China’s
Strategic Trade Controls and U.S.-CHINA Cooperation on Nonproliferation
Testimony
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on
China’s
Proliferation and the Impact of Trade Policy on Defense Industries in the
United States and China
July 12, 2007
Prepared
Statement of Dr. Gary K. Bertsch
University
Professor of International Affairs, and
Director,
Center for International Trade and Security,
School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia
Thank you for the
invitation to testify. My colleagues and
I at the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of
Georgia conduct research, analysis, and outreach to promote better trade and
security policies and practices worldwide from our two offices in Athens,
Georgia and Washington, DC. We have worked in over 40 countries and have focused considerable
attention on nonproliferation export control issues in China during the past
decade. I am pleased to share our
observations with the Commission.
Introduction
As
we enter the second half of 2007, China’s strategic trade controls and
U.S.-China cooperation on nonproliferation are at a critical juncture. The United States and China are global trade
leaders, though in a world facing serious state and non-state weapons
proliferation threats. Over the last
several years, China has been working to advance its export control system to
address those common threats and become a more responsible international actor,
yet it continues to encounter many challenges.
Moreover, despite mutual and international security concerns, U.S.-China
engagement on nonproliferation export control has yet to gain traction. Meanwhile, U.S. non-governmental entities have
been working with Chinese partners to establish U.S.-China cooperation in this
area. Indications are that those efforts
have helped produce notable advancements in China’s export control system, and
they would benefit from even greater U.S.-China engagement on these issues.
Avenues
to more robust U.S.-China cooperation on export control and nonproliferation do
exist and need to be exploited and enhanced to a greater degree. While legal and political restrictions
currently limit the extent of government-to-government cooperation on
nonproliferation and export control, there have been recent attempts to expand
the scope and level of engagement in those areas. In addition, U.S.-based non-governmental entities
(in conjunction with their Chinese counterparts) have forged productive pathways
toward more fruitful cooperation in recent years. These pathways have helped fill the gaps left
by the limitations on government-to-government engagement, and have laid the
groundwork for greater cooperation in the future.
With
the above in mind, this statement will focus on the development of China’s
strategic trade controls and U.S.-China export control cooperation in order to address
the following subjects: 1) what the U.S. can do to encourage or assist China in
complying with its nonproliferation obligations and more fully implement its export
controls; 2) what the U.S. can do to encourage or assist China in becoming more
involved in the broader global nonproliferation agenda; and 3) the role China has
played and can continue to play in international nonproliferation and export
control efforts. To provide insight into
those topics, I will share some of the results and observations from my
Center’s work and experience in China. I will first give a brief overview of the
development of China’s
export-control system from 1994 to 2004, which has been described as the era of
de jure export control in China. I will discuss both the progress and
shortcomings of that period. I will then
provide a summary of the U.S.-China cooperative initiatives on export control
that have taken place since 2004, wherein I emphasize that while there has been
some government-to-government cooperation in this area, the majority has
occurred in the non-governmental arena. I
then will turn to a description of the most recent developments in China’s
export control system, noting not only the continued progress China is making
but also the role that cooperative initiatives such as ours have had in
promoting such progress. In closing, I
will offer specific responses to the questions posed by the commission. It is my sincere hope these remarks will
provide information and perspectives that will be of use to the important work
of the Commission and other relevant actors in the United States.
Background on China’s
Export Control System, 1994-2004
The
Center’s research of China’s export control system began in 1996, when the
Chinese system was nascent and largely opaque. Since then, we have conducted several studies
on China’s
export control development. Each successive analysis demonstrated discernible
progress, yet each report also noted significant disparity between Chinese
export controls and international standards.
In our most recent assessment, which covered the development of China’s system through 2004 and was published in
early 2005, we observed that capacity and political will were the key remaining
shortcomings and challenges to improving China’s system.
The
contemporary development of China’s
export control system began in the mid-1990s.
By the end of 1995, China had promulgated its first formal export
control regulation (on chemical weapons-related items) and issued its first
white paper on Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policies. Nuclear-related regulations were instituted
in 1997 (covering nuclear exports) and 1998 (covering nuclear dual-use items),
following China’s
admission to the NPT Exporters Committee (the Zangger Committee). The Chinese government issued its first set
of arms export regulations in 1997.
