July 12, 2007
Dr. Brad Roberts
Research staff
member, Institute for Defense Analyses
Testimony before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
China’s Proliferation and the
Impact of Trade Policy on Defense Industries
in the United States and China
The focus of my remarks is on the proliferation policies and
practices of the People’s Republic of China. I will not describe these in detail, as I
understand that the administration witnesses on the first panel will already
have done so. As a general
characterization, China has
moved over the last 15-20 years to bring those policies and practices into
closer alignment with international norms and U.S. preferences. But some important gaps remain and U.S.
officials have registered concerns about:
·
aspects of China’s trade in proliferation
sensitive dual-use materials and technologies;
·
its lack of participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative and other ad hoc coordinating mechanisms;
·
and its failure to fully support U.S.
strategies vis-à-vis specific countries of proliferation concern.
What explains these gaps?
Why does China
not do a better job on nonproliferation?
How can its future performance be improved?
My insights into these matters derive from a decade of
interaction with experts in the Chinese think tank community at conferences, seminars,
and other gatherings in China,
the United States,
and elsewhere. Some of those experts are
from the academic world but others are a part of the PRC government, including
uniformed military personnel. Their
views are not necessarily fully reflective of the thinking of senior
decision-makers in the Party, military, or state institutions. But they provide useful insights into the
context in which Chinese policy is made.
Reported below are their ideas as best I understand them. In reporting their views, I am not endorsing
them. Where a conclusion or opinion of
my own is expressed, please understand that these are my personal views that should
not be attributed to my employer or any of its sponsors.
The gap between U.S. expectations and Chinese
performance in the nonproliferation realm has two primary explanations:
1. China does not see the proliferation problem in
quite the same way as the United
States.
2. It
sometimes prefers solutions to proliferation problems different from those of
the United States.
An obvious result is that China’s
expert community assesses China’s
nonproliferation performance more positively than does the U.S. expert
community. Understanding these different
perceptions can help to bring into focus opportunities to continue to narrow
the gap. I will address each of these
points in turn.
First, China and the United States have overlapping but
not identical views of the problem posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
For the Bush administration, the acquisition of WMD by rogue
states and non-state actors is a
fundamental challenge to U.S.
security and to international order more generally. The “crossroads of tyranny and technology”
poses a threat to U.S.
security of sufficient magnitude to warrant the full use of U.S. power to
confront “gathering threats,” including the preemptive use of military means to
remove those threats when other means have failed. The “crossroads” also poses a threat to international
order of sufficient magnitude to warrant an unprecedented level of cooperation
among the major power based on common interests and common
responsibilities. Proliferation is thus
a test of other stakeholders in international order in terms of their
willingness to accept and exercise power to defend order. These core concepts are well articulated in
the administration’s National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat
WMD.
The People’s Republic of China takes a different view of the
international security environment. To
be sure, proliferation has steadily grown in salience in China’s views
of its security environment, as recent Defense White Papers attest. Over the last decade or so, there has been a
broadening and deepening of Chinese consensus around the proposition that the
proliferation of nuclear weapons is harmful to China’s
security and to its interests in stability in the Middle
East and elsewhere. There
is also a rising willingness to exercise Chinese responsibilities as a
stakeholder in international order to inhibit proliferation and deal with
problems of non-compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
But proliferation is not THE central problem for China in the way that the Bush administration
perceives it to be for the United
States.
For China, the
central challenge is the United States—the
only foreign actor with the potential to make or break China’s quest
for peace, development, stability, and power.
Will the United
States be partner or spoiler in this quest? Will it be (in Chinese eyes) a careful
steward of common interests in peace in the Taiwan strait or a witting or
unwitting partner of Taipei’s
in precipitating war? China’s experts are deeply ambivalent about a U.S. dominated world order, which both serves China’s interests in stability but also
threatens to contain China’s
power. They prefer instead the emergence
of a more multipolar order. This
ambivalence makes it difficult for China to fully join the Bush
administration in the aggressive use of all means at its disposal to confront
challenges at “the crossroads of tyranny and technology.” Some Chinese experts argue that cooperation
with the United States on
nonproliferation should be more far-reaching because it pleases Washington and thus contributes to a friendly, steady
hand on China
policy there. Other Chinese experts
argue that such cooperation only extends American hegemony and the “unipolar
moment” and thus works against China’s
long-term interests. A few even argue
that some continued proliferation in regions not neighboring China helps to
keep the United States focused on those areas rather than on China’s rise.
