

Logistical Mobilization for Military Combat in the Southeastern Coastal Region

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Journal of Military Economic Studies

December 18, 2000

Synopsis: *An effective logistical mobilization program for military combat in the southeastern coastal region requires a strengthened leadership, closer coordination and cooperation between related participants, and a more systematic command mechanism. It also requires a rapid expansion of the military budget based on the existing situation, a centralized blueprint, a sound deployment of resources, and an upgraded set of laws and regulations on logistical mobilization.*

At the beginning of a new century, with increasing changes in the world strategic order and rapid development of advanced high-tech weapons and equipment, there have been an increasing number of determinant factors leading to the greater possibility of regional warfare. The southeastern coastal region of China where territorial disputes take place frequently will most likely become a pivotal point in a possible, future regional war. Therefore, to step up the logistical mobilization process in this region for future military combat in a pending regional war has become an urgent task. We believe that the following six aspects should be the focus of attention in this logistical mobilization program.

1. A strengthened leadership with closer coordination and a systematic command mechanism

To establish a more centralized and unified command system for the mobilization of logistical resources will no doubt be an important precondition for ensuring a rapid transition from peace time to war readiness in the southeastern coastal region in a state of emergency. It is also crucial for ensuring swift mobilization, fast logistical cover and eventually taking control of the war. In view of the existing status of the logistical mobilization system of the region, we can see that there are still many areas that need improvement. There is inefficiency, a lack of a centralized and systematic mechanism, and a lack of smooth coordination between different sectors and insufficient preparedness for emergency events and the possibility of expected warfare. The system is also ill suited for operating in high-tech warfare in the region. Therefore, improvements should primarily concentrate on the following: a more established command mechanism with more scientific coordination and a division of labor within the system, clearer allocation of responsibilities, a more streamlined structure, better relationships between various participating sectors and much higher efficiency in all areas of operation. In forming such a logistical mobilization system, the following principles should be strictly applied:

To have a centralized and unified command system: a centralized and unified command system will not only be the guarantor for centralizing the command power for logistical mobilization, it will also ensure well-coordinated leadership during peaceful times of

general logistical preparation. Such a command system will be ready and prepared for a sudden war with effective allocation and mobilization of logistical resources, rapidly able to transform the economic resources of the southeastern coastal region - manpower, materials and financial means - into war efforts and war resources. This centralized command system can also ensure that political and military orders are carried out smoothly, that a highly effective mobilization program is in place, and that the possible confusion of "multiple leadership" and "multiple orders out of many channels" can be avoided. However, such a unified command mechanism might run into problems such as a lack of horizontal collaboration and a lack of necessary flexibility for such operations. To overcome such defects, some regulations should be established in order to grant certain autonomous decision-making powers to certain sectors and to certain commanders.

To streamline and reduce layers of the command structure: along with the more and more extensive use of technology in the military field, the pace of modern regional war is accelerated, the process shortened, and the time required for mobilizing resources extremely limited. During the Gulf War, from August 7th 1990 when the U.S. forces began their military deployment to the end of the month when they completed the sea and air blockade, Iraq was left with only a little over 20 days for the mobilization of its resources. Therefore, only by establishing streamlined command structures stripped of all redundant layers can the response be more rapid and the resources be more effective and more rapidly mobilized. After meeting the requirement for carrying out necessary logistical duties, the logistical mobilization command mechanism in the southeastern coastal region should massively streamline the structure and cut down overlapping levels of command in order to improve efficiency. An over-staffed command system burdened with too many levels of command will inevitably result in slow responses, shifting and shirking of responsibilities among the staff, and low efficiency.

To maintain stability: to carry out effective activities revolving around the mobilization of logistical resources, the command system needs to maintain a status of relative equilibrium. The more stable and balanced the system is, the more effective it will be. The structural overhaul and new division of responsibilities among the various departments of the command system will no doubt bring changes to the operation of the system. Therefore, there should not be too frequent restructuring within the command mechanism and a relative level of stability should be maintained. However, with the frequent external changes that have been taking place, the command system should not become too rigid and labored either, as an excessively rigid system will result in low internal flexibility and mobility when attempting to adapt to a changing environment. The solution is to carry out appropriate and well-timed restructuring within the command system in order to achieve refreshed efficiency and vitality.

