• Taiwan recently has undergone a remarkable political transition, rejecting authoritarian government in favor of free elections and a multi-party parliamentary democracy.

• China is increasing at the rate of roughly 50 per year the number of ballistic missiles it has deployed opposite Taiwan and could have 600 missiles within five years.

• China is enhancing its capability to carry out attacks across the Taiwan Strait with its special operations forces, air forces, and navy and missile forces with little notice.

• It appears the Chinese buildup is designed to forestall pro-independence political movements in Taiwan and help bring about an eventual end to the Island’s continued separate status.

• Executive-Congressional consultations regarding Taiwan’s security up until the most recent period have not been in conformity with the clear expectation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The Commission feels strongly that such consensus building is crucial given the clear security risks of this situation. In the last two years the Executive-Congressional consultations in this area have improved.

The Taiwan issue is the most dangerous flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. This chapter continues the discussion of cross-strait issues begun in Chapter 5 and provides a discussion of the military and security relationship. Prospects for maintaining peace and security in the region and in the Taiwan Strait depend on how Beijing and Taipei manage their significant political differences. While cross-strait economic interactions have flourished since the 1990’s, the two sides remain locked in an uneasy standoff. The United States, with significant interests at stake in its relations with both parties and in the region, cannot stand aside. China’s political and military strategy is designed to remind U.S. leaders of the significantly increased direct costs to America and its regional relationships should our military forces intervene to challenge Chinese interests. Even though China retains substantial incentives to collaborate with the United States in future years, the situation remains volatile over the medium and long terms. The real possibility that tensions could erupt into major crisis must be factored into U.S. policy and planning.

A military defense for an island of 23 million people, facing a nation of 1.3 billion people, is complicated and difficult. While recognizing that Taiwan’s security depends on more than just military means, this chapter concentrates on the military dimension of the impasse between the two sides. Taiwan has made significant progress in its transition to democracy, a multi-party parliamentary system of government, and to a successful open-market economy. This chapter will examine China’s position on the use of force to resolve Taiwan’s status and its capabilities for exercising that option and will briefly look at the issues that Taiwan’s defense planners are facing and conclude with a discussion of U.S. strategy.

Chinese officials have long maintained that they cannot and will not rule out the use of force against Taiwan under certain conditions. These conditions include a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, internal unrest there, or even indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.¹ The government has published two white papers concerning the "One-China Principle and Taiwan". These papers plus supporting reports and official statements set forth what Chinese officials perceive to be a viable foundation on which unification talks can proceed. The first white paper was released in 1993, which was then followed by President Jiang’s Eight-Point Offer to Taiwan on January 30, 1995. The second white paper followed on February 21, 2000. The basic premise of the One-China Principle and the key points are:²

• China will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to rule out the use of force;
• Will actively promote people-to-people and economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides;
• Start direct trade, postal, air and shipping services as soon as possible;
• Achieve reunification through peaceful negotiations; and
• Any matter can be negotiated on the premise of One-China.

Recent statements by China’s leaders indicate that the use of force remains an option in dealing with Taiwan:

Recent evidence also suggests that China’s leadership is serious in its efforts to pursue unification. In the late l990’s, China made a critical decision to make its force deployment credible in order for the leadership to enhance its options in dealing with pro-independence forces in Taiwan. It is believed that the PRC military has been directed to have viable options ready by 2005-07. Late last year, there was a leak to the Hong Kong newspaper Insight, of what purports to be an August 1999, Central Military Commission (CMC) document discussing the plans for military action against Taiwan. On orders from Beijing, Insight’s offices were subsequently closed for two weeks and the publication withdrawn from circulation. Analysis of the 2001 PLA Dongshan Island exercises of last year indicates the exercises focused on joint operations with the goal of taking Taiwan. The PLA exercised all elements of a potential war plan from the use of its Second Artillery Corps ballistic missiles, from information warfare to joint landings and potential anti-carrier naval operations at sea.

