Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on China’s Proliferation and the
Impact of Trade Policy
on Defense Industries in the United States and China
385
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Joseph Cirincione
Senior Fellow and Director of Nuclear Policy
Center for American Progress
July 12, 2007
Thank
you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on China’s
proliferation policies and practices.
China
is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and possesses enough nuclear material for hundreds of nuclear weapons. China has approximately 200 nuclear
weapons on various delivery platforms, mostly short- and medium-range missiles.
Approximately 20 Chinese weapons are
deployed on missiles that can reach the continental United States. Starting in the
1960s, China
became a major supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to the
developing world.
The United States and other countries have worked to
draw China
step-by-step into the international nonproliferation regime. Over three decades, these efforts have
achieved important progress. Technology
transfer issues exist, but they are now a relatively minor aspect of the United
States–China relationship, comparable to issues that we have with allied
nations whose companies engage in nuclear black market sales.
China
is of particular nonproliferation importance in two ways. As a nuclear weapon state, it has a large
nuclear weapons and material production complex. These weapons and materials are of concern to
its neighbors, to the United
States, and other potential adversaries. Questions about the security and
accountability of the weapons and materials are particularly important. China, however, has also been a
major supplier of nuclear technology and equipment in the developing world, and
its past behavior in the nuclear and missile fields was a significant
nonproliferation concern.
Following
its first nuclear test in 1964, China
began a slow but steady process of developing a full-fledged nuclear weapons
infrastructure and strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal.[1] Having been isolated by the West after the
Communist revolution in 1949, China
was also isolated from the evolving international framework of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and from the collaboration that produced the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1950s, the NPT in the late 1960s, and the
development of nuclear export control guidelines in the 1970s. As a Communist power during the Cold War, China was also
excluded from the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
which originated in 1987 as a Western arrangement to exchange information on
and restrain the exports of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology.
In
the early years, the People’s Republic of China adopted a posture that
rhetorically
favored
nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly in the developing world, where
this theme once had some appeal as a rallying point for anti-imperialism.[2] Through the 1970s, China’s
policy was not to oppose nuclear proliferation, which it still saw as
limiting U.S.
and Soviet power. After China
began to open to the West in the 1970s, its rhetorical position gradually
shifted to one that opposes nuclear proliferation.
China’s
practical approach to the export of nuclear and military goods did not,
however, conform to the standards of the international nonproliferation regime.
Despite China’s
de facto commitments in 1992, 1994, and 1998 to uphold the nonproliferation
regulations of the MTCR, Chinese state-owned corporations continued to engage
in illicit nuclear arms transfers to Pakistan,
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.[3] Major efforts have been made over the past 25
years to persuade China
to modify its approach formally, bringing it into closer
alignment
with the policies of the other nuclear supplier states. These efforts have produced demonstrable
results, evident in China’s
accession to the Zangger Committee in October 1997 and to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in May 2004 and in greatly reduced technology transfers. China has also signed and ratified
the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, banning
the development or stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. In October 2004, at their meeting in Seoul, the thirty-four members of the MTCR rejected China’s bid to become a member, apparently over China’s failure
to meet fully their nonproliferation standards. Many experts believe that China’s entry into the MTCR could deter it from
proliferating its nuclear-related materials to countries such as Iran, Pakistan,
and North Korea.[4] A domestic export control system has developed
with constant U.S.
encouragement, but it is still a work in progress and has not yet become
completely effective.
China
plays a central role in both the North Korean and Iranian proliferation crises.
The United
States believes that ending North
Korea’s nuclear program depends heavily on China’s ability to pressure Pyongyang. The U.S. Department of State’s former director
for policy planning, Mitchell Reiss, has characterized China as the “mediator” between North Korea and the U.S. in discussions. China has, he said, “the most
influence on the North. And so to get [it] on board . . . gives us much more
weight in these negotiations.”[5] During an April 2004 visit to China, Vice
President Dick Cheney spoke approvingly of China’s increased commitment to the
nonproliferation regime, while urging it to make economic assistance to North
Korea conditional on Pyongyang’s cooperation in the six-party talks designed to
end its nuclear activities.[6] China
played a major and positive role in convincing the North Korea leadership to suspend
further tests after its October 2007 nuclear weapon test and to return to the
Six Party Talks. China appears committed to ending North Korea’s nuclear program, both for its own
strategic purposes and to demonstrate the positive aspects of what China refers to
as its peaceful rise to great-power status.[7]
China’s relationship with Iran has become a greater concern as China’s
economic relationship with that country grows. In November 2004, China
signed oil and gas contracts with Iran worth an estimated $100 to
$200 billion. (China has also signed oil deals with Brazil, Angola,
and Sudan
because its booming economy has stimulated a huge and growing need for natural
resources.)[8] Nonetheless China
has cooperated in passing two UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iran’s
failure to comply with its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT and has
supported the limited sanctions enacted by those resolutions.