To adopt more advanced methodology: the constantly evolving advanced technology and scientific inventions in the modern world have made it easy to improve and upgrade the command methods. For instance, the extensive application of micro-electronic technology, satellites and laser technology serve to provide many modern command methods for mobilization of logistical resources. On the other hand, it also helps the

general public to form a micro-electronic network for searching and collecting information and data that could be well used for the mobilization program. During the Gulf War, the U.S. military used more than 3,000 computers in the region for tracking, analyzing, collecting and searching for information in deploying and dividing logistics. The modern world is moving into an information era, which will fundamentally alter the method of warfare. The modern command system for the mobilization of logistics must take full advantage of the various advanced methods of command in coordinating and organizing logistical resources in order to ensure a smooth flow of manpower, material resources, and information.

At the present time, there is no central reputable command system in the southeastern coastal region of China with the authority to coordinate resources from both the military and civilian sectors in times of peace or carry out a comprehensive mobilization campaign in the case of war. The various departments in charge of logistical mobilization at the province (or autonomous region), municipality and county levels are, in effect, administrative bodies that have no decision-making power or authority. We believe that command headquarters for wartime mobilization should be set up based on the Greater Military Regions, which will be composed of political and military leaders from the Greater Military Regional Commands and provincial authorities, under the central command of the national logistical mobilization authority. These command headquarters will be in charge of the mobilization campaigns both in times of peace and war within the military command regions. Their basic functions will be: to organize preparation and mobilization of logistical resources in accordance with the strategic planning of the central authorities; centrally control the resources of manpower, materials, and finances according to wartime needs; map out mobilization plans; coordinate collaborations of various logistical construction projects; monitor and push forward the carrying out of various mobilization tasks according to the requirements of the general mobilization campaign. At the same time, a unified and distinct division of responsibilities and accountabilities should also be established at the levels of province (or autonomous region), municipality, county, and logistical departments of the armed forces to accommodate more smooth commanding and more effective mobilization plans. Only by adopting such schemes can there be an effective mobilization campaign for wartime readiness within the logistical resources.

3. Increase the pace of development and expansion of the military's economic power based on the existing conditions

The large investment in high-tech weaponry, equipment and logistical materials, and their high consumption has markedly increased the dependency of military logistical mobilization on the regional and national economies. At the same time, the rapid development and simultaneous integration of heightened technology in both military and civilian quarters has made it possible for the potential military mobilization of the regional civilian economic resources. The southeastern coastal region has always been the front line of China's reforms and, after years of construction and development, a strong and solid economic foundation has been firmed up with huge potential in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, energy resources, information technology and

professional manpower. Only by relying on the economic construction and development of local regions can the wartime logistical mobilization campaign increase the military's economic power, and therefore be able to rapidly and successfully mobilize all possible resources required to win military battles.

First of all, the advantage of a prosperous economy in the southeastern coastal region should be advantageous in advancing military power. Comrade Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that the modernization of national defense could not be separated from the modernization of agriculture, industry, and science/technology. Without the modernization of the latter three there will be no modernization of national defense. A mobilization campaign for logistical resources involves political, economic, military, scientific/technological, cultural and diplomatic concerns. A nation's true defensive power is not only measured by its military strength and its direct war preparedness, but, more importantly, it is measured by the nation's composite economic strength, which is what sustains its military power. Only with powerful economic support can the logistical mobilization campaign have a solid material foundation. The result of military combat in the southeastern coastal region of China will largely depend on the level of economic development in the region. Therefore, in order to meet the needs of regional high-tech warfare in the future, the southeastern coastal region should, in accordance with the comprehensive strategic program of economic development of the nation, grasp the opportune timing of the present reforms and push for more rapid economic development in the area. The emphasis in the region should be placed on increasing the composite economic strength, which will, in turn, set up a strong basis for the mobilization of logistical support. At the same time, in areas such as urban planning, industrial layout and the construction of roads, bridges, airfields, harbors and telecommunication facilities, the focus should be placed on incorporating economic profits with the needs of national defense to ensure a successful logistical mobilization campaign.