Their debate is influenced significantly by a broad
skepticism in China about
the durability of the U.S.
commitment to nonproliferation. Many Chinese
experts see China as moving
closer to the nonproliferation regime just as the United States moves away. A few, especially cynical observers even
worry about a U.S. ruse to trick China into not helping its friends acquire nuclear
weapons at the same time that the United States quietly encircles China with
new nuclear-armed allies. In defense of
their claim that the U.S.
commitment to nonproliferation is weakening, they argue that:
- The
Bush administration undertook a series of initiatives in 2000 and 2001 to
loosen arms control restraints and to undermine multilateral processes
aimed at strengthening existing multilateral mechanisms.
- The
2002 Nuclear Posture Review signaled U.S. intent to abandon its
Article VI commitment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to
increase its reliance on nuclear weapons while also lowering the nuclear
threshold.
- Counterproliferation
has gained the upper hand over nonproliferation in terms of the time,
attention, and focus of senior U.S. policymakers. Bush administration officials have
spoken about the likely collapse of the nonproliferation regime.
- The United States
continues to assist its friends and allies to acquire nuclear weapons or
to increase their nuclear potential.
Around China’s
periphery, these conspicuously include India
and Japan.
- The United States
has been unreceptive to PRC initiatives to reduce the risks of strategic
military competition, including its proposals for a bilateral agreement on
no-first-use of nuclear weapons and for a multilateral agreement banning
the weaponization of outer space.
Indeed, they argue, the Bush administration writes openly about
dissuading Chinese competition by maintaining supremacy and increasing its
freedom of strategic maneuver.
[To repeat: these are
Chinese arguments about U.S.
policies, not mine.]
In sum, China
and the United States
have different perceptions of the proliferation problem and of the ways in
which nonproliferation can contribute to the achievement of national objectives. But these differences have not precluded a
significant convergence of policies and practices over the last two
decades.
The second primary
explanation for the continued gap between China
and the United States
on proliferation is that the two countries sometimes prefer different solutions
to specific proliferation problems.
Even where the two countries can agree on the need to tackle
a specific proliferation problem, as for example in instances of noncompliance
with the NPT as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the two often
differ on the means of doing so. The United States
approaches its responsibilities as a security guarantor with a sense of purpose
born of decades of worry about nuclear war and a century of worry about “tin-pot
dictators” emboldened by military prowess.
It seeks solutions to problems of treaty noncompliance that are prompt
and definitive. China
approaches its responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council from a different historical experience. As a country with a deep and abiding
grievance against the injustices done it by major powers willing to intervene
in its internal affairs, China has a strong antipathy to interference in the
affairs of another state and to the use of force, or threatened use of force,
to compel a sovereign entity toward some externally imposed purpose. Thus it is hardly surprising that China’s expert
community is generally skeptical of the effectiveness of coercion by major
powers, whether political, economic, or military. Those experts tend to see the United States
as overly reliant on coercive policy tools and as unwilling to work with
political tools of persuasion. They see
the former as unpromising of success and the latter much more certain of
success over time. Those experts also perceive
the United States
as overly eager to act in response to intelligence that it won’t share with
others and that is sometimes unreliable.
These perceptions translate into an unwillingness to sign up
uncritically to country-specific strategies crafted in Washington.
On North Korea, for
example, Chinese experts have generally seen the time as not ripe for
exercising China’s influence
in a bid to end the nuclear program there, on the argument that neither Pyongyang nor Washington
is ready for such a final deal. On Iran, China
has generally taken the European and Russian view that more can be done within
the nonproliferation regime to bring Iran into full compliance with its
treaty obligations. But even on these
two cases it sometimes seems that policy disagreements overshadow the
significant convergence of policy that has occurred.
In sum, even where the two can agree on a problem, they
don’t always agree on the solution.