China is not looking for a confrontation with
the United States over Iran, but neither does it want U.S. actions to
increase instability in areas vital to its economic development. It sees Iran and North Korea not as threats that
must be confronted but as problems that can be managed through flexible and
patient diplomacy.
China’s Record: A Positive but Mixed Bag
During the 1990s China made notable strides in
adopting international nonproliferation norms, joining international
agreements, and controlling exports of sensitive nuclear material and
technology. During this period China
joined key treaties such as the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons
Convention and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As noted, Beijing
made a series of commitments through bilateral agreements with the United States
on both nuclear and ballistic missile transfers.
China
softened its stance toward “informal” multilateral control arrangements. However, Beijing
still remains on the outskirts of several critical nonproliferation agreements.
While China expressed interest in joining
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in February 2004 it is not a full partner
and may not be fully observant of the revised guidelines of 1993.[9] China
did not join the 93 countries in signing the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation in The Hague on
November 25, 2002 and China
has declined to join the Bush Administration’s Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).[10]
In
the matter of chemical weapons, China
has not joined the Australia Group, but in March 2004, China and the Australia Group held
discussions on export control, pledging to strengthen ties with the group.[11] China has however adopted export
controls mirroring the Australia Group control list and on chemicals listed on
CWC schedules. Moreover, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Paula
DeSutter, has noted the significance of China’s “catch-all” provisions for
chemical and biological goods. In
testimony before this committee she explained that “catch-all” provisions
“provide a legal basis to control items not on the lists, if the exporter has
reason to believe or has been informed that the items are destines for a CBW
program.”[12]
During this decade China’s proliferation activities
narrowed in terms of both their scope and character. Leonard Spector, the Deputy Director of Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, has noted that during this period Chinese
transfers moved away from sales of complete missile systems to exports of
largely dual-use nuclear, chemical, and missile technologies. Similarly, the number of recipient countries
declined dramatically to three—Iran,
Pakistan, and North Korea.[13] Spector attributes this change in China’s proliferation activities to three
factors: China’s
recognition of the economic benefits of maintaining a stable relationship with
the United States; Chinese
views about the negative impact of proliferation on regional stability in East
Asia; and China’s
sensitivity to global opinion and desire to be perceived as a responsible
member of the international community.[14]
Some political figures and commentators continue to describe
China
as an indiscriminate proliferator, willing to sell almost anything to the
highest bidder. In testimony before this
committee, former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn, explained that
“this was a reputation the Chinese did not truly deserve but it persists to
this day. Part of the reason is that China’s
progress in complying with and enforcing nonproliferation standards over the
years has been uneven. The pattern has often been two steps forward, one step
back.”[15]
I agree with that assessment. Serious hurdles remain, such as the need to
improve export control systems, but the trends are positive.
Improving Export Controls
Under
direct U.S. pressure, China
has moved to establish a domestic legal system to control sensitive nuclear
exports by private or semiprivate Chinese entities. These steps, while imperfect, were sufficient
by 1998 for the United States
to certify that China could
be trusted to safeguard U.S.
sensitive nuclear technology as part of the implementation of the 1985
U.S.–China Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. The certification concluded that “the People’s
Republic of China has
provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United States that it is not
assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state, either directly or
indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive devices or the material and
components for such devices.”[16]
The
continuing nature of China’s
role as an international supplier of nuclear technology to weapons programs is
in question. China
disregarded international norms in the 1980s by selling nuclear materials to
such countries as Argentina,
India, Pakistan, and South Africa, without requiring the
items be placed under IAEA safeguards. U.S.