Secondly, the scientific and technological advantages of the southeastern coastal region of China should be fully utilized for speeding up the development of high-tech equipment. In modern regional warfare, technology has become more and more of a decisive factor in the effectiveness of weaponry and the overall performance of military forces. As a result, the logistical mobilization campaign must be guided by the principle of fulfilling the "two fundamental transformations" set out by the Central Military Commission. These are: in preparing for military combat, there should be a fundamental transformation from trying to win conventional regional warfare under normal circumstances to dealing with and winning regional warfare involving modern technology, especially a high-tech conflict; in military construction, there should be a fundamental transformation from a quantitative model based on size to a qualitative model based on efficiency, from a manpower-intensive emphasis to a scientific and technological-intensive focus. The campaign should base itself on the advancement of science and technology in the region to push for more rapid progress in developing better weaponry and equipment. Since the beginning of reforms in the southeastern coastal region, there has been impressive economic growth spurred by thousands of high-tech industries and immense scientific and technological advancement. All this will provide a sound climate for jointly researching and developing high-tech logistical facilities. When

seeking to fully utilize the technological advantage of the southeastern coastal region, the logistical mobilization campaign should take into account the special character of the modern era, the external strategic environment, and the military requirement for the technological support of logistics. The key is to incorporate military and civilian resources, to combine peacetime preparedness with wartime readiness, and to concentrate research and development efforts on logistical equipment that will clearly be a forerunner, a driving force, and a mainstay in the field in order to increase the technological content of these logistics.

Thirdly, there is a need to take full advantage of the superiority and intense concentration of quality personnel in the technology zone of the region for the purpose of expanding the pool of reservists with strong technological background. Judging from the experience of recent high-tech wars, we can see that all the nations involved not only decided to use the battlefield as a testing ground for new weapons, new equipment, and new combat methods, they also brought their top scientists and technological personnel to the front line. More and more emphasis has been placed on a composite quality made up of highly trained military and technological personnel and the technology they are involved in; more and more emphasis has also been on the reserves and mobilization of quality technological manpower. The Gulf War witnessed the mobilization of 50,000 reservists by the U.S. military forces. These reservists were mostly trained professionals in various fields including transportation operations, fueling, paramedical services, engineering construction, equipment repairs, and mechanics. Half of these reservists were sent directly to the Gulf region to carry out logistical operations in their fields. Future high-tech warfare will not only require a sufficient number of reservists, but also a pool of politically sound and technologically well-trained personnel as reservists. The southeastern coastal region should focus on mobilizing such a wealth of reservists with technological training and incorporate the technological staff in the logistical departments of the military forces into a comprehensive program for the entire regional mobilization campaign. The technological advantage of the coastal region should be fully recognized while carrying out an overall plan to systematically identify, reserve, and train various technological professionals in the needed fields. These personnel should be trained to recognize their responsibility clearly as well as master relevant high-tech know-how and knowledge of related fields so that they can carry out normal duties during times of peace and make large contributions in times of war.

3. To improve reserves of military supplies with unified planning and a sound distribution structure

With the immense destructive power of high-tech weapons and the enormous amount of material consumed in modern warfare, limiting oneself to one direction, one arm of the military forces, or one war zone, will not satisfy the astronomic need for military supplies. In future regional warfare, if logistical support for troops is to be sustained continuously after sufficient self-protection is ensured, the logistical department must rely on existing logistical resources within the region to build up an indestructible network basis for guaranteeing wartime logistical supplies.

A stable pool of strategic reserves should be formed. The southeastern coastal regional has extensive coastal lines and the strategic point of focus in battles will change according to the changing situation. In order to maintain certain stability while making adjustments and changes, the emphasis on reserves of military supplies should be placed on forming a strategic hinterland to ensure omni-directional, equidistant and base-point radial-style logistical support. That will guarantee a relatively stable overall framework for carrying out logistical support operations regardless of the strategic readjustment and changes in the southeastern coastal region. In other words, the purpose is to use certainty and stability to deal with volatility and tumult. The logistical layout and distribution should be centrally controlled in order to streamline the size of the reserves and avoid overlapping.

There should also be a combination of strategies to unify as well as divide resources. A sudden occurrence of regional warfare in the southeastern coastal region will inevitably require rapid and accurate 3-D logistical support for all arms of the military in all directions and dimensions. The warehouses at the base should be centrally controlled to form an integrated mechanism but with clear divisions of accountability. Only with such a system in place can military supplies be efficiently centralized and effectively distributed to meet all wartime needs. Under a general plan, the limited military budget should be efficiently used to accumulate reserves for the needs of all troops. New warehouses with systematized facilities and supply bases should be established. These warehouses should be suitable for joint operations of all the armed forces. There should be an expansion of supplies for common use, while supplies for specialized use should be more and more limited. The goal is to gradually change the fact that the various troops all have their own reserves for both common use and specialized use, and to strengthen a centralized control system for both kinds of supplies.