Chinese authorities are apparently considering several broad classes of military contingencies available to impose their will on Taiwan:

• An invasion of Taiwan (or an offshore island), using amphibious or other sea or air-transported forces.
• Air or missile strikes on its industrial infrastructure or commercial assets
• A blockade.

Associated with each of these contingencies is some strategy for avoiding, discouraging, or defending against possible third-party intervention, that is, against a determined U.S. response. China’s most formidable challenge would be to withstand international condemnation and the imposition of global economic sanctions.

Beijing has increasingly focused on advanced training methods to demonstrate joint-service war-fighting skills that are steadily altering the balance of power with Taiwan. Over the past several years PLA exercises have shifted from intimidating Taiwan to a more serious effort to prepare its military forces to invade. Last year’s Dongshan Island exercises illustrated an increasing level of sophistication in war-fighting tactics and interoperability. The PLA is radically overhauling its training regime and introducing more realistic exercises including night maneuvers, combined operations training, long-distance deployments and live-fire exercises.

In keeping with its recent efforts to implement a strategy based on "high-tech limited wars," the PLA’s tactical goal would be to strike fast and hard in the event of a cross-strait attack. Planning for U.S. involvement compels the PLA’s war-fighting plan towards a quick, decisive neutralization of Taiwan and the degradation of its ability to defend itself. The strategy is to present the United States with a significant political decision. Assuming the strategy was successful, rather than assisting in Taiwan’s defense the United States would then be required to expel a Chinese occupational force.

The PLA is making wide-ranging advances in the size and sophistication of its forces arrayed along the strait. The combination of advanced surveillance, large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, and the element of surprise is a serious threat to the region’s stability.

China has stationed some 75 Russian SU-27 fighters with advanced air-to-air missiles opposite Taiwan, and it will assemble another 125 fighters with Russian help. China also has purchased 40 SU-30 fighters, each of which can provide radar targeting through a data link to four SU-27s. The PLAAF’s SU-27s and SU-30s are highly capable planes. Of particular concern is the massive numbers of less capable fighters possessed by the PLAAF. These aircraft can overcome by attrition the technologically superior planes of Taiwan’s air force.

China poses an increasing threat to the region with its acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines and the indigenously produced Song-class submarines. The Song-class is the first Chinese submarine equipped with a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile. The Kilos are among the quietest conventional submarines in the world, and coupled with the Song-class submarines, provide a generational leap in China’s conventional submarine technology.

China’s has also purchased Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers. The SS-N-22/Sunburn/Moskit anti-ship missile on these destroyers is designed specifically to attack U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups and to defeat the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air-defense system. The SU-30 fighter can also carry the air-launched version of the "Moskit" anti-ship missile as well as advanced air-to-air missiles that can travel farther than the 100 miles across the strait.

These actions are seriously affecting the region’s balance of power. Within ten or fifteen years China will have the ability to project its forces and will probably possess sufficient air and sea capabilities to enforce her expanding perimeters. Even now at considerable cost and with substantial losses, the PLA Air Force could establish the air and sea superiority needed for a successful invasion.

An extensive increase in the number of operationally deployed short-and intermediate-range missiles is clearly in progress with many of the missiles positioned at bases near the strait.⁵ The significance that PLA strategists attach to ballistic missiles was evident in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when the effectiveness of China’s forces was fundamentally challenged by the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers. There are significant political costs associated with this buildup; the deployments radically increase the potential for miscalculation and decrease the time to make those decisions by both governments. Missile strikes are incalculably risky; once launched, the Chinese leadership cannot afford to fail. The initiative will have to be prosecuted until Taiwan surrenders.

Chinese leaders understand the inherent political risks to its survival should an attack fail. Failure would strip the regime of its domestic legitimacy and threaten its continuation in power. Failure would likely also mean de facto independence on Taiwan. This must give the leadership pause.

Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, stated that China had recently increased its deployment of short-range ballistic missiles against Taiwan. Another assessment of these missiles concludes that:

Of concern, however, is the limited information we actually have on missile deployments, given their growing importance to PLA war strategy. The PLA could be increasing its current production well beyond current assumptions. Taiwan’s national defense report published in August of 2000 indicated the PLA had approximately 400 ballistic missiles of different kinds covering Taiwan and estimated that this could increase to 600 in five years.⁷ Ballistic missile batteries could easily be hidden in the rough terrain along the mainland’s coastline. It is not just the numbers that are increasing; China is increasing the accuracy of its short-range ballistic missiles and Taiwan lacks an effective response to this threat.

Taiwan forces, however, would not be the only ones facing the missiles. The PLA, in anticipation of U.S. intervention, has indicated a willingness to use accurate short-range and medium-range ballistic and cruise missies against U.S. forces, including bases in Japan and aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pacific. All PLA missiles capable of hitting bases in Japan from China’s territory are nuclear-tipped.

PLA strategists understand that modern battlefields will be nonlinear requiring a modern integrated force to be successful. Thus, the operational strategy of using air strikes or missiles to carry out accurate attacks on rear targets has been given particular emphasis. In terms of an emerging strategy, ballistic missile attacks will probably announce a PLA offensive operation against Taiwan. To be successful the PLA will need to disrupt, degrade, or destroy Taiwan’s overall combat capability. PLA strategists have written on the need for missile attacks in the opening phase of combat in order to splinter Taiwan’s fully integrated and developed air defense network. These strategists insist that the key parts of Taiwan’s air defense system, such as airfields, ground-based radar stations, and command, control, communications, and intelligence centers become the first targets. Taiwan is virtually defenseless against a ballistic missile attack. Taiwan’s missile defense forces are vulnerable and China’s ever-strengthening ballistic missile capability can cause severe destruction.⁸ Although expressing doubt that the PLA could coordinate simultaneous missile and military operations, the Defense Department’s annual military report on China says that these weapons would be most effective when used in high-volume, precision strikes. Taiwan’s resources and population centers are concentrated, and missiles pose a very serious problem for electric power production, oil storage and processing facilities, communications, ports, airports, railroads, and factories. A few ballistic missiles would be enough to destroy most of Taiwan’s civilian oil reserves stored in the event of war.⁹

As long ago as October 1998, a Defense Intelligence Agency report outlined a major buildup of short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. Up until 1998 the missile deployment had been modest and was limited to a garrison of CSS-6 weapons. The Chinese plan to have in place a total of 600 missiles by 2005, by deploying about 50 new missiles a year.

Missile strikes have the advantage of speed: targets would be destroyed with little or no warning. If attack plans were implemented covertly over a period of time, a quick-strike missile attack would minimize the possibility of third-party intervention. Because of the speed of the missiles and the short distance across the strait, Taiwan would have very little time to prepare its defenses. A barrage even of hundreds of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles fired against Taiwan, however, would actually do limited (or at least not permanently devastating) damage, unless China resorted to chemical, biological or nuclear warheads or the missile strike is coordinated with other concurrent military operations such as air and maritime engagements.

Because Taiwan will continue to maintain significant qualitative and technological advantages against Chinese forces over the near term, the issue of a Chinese blockade will be the most important defense issue in the coming decade. The primary objective of a blockade would be to cripple Taiwan economically and isolate it internationally. A review of available Chinese military literature indicates that China's leaders apparently believe a blockade would be less likely to provoke outside intervention than other actions. Beijing would probably initiate a blockade in steadily increasing steps. Escalating at will, Beijing could deploy successively more severe responses, beginning with stopping Taiwan-flagged merchant vessels operating in the strait and ending with mining harbors and ports and deploying submarines and surface ships.¹⁰

Chinese naval forces currently have a numerical superiority in submarines and large surface ships and possess the capability to blockade Taiwan’s major ports. In implementing a blockade, Chinese forces could bring to bear a mix of military ships, submarines, aircraft, commercial ships, fishing ships, and other civilian-use craft. All could do double duty as mine-laying craft, intelligence boats, and amphibious troop carriers.