Intelligence officials in 2004 concluded, “Over the past several years, Beijing improved its
nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral nonproliferation
regimes, promulgation of expanded export controls, and strengthened oversight
mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains of
great concern.”[17] Over the past decade the pace of China’s
exports have outstripped the capacity of the government to monitor and verify
the behavior of Chinese companies. The
Chinese export control system has historically lacked the adequate resources,
central capacity, and inter-agency coordination to be implemented effectively.[18]
China’s nuclear exports to two particular
countries, Pakistan and Iran, have been a leading cause of concern (for
history of Chinese exports to Pakistan
and Iran,
refer to appendix 1). These exports and
other issues have provoked several serious crises in United States–China
relations and triggered repeated congressional demands for sanctions. During the eight years of the Clinton administration,
Chinese entities were subject to sanctions 17 times. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has
imposed sanctions on 19 occasions on 32 different PRC entities. Among those
sanctions, the Bush Administration levied missile proliferation sanctions that
effectively denied satellite exports (for two years), after a Chinese company
transferred technology to Pakistan in 2001, despite its promise in November 2000
to discontinue such practices.[19]
Recently,
however, China
has taken steps to curb this behavior by its companies. Between November 2006 and February 2007 China’s State Council approved two sets of
regulations and amendments on nuclear material exports and dual-use exports
that clarified the lines of authority within the Chinese government and created
a stronger legal basis for enforcing China’s export controls. These enhanced regulations aim to put teeth in
China’s export controls and bring Beijing closer to meeting its obligations
under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540.[20] The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
notes, “This marks the first time that Beijing
has included a number of complex nonproliferation issues within its formal
regulations.”[21] These issues include the spread of highly
enriched uranium, sensitive production technology, dual-use technology, nuclear
terrorism, and transshipments.[22] CNS notes that the revised regulations
increase the authority of relevant agencies—the Ministry of Commerce,
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense and the
General Administration of Customs—to control the transfer of nuclear- related
technology and materials and stipulate required punishments for companies or
individuals found in violation.[23]
Controlling
China’s Fissile Material Stockpile
A
frequently overlooked proliferation issue in China is its large stockpile of
weapons-usable fissile material. Although
the situation in China seems
stable at present, increased political and economic strain could raise the risk
of the diversion of fissile material from China’s nuclear complex. Little is
known about the state of China’s
material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) system. The exact size of China’s
fissile material stock is unknown because Beijing
has not disclosed it or the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. Analysts estimate that China has produced between 3 and 7
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and between 15 and 25 metric tons of
highly enriched uranium.[24] China is believed to have ended its
production of plutonium for weapons in 1991 and of uranium for weapons in 1987.[25] Chinese weapons are believed to be heavily
dependent on weapons-grade uranium, and it is estimated that China uses 20
to 30 kilograms per weapon. Plutonium weapons might require 3 to 4 kilograms on
average.[26]
China produced weapons-usable enriched uranium
from 1964 until 1987 at two sites, Lanzhou
and Heping.[27] Plutonium was also produced at two sites,
Jiuquan and Guangyuan, from 1968 until 1991.[28]
China
presumably has stored its residual fissile material stocks at various nuclear
facilities. Their locations and the
amounts of China’s
nonweaponized fissile material, however, have not been declared and are not
specifically known, nor is the level of security at the storage sites. The China National Nuclear Corporation (which
has the status of a government ministry) “produces, stores, and controls all
fissile material for civilian as well as military applications.”[29] It is estimated that about fourteen sites
associated with China’s
nuclear weapons program have significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile
material. The primary locations of
nonweaponized fissile material are believed to be China’s facilities for plutonium
production and uranium enrichment as well as its research institutes for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities across the country. Information on China’s
MPC&A system is scarce, but the United States
has been concerned about it enough to initiate discussions on China’s
MPC&A (among other issues) between the national nuclear laboratories in
both countries.
Contacts
between the nuclear weapons laboratories in the United
States and China were developing beginning in
1994, but they were suspended in the wake of allegations of Chinese nuclear
espionage in the Wen Ho Lee case in 1999. Although China’s
MPC&A system is modeled after the Soviet system, an expert at one of the U.S. national laboratories ranked China’s MPC&A system as better than that of
the Soviet Union before it collapsed.[30] In 1996, China commissioned a computerized
“national nuclear materials accounting system” at about twelve nuclear
facilities to improve its ability to prevent the illegal loss, theft, or
transfer of nuclear materials. Still,
questions remain about the level of protection at China’s nuclear facilities. China’s
MPC&A system is vulnerable to “insider” theft. Also, China lacks the resources to
modernize its MCP&A technology.
However,
since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, China
has renewed efforts to improve international cooperation with the United States
to install laboratory-to-laboratory collaboratives to coordinate advanced
safeguard techniques between the nations.[31]
What Not to Do: Exaggerate the Problem
Government
concern over China,
particularly in the Congress, often flares into hysteria. China “scares” emerge with some
regularity and are often used to promote other political or ideological
agendas. A classic case is the
Congressional reaction to allegations in 1998 and 1999 of Chinese nuclear
espionage.
That
year, reports that China had
stolen the designs of the most advanced U.S. nuclear warheads rocked United
States–China relations. The New York Times launched the
scandal in a March 6, 1999 story that claimed, “Working with nuclear secrets
stolen from a U.S.
government laboratory, China
has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of
its bombs. . . . Government investigators have identified a suspect, an
American scientist at Los Alamos laboratory.”[32]
The
story was based on leaks from a special investigative committee in the U.S.
House of Representatives chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R.-CA.). The committee released a glossy, three-volume,
declassified report on May 25, 1999, that concluded:
- These thefts of nuclear
secrets from our national weapons laboratories enabled the [People’s
Republic of China,
or PRC] to design, develop and successfully test modern strategic nuclear
weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible.
- The stolen U.S.
nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons
on a par with our own. . . . The stolen information includes classified
information on seven U.S.
thermonuclear warheads.