It is necessary to optimize the reserve structure of military supplies in the war zone. The reserve level of supplies in the war zone should stay in line with the general economic level of the southeastern coastal region, but adapt to the needs to upgrade the military weapons and equipment, so that there will be a steady but constantly upgraded pool of reserves. Specifically, there should be four independently complete systems. The first system is a regionally incorporated system to centralize all base warehouses so that each warehouse will be a complete unit while having the ability to support others. The second is an organizationally incorporated system, which is based on the unit of a tactical corps, to combine the reserve needs for "food, clothes, sleeping accommodations, daily necessities, travels and combat" to establish a unified fighting force. The third system would coordinate and centralize all arms of the military forces within their logistical supply reserves. The military reserves under the control of the logistical department should be primarily those for common use, while special attention should be given to reserve specialized goods to ensure logistical support for warehouses supplying the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Troops. The logistical reserves under the control of different arms of the military should be focused on supplies for specialized use. In the warehouse of the Navy and Air Force near the battlefields where joint military operations are carried out, there should also be enough reserves of supplies for common use to give logistical support to all arms of the military fighting nearby. The fourth system would

combine quantity with quality, aiming to take into account both the wartime needs for logistical supplies, the support capability of the nation, and the production cycle of the economy. Naturally the wartime military reserves should be sufficient in quantity while being of sound quality.

4. Preparation for logistical mobilization should be based on the present status to ensure that relevant needs are fulfilled

"If you are prepared, you win; unprepared, you lose, and that is true of everything." The logistical mobilization campaign under the circumstance of high-tech regional warfare will be unprecedented in many areas. It will be strictly regulated by central policies, involving a vast range of fields, extremely limited in preparation time, highly demanding and enormously complicated in all aspects. This means the mobilization campaign in the southeastern coastal region should start in earnest during times of peace and be treated as a strategic task of immense overall significance.

A survey should be carried out to recognize logistical potential. The survey will not only serve to clarify actual economic strength but also find out the distribution of that strength. A database should be established on logistical potential, which can form a basic starting point for logistical mobilization. A general survey system for the entire region should be set up under the leadership of the central authorities but coordinated among logistical departments of the armed forces and local government to check on logistical potential. The contents of the general survey should include: quantity, qualifications, age range, and profession of the local professional personnel related to military logistics. It should also survey the research fields of the research bodies, the level of usability for logistical purposes, the composition of the research staff, the caliber of the research capabilities, and the quality of the research (testing) facilities. The general survey will also include local companies, to gather information on the quantity, size, and distribution of these companies and factories, especially those involved in food processing, medicine, mechanical electric equipment, airplane manufacturing, shipbuilding and shipping, automobile and automotive parts manufacturing and various repair shops and factories. It will be helpful to find out the general technological background and quality of the companies' staff and factories' workers, the production and repair abilities of these facilities, the state of their facilities/equipment and their supporting capabilities in case of war. Other local warehouses, especially fuel storage tanks and warehouses and mechanical electric equipment, can also be of use. Therefore, a survey on the number, the size, the distribution, the reserves volume in stock, the state of the facilities and war supporting capabilities will be crucial information. Special attention should be given to the region's front line force in the fields of science and technology. A database of logistical potential can be established, based on information gathered in the general survey, complete with information on resources that can be mobilized in the event of a war. To save manpower and financial resources, and avoid waste and overlapping, such a general survey should be carried out according to a regular time schedule, for instance, once every six months in key areas, and once a year in other regions.

A general blueprint for logistical mobilization should be formulated. Logistical

mobilization is the process of a nation applying all resources including armed forces, existing and potential capabilities and reserves, in order to launch a war or deal with other emergency situations. The key to shortening this process lies in a detailed plan for carrying out mobilization activities. There should generally be three plans: long-term, medium-term, and short-term. The long-term plan normally covers a span of 10 years and mainly sets out the general direction and strategy of the mobilization campaign with general regulations on regarding broad goals and overall strategies. The medium-term plan is normally a five-year program that stipulates specific measures for carrying out the long-term goals and also forms the basis for mapping out the short-term plan. The short-term plan is an annual program and one stage of the medium-term program consisting of specific, detailed steps to be taken and checked. The formulating of a general blueprint for logistical mobilization should be realistic and in accordance with the national development program of science and technology and the overall logistical mobilization goal. The programs should be centrally controlled with detailed sub-divisions in the structure. They should also be balanced, taking into consideration both military and civilian concerns, the proportional ratio between the front line and base, the consumption needs of future warfare and the realistic economic capabilities of the nation and the production abilities of the base regions. The programs should also maintain relative stability and flexibility and should not be modified often, except in the case of changes from peace to war situations so that they will be "applied while in operation."