Barring third-party intervention, the PLA Navy's quantitative advantage over Taiwan's Navy in surface and sub-surface assets would probably prove decisive. Taiwan's military forces probably would not be able keep the island's key ports and sea-lanes of communication open in the face of concerted Chinese military action. Taiwan's small surface fleet and four submarines are numerically insufficient to counter China's major surface combatant force and its anti-submarine warfare assets. The PLA Naval Air Forces’ B-6D bombers armed with C-601 anti-ship cruise missiles would place Taipei's merchant ships and combatants at serious risk.

A blockade, while not risk-free, would be far less costly and dangerous to the PLA. The disadvantage of a blockade is that it takes a long time to succeed and the strait is an important and busy waterway used by commercial shipping of many countries: closing it would harm their economies as well as Taiwan’s. If successful, it would cripple Taiwan economically without destroying its infrastructure or killing many people. Taiwan is dependent on the freedom of sea cargo transport, which accounts for almost 99 percent of its total cargo transport. Ministry of National Defense (MND) officials estimate that Taiwan would only be able to endure a blockade for 120 days before needing a resupply of essential materials.

Taiwan’s current military doctrine seeks to address three operational requirements.

To meet these objectives Taiwan must maintain a technologically superior qualitative edge over PLA assets. For the past decade, Taiwan's military has been transforming its operational forces by acquiring modern weapons systems and associated equipment in order to deter Chinese aggression. Billions of dollars have been spent on developing both domestic programs like the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) and the Tien Kung air defense system, as well as on foreign purchases such as F-16 fighters and French-built Lafayette-class frigates.

However, the current organizational structure of Taiwan’s armed forces hinder force modernization. Additionally, Taiwan’s defense purchases often appear to be made for political reasons rather than as part of an overall strategy to effectively defend the island from attack. To overcome these definite deficiencies, Taiwan is engaged in a ten-year (2001-2010) modernization, reform, and restructuring plan.

On January 5, 2000, the Legislative Yuan passed the National Defense Law and the Organic Law of the Ministry of National Defense (MND). The main goal of the legislation is to effect greater control over the military services and to better coordinate weapons acquisitions programs. This is being implemented by bringing the operation of the military under one unified system led by a single defense minister. The laws require Taiwan’s defense establishment to reorganize the national defense systems and unify its military administration and military command structure. In effect, it mandates requirements necessary for a modern, professional armed force. Taiwan’s military services are now under pressure to demonstrate better coordination between competing, independent operating branches and units.

With the exception of some recent systems from Russia, the most modern Chinese conventional weapons are inferior one-for-one with the Western-built equipment in Taiwan. The Chinese military is impressive in size, but lacking in technological sophistication. Taiwan’s F-16s and Mirage 2000s, for example, could counter China’s SU-27s with Taiwan’s pilots better trained than their Chinese counterparts. Taiwan still has a technological edge over the Mainland militarily, but this will disappear without U.S. support. Taiwan’s advanced weapons are not being used to their fullest extent.

The most pressing needs of Taiwan’s military include improved defenses against cyber attack and incoming missiles, better anti-submarine warfare capabilities, expanded military training programs, and a restructuring that would emphasize naval and air power rather than ground forces.

Officials of the Defense Ministry believe Taiwan will be forced to fight an island defensive war, with little to no early warning time, shallow depth, and a quickly moving field of battle and is modernizing its armed forces to meet those needs. An invasion would run headlong into Taiwan’s strong suit of layered shore-based coastal defense, an effective air force and the Asian region’s third most powerful navy. For example Taiwan has begun to invest increasing amounts of time and money in developing its own offensive Information Warfare (IW) capabilities but they are believed to be limited. Taiwan’s armed forces have also decided that the upgrade of the island’s Early Warning (EW) capabilities is a main goal.

Since our official recognition of the PRC, U.S. foreign and defense policy has been designed to ensure continued stability and security of the Asia Pacific region. The overarching U.S. goal is to avoid any use or threat of force by China or provocative behavior by Taiwan to resolve differences in the strait. The "Three Communiqués" and the Taiwan Relations Act provide a political framework to manage the relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. This framework has provided an environment within which China-Taiwan relations can develop without threatening the peace of the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.