- The stolen U.S.
secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic
thermonuclear weapons.[33]
The
committee spent most of its time in 1998 investigating charges that critical technology
had been transferred to China
by major U.S. corporations
while using Chinese rockets to launch U.S. satellites. Some political leaders believed the
investigation might lead to impeachment charges against then-president Bill Clinton.
Although it was a major political issue
during much of 1998, it faded in 1999. The
committee turned to the matter of Chinese espionage on October 21, 1998,
concluded taking testimony on the issue from three witnesses on November 15,
and filed its report on January 3, 1999.
The
report led to sensational charges. Wen
Ho Lee, a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratories, was arrested under
suspicion of espionage. Stephen Younger,
then–associate director for nuclear weapons at Los Alamos, testified at Lee’s
bail hearing, “These codes and their associated data bases and the input file,
combined with someone that knew how to use them, could, in my opinion, in the
wrong hands, change the global strategic balance.” He added, “They enable the possessor to design
the only objects that could result in the military defeat of America’s conventional forces. . .
. They represent the gravest possible security risk to . . . the supreme
national interest.”[34]
The
Cox committee report recommended that the executive branch conduct a
comprehensive damage assessment on the implications of China’s acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons information. The administration did so, forming a team of
officials from the intelligence and investigative agencies, including the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and nuclear
laboratories. An independent panel of
nuclear experts, chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah and including General Brent
Scowcroft and John Foster, then reviewed their damage assessment. In April 1999, the panel issued its report. This net assessment reached three critical
conclusions:
- China’s
technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and
unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries’ scientists,
conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified
U.S.
weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative
contribution of each cannot be determined.
- Significant deficiencies
remain in the Chinese weapons program. . . . To date, the aggressive
Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of
their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons deployment.
- China has had the technical
capability to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
(MIRV) system for its large, currently deployed ICBM for many years, but
has not done so.[35]
This assessment contradicted the central claims of the Cox
report. As the political fires cooled,
most experts agreed with the concerned but cautious independent assessment. The case brought against Lee, the alleged spy,
was dropped in 2001 after he was held for months in solitary confinement. A criminal investigation of the charges was
resolved in January 2002 with a fine against the Loral Corporation for its
failure to follow proper declassification procedures before providing a report
to Chinese officials who sought information on launch failures.[36] Neither the Bush administration nor the Senate
or House of Representatives has raised anew any of the allegations in the Cox
report.
Learning the lessons of this sorry episode in the history
of congressional oversight may help prevent it repetition in the near future.
What To Do: Engage China, Lead by Example
The most important step by far to continuing the
improvement in China’s
nonproliferation performance is to continue to integrate China into
global institutions and cement its adherence to international norms.
The 2007 report of the Council on Foreign Relations
Independent Task Force on U.S-China Relations recommends precisely this overall
approach. It calls for a strategy that
combines both balance-of-power and concert-of-power tactics. That is, maintain U.S.
strength and global presence, but promote dialogue, transparency and
coordination with China. In Asian relations, the report says, this
would mean strengthening relations with traditional allies and friends, but
also modernizing these relationships to “make room for Chinese participation.”[37]
By extension, in nonproliferation, this would mean
continuing to promote multilateral treaties and arrangements that help secure
American interests, but also responding to Chinese suggestions for new
arrangements that would “make room” for Chinese concerns. One specific example would be to resolve the
almost decade-long standoff at the Conference on Disarmament that has prevented
negotiations on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons by agreeing to the Chinese request to also explore negotiations on a
treaty for the peaceful uses of outer space.
Most importantly, it would be a mistake to believe that
increasing U.S. demands on China are
raising the level of American hectoring will result in a change in Chinese
compliance with nonproliferation norms.
The United States
is on shaky ground. Most of the worlds
now see the United States
as a country that has walked away from its own declared values and norms, that
has abandoned the nonproliferation regime it fathered, that is set on creating
its own, new norms based primarily on its own perceived needs. Non-nuclear weapon states, for example, are
reluctant to take on new responsibilities and new nonproliferation obligations
when they believe that the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States, have
not fulfilled pledges to reduce their nuclear weapon stockpiles, and in fact,
are increasing the roles and value of nuclear weapons in their own security
policies.
Recent
examples of what is seen as nuclear hypocrisy include, the advocacy by some in
the United States of new
battlefield uses for nuclear weapons; programs for new nuclear weapon designs
and expanded weapons production; and the U.S.-India nuclear deal that grants India
special privileges despite its non-compliance with nonproliferation norms. It is unrealistic to expect great improvement
in the behavior of other’s until we improve our own behavior. The United States needs to lead the way
towards a recommitment to the original bargain of the NPT—the elimination of
nuclear weapons. The failure of nuclear weapons states to accept their end of
the bargain under Article VI of the NPT has undermined every other aspect of the
nonproliferation agenda.