There should be certain production projects concerning general military reserves. The huge consumption volume of military supplies and the duration of such consumption during a war requires the all-out efforts of the logistical department of the armed forces as well as the support of production in the base area to generate reserves. In order to improve the productivity of reserve supplies during the war, efforts should be made under calmer circumstances to establish enough sizable reserve-generating factories to maintain a certain level of reserve productivity. Selections should be made, according to wartime logistical needs, in favor of easily accessible large- and medium-size local enterprises (companies) that have strong technological backing with good equipment and production facilities. These enterprises should be given production tasks for generating military reserve supplies based on their specific fields of activity. There should also be efforts to well maintain the equipment and facilities, upgrade them when needed, train their mainstay technical staff, and closely monitor the sources of technical data and raw materials. Periodic tests should be organized to check on their logistical production abilities in response to the call of war. To motivate productivity, policies should be made to grant certain industrial privileges to the enterprise by central and local authorities.

There should be improvement in reserves of common-use supplies. Apart from working on reserves of specialized-use supplies within the armed forces, the civilian sources of facilities for common use should also be fully tapped. The military and local government departments in charge of logistics will predict and assess the demand level of wartime supplies when deciding to set up the correct amount of requested materials from the civilian sources. The projected reserve production goals for these local producers should take into account various elements such as the production level, amount of stock, production cycle, as well as production and sales figures. On the other hand, the military

forces should consider turning towards civilian sources to supply their normal daily consumption. To appoint specific local suppliers for facilities and materials in daily use will not only be conducive to maintaining continuity for wartime supplies but will also motivate civilian suppliers in their active efforts to produce military reserves.

5. To establish a strong reserve force to support the front line with a strengthened awareness education program

At the present, the world is in a new period of peace and development. However, regional conflicts have never died down. Although the Cold War has ended, the dark clouds of the hegemonies and militarist countries have never completely dispersed. There has not always been peace and tranquillity along China's borders. The General Party Secretary Jiang Zemin has pointed out that the more peaceful it seems to be, the more efforts should be made to alert the public to the national defense awareness and overcome the ignorance of lurking dangers. Setting up a national educational program to promote ideological recognition of the need for further national defense construction and strengthen the supporting force to the front line is of lasting strategic and practical significance.

Emphasis should be placed on strengthening a national defense awareness educational program in order to increase the centripetal force of the nation, where national spirit is needed to pull all the forces together. An awareness of national defense centered on patriotism is an expression of such a powerful centripetal force. China is a country composed of multi-ethnic groups, and has enjoyed relative stability so far. However, the international reactionary forces have never stopped their pursuit of the so-called "peaceful evolution" strategy, which aims to overturn the socialist system of China through activities of infiltration and subversion. The Taiwan pro-independence force is also becoming increasingly strong with a clear agenda for separating the country. A small number of forces within China, which persistently pursue bourgeois liberalization, have made attempts to stir up new social chaos. Therefore, China faces an urgent task to strengthen education and raise awareness of national defense. A sharp awareness of national defense needs, centered on patriotism, revolutionary heroism and a nationalistic spirit, will translate into a fighting force in terms of the military, productivity in economic construction, and a centripetal and cohesive force politically. This awareness will also actively serve to preserve lasting stability of the nation, general wealth, and prosperity. It will also ensure the coordinated development of reforms and economic construction.

Improvement should be made in the People's Militia so that there are backup contingents (squads) to cover for military logistical support. The People's Militia is an important component of the supporting force to the front line. In the modern high-tech era, the nature of regional warfare requires the establishment of professional logistical support with militiamen always standing ready for action. The southeastern coastal region should systematically gather and train groups of militiamen for logistical support at the levels of the province (autonomous region), municipality, and county, according to specific logistical needs. In terms of transportation, militia automobile transportation regiments, battalions, and shipping fleets should be formed. Field medical centers should be

established, consisting mainly of hospital staff and facilities at prefecture and city levels. The local departments specializing in commerce, oil, and general materials should be the main force in setting up supply support teams, which can be readily and quickly called for in the event of a war. These militias will be composed of key militiamen and ordinary militiamen and report, in principle, to the local military authorities while supplies are generated through local civilian sources.