U.S. objectives for the cross-strait relationship include:

In 1979 the United States officially recognized the government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China and ceased recognition of Taiwan. In the same year the Congress passed The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to ensure that Taiwan’s security would not be compromised as a result of the termination of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States. In 1982 President Reagan promised Taiwan that the United States would not negotiate behind its back on Taiwan’s status or arms sales.

Since its passage and reconfirmation by successive administrations, the TRA -- together with President Reagan’s assurances -- has proved to be a solid foundation for Washington and Taipei relations. It has also been crucial in managing and shaping American policies toward Taiwan and Asia. Since its inception, however, Beijing has simply rejected the TRA as an attempt by the United States to interfere in China’s internal affairs and has repeatedly declared the TRA invalid. It continues to insist that the "Three Communiqués" are the only basis for the Sino-American relationship.

While the TRA does not identify specific actions that the U.S. would take in the event that Taiwan’s security of Taiwan was threatened, it does provide the option for the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s defense. The U.S., however, is obliged by the TRA to help Taiwan defend itself through the provision of such items that it needs for its self-defense.

In assessing Taiwan’s defense needs, DoD has dedicated significant resources to monitoring the security situation in the strait and continues to improve these efforts. It continually reevaluates Taiwan’s defense posture to ensure that we make available to Taiwan such items as will provide a sufficient self-defense capability.¹²

In 2001, the U.S. approved the largest sale of defensive weapons and services to Taiwan in nearly a decade. Taiwan’s legislature now needs to determine if it will fund the purchases. The major items in the proposed sale are:

• Four used Kidd-class destroyers
• 12 P-3C Orion aircraft, land-based, long-range surveillance aircraft, used primarily in anti-submarine or anti-surface warfare
• Eight diesel submarines designed to counter blockades and invasions
• Paladin M109A6 self-propelled artillery system
• MH-53E minesweeping helicopters
• AAV7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicles
• Mk 48 torpedoes without advanced capabilities (designed to combat fast, deep-diving nuclear submarines and high-performance surface ships
• Avenger surface-to-air missile system (lightweight, highly mobile and air transportable)
• Submarine-launched and surface-launched torpedoes
• AN/ALE-50 self-defense pods for the F-16s (aircraft survivability equipment)
• 40 Maverick, AGM-65G air-to-ground missiles for the F-16s
• 40 Javelin anti-tank missile systems¹³

Earlier, the Congress included a provision in the Defense Authorization Act of l998 that required the Department of Defense to study ballistic missile defense for Taiwan. In April 2000 the U.S. approved the sale of sophisticated air-to-air and anti-ship missiles and a Pave Paws long-range radar system that could eventually be linked to a theater missile defense system.

In 2000, the U.S. sold Taiwan advanced AIM120C air-to-air missiles but with the caveat that the missiles be delivered only in the event of a threatened attack by China. U.S. policy is to avoid introducing capabilities that would go beyond what is required for Taiwan’s self-defense. The AIM120C would have introduced beyond-visual-range capability into the region. Taiwan pilots, however, are permitted to train with the missiles on U.S. ranges. This decision should be reviewed if the transfer by Russia to China of AA-12/Amramskis is verified.

The Commission notes that the role of Congress in developing U.S. policy towards Taiwan has been sporadic over the years because successive administrations have resisted active consultation as specified under the TRA. Important policy differences between Congress and the Executive Branch, many of which stem from a lack of consultation, have not been conducive to a coherent American policy. That has changed in the past two years in part because of new legal requirements for periodic consultations. This is a welcome evolution.