Universal Compliance, a 2005 study
concluded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reaffirmed this
premise:
The nuclear-weapon states must show
that tougher nonproliferation rules not only benefit the powerful but constrain
them as well. Nonproliferation is a set
of bargains whose fairness must be self-evident if the majority of countries is
to support their enforcement . . . The only way to achieve this is to enforce
compliance universally, not selectively, including the obligations the nuclear
states have taken on themselves…The core bargain of the NPT, and of global
nonproliferation politics, can neither be ignored nor wished away. It underpins the international security system
and shapes the expectations of citizens and leaders around the world.”[38]
This view is gaining ground in the American strategic
community. A January 2007 oped in the Wall Street Journal co-authored by George
Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn, marked a significant
change in the thinking of influential policy and decision makers in the United States.
They contend that the leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons
should turn to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a “joint
enterprise.” They detail that a nine point program that includes substantial
reductions in the size of nuclear forces in all states, the elimination of
short-range nuclear weapons, and the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. The oped concludes that, “Reassertion of the vision of a world
free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would
be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's
moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security
of future generations.”[39]
What is true in general is true in specific. Tightening Chinese export controls and increasing
Chinese commitment to prevention of new nuclear or missile programs in new
nations will be easier and faster when the United States, China and other major
powers are moving together towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Other approaches are likely to offer only
temporary improvements, ultimately failing if the nonproliferation regime
collapses.
Appendix 1: Chinese Export History with Pakistan and Iran
PAKISTAN
PAST
EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN.
China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program may have been
critical to Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons breakthroughs in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have supplied Pakistan with
the plans for one of its earlier nuclear bombs and possibly to have provided
enough highly enriched uranium for two such weapons.[40]
According to an August 1997 report by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency: “Prior to China’s
[1992] accession [to the NPT], the United States
concluded that China had
assisted Pakistan
in developing nuclear explosives. . . . Questions remain about contacts between
Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program.”[41] In
February 2004, Libya turned
over to U.S. officials
Chinese nuclear bomb designs that it had received from Pakistan’s
illicit nuclear black market.[42]
China also assisted Pakistan with the construction of
an unsafeguarded 50- to 70-megawatt-thermal (MWt) plutonium production reactor
at Khusab, and the completion of a plutonium-reprocessing facility at Chasma
that had been started with French assistance in the early 1970s.[43]
Since June 2000, Khusab has been producing between 8 and 10 kilograms of
weapons-grade plutonium a year.[44] China pledged to the United
States that it would not export heavy water for the Khusab
reactor, but when reports in 1998 claimed China
was transferring an excess of heavy water to the KANUPP reactor, the U.S. suspected
that it may be rerouted to fuel the military reactor at Khusab.[45] China in 1995 also sold Pakistan ring
magnets used on centrifuges for enriching uranium at the A. Q. Khan Research
Laboratory in Kahuta.
China has also assisted Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program,
circumventing the nuclear trade embargo on Pakistan observed by members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, by helping build a 300-megawatt-electric (MWe) power
reactor at Chasma. This reactor will be placed under IAEA safeguards as a
condition-of supply under the existing China–Pakistan agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
Pakistan has
not accepted full-scope safeguards as its official government policy, but it
has accepted IAEA safeguards for the KANUPP power reactor, the PARR I and PARR
I, and Chasma.[46] China will also proceed with plans to build the
Chasma II reactor, and U.S.
government officials state that IAEA safeguards will apply. The NSG allows
members to fulfill agreements made before their accession to the group.[47]
China does not appear to have supplied any new
weapons technology to Pakistan.
China’s close ties proved
useful as Chinese officials played a quiet but— according to U.S. diplomats—crucial role in supporting Pakistan and coordinating with the United States
after the September 11 attacks.[48]
IRAN
EXPORTS
TO IRAN.
China has also been a
principal supplier of nuclear technology to Iran. China
provided Iran
with three zero-power and one very small (30-kilowatt-thermal) research
reactor, as well as two or three small calutrons (electromagnetic isotope
separation machines). While calutrons in those numbers would not themselves
produce fissile uranium in significant quantities, they would serve to train
personnel in a sensitive nuclear activity.[49] China and Iran
signed a ten-year nuclear cooperation agreement in 1990, and Iran agreed in 1992 to purchase two 300-MWe
pressurized-water reactors from China.[50]
The United States has led an international effort to
prevent the supply of nuclear technology to Iran
and has placed pressure on China
(and other suppliers) to cancel nuclear deals with Iran. United States pressure has made a
difference. By 1995, there were signs that China’s
nuclear cooperation with Iran
was being scaled back. Another factor in this retrenchment may have been Russia’s
competition as an alternative supplier. Russia
agreed to supply light-water nuclear reactors to Iran
and to help Iran
finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which had been
abandoned by German contractors during the Iran-Iraq War. Opposition from the United States to China’s reactor contract probably
also played a part.[51]
Iranian shortages of capital may have been a third factor. At any rate, in
September 1995 China finally
agreed to “suspend for the time being” its reactor sale to Iran.[52] A
few months later, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman acknowledged that “the
implementation of the agreements between China
and Iran
on nuclear cooperation has ceased.”[53]
China continued until 1997, however, to assist Iran in constructing a plant near Isfahan to produce uranium
hexafluoride, the material fed into gas centrifuges for enrichment. Chinese
technicians were assisting Iran
with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium mining and
processing and fuel fabrication.[54]
Yet it seems that these activities were carried out in accordance with the NPT
and under IAEA safeguards.