Rapid reaction is the key to all logistical support. In the modern era of heightened technology, the role played by logistical support becomes increasingly important and difficult. During the First World War, support staff only made up 30% of people involved in the war; during the Second World War, the figure went up to 58%, while the Gulf War witnessed the jump of support personnel to over 80%. Most support personnel are involved in logistical support. In light of the requirement of a modern high-tech war, the ratio of logistical reservists should be 50 - 60% of total reservists. As a result, the habit of overlooking the importance of logistical reservists should be changed to speed up steps toward setting up a significant logistical reservist force. The logistical reservist pool should have the military troops as the main force, probationary officers and pre-registered soldiers as the base of support, divided according to regular army hierarchical systems, adopting strict regular training and management schemes. Once needed, these logistical reservist troops will expand rapidly to carry out logistical support operations. The size of such reservist troops should be carefully decided because if too small, it will be hard to meet the wartime needs; if too large, it will add an extra financial burden for the nation. At the same time, there should be a sound division in structure for these forces with comprehensive logistical support groups in the right proportion with specialized logistical support groups.

11. To improve mobilization laws and regulations according to needs and to regulate proper applications

The degree of legalization in logistical mobilization campaigns is an important indicator of the degree of effectiveness in a country's war mobilization system, which will have a direct impact on the build-up of a nation's defensive strength. The relevant departments of the civilian and military authorities should step up the process to formulate regulations for logistical mobilization, identifying the principles, methods, contents, and procedures of the mobilization campaign while also specifying clear legal responsibilities regarding the logistical mobilization of various government departments, organizations and institutions. Only in such a way can the logistical mobilization process move onto a standardized, legal track.

The legal framework for logistical mobilization should be improved. First of all, efforts should be made to review existing laws and regulations concerning logistical mobilization. After the founding of New China, a series of laws and regulations and specific measures on mobilization have gradually emerged in the fields of industry, transportation, and general supplies. The emergence of a socialist market economy has led to a new set of laws and regulations suited to a market economy. Although the effort is commendable in replacing obsolete regulations, it has also caused confusion.

Sometimes the new regulation even conflicts with the old. Therefore, quick steps should be taken to examine and assess the existing regulations in order to modify, amend, or abolish them when necessary. Secondly, a corresponding set of regulations for logistical mobilization should also come into play, based on the laws and regulations at the national level, with specific rules and regulations designed for different departments and professions. For instance, there should be special mobilization laws for science and technological industries, for general supplies, and for national health sectors. In these laws and regulations, clear rules should be set up in mobilizing civilian personnel, collecting equipment, and running facilities that can be used both by the military and by civilians, turning civilian factories into military product producers, and in the military use of train stations, harbors, and quays. Thirdly, detailed regulations and application measures should be identified according to the general mobilization needs and the specific mobilization tasks of various departments.

A program for mapping out mobilization laws and regulations should be clarified. The program will cover specific legal projects, division of responsibility, and the time frame for completing projects according to the comprehensive mobilization legal goals to make sure the legalizing process for the mobilization campaign will be carried out according to the plans, step by step, and in an organized manner. The plan to legalize the logistical mobilization process will be formed in accordance with the inner regularity of external elements, the battlefield, and the actual needs of the market. In this way, goals can be set covering specific legal projects in a unified plan and according to priorities. Projections should be made in the legalizing process to preempt changes that will take place during the mobilization process. At the same time, realistic factors should also be taken into account such as the actual plausibility of achieving these goals, e.g. the amount of manpower, materials, and time needed, so that no unrealistic expectations will be made.

Attention should be paid to the strengthening of the executive and legislative powers of the mobilization laws and regulations. The lack of complete law enforcement agencies is a weak link in the legal process of mobilization procedures. Some local legislatures place too much emphasis on economic cases and overlook military laws and regulations, making it difficult to enforce laws and regulations involving war mobilization. Therefore, the legislative function of the local People's Congress should be fully utilized to periodically review and assess whether and how local leadership has managed to abide by the laws and regulations concerning logistical mobilization. Problems that emerge during the process should be quickly identified and resolved. Education and other public relations efforts should be increased as to the laws and regulations on logistical mobilization to ensure their proper and strict enforcement and also to ensure that government and military mobilization orders can be carried out smoothly.