U.S. policies have been successful over the years because they have injected caution in the Chinese leadership about resort to force in dealing with Taiwan and, at the same time, induced caution in Taiwan about publicly declaring independence, fearful that without a firm U.S. commitment China might retaliate with force. The strategic ambiguity policy also sought to stabilize the status quo while the two resolve their differences. It is important for all sides to avoid miscalculation and for the United States to make it clear to leaders in both Beijing and Taipei that their behavior has consequences that may adversely affect the long-term gains in democracy on Taiwan and the impressive economic gains in both Taiwan and on the Mainland. The Commission believes it must remain U.S. foreign policy and national security objective to convince the parties that only a peaceful resolution of their differences is acceptable.

Taiwan today has a strong economy and a vibrant, multiparty democracy. The people on Taiwan have demonstrated impressive courage and resilience in their embrace of freedom as they live under dangerous circumstances. Taiwan has achieved remarkable progress in democratic elections, civil liberties, market economic development, and stable, viable governmental institutions.

A strong defense capability is important to Taiwan’s security and economic well-being. The current posture of Beijing to pursue economic integration as a peaceful mechanism to asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan could be supplanted by more troublesome strategies and actions in the next three to five years. After that time, the PLA will have sufficient military capability, to pursue forceful unification.

A strong Executive-Congressional consensus on U.S. policy regarding Taiwan needs frequent updating based on regular consultations, given the severe national security implications of this situation and for U.S. credibility throughout the region.

• The Commission recommends that the U.S. along with its allies should continue to call upon China to renounce the threat of or the use of force against Taiwan and continue to caution Taiwan about declaring independence.

• The Commission strongly recommends those provisions in the FYs 2001 and 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts, providing for briefings to the Congress by the Executive Branch on the ongoing discussion between any Executive Branch agency and the government of Taiwan on U.S. arms sales and that the defense relationship be included as a permanent requirement.

ENDNOTES:

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 May 2002), 47.
2. The Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council, White Paper: The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 21 February 2000).
3. Wen Jen, "Jiang Reportedly Threatens War with US over Taiwan," Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao, 26 March 2001; translated in FBIS.
4. "PLA NPC Delegates Stress Need for Expeditious Resolution of Taiwan Problem," Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She, 9 March 2001; Meng Yan, "PRC’s Chi Haotain: Any Attempt to Sever Reunification of Motherland ‘Will Be Futile,’" Beijing China Daily, 1 August 2001; translated in FBIS.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Section 1, NBC Proliferation Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2001), 8.
6. Dickie Mure, Joe Leahy, Richard McGregor, and Andrew Ward, "US Warns it may aid Taiwan on missile defence," Financial Times, 19 April 2002, sec. Asia Pacific, p.11.
7. 2000 National Defense Report, 8 August 2000, <http://www.mnd.gov.tw/report> (27 June 2002). Bill Gertz, "Admiral Calls for Pacific missile defense system", The Washington Times, 12 November 1999 <http://www.taiwandc.org/washti9903> (26 June 2002).
8. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait Washington, D.C. 26 February 1999. <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait> (27 June 2002). See also Lin Tsung-ta "Taiwan Vulnerable to Ballistic Missile Attacks, Landing by China", Chien-tuan K’e-chi (in Taipei), 1 November 1997, No. 159, pp 81-88; translated in FBIS.
9. National Defense Minister, Tang Fei Interview, "Tang Fei: In the Face of War Threats, We Cannot Suffer and not Hit Back", Lien Ho Pao (in Taipei), 28 December 1999 pg.2; translated in FBIS.
10. See Chang Li-te, "Possible Forms of a Chinese Communist Blockade of Taiwan and Taiwan’s Path for Response; Also Discussing International Law’s Influence on Such a Blockade", Chien-Tuan K’o-Chi (in Taipei), 1 July 2001 pp 24-33; translated in FBIS. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait Washington, D.C. 26 February 1999.
<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait> (27 June 2002).
11. U.S. Department of Defense, Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 18 December 2000).
12. Ibid.
13. "U.S. Offers Arms to Taiwan," ABC News.Com, 24 April 2001, <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/taiwan010424.html> (24 April 2001); Shirley A Kan, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990," CRS Report for Congress, 30 January 2002.