In
October 1997, China agreed
to end cooperation with Iran
on the uranium conversion facility and not to undertake any new cooperation
with Iran
after completion of the two existing projects—the zero-power reactor and a
zirconium production plant. During a visit to these facilities by one of the
authors in March 2005, the Chinese-built heavy machinery was clearly in
evidence. Iranian officials expressed their frustration at the abrupt end to
the Chinese assistance, which they said made their work more difficult. As of
early 2005, Iran
had still not been able to produce finished zirconium or uranium hexafluoride
of adequate quality for use in centrifuges. U.S. intelligence assessments note
that “although the Chinese appear to have lived up to these commitments, we are
aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have
raised questions about its ‘no new nuclear cooperation’ pledge. According to
the State Department, the administration is seeking to address these questions
with appropriate Chinese authorities.”[55]
Sensitive Missile Exports
As
with its nuclear exports, China’s
role as a provider of missile and missilerelated technology to several
countries has been a controversial issue in overall relations with the United States
and other countries. China
reportedly has aided the missile programs of Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, although the extent of that
assistance has been greatly reduced in recent years. Unlike in the nuclear
arena, however, there are no international treaties that prohibit the export of
ballistic missiles and related equipment. China was not involved in the
creation of the MTCR and for many years resisted being held to its standards.
Over time—through the application of sanctions required under U.S. law for the
export of missiles and equipment, and with the incentive of licensing the
launch of U.S. satellites on Chinese commercial space launch vehicles—China did
agree to abide by some terms of the MTCR. The CIA stated in 2003 that “although
Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms
and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations—offering its
first national training course on Chinese export controls in February 2003—Chinese
entities continued to work with Pakistan
and Iran
on ballistic missile-related projects during the first half of 2003.” In May
2004, the Bush administration placed sanctions on thirteen foreign companies,
five of which were Chinese, for exporting nuclear-related materials to Iran.[56]
PAST
EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN.
China was believed to
have transferred key components for the short-range, nuclear-capable M-11
surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan
in the early 1990s. In June 1991, the United
States imposed MTCR Category II sanctions against
entities in Pakistan and China
for missile technology transfers. These sanctions were lifted in March 1992
after the United States
received written confirmation from China that it would abide by the
MTCR “guidelines and parameters.” Washington
took this confirmation to mean that China would not export either the
M-9 or the M-11 missile.
But
reports surfaced that China
had again transferred complete M-11s to Pakistan in late 1992. The Clinton administration again imposed Category II sanctions
on Pakistan and China
in August 1993. These sanctions were lifted in October 1994 after China
again promised not to export M-11 or similar missiles, and to abide by the
“guidelines and parameters” of the MTCR.
Press
reports in the fall of 1996 revealed new evidence of additional Chinese
transfers of complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan. One quoted a recent U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate that indicated that Pakistan
already had roughly three dozen M-11s stored in canisters at the Sargodha Air
Force Base, west of Lahore,
along with maintenance facilities and missile launchers.[57]
It was said that those missiles, although not “operational,” could be unpacked,
mated with launchers, and made ready for launch in 48 hours. Even more disturbing
in the report was the conclusion that Pakistan,
using blueprints and equipment supplied by China, had begun construction of a
factory in late 1995 that was capable of producing short-range, solid-fuel
missiles based on the Chinese-designed M-11. The factory, located near Rawalpindi, was then
expected to be operational in one or two years.[58]
A
Chinese supply of complete missiles, or of the production technology for
missiles covered by the MTCR would be a major violation of MTCR guidelines and,
according to U.S. law, would
trigger Category I sanctions—which could block all trade between the United States
and Chinese aerospace and electronics firms. China
and Pakistan
have both denied the existence of the missile plant.[59]
In
April 1997, U.S. State Department official Robert Einhorn reiterated the Clinton administration’s concerns over Chinese transfers
of missile-related components, technology, and production technology to Pakistan.[60]
He also said that the United States
could not make the determination that complete, operational missiles had been
transferred; such a determination would require a “high evidentiary standard”
because the consequences of sanctions on U.S. firms would be highly
damaging. The CIA reported in 2003 that Chinese entities continued to assist Pakistan
in the “serial production of solid-propellant [short-range ballistic missiles]
and supported the development of solid-propellant [medium-range ballistic
missiles].”[61]
EXPORTS
TO IRAN.