During that time, China
did not address missile or biological-related export controls in its
regulations, although it provided some information in annual arms control white
papers. In 2002, China promulgated a
series of new or amended regulations covering a range of strategic commodities
and technologies, including chemical, biological, missile, and munitions. Those regulations included control lists that
were reflective of the multilateral export control regimes such as the
Australia Group (AG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), export
control licensing processes, and more advanced controls, such as end-use based
“catch-all” controls.
From
2002 through 2004, the Chinese government worked to implement its national
control system and sought to integrate China into the multilateral export
control arrangements. In December 2003, the
Chinese government issued its first nonproliferation policy paper specifically
to address China’s
developing export controls. The
following year, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed an amended Foreign
Trade Law (2004) that opened China’s foreign trade to individual importers and
exporters, further under-girded its domestic system of controls, and included a
wider range of criminal and administrative penalties for violations. In 2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) and began membership talks with the Australia Group and the
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). During this
period China also continued to issue nonproliferation white papers on an annual
basis emphasizing the importance of export controls, instituted an electronic
export licensing system, and began a series of outreach efforts and training
exercises for its Customs service and major strategic enterprises. Also in 2004, the Chinese media reported the
first public disclosure of an export control violation and punishment, although
the report lacked details on the identity of the violator or the precise
penalty for the offense.
China’s
first decade of de jure export
control was a productive and significant one; however, it left several gaps in
areas that required attention. China
remained outside the Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group, and its 2004
application for membership in the MTCR was rejected. Furthermore, from the mid-1990s through 2004,
several Chinese companies were sanctioned pursuant to U.S. nonproliferation law, with many of the
companies sanctioned several times, in particular for reported chemical- and
missile-related transfers to Iran. Additional shortcomings of that period
included inadequate training and resources, along with concerns over China’s
capacity to implement its export control laws and procedures. Finally, China’s export control system still
either lacked or insufficiently defined some of the more complex export-control
mechanisms. For example, China had
no legal basis to control brokering and transshipment activities, and controls
on transfers of strategic technology were not clearly formulated. However, through its own initiative and
through cooperation with entities in the United
States, China
began to address many of these issues.
U.S.-China Export
Control Cooperation, 2004-present
Overview of U.S.-China
Export Control Cooperation
Before
offering my observations on the most recent developments in China’s export
control system, I would first like to discuss the U.S.-China cooperative
endeavors that have occurred since 2004, when our Center last conducted a
complete assessment of China’s export control system. I will provide a brief overview of some of
the U.S. governmental and
non-governmental initiatives of which I am aware, and then I will focus on the
work our Center at the University of Georgia has done and is doing in China.
Overall,
there has been relatively little government-to-government engagement or cooperation
between the United States
and China
on export controls, due largely to political and statutory restrictions. Those restrictions stem from legislation
passed in the early 1990s in response to Tiananmen Square that limited the
types and amount of assistance the U.S.
government could provide to China. Recently, there have been some efforts to
promote government-to-government cooperation on export control In 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) reached an agreement on
end-use verifications for exports of controlled items from the United States to China under the Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade (JCCT). Subsequently,
MOFCOM and DOC established the “U.S.-China
High Technology and Strategic Trade Working Group” under the JCCT in April 2006
and held a joint export control workshop for Chinese industry in Shenzhen in
January 2007. There also has been some
bilateral cooperation between the U.S.
and Chinese Customs services, with Shanghai
and Shenzhen becoming Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in recent years.
At
the same time, think-tanks, research institutes, universities, and private
firms have engaged their Chinese counterparts and others in China on the issue of export control
and nonproliferation in Track II-type dialogues or academic settings. For example, our colleagues at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute co-coordinate the annual U.S.-China Arms Control, Disarmament, and
Nonproliferation Conference, which addresses export controls among other
issues, and host several training programs on nonproliferation and arms control
for Chinese experts and government officials.
At the regional level, there is the Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a Track II forum on security in Asia
that has been ongoing since 1993. In
2005, CSCAP formed an “Export Control Experts Group” which includes Chinese
experts is co-chaired by the U.S. CSCAP Committee and our colleagues in the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Pacific Forum. Of course, Chinese experts participate in the
annual International Nonproliferation Conference organized by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the former home of my fellow panel
member, Mr. Joseph Cirincione. Other
export control-related forums and initiatives coordinated by U.S. entities and involving Chinese
participants include conferences and seminars put on by various firms and trade/manufacturing
associations such as the annual Global
Trade Controls Conference organized by MK Technology. Initiatives like these (as well as our own),
will often receive some form of official encouragement or support, which is
helpful and at times necessary, but could be even more productive with greater
government involvement.
I
should also mention some of the non-governmental organizations and institutions
in China
that have worked to promote export control awareness and bilateral
cooperation. The China Arms Control and
Disarmament Association (CACDA) has been a leader in this field and is involved
in several export control-related initiatives.
Experts from other key institutions such as the Chinese People’s
Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) and the Chinese Institute for
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), in addition to faculty and
research centers at some of China’s
finest universities - including Tsinghua
University in Beijing
and Fudan University
in Shanghai - also
participate in such initiatives. These
non-governmental efforts are either in conjunction with or in addition to the
export control work conducted both in China and in the United States by my own
Center. I am pleased now to share our
efforts with you.
CITS Work and
Cooperation in China
The
Center for International Trade and Security at the University
of Georgia began its work in China just
over ten years ago. Our initial focus of
study was China’s
developing strategic trade control system, which we first evaluated in
1996. Since then we have updated the
evaluation on roughly a biennial basis and have expanded our activities from
research into outreach and training. We
rely primarily on the support of private foundations such as the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation,
the MacArthur Foundation, and the Japan
Center for Global
Partnership (CGP). CACDA has been our
primary partner in China,
and our CACDA colleagues have been instrumental in making our work there
possible.
Our
work supported by CGP, Ford, and MacArthur has focused primarily on training Chinese
companies to comply with export control regulations. With CGP support, for example, we have
collaborated with a Japanese organization, the Center for Information on
Security Trade Control (CISTEC), on training workshops in Tokyo
and Beijing. Those workshops provided training to select
industry representatives in China
on developing and deploying internal compliance programs (ICPs), which help
ensure that companies stay in line with national and international obligations
and avoid inadvertent transfers of proliferation-relevant items. With Ford and MacArthur support, we have worked
with and supported actions by other stakeholders, including academia, media, and
non-profit organizations, to strengthen industry compliance with export controls
in China. In total, since 2004, we have co-coordinated
and participated in six outreach activities involving Chinese strategic
enterprises and two seminars for customs officers in China,
provided specialized export control training for Chinese practitioners and
experts at the University of Georgia, and hosted several Chinese delegations for
exchange visits through our office in Washington,
DC.
We
have also developed the China-U.S.
Working Group on Trade and Security in coordination with CACDA and support
from the MacArthur Foundation. The Working Group is an effort that draws
upon Chinese and American experts and specialists to address key national and
international nonproliferation and export control issues currently facing the
two countries. The goals of the Working
Group are to increase awareness and understanding of these issues, to exchange
ideas and experiences on some of the more technical aspects of strategic trade
control, and to offer viable solutions to the challenges involved in promoting U.S.-China
relations regarding high-technology trade.
Through sustained dialogue and a robust and creative program of research
and outreach activities, the Working Group hopes to contribute to U.S.-China
cooperation and compliance on export control and nonproliferation issues. While the Working Group focuses primarily on
issues involving China and
the United States,
the expectation is that its efforts will be a positive influence on broader
trade and security issues with both bilateral and global relevance. The following are some of the key issues on
the Working Group agenda:
·
Recent
developments in Chinese and U.S.
export controls;
·
Issues
of international concern, such as the control of intangible technology
transfers, end-use/-user or “catch-all” controls, and controls on brokering
activities;
·
Industry
compliance and export management;
·
Increasing
formal U.S.-China cooperation in the area of export controls;
·
Customs
and export control enforcement;
·
Global,
multilateral, and regional export control regimes and initiatives; and
·
Other
trade and security issues important to both China
and the United States.
In
many respects, the Working Group is intended to complement the export-control-related
work and dialogue of the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT). And, because of the Working Group’s informal
structure, it can act more quickly to address emerging and sometimes sensitive
or contentious issues.
I
believe one of the most important activities institutions in the United States
can undertake is to work with Chinese industries and companies to enhance their
awareness and compliance with international nonproliferation and export control
standards. Our Center’s experience with China
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) is illustrative of the benefits of this
sort of cooperation. NORINCO is a major
import/export and marketing company under one of China’s top state-owned defense
holding companies, the China North Industries Group Corporation (CNGC). NORINCO was the subject of seven U.S
sanctions beginning in 2003. In 2006,
the company’s leaders approached our Center and asked for assistance in
developing their export control internal compliance program. After a series of exchanges and discussions
on the nature of the proposed cooperation, we began our work in this unique
endeavor.
Our
University of Georgia Center is now actively promoting strategic trade
awareness and compliance in NORINCO. We have
reviewed the company’s existing internal compliance procedures and offered
insight to its executives on how to institute comprehensive internal controls
on strategic exports. We provide
training to company executives to familiarize them with international
developments in export controls, the current state of U.S. export control policy and
practice, and the relevance of these developments to the company in the short
and long term. Our Center also provides
comprehensive export control and internal compliance training to company
employees who are actively engaged in strategic trade operations. In the near future, we will provide export
control training to a broad spectrum of NORINCO employees to raise
nonproliferation awareness and understanding throughout all levels of the
company. In addition, NORINCO is
supporting our efforts to conduct industry outreach activities for Chinese industry
in the form of seminars, workshops, and briefings, and by translating into
Chinese and disseminating our Center’s export control newsletter to audiences
in China.
Recent Developments in China’s Export Control System
Although many factors are at work, I believe engagement like
ours is important in promoting positive export control developments in
China. There have been significant and
positive changes in many facets of China’s export control system over
the last eighteen months. While the changes to China’s
export controls have occurred primarily in the legal/regulatory sphere, with
the introduction of new measures and the amendment of existing ones, there also
have been noteworthy developments in the areas of industry compliance,
international participation, and implementation. However, most would agree that work remains to
strengthen China’s
export control system. For example, it
is apparent that many of China’s
smaller and medium-sized companies are in need of export control training and
the development of internal compliance programs. In addition, the Chinese system is still
without comprehensive controls on brokering activities and intangible transfers
of technology (ITT). Moreover,
developments must be evenly balanced across the country, especially now that
localities are to play a greater role in licensing, government outreach to
industry, and enforcement. Overall, China is on a path of positive
development with respect to its nonproliferation export controls. Continued and increased encouragement and
assistance from the United States will not only help ensure that it remains so,
but could prove to be an avenue to greater cooperation in other areas of the
bilateral relationship.
From late 2005 through early 2007,
China executed a dramatic overhaul of its export control legal foundations with
new or updated measures in almost every sphere of control. In December 2005, the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) issued Circular No. 548 on
Reform of the Administrative Approval System for
the Import and Export of Sensitive Items and Technologies, which commissioned
China’s provincial, municipal, and other local entities to serve as the initial
reviewers of export permit applications for dual-use goods and
technologies. 2005 ended with MOFCOM and
the General Customs Administration (GAC) issuing the most comprehensive and
sophisticated regulation to-date, Order No. 29 on Measures for the Administration on Import and Export License for
Dual-Use Items and Technologies.
These measures authorized the creation of a comprehensive national
control list, expanded the scope of catch-all and transit/transshipment
controls, and laid the foundation for broader coverage of technology transfers. For example, the measures amended a previous
regulation that required an exporter to seek a license if he or she knew or should
have known that the export item “will be used” for a WMD-related purpose to
require that license when the exporter knows or should know “there is a risk
the item will be used” for a WMD-related purpose. These measures signal that China’s export control system is moving
to a more advanced level of development.
Further,
in 2006 and 2007, the Chinese government strengthened export controls in
several specific areas. In July
2006, the Commission on Science and Technology in National Defense (COSTIND)
and the GAC issued Notice No. 50 (2006), which established temporary export
control measures for graphite-related products, pursuant to its Nuclear Dual-Use Export Control Regulation. Notice No. 50 applied dual-use export
licensing and clearance procedures to a list of seven graphite-related items with potential nuclear application.
Also in July 2006, MOFCOM released an updated Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and
Technologies Export Control List that subjected exports
of 14 new bio-related items to control and reflected updates in the Australia
Group (AG) dual-use control list. In
August 2006, MOFCOM and GAC established the requirement that specific civil
aviation parts - those with potential missile dual-use application - would be subject
to either the Missile Dual-Use Export
Control Regulation (2002) or the Measures
for Dual-Use Export Licensing (2005).
In September 2006, MOFCOM issued new regulations on the import and
export of precursor chemicals which included provisions meant to strengthen
licensing requirements for those items. In
December 2006, the PRC State Council promulgated an amended set of regulations
on the control of nuclear exports, aligning the regulations more closely with China’s
NSG obligations. On the last day of 2006, the GAC and MOFCOM issued the
latest version of China’s
control list. Finally, in February 2007,
the PRC State Council expanded China’s
nuclear dual-use export regulations to address issues of potential
re-production and re-transfer of imports from China, reportedly in recognition of
the growing threat of nuclear terrorism.
Recently, China
also has been more involved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on export
controls. China
participated in a series of bilateral conferences and exchanges on export
controls with the European Union, Japan,
and the United States,
and held discussions with representatives from various multilateral regime
representatives in 2006. China also held a bilateral forum on export
control with the United Kingdom
in March 2006 that was followed by a June 2006 meeting between Chinese and EU
export control officials in Beijing
to discuss ways to broaden and deepen China-EU cooperation on export
controls. In addition, that June, Chinese
officials participated in a round of negotiations in Beijing with an Australia Group delegation
that included the AG Chairman and representatives from several Chinese
ministries. Finally, in early 2007,
Chinese experts, officials, and industry representatives participated in export
control seminars with the EU and United States.
Other notable developments in the past eighteen months have
included signs of increased transparency, enforcement, and high-level
government support, demonstrating that export controls are increasingly accepted
and implemented in China. Party and State leaders in China have “attached great importance” to
implementing China’s
export controls according to a February 2006 public notice. Similarly, in April 2006 Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao proclaimed that China
is “stepping up” its enforcement efforts to improve its export control system. Following word with action, in September
2006, the Chinese government published the identity of an export-control offender,
along with details of the violation and the penalty - a RMB10,000 (US $1,300) fine
- for attempting to export a controlled chemical without a license. This marked the first time information such
as this was publicly disclosed. Further
transparency has been demonstrated by the increasing amount of information
about export controls, in both Chinese and English, made available on Chinese
government agency websites.
To complement its regulatory enhancements, international
cooperation, and movement towards stricter enforcement, China has also begun an active industry
outreach program. Several workshops and
seminars have taken place in the last eighteen months, with several more
planned for the months ahead. In
September 2006, several key Chinese ministries, including MOFCOM, the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), and the Customs
Administration, conducted export control training for approximately 120
enterprises in Shanghai.
There was also a special training held
in Dalian, China, following changes to China’s nuclear export controls in late
2006. China’s
Public Security Bureau (PSB) participated in two training sessions for dual-use
exporters last month (June 2007), one in Hebei
Province and one in Yunnan Province. It is important to note this kind of training
is increasingly offered in China’s
provinces and localities, not just in major centers like Beijing
and Shanghai.
It
is my impression that China’s
industry leaders understand the need for - and are sincere in pursuing - export
control system development and reform.
More of them are interested in becoming informed about international
export control standards and practices.
Many of them eagerly send company representatives to the informational
programs and training sessions that we and others offer. They are doing their homework, asking
insightful questions, and appear enthusiastic about learning the policies and
practices of modern export controls. It
is my distinct impression that the relevant leaders and officials in China
are making significant progress on a topic that was largely unknown to them in
previous years. As an example, NORINCO’s
internal compliance program has undergone significant and very positive changes
in the last year. Attendees at a recent
industry outreach seminar in Beijing
praised NORINCO for its efforts to create a comprehensive internal compliance
program; this led to representatives from other Chinese strategic enterprises
expressing their intent to create similar compliance programs in the near
future.
Finally, we should also call attention to the efforts of certain
faculty and programs in Chinese universities to promote nonproliferation and
export control awareness, education, and understanding. Scholars at Fudan University, for example,
have been active on this front for over a decade and will host a conference
later this month in Shanghai, reaching out to faculty and programs in other
Chinese universities about these issues.
China Foreign Affairs University, Tsinghua University, and Beijing
University are also giving attention to these concerns and have the capacity
along with Fudan University to embed more nonproliferation and export control
training in the curricula. Strategic
trade-control curriculum development is also being considered at Shanghai Customs
University, one of the key training
centers for China’s
national customs service.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Considerable opportunities exist for
further cooperation between China
and the United States
on nonproliferation export controls. China’s remaining export control challenges are
now less the result of fundamental policy differences with the United States and other Western countries and
more a matter of the China’s
capacity to implement and enforce its newly outlined export control standards. It is premature to gauge how well China will
implement its new regulations or whether its behavior in its own national
control system and within the multilateral supplier regimes, such as the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, will bring forth “growing pains.” However, on balance, given China’s steady investment in
improving its domestic infrastructure and its engagement with the regimes, I
believe the probability of improved behavior and performance will increase over
time.
I further believe that U.S. engagement is critical to
maintaining the positive trajectory of Chinese export control development. High level and official dialogue, regular
information exchanges, export control assistance, and related confidence-building
measures are all important. Continued
progress requires sustained political commitment from China, as well as recalibrated
international assistance. U.S. leaders should recognize and continue to
encourage the progress China
is making. They should work cooperatively
with their Chinese counterparts to refine policies and practices, and improve
export control implementation in both countries. U.S.
officials should be forthcoming and admit that the U.S. system and its performance
also need attention. An honest,
fair-minded, and constructive approach will be useful. The current U.S. and multilateral export
control systems and practices were created in the Cold War era and are not well
equipped to deal with strategic technology transfer and proliferation in the 21st
century. Much of the critical work
needed to improve export controls requires multilateral cooperation on
extraordinarily difficult issues. While
much of that work remains to be done, growing U.S.-China cooperation and more effective
U.S.
and Chinese export controls will continue to have a salutary impact on addressing
the myriad threats associated with WMD proliferation around the globe.
With regard to our own Center’s role in
this engagement, a
number of positive outcomes have resulted from our cooperation with Chinese
industry, non-governmental organizations and universities. Industry is the first
line of defense in restraining proliferation, and we are witnessing many positive
developments. For example, NORINCO’s
corporate leadership has expressed a clear and unmistakable commitment to a
responsible corporate export control program.
Its representatives are receptive to the ideas and the training that we
and other U.S. experts provide, and they have worked diligently to inform their
workforce about the need for export controls, to educate their regulatory
officials, and to upgrade their internal compliance program. The NORINCO experience will likely have
positive influence on other Chinese enterprises. More Chinese firms are recognizing that responsible
export behavior, informed corporate officials, and an effective internal
compliance program can be “trade enabling.”
That is, export control compliance will be good for business in the
global economy of the 21st century.
Those companies that have or are developing a responsible corporate
culture and internal export control compliance systems will be more likely to avoid
U.S. sanctions and be more competitive in more markets than their less
responsible counterparts.
To
summarize in terms of the topics raised at the outset of my testimony, allow me
to conclude with the following:
1. There is much the U.S. Government and non-governmental
institutions can do to encourage and assist China in complying with its
nonproliferation obligations and implementing stronger export controls. Furthermore, I believe that positive
engagement produces the most successful outcomes. I encourage the U.S. Congress to engage with
their Chinese counterparts to put more nonproliferation and export control
content into their growing exchange programs.
I encourage the executive branch agencies to do the same. The experience of our University of Georgia
Center in engaging counterparts in Chinese universities and non-governmental
organizations, and with industry representatives, has been satisfying thus far and
is an example of what can be accomplished.
I am confident that much more can be achieved in the years ahead.
2. There is also much we can do to encourage China’s
growing participation in the global nonproliferation agenda. