NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA-CHINA MILITARY RELATIONS:
A REPORT ON THE AUGUST 19-23 2003 MOSCOW AEROSPACE SALON (MAKS)
INVESTING IN RUSSIA, OVERTAKING RUSSIA
From a strategic perspective the 2003 MAKS show demonstrated an increased Chinese propensity to invest in Russian military firms capable of providing technologies better than that available to the Russian armed forces. But at the same time, it is clear that some Russians also realize that China has an increasing potential to offer competition in many of these same technical areas and to then potentially pose a threat to Russian firms. Several new Russian weapon systems on display benefited from “company funding,” which is becoming a code word for “foreign funding.” In some cases one can reasonable deduce that China is the source for such “company funding.”
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AWACS JAMMER One of the surprises of MAKS 2003 was the TOPOL-E, a radar jammer designed specifically to target the U.S. Navy E-2 HAWKEYE radar aircraft. This program was a beneficiary of “company funding.” It is reasonable to speculate that China was indeed the funding source for this new threat to U.S. forces. |
That China is doing so presents two challenges. First, China is able to acknowledge areas of Russian excellence over its own, and then employ the Russian military-technical complex to build new capabilities much faster than if it relied on indigenous firms. Second, by employing Russian firms to build in some cases new generations of technology, China is also enabling Russia to market new weapons which can pose possible threats to other U.S. interests while providing profits which these same Russian firms can use to remain competitive with U.S. technology.
For Russia the strategic gamble it is taking is that it can develop the next generation of military technology before China can master the current generation, and thus, remain dependent on Russia for cutting edge military technologies. To an increasing degree Russia is also taking this gamble with India. Many Russians are confident they can remain well ahead of China and India. But some Russian sources at MAKS indicate that China in some cases may be able to master new technologies faster than previously expected, and thus, pose a commercial in addition to a possible military threat. This appears to be case in the area of combat aircraft and reconnaissance satellites may join this category. But for now Russia is getting funding and making new system which in many cases its own military forces cannot afford to use.
Looking broadly at the Russian military complex, shows like MAKS
illustrate that it has more money than the impoverished era of the early-to-mid
1990s, but problems still remain. Main customers like India, and presumably
China, have doubts that Russia can remain a leading military innovator as
it was during the Cold War. Some Russian commentators view their military
sector as still living off the fat of the previous era. But Russia does retain
secrets and surprises. Some that have leaked in recent years are advanced
work on laser weapons, “plasma stealth” and on new hypersonic attack missiles.
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More brains than money, a Beriev concept for a 1,000 ton payload wing-in-ground (WIG) effect vehicle is a concept in search of funding. It is an innovative concept which is comparable to the new Boeing PELICAN WIG. A Beriev official said the company welcomes foreign investment to bring this concept to life. |
MANY MORE SUKHOIS
One Sukhoi official who was involved in their China business stated that the PLA already had about 300 Sukhoi fighters. This is a number double open published estimates—about 150. My personal estimate is about 170, based mainly on Russian press reports. If true this new Sukhoi number would constitute a considerable revelation and point to a hitherto publicly unacknowledged threat to Taiwan. However, this individual could also be referring to the total expected number after fulfillment of current contracts. This issue deserves greater U.S. government review.
Of particular interest this individual stated that he expected the PLA to sign a follow-on contract to continue the co-production of Su-27 fighters at Shenyang. He noted that since 2002 the PLA has produced “several dozen” more J-11 (Su-27) fighters, which could mean that co-production totals may now stand closer to 100 fighters—half the 1996 contract for 200. A production rate of 48 a year could support the formation of possibly two new regiments of fighters per year and fulfill the 1996 co-production contract by 2005 or 2006. The possibility of a second co-production contract means that the number of Sukhoi fighters in the PLAAF could grow well beyond 400 within this decade.
J-11 “Indigenization” This Sukhoi official was also willing to talk about the PLA’s desire to “indigenize” the J-11 with substantial new Chinese-made components, like radar, engines and avionics. He said that the PLA was capable of doing all these things but that it would take the PLA “ten years” to realize an indigenized J-11. But when they did so, he expected that the PLA would also sell this fighter. This new J-11 is expected to carry PLA-made weapons like the SD-10 active-guided AAM, precision attack weapons, radar and a new “glass” cockpit of digitized avionics. The main goal of the program is to make a fighter capable of both fighter and attack missions—something the baseline Su-27SK/J-11 cannot do. This individual also confirmed comments by a Sukhoi official at the 2002 Zhuhai show that Shenyang J-11s have a better production finish than those made at the KnAAPO factory in Komsomolsk.
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New Mult-role Su-27SM. A modernized Su-27SK, is the goal of China’s effort to create an indigenized J-11 fighter, but apparently is not using Sukhoi’s ready- made template that was displayed at MAKS. |
Surprisingly, Shenyang is not going to Suhkoi to support this program—a matter which vexes them. Sukhoi used MAKS to promote its new program to upgrade the basic Su-27SK. Unlike the new J-11 version which is still in development, Sukhois upgrade package available now would enable multi-role fighter and attack capabilities, provide upgraded radar and avionics, plus a new digital fly-by-wire system which greatly improves aircraft control.
Su-30MKK2 “AWACS” Sukhoi revealed on the flight line for the first time a modified version of Su-30 aircraft No. 502 which was designated Su-30MKK2. This is very likely the prototype of the Su-30MKK version that will be delivered to the PLA Navy. Suspended between the engines, however, was large pod called the M400. Made by the Kupol Bureau, it is advertised in a placard as a side-looking radar with a range of “not less than 100km,” meaning its range is likely very much more than that. Information will be digitally data-linked to other Su-30s in a strike group. One source said that so equipped, such a Su-30 could “control” up to ten other aircraft in a strike group.
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M400 Side Looking Radar, intended to equip some of the PLAN’s new Su-30MK2 strike fighters, to provide unit level battlespace information to control offensive and defensive missions. |
It is very likely that this new radar will equip Su-30 units now being acquired by the PLAN. This is very significant as finding naval targets is often more important than being able to attack them. While this radar is clearly much less capable than the U.S. AWACS radar aircraft, it does give the PLAN a long range airborne radar cuing platform that will allow PLAN Su-30 units to manage their own multi-axis attacks against surface naval targets. This capability will provide insurance against the possible inability to either acquire dedicated PLAN long-range AWACS platforms, or provide redundancy in the event the later are destroyed.
When asked about the ultimate number of PLAN versions of the Su-30MKK, the Sukhoi official became less exact. He acknowledged that one contract had been signed but would not confirm what a high Sukhoi official stated at the 2002 Zhuhai show that they expected up to 40 to be acquired by the PLAN. Other sources indicate that the PLA may chose to upgrade all of its Su-30MKKs to the Su-30MKK2 level of capability. However, there may also be less certainty around a proposed Su-30MKK3 version, which has been reported to use a new Phazotron bureau ZHUK-M-E 300km range radar and uprated engines. This official indicated that the Su-30MK3 was only an “experimental” program and was not sure that it would succeed.
RUSSIAN VIEWS OF PRC FIGHTER PROGRAMS
More than at previous MAKS, Russian officials were willing to comment on Chinese fighter programs. In general there was praise for growing Chinese technical capabilities, while estimated timelines ranged from 5 to 10 years before the realization of key PLA projects. Both Sukhoi and Salut officials had praise for the Chengdu J-10 program. The Sukhoi official expected the Chinese to produce 1,200 to 1,500 J-10s over the course of its lifetime. He said that he expected it to become the main PLAAF fighter. This opinion compares to widespread doubts in the West just a few years ago that the J-10 remained a viable program. The Salut official was also impressed with J-10 program and noted Israel’s deep involvement in the program. A Sukhoi official also stated that Israel was offering to upgrade systems in PLA Sukhoi fighters. Regarding China’s fifth-generation fighter program, most notably Shenyang’s “XXJ,” the Sukhoi official expressed confidence that China could master all the advanced technologies required for this new fighter, but that it would take 10 years for the PLA to complete the program. This would only put the XXJ about 6 years behind the expected (funding willing) 2006 IOC for the F/A-22A.
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PRC 5th Generation Fighter revealed at the 2002 Zhuhai airshow. Some Russian think the PRC can realize this advanced fighter in 10 years. It is apparently a Shenyang concept. |
PRC AND RUSSIAN FIGHTER ENGINES
One of the main challenges for the PLA traditionally has been the development and production of modern military turbofan engines. Their inability to do so has meant that new domestic fighter designs have been dependent on foreign engine imports—which could make such combat aircraft programs highly vulnerable to shifting politics. For example, the J-10 had to be designed around the 12,500kg thrust Saturn AL-31FN
turbofan in order to produce a successful modern multi-role fighter with sufficient performance.
This year, for the first time in my experience, a very high Saturn official with extensive exposure to the PLA’s advanced aircraft engine sector stated that the new WS-10A, reported to be an impressive 13,200kg thrust turbofan, could be in service in about 5 years. At the Zhuhai 2002 show a photo was released of a J-11 alleged to have been modified to test one WS-10A. The Saturn official said it was “entirely possible” for the PLA to finally succeed in making a 13.2 ton engine, but that they were experiencing troubles in perfecting speci fic engine elements, and offered the fuel pump system as an example. Nevertheless, that the PLA would be this close to producing an advanced turbofan is a remarkable achievement, a sentiment clearly shared by the Saturn offical. Also surprising, this official said that as soon as the WS-10A is perfected that the PLA would likely stop buying Saturn products.
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Saturn AL-31FN engine, a modified AL-31 for the Chengdu J-10 fighter. This engine could be made redundant by the successful development of the WS-10A turbofan, which may be just 5 years away, a remarkable achievement for the PLA. |
Saturn is now developing two advanced versions of the AL-31; the first a 13.2 ton thrust upgrade, to be followed by a 14.6 ton thrust version. As they will be no bigger than the original engine, they will be available to backfit older Russian and foreign fighters. The Saturn official noted that the advanced AL-41 program is essentially on hold waiting for a “demand” in the form of the 5th generation Russian fighter.
RUSSIAN BUNKER BUSTER FOR THE PRC
The “Region” bureau unveiled for the first time a new line of GPS/GLONASS and laser/TV guided bombs. The most significant is the KAB-1500, a 1,500kg (3,400lbs) “bunker buster” that has no U.S. comparison, save for much larger weapons that cannot be carried by fast aircraft. One version of this bomb is filled with fuel-air explosive (FAE), a particularly powerful explosive that destroys by generating fantastic heat and pressure. Another version is equipped to penetrate concrete. While this bomb has been in Russian service for some time, this year was its MAKS debut.
In addition, Region displayed the KAB-500S-E, a 560kg GPS/GLONASS guided bomb. This guidance allows precision targeting—5-10m accuracy—in all weather. Also on display for the first time was the LGB-250, a 300kg laser-guided bomb with a swivel seeker, which compensates for the seeker not being able to pick up guidance cues from greater angles. Such bombs can be cued either by aircraft or ground troop laser designators, which confer a far greater ability for the aircraft to perform close air support missions.
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New Bombs by Region, a 1,500kg bunker buster (top) displayed for the first time has been purchased by the PRC, and will enable PLA Su-30s to attack Taiwan’s underground air tunnels. A new laser guided bomb (bottom) has likely been funded by the PRC. |
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While the U.S. has had both types of bombs for over a decade it is significant that Russia has finally made these bombs. It is not clear that Russia has the resources or requirement for these weapons. The real reason they have appeared likely has more to do with foreign demand, and very likely, foreign funding. One source noted that the larger KAB-1500 has been sold to both India and China and were delivered in 2002, and that the LGB-250 was “company funded,” the code-word for foreign funding. The funding source for the LGB-250 could either be China or India, as both have the need to be able to conduct precision close air support. However, two years ago China revealed a new laser guided bomb in mock-up form which uses a seeker similar in shape to that on the LGB-250, indicating a greater probability that China is the funding source for this new Region laser-guided bomb.
SATELLITE COOPERATION
NPO Machinostroyenia holds an important place in the Russian aerospace complex. It is one of the only Russian companies, which during the Soviet era, managed to integrate tactical missile, strategic missile and space systems into complete combat systems. Today it sells the YAKHONT 300km+ supersonic tactical missile, cued by its KORNET-E radar satellite and associated electro/optical satellite, which in turn can be launched by STRELA, a space-launch vehicle based on the RS-18 ICBM that also designed by NPO Mashinorstroyenia. While NPO Machinostroyenia has its competitors in all these areas within the Russian military complex, it is also one of the more successful in using foreign sales to sustain product development.
At the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow a Chinese official involved in the PLA’s satellite program stated that there had been cooperation with NPO Mashinostroyenia since at least 1997. When offered this statement at MAKS, a NPO Mash official first blanched, but was then quite willing to acknowledge cooperation with China’s “civilian” Earth observation satellite program, which it noted was different from its “military” program, with which it does not cooperate. One NPO Mash official noted that they were soon to sign a contract for cooperation toward China’s first radar satellite. NPO Mash said its first KONDOR-E, a one-meter capable satellite, should be launched in 2004. Recent Chinese statements indicate they expect their first radar satellite to be launched in 2006.
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NPO Mashinostroyenia Kondor-E satellite system for the PRC. According to NPO Mash officials the new PRC earth observation satellites will benefit from both the Kondor-E radar satellite (top) and the Kondor-E electro/optical satellite (bottom). |
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Of some interest, NPO Mash says that China will use the L-Band, which is not capable of less than one-meter resolution, whereas their satellite will use the more capable S-Band. However, it can safely speculate that China will indeed get the S-Band radar as well. There is some evidence that the Chinese have also conducted their own research and may have built their own S-Band phased array radar, but it is not known if it is configured for satellites.
For several years NPO Mash has also marketed an electro/optical satellite with a one-meter resolution. Significantly, NPO Mash stated that in the near future it expected a contract to work with China on new electro/optical satellites as well. Given that the Chinese were willing to acknowledge early cooperation with radar satellites, it cannot be discounted that NPO Mash-China cooperation is ongoing regarding future PLA electro/optical satellites.
ANTI-SHIP MISSILES, NAVY NEWS
Three Russian companies were marketing supersonic anti-ship missiles, two of which have been sold to the PRC. The only one that apparently has not been sold is the NPO Mashinostroyenia YAKHONT, which was displayed for the first time in a mock-up of its air-launched YAKHONT-M version. YAKHONT is advertised with a M 2.7 speed and a range of 300km, while it is sure that the range can be increased if needed. The air-launched version was shown being carried by a Su-30 and a Tu-95 bomber. A NPO Mash video showed the YAKHONT being launched from land, ship and underwater platforms. An official said the air launched version would be tested in 2004.
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Air-launched YAKHONT, due to be tested in 2004. NPO Mash denies reports it will arm the new PLA Navy destroyers now being built in Russia. |
One surprise of the show was that NPO Mash’s main foreign partner with the YAKHONT, the Indian-Russian venture BRAHMOS, was not at the show. BRAHMOS is an almost exact replica of YAKHONT that is being produced in India and they had a popular display at the 2001 MAKS. It is due to begin production in 2004. From the demeanor of one NPO Mash official one could sense that perhaps they are feeling the heat from Indian competition, as they are also marketing BRAHMOS for foreign sales. At the 2002 Zhuhai show one source noted that he expected China to buy YAKHONT, and there have been Russian press reports that it will arm two new SOVREMENNIY destroyers being built for the PLA Navy. However, NPO Mash officials denied that YAKHONT would be sold to the PLA.
NPO Mashinostroyenia was less willing to speak about its next generation missiles. In 1997 it revealed its “ALPHA” concept which featured a more flexible lower fuselage air intake, but officials say that program has ended. While a NPO Mash official acknowledged that they did have advanced missile programs he would not divulge details. NPO Mash is known to have a hypersonic missile program that may utilize advanced “Plasma Stealth” technology, which uses an ionized gas cloud in the radome to absorb radar signals. The Russian Gromov Research Institute continues with hypersonic research programs
Recent press reports indicate that the new SOVREMENNIYs will be instead armed with a new 200km range version of the Raduga MOSKIT. So far the longest range version of this M 2.5-M 3 speed missile is 120km. A Raduga official acknowledged that the new version existed but that it was a “company funded” initiative and would not comment on sales to China. In addition, he would not comment on whether the new higher range was achieved by having a smaller warhead or a larger engine. The MOSKIT is very deadly because it combines a large warhead with such high speed as to devastate most smaller ships and also cause significant damage to larger ships. While the contract to build the SOVREMENNIY destroyers has been a matter of embarrassing controversy in Russia since early 2002, press report just before MAKS indicate that those issues have been settled and that construction will proceed.
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Anti-ship missiles, a new version of the Raduga MOSKIT (top) may now arm the next two SOVREMENNIY destroyers for the PLAN, and the Novator CLUB-S (bottom) will arm the PLAN’s eight new KILO |
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The Novator bureau was also marketing its CLUB-S and CLUB-N anti-ship missiles. While usually very secretive, a Novator official acknowledged that China would be getting the Club-S on its eight new KILO class conventional submarines—a big statement for them. Information gathered at the show indicates that construction for these submarines has been well underway for the last year. The CLUB-S was shown in a new video which illustrated its ballistic missile second stage, which heads toward the target at 1,000m/s during the terminal phase of its attack.
NO AWACS, NEW AWACS
Conspicuously absent from this year’s MAKS was the Ilyushin bureau, which makes the Il-76 heavy transport aircraft, which the PLA has purchased, the IL-78M refueling aircraft which the PLA is reported to be purchasing, and the airframe for the Beriev A-50E AWACS, which the PLA is also reported to be purchasing. An official from the Beriev company, however, denied that the A-50E was going to China. This statement was in contrast to one made by the A-50 AWACS radar maker at the 2001 MAKS show, who was certain that the A-50E was going to China.
Of some significance, however, were three new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) unveiled in model form by Sukhoi. Two of these models represented strategic UAVs similar in size to the U.S. Northrup-Grumman Global Hawk, and they had designed endurances of “several dozen hours.” These two larger UAVs carried two types of radar: one with a large tri-angular phased array radar mounted atop the fuselage; and another with an apparent synthetic aperture radar in a dome below the fuselage. A third smaller UAV was turboprop powered and was equipped with electro/optical sensors in a manner similar to the U.S. PREDATOR UAV. All three UAVs had nose-mounted satellite communication antennae, similar in style to U.S. UAVs.
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Three new UAVs by Sukhoi, ZOND-1 is a strategic UAVs, with an AWACS phased-array radar (top); ZOND-2 has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) equipped version (bottom right). ZOND-3 has IR sensors. While Sukhoi did not reveal much, there is a possibility this program is foreign funded, perhaps from China. |
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A Sukhoi official said the program was not government funded but that there was both foreign and domestic interest in these programs. But it should be stressed that the Russians were saying very little about these new UAVs. There could be a foreign funder, or there is also a possibility that the UAV models were meant to attract foreign interest rather than reflect it. But if one presumes that China is the funder, that would indicate a major leap in capability for the PLA. It would indicate that the PLA may have chosen to compliment or even forgo manned AWACS platforms with newer and more flexible unmanned AWACS platforms. This program deserves close attention.
DEDICATED HAWKEYE JAMMER
One surprise of the show was the TOPOL-E, a new radar jamming device made by the Signal Stavropol Radioplant. This system apparently was designed and made within the last year for sole purpose of jamming radar from U.S. Navy E-2 HAWKEYE AWACS aircraft. It is designed to intercept, locate and jam radar of the AN/APS-125, 138, 139 and 145 systems. Its maximum jamming range is 250km and can operate continuously for 24 hours. Company officials were adamant, however, that this system could not jam radar from larger E-3 AWACS or newer E-8 JSTARS radar aircraft, but that it could jam future phased array versions of the HAWKEYE radar. Company officials said that this program was not funded by the Russian government, but by “company funds.” This again, has all the marks of a China-funded enterprise, as who but the PLA has a rapid requirement to be able to jam the radar of E-2 aircraft?
AEROSTAT RADAR FOR THE PRC
In 2002 press reports indicated that Russia was selling the PLA a new balloon-mounted radar system, or “Aerostat,” that would be deployed on the Taiwan Strait. The RosAero Systems company had on display a large model of its radar carrying aerostat. A company official would not say that the aerostat had been “sold” to China, but that negotiations were underway and that much technical information has been passed to China.
NEW LASER COUNTERMEASURE DEVICE
While the device has been in existence for several years, for the first time at MAKS the Nudelman Precision Engineering Bureau displayed its PAPV “portable automatic sighting device.” Its purpose is to blind snipers and other electro/optical devices that specifically use optical systems. It combines a laser which can perform laser radar-like functions to find and home in on a target optical device. Then the laser produces a much more powerful impulse which an official said can harm the sniper. “You really want to hurt him” said the official. Nudelman officials professed to be unaware of a new Chinese laser device on the T-98 tank which may be able to perform the same kind of function.
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Nudelman laser based counter-sniper device indicates that this bureau may have more sophisticated laser weapons as well. |
IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN SECURITY
It is becoming increasingly clear that the PLA may be making real progress in enlisting Russia to develop new and dangerous capabilities that the PLA intends to use against Taiwan. The timeline for some new programs like the TOPOL-E “Hawkeye jammer” may indicate that the PLA may be placing a high premium on the very rapid development of these new systems. One can only conclude from information gathered at the 2003 MAKS show that the security outlook for Taiwan in increasingly grim.
At one level the PLA is making a concerted effort to combine larger numbers of attack platforms with new ISR capabilities. This was a lesson repeated many times by the successful U.S. employment of high technology precision targeting capabilities during multiple conflicts over the last decade. The PLA is now taking to heart this requirement for its forces as it prepares for a Taiwan campaign. It is not enough just to purchase large numbers of 4th generation fighters; the PLA is also acquiring the long-range targeting systems and new precision weapons to fully exploit its new air combat platforms. This is exemplified by the equipping of the Su-30MK2 with a new side-looking radar pod to enable air battle control at the unit level.
There is continued progress in NPO Mashinostroyenia’s programs with China to transfer both radar and electro/optical satellite technologies. That NPO Mash specializes in small satellite buses is also significant because they are easier to launch and thus to replenish in the event of U.S. attack.
Should Sukhoi’s new strategic UAVs also turn out to be a China-funded program that hold great significance as well. It would indicate that China is moving beyond manned AWACS platforms, which allow for greater persistence/endurance and allows the PLA to take greater peacetime chances by moving closer to target areas than might be prudent with manned aircraft. The development of a large SAR-equipped UAV also indicates a possible ground-mapping and targeting function similar to the U.S. JSTARS. Such UAVs, while not cheap, are less expensive than manned radar platforms, and thus, may allow the PLA to acquire more UAVs.
Some new Russian systems even take on a strategic significance for the PLA. For example, the KAB-1500 confers the potential to attack Taiwan’s Hualien aircraft tunnels with a massive non-nuclear penetrating bomb that can then be followed by an equally large FAE bomb to wreak havoc on the aircraft within. In fact, this bomb forces Taiwan to either greatly increase air defenses over Hualien to include bomb intercepting systems, or it must consider altering its defensive strategy which now depends heavily on hiding enough fighters in Hualien to survive an initial surprise PLA onslaught.
The LGB-250 development program may have given China a far better ability to conduct close-air support. The PLA is apparently placing greater stress on precision targeting capabilities in order to limit collateral damage to Taiwanese civilians in the event of a Taiwan conflict. The LGB-250 can be directed very precisely by ground troop laser designators. In such an instance the PLA could equip many older Q-5 attack fighters with just one bomb and extra fuel in order to provide “artillery” support in the same way as does the U.S.
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Su-30MKK model in PLAAF colors is shown armed with the KAB-1500 bunker-buster bomb. This weapon poses a grave new challenge to Taiwan’s air defense strategy, requiring that both Taipei and Washington devise countermeasures. |
The MAKS show also provided additional confirmation of the growing PLA naval threat to Taiwan. That the PLAN is acquiring two supersonic capable Russian anti-ship missiles, in addition to what they may be developing on their own, results in greater urgency that Taiwan somehow acquire countermeasures. Taiwan must develop and/or purchase anti-missile systems for ship defense as it also moves ahead with its own programs to acquire supersonic missiles that can attack PLAN ships.
IMPLICATIONS FOR US SECURITY
Information gathered at MAKS indicates that the U.S. will face an even greater challenge in both defending its own forces from increasingly capable PLA systems, and in providing for Taiwan’s security. The PLA is very likely placing a high priority on acquiring new Russian systems which can especially target and attack U.S. naval forces.
New naval threats include an apparent goal to provide new naval attack Su-30MK2 fighters with multiple ISR assets to ensure the targeting of U.S. ships. The M400 locating radar, new radar satellites and possible new radar equipped strategic UAVs may all be combined with new ground-based long-range radar systems to provide an overlapping ISR picture for PLA attack platforms. It can then be expected that a common naval battle zone picture can then be used to coordinate strikes by Su-30s, multi-role J-11s, J-10s, submarines and surface ships. Land-based ballistic and cruise missiles may also be used in such naval battles.
The U.S. is also going to face greater pressure to augment its airpower assets in Asia. A PLAAF with more than 300 Su-27/30 class fighters plus hundreds of J-10 fighters, with modern ISR and weapons, means the PLAAF will no longer be a third-world airforce. The advent of modern combat jet engines also means that the PLA will be increasingly able to develop new indigenous fighters such as the “XXJ” program. China can be expected to sell what it makes, increasing threats in other areas critical to U.S. interests.
Given Washington’s global commitments, it may no longer be sufficient to purchase 300 or less F/A-22 fighters. To sustain deterrence the U.S. will require fighter platforms that are significantly superior to current or anticipated Russian or PLA fighters. It is also necessary to accelerate the introduction of advanced versions of the F/A-18E/F in order to give U.S. carrier battle groups a margin of superiority. In addition the Navy should ensure that its version of the F-35 should also be superior to anticipated threats. Just as important the U.S. should continue to develop and field superior aircraft weapons and invest in truly effective combat UAVs which can defeat or avoid expected PLA aerial threats.
Finally, the 2003 MAKS shows that the Russia-China military technical nexus is alive and growing. Despite the risks to each in this relationship, both sides are also managing to derive tangible benefits. China is getting new weapon systems faster plus a great deal of new military technology, some of which it is also mastering. Russia is getting cash to keep alive its military-technical sector and in some cases, is able to remain competitive in the global arms market. For China there remains the risk of greater dependence on new Russian technology. For Russia, there is an increasing chance that China will catch up, and threaten Russian military export markets. In addition, Russia is tied to a market which could evaporate should China’s communist system collapse. But the chances for such an event are unknown. In the meantime, MAKS 2003 has provided useful information which confirms that the Russia-China alliance is producing significant new threats to Taiwan and to American security interests in Asia.
Prepared For The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
by Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Center for Security Policy
Submitted on October 7, 2003