China has been a
supplier to Iran
of antiship cruise missiles (Silkworms, C-801s, and C-802s), dating back to the
Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. More recently, China
has also played a role in Iran’s
efforts to set up an indigenous ballistic missile development and production
program. In June 1995, the CIA had reportedly concluded that China had delivered guidance systems, rocket
fuel ingredients, and computerized machine tools to Iran to assist that country in
improving imported ballistic missiles and in producing its own missiles.[62]
In August 1996, the China Precision Engineering Institute reportedly agreed to
sell missile guidance equipment to Iran.[63] China has transferred short-range CSS-8
ballistic missiles to Iran.
In addition, China has sold
ten fast-attack craft armed with C-802 antiship cruise missiles to Iran, and Iran is modifying additional
fastattack craft to launch the missiles. In 1997, China
pledged to the United States
that it would not export C-801s and C-802s.[64] China has improved relations with the United States
by making de facto commitments to halt
missile-related transfers in 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002.[65]
In 2002, China
released a white paper listing a comprehensive set of export controls that
reiterated many of those stated in the MTCR.[66]
Nevertheless, the United
States placed sanctions on 28 Chinese
companies or individuals, most recently in December 2004.[67]
The CIA reported in 2003 that “ballistic missile-related cooperation from
entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China
over the years has helped Iran
move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 continued to include
equipment, technology, and expertise.”[68]
[1] See Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard
Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. V:
British, French, and Chinese Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994); Ming Zhang, China’s
Changing Nuclear Posture (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
[2] See John Wilson Lewis and Xue
Litai, China
Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University
Press, 1988), p. 36.
[3]
DeSutter, “China’s
Record.”
[4] Victor Zaborsky, “Does China Belong in the Missile
Technology Control Regime?” Arms Control
Today, October 2004; available at
www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Zaborsky.asp.
[5] Paul Kerr, “U.S.,
North Korea Jockey for China’s
Support as Working Group Nuclear Talks Approach,”
Arms Control Today, May 2004; available at
www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_05/NK.asp.
[6] Dick Cheney, “Remarks by the Vice President at Fudan University
Followed by Student Body
Q&A, Fudan University of Shanghai, China,” April
15, 2004; available at www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/04/20040415-1.html.
[7] Zheng
Bijian, “China’s
Peaceful Rise to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.
[8] Howard W. French, “China’s
Splurge on Resources May Not Be a Sign of Strength,” New York
Times,
December 12, 2004; available at www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/weekinreview/
12fren.html?oref=login.
[9] Paul Kerr and Wade Boese, “China Seeks to Join Nuclear,
Missile Control Groups,” Arms Control
Today, March
2004; available at www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/China.asp.
[10] Shirley
A. Kan, “China
and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,”
CRS Report for Congress, May 9, 2007, pg 2
[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, “China and
Multilateral Non-
Proliferation Mechanisms,” June 29, 2004, available at
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/
fkswt/dbfks/t141201.htm.
[12] Paula
DeSutter, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission,
September 14, 2006
[13] Leonard
S. Spector, Hearing on China’s
Proliferation Policies and Practices, before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, July 24, 2003
[14] Leonard
S. Spector, Hearing on China’s
Proliferation Policies and Practices, before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, July 24, 2003
[15] Robert
J. Einhorn, “China’s
Proliferation Policies and Practices,”
Testimony before the Commission on U.S.-China Economic and Security Review,
July 24, 2005, pg. 1
[16] Presidential Determination 98-10, issued by the White
House, January 15, 1998.
[17] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July through
31 December 2003,” 2004.
[18] Leonard
S. Spector, Hearing on China’s
Proliferation Policies and Practices, before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, July 24, 2003
[19] Shirley
A. Kan, “China
and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,”
CRS Report for Congress, May 9, 2007, pg 1
[20] Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, International
Export Control Observer, Issue 10, March/April 2007
[21] Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, International
Export Control Observer, Issue 10, March/April 2007
[22] BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, February
17, 2007, Lexis-Nexis
[23] Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, International
Export Control Observer, Issue 10, March/April 2007
[25] Nuclear
Threat Initiative, “Lanzhou
Nuclear Fuel Complex.”
[26] A commercial-scale facility is still provisionally
planned, though China
has not yet determined where it will be located. Construction is likely years
away. Mark Hibbs, “Separation Plant on Drawing Board until 2006–2010 Plan, CIAE
Says,” Nuclear Fuel, November 22, 2004
[27] Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Baotou Nuclear Fuel
Component Plant,” available at www.nti.org/db/china/baotou.htm.
[28] See
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Yibin Fuel Plant.”
[29]
Interview with U.S. National Laboratory official, June 1996.
[30] Tang Bin, “China: Major Advances Realized in
Nation’s Nuclear Fuel Accounting System,” Zhongguo
He Gongye Bao [China Nuclear
Industry News], September 11, 1996, in FBIS-CST-96-019, November
26, 1996.