Drawing China’s
policies and practices more closely to U.S.
preferences would be easier if there were a significant constituency in China arguing that China’s behaviors are falling well
short of what is required. But few in China make this
argument, and not simply because criticizing their government can be
costly. China’s
experts generally see China’s
nonproliferation policies and practices as very well aligned with China’s
international obligations. They hold up
the development of institutional capacity over the last decade, in the form of
a regulatory system supported by an interagency process, as testament to China’s
commitment to police its behaviors and ensure its compliance with its
self-accepted treaty obligations. [The
development of that capacity deserves U.S. recognition and praise.] China’s
experts acknowledge that Chinese policies and practices sometimes fall short of
U.S. preferences even when
they meet China’s
international obligations. They
emphasize this distinction between international obligations and U.S. preferences and argue that most if not all
of the U.S. complaints about
Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices stem from China’s reluctance to meet U.S. demands that exceed China’s treaty
obligations. Of course they then ask why
China should be held to standards
written unilaterally in Washington and not to China’s own
self-accepted obligations.
For example, the United States
has been disappointed by China’s
reluctance to formally participate in activities such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative and the Missile Technology Control Regime. As a general matter, Chinese experts oppose
“coalitions of the willing” because they perceive them as unhelpful—in Chinese
eyes, they slow the development of a multipolar system and undermine the
legitimacy of standing multilateral institutions.
The Bush administration has also been disappointed with China’s lack of
enthusiasm for the proposed U.S.-India nuclear agreement. China’s
position reflects a long-standing concern about U.S.
nonproliferation policies that they perceive as providing special nuclear
benefits to U.S.
friends outside of the treaty regime. Chinese
experts criticize what they perceive to be a double-standard in U.S.
nonproliferation policy. On the one
hand, U.S. adversaries are
treated to tough U.S.
policies, sustained coercion, and even preventive war. On the other hand, U.S.
friends get a helping hand to develop their nuclear potential—think of Israel, India,
and Japan,
they argue. Chinese experts ask if America will only be happy with China’s nonproliferation performance when China has fully
signed up to support these double standards.
China’s
experts generally see no reason other than deference to the United States
to join in special American projects that fall outside the internationally-defined
regime. This deference comes hard when
many of those experts see the United
States as unwilling to reciprocate with
deference of its own to some important Chinese interests.
This brings us to the final question: what more can be done to narrow the gap
between U.S.
expectations and Chinese performance in the nonproliferation realm?
Some of the barriers to improved Chinese performance derive
from misperceptions of U.S.
policies and intentions. The U.S. expert community has tried to dispel those
misperceptions but there is no substitute for a serious effort by U.S. officials
to understand Chinese perceptions and to dialogue about them in a way that
creates mutual understanding.
But some of the barriers to improved Chinese performance
derive from complaints about U.S.
policy that are held by other stakeholders in international order with a
commitment to nonproliferation. It is
conceivable that more can be done to persuade skeptics of the utility of
coalitions of the willing and of exceptional policies for exceptional
situations. But it is also conceivable
that something can be learned from this criticism that can inform continued U.S.
policy development in a way that enhances the prospects for success in dealing
with proliferation over the longer term.
To deal effectively with Chinese misperceptions and
criticisms, it is important to understand them.
This requires dialogue. From this
outsider’s perspective, it appears that the process of communicating between
the two countries on proliferation has been a largely one-way flow of U.S.
complaints, demands, and threats. It has
also been episodic. But dialogue is a
two-way street. And it must be sustained
if its value is to be cumulative.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went to China in autumn 2005 in
part to persuade China of the virtues of greater transparency and came back to
praise the virtues of “mutual demystification.”
A process of articulating and exploring the different perceptions and
underlying beliefs that guide policy choice in each capital may help to narrow gaps
in valuable ways. Continuing progress in
bringing China’s
nonproliferation policies and practices into alignment with U.S. preferences seems to require a
closer convergence of:
- perceptions
of the security environment;
- beliefs
about the potential for deeper China-U.S. cooperation to influence that
environment in ways that serve the interests of both;
- expectations
about the long-term viability of nonproliferation; and
- thinking
about how carrots and sticks can best be employed in multilateral efforts
to deal with current and emerging problems of treaty non-compliance.
Such an agenda seems well aligned with the objectives of an
administration committed to strategic dialogue with Beijing and desirous of enhancing
China’s contributions to international order as a “responsible stakeholder.”