite Technology Group
foundered, and the deal to sell the AMOS satellite fell through.[105]
The PRC’s domestic Dong Fang Hong
(DFH, East is Red), communication satellite series has been slow to develop.
The 2,266 kg DHF-3 successfully launched in 1997 was co-developed with Germany’s Daimler Benz Aerospace, now DASA. This satellite has 24 transponders, can handle
six color TV channels and 8,000 telephone calls at a time. It will be
succeeded by the 3, 500kg DFH-4 that can generate three times the power of its
predecessor and also handle high-speed data links.[106]
The PRC has also started development of the DHF-4, which will carry 52
transponders; 38 C-band and 14 Ku-band. The French satellite company Alcatel
is to provide the communications payload for this satellite.[107] The DFH-3 satellite bus is believed
to be the basis for the new 2,300 kg ZHONGXING-22 communication satellite
launched in January 2000. These are also believed to be dedicated largely to
PLA communications traffic. A second ZHONGXING communication satellite was
launched in November 2003.[108]
These may be the first of several satellites that will be part of the PLA’s new
QU DIAN C4I system.[109]
Foreign Assistance for PLA Electro-Optical Satellites
CBERS-1
ZYUAN-1 SHENZHOU-5 HJ-1A HJ-1B KONDOR-E Date lunched: 1999 2000
2003 2005 (?) 2005+ 2005 (?) Weight: 400kg
400kg 800kg Resolution: 20m
3-5m 1.6m >1m
>1m >1m
Hyper
spectral With the help of foreign technology the PLA is
rapidly developing a high-resolution electro-optical imaging satellite
capability. The ability to access such imagery on demand is a key requirement
for modern warfare. The ability to have near real-time access to such imagery
is also essential to strategic decision making and can also be used to
intimidate or to assist allies. While the PLA for many years has had relatively
simple film-based reconnaissance satellites, for many years it has been working
to develop modern high-resolution reconnaissance satellites with real-time data
delivery. This break-through occurred in October 1999 when the PRC launched the
China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite-1 (CBERS-1), which has a 20-meter
resolution, meaning it could spot objects larger than 20 meters. With the
CBERS the PRC was able to acquire satellite direct transmission technology,
dispensing with the need to recover film. The PRC and Brazil launched CBERS-2 in October 2003 and are developing CBERS-3 and CBERS-4. In September 2000, the PLA launched its ZI
YUAN-2 (Resource-2) satellite. It is based on technology mastered in the course
of CBERS cooperation but with an estimated 5 to 3-meter resolution. This is a
prime example of how the PLA has leveraged access to foreign technology to
improve its strategic capabilities. The PRC will soon launch a new series of
advanced electro-optical reconnaissance satellites. They were revealed at the
2002 Zhuhai Airshow to be the DFH Satellite Corporation’s HJ-1A and HJ-1B
electro-optical satellites. The HJ-1A will have a multi-spectral camera with
infrared capability, while the HJ-1B will have a hyper-spectral imager.[110]
Earlier reports indicated the new electro-optical satellites would weigh 400 kg
and will have a life-span of three years.[111]
If these satellite incorporate Russian technology for their cameras their
resolution could be better than 1 meter. It is also likely that
high-resolution reconnaissance missions will be moved to smaller-size satellite
buses. Another report indicates first four electo-optical satellites could be
followed by another four, for a total of eight.
[112]
At the 2003 Moscow Airshow officials from the
NPO Machinostroyenia Company disclosed that they were in discussions with the
PRC to sell their KONDOR-E electro-optical imaging satellite, which is paired
with their KORSAR radar satellite.[113]
NPO officials were careful to note that they were not selling a military
capability, but hoping to contribute to the PLA’s new “disaster monitoring”
satellite constellation. However, this is small comfort. With a relatively
small 800kg bus and a resolution of less than 1 meter, the KONDOR-E would give
the PLA a real boost in imaging capability to add to their existing
capabilities. It is also possible that the key systems from the KONDOR-E could
be incorporated onto the HJ-1A or HJ-1B electro-optical imaging satellites. Russian Assistance for PLA Radar Satellites The PLA has turned to Russia to accelerate its
acquisition of radar satellite technology. Radar satellites (radarsats) are
critical to the future PLA space information network because they allow for
all-weather observation and are able to penetrate cloud cover. They are
especially useful in tracking moving naval targets. PRC radarsat development
builds upon earlier development of airborne synthetic aperature radar (SAR) in
the early 1990s, which is now used for civil and military missions. In mid-2000
the PRC announced plans to launch a constellation of four new radar satellites
(radarsats) by 2008, to complement four new electro-optical imaging satellites.[114]
While this initial constellation was confirmed by an official of the DFH
Satellite Co. at the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow, a previous report noted there could
be an eventual total of eight radar satellites.[115]
This number of satellites will allow two daily revisits by each type of
satellite to monitor an area of interest. In 1996 CASC entered into
negotiations with Canada’s SPAR, but it is not known if there was any
technology transferred from SPAR’s successful RADARSAT. A SAR satellite antenna
revealed as part of an 863 Program exhibition bore a striking similarity to the
Canadian RADARSAT antenna. However, in September 2001 the Chinese revealed
another design for an indigenous radar satellite that clearly used an antenna
design from the Russian NPO Machinostroyenia bureau.[116]
This was confirmed at the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow, when the DFH Satellite Co. Ltd., revealed its HJ-1C radarsatellite. Company officials acknowledged that
cooperation with NPO Mashinostroyenia began in 1997, when the first indications
of such cooperation were noted.[117]
NPO Mash’s radarsat weighs about 800kg and produces an image resolution of less
than 1 meter.[118]
DFH officials stated that the HJ-1C weighs 700kg, with a 120kg antenna, and it
has a 3-year life span. These officials also noted that DFH was working on a
100kg radar satellite with only a 20kg antenna.[119]
The PRC is also known to have approached the Russian Almaz bureau, which
designs Russia’s radarsat series. The PRC’s SAR satellite may also benefit from
the purchase of U.S. Loral Corporation airborne SAR technology in the 1980s. PLA Access To Foreign Commercial Space Imaging Services As is happening in the U.S., the PLA very likely developing novel means to incorporate commercial imaging into its
military planning and operations. In fact, the PLA has long made use of access to foreign
sources of commercial satellite imaging. In the 1980s the PRC purchased U.S.
LANDSAT multi-spectral images. In 1992 China’s National Remote Sensing Center entered into a $8million contract with Italy’s Telespazio Co. to build a
satellite imaging processing center to train photo interpreters.[120]
There is a downlink in the PRC for images from the French SPOT commercial
imaging satellites. China was one of the first countries to receive 2.5m
resolution images from the SPOT-5, launched in May 2002. SPOT-5 has the
advantage of having a 120km “swath,” or field of view.[121]
It can also take a “stereo view” from two cameras to assist 3D digital map
mission planning.[122]
In addition to SPOT, the PRC has ground stations that receive data from the
European Union’s ERS, Canada’s RADARSAT (10m res), Japan’s JERS and the U.S.
LANDSAT.[123]
The PLA, by either direct purchase or via third parties, can obtain high
resolution from Israel (EROS-A1, 1.8m resolution to .67m ; EROS B1, .87m),
Russia and the U.S. (IKONOS-1, 1m; QUICKBIRD, .61m ).[124]
U.S. Navstar Global Positioning System Status: PRC civil and military users have access to
civilian access signals Constellation: 24 operational satellites since 1993 that
broadcast civil signals (100m accuracy) and more precise (P-Code, 30cm
accuracy) signals for U.S. approved military users Russia’s GLONASS Navigation Satellite System Status: Russia has sought to
enlist PLA investment, which has not occurred Constellation: 11 satellites working, latest 3 launched in
December 2003 European Space Agency
GALILEO Navigation Satellite System Status: The PRC is a full partner in the GALILEO system
and due to invest over $200 million Constellation: Planned constellation of 30 satellites by 2008
Russian Assistance for Project 921-1 SHENZHOU Manned Space Capsule
Possible Future Foreign Technology for the Project 921-2 Space Station
PLA Use of Foreign Navigation Satellites
The PLA makes extensive use of
navigation satellites and as it develops its own navigation satellite system,
it has sought to promote other foreign constellations to dilute the essential U.S. monopoly in navigation satellites. For the U.S. and allied militaries the advent of
the NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system marked a revolution for
precision navigation and for being able to target new classes of weapons like
the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb. GPS has had a more widespread
effect on the world-wide civil economy.[125]
The PLA currently uses the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian
GLONASS to provide guidance to a range of weapon systems. However, as the U.S. has the option to deny GPS services, the PRC is also thought to have been developing
its own navsats since the 1970s. In October and December 2000, and then May
2003, the PRC launched three BEIDOU locating satellites.[126]
These are located in geosycronous orbits over the PRC. Often reported to be
navigation satellites, they can provide location data, but are not true
navigation satellites like the U.S. GPS. Reports indicate that the PRC is
developing a second generation of true navigation satellites that could
eventually have constellation of five to seven satellites.[127]
Despite this PRC effort, Russia spent considerable effort in 2000 trying to convince Beijing to invest in its GLONASS
system. In late 2001 Russia launched three new GLONASS satellites to bring the
number of operational satellites up to nine. The launch of three more in
December 2003 brought the number of working satellites up to 11.[128]
Russia hopes to reconstitute a fully functional constellation of 18-20
GLONASS satellites by 2005 and to develop new longer lasting third-generation
GLONASS-K version.[129]
It is suspected, though not confirmed, that China is helping to pay for the new
satellite.[130]
However, other sources note that the PRC and Russia were not able to reach a
GLONASS support deal.[131]
But even if the PLA can secure sufficient control over the Russian navsat
system—which is not assured--the PRC will likely proceed with its indigenous
system.
By late September 2003 the
European Union and the PRC reached agreement for the PRC to become a full
partner and shareholder in the future European GALILEO navigation satellite
constellation.[132]
The PRC is expected to invest about $200 million and have a seat on the
satellite constellation’s administrative board.[133]
This would equal the investments being made by GALILEO’s European partners. Beijing actively encouraged GALILEO, both to undermine the monopoly of the U.S. GPS system
and to attract space launch business.[134]
GALILEO is expected to eventually comprise a 30 navigation satellite
constellation by 2008 that will offer the same services as GPS.[135]
As the Europeans are more likely to keep their constellation maintained better
than the Russians can their GLONASS, it is likely that even if the US tried to deny GPS signals to the PRC, its precision weapon systems could still function
via GALILEO and GLONASS navigation signals.