[31] Hui Zhang, “Evaluating China’s MPC&A System,”
paper presented at the Institute
of Nuclear
Materials Management 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, 2003, pp. 5–6.
[32] James Risen and Jeff Gerth, “Breach at Los Alamos:
A Special Report”; and “China
Stole Nuclear
Secrets for Bombs, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times,
March 6, 1999.
[33] Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People’s Republic of China, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1999), pp.
ii, iii, 60.
[34] “Atomic Scientist Is Taking Case to Court of Public
Opinion,” New York Times, January 9, 2000;
and “Excerpt from Testimony at Hearing on the Wen Ho
Lee Case,” New York
Times, September
27, 2000.
[35] “The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment on the
Implications of China’s Acquisition of
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development of
Future Chinese Weapons,” April 21,
1999; available at
www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ChinaDamageAssessment.htm.
[36] “Loral
Settles U.S. Probe for $14
Million,” Washington
Post, January 9, 2002.
[37] Carla
A. Hills and Dennis C. Blair, Chairs, U.S.-China
Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A responsible Course, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2007, p.
81.
[38] George
Perkovich, Jessica Mathew, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal,
Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security,
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, Dc, 2005) p. 24, 34, and 39
[39] George
Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 4, 2007
[40] Leslie Gelb, “Pakistan Link Perils U.S.–China
Nuclear Pact,” New York Times, June 22, 1984;
Gelb, “Peking Said to
Balk at Nuclear Pledges,”New York Times, June 23, 1984; and Gary
Milhollin
and Gerard White, “A New China Syndrome: Beijing’s Atomic Bazaar,”
Washington Post, May 12,
1991.
[41] U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control
Agreements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, 1997), p. 80.
[42] Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Libyan Arms Designs
Traced Back to China,”
New York Times,
February 15, 2004; available at
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42692-
2004Feb14?language=printer; “Report: China Nuke
Traffic Link,” Associated Press, February 16,
2004; available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/12/terror/main648733.shtml.
[43] Bill
Gertz, “China Aids Pakistani
Plutonium Plant,” Washington
Times, April 3, 1996.
[44] “Pakistan Producing Weapon-Grade Plutonium,” The
Dawn, June 14, 2000; available at
www.dawn.com/2000/06/14/top8.htm.
[45] Global
Security, “Khushab,” available at
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/khushab.htm.
[46] Global
Security, “Chasma,” available at
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/chashma.htm.
[47] John Wolf, “China in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group,” Testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, May 18, 2004; available at
www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/32570.htm.
[48] Charles Hutzler, “China’s Quiet, Crucial Role in the
War,” Wall Street Journal, December 18,
2001.
[49]
Albright, Berkhout, and Walker,
Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, pp. 359–360.
[50] Mark Hibbs, “Russian Industry May Be Key to Iran’s Reactor
Prospects,” Jane’s Special Report,
Nucleonics Week, September 17, 1992, p. 3.
[51] Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Says It Plans 10 Nuclear Plants
But No Atom Arms,” New York Times, May
14, 1995, p. 1.
[52] “China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors,” Washington
Post, September 30, 1995.
[53]
“China–Iran,” Associated Press, January 9, 1996.
[54] Bill Gertz, “Iran Gets China’s Help on Nuclear Arms,”
Washington Times, April 17, 1996; R.
Jeffrey Smith, “China
Nuclear Deal with Iran Is
Feared,” Washington
Post, April 17, 1995; and
David Albright, “An Iranian Bomb?” Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, July/August 1995, p. 25.
[55] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 January
through 30 June 2002,” available at
www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/cia/cia041003.pdf.
[56] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July through
31 December 2003.”
[57] R.
Jeffrey Smith, “China Linked
to Pakistani Missile Plant,” Washington
Post, August 25, 1996.
[59] Aurang
Zeb, “Pakistan Denies It’s Building Missile Factory,” Reuters, August 26, 1996.
[60] Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, “Weapons Proliferation in China.”
[61] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July through
31 December 2003.”
[62] Barbara Opall, “U.S.
Queries China on Iran,” Defense
News, June 14–25, 1995; Elaine Sciolino,
“CIA Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms
Components,” New York Times, June 21, 1995; and
“Chinese Shipments Violate Controls,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, July 1, 1995, p. 3.
[63] Bill
Gertz, “China Sold Iran Missile Technology,” Washington Times, November 21,
1996.
[64] Nuclear Threat Initiative, “China’s Missile Exports and Assistance to Iran,”
available at www.nti.org/
db/china/miranpos.htm.
[65]
DeSutter, “China’s
Record.”
[66] Kerr
and Boese, “China
Seeks to Join Nuclear, Missile Control Groups.”
[67] “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on 3 Chinese Firms,”
Associated Press, December 2, 2004, available at
www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-China-US-Iran.html.
[68] Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 July through
31 December 2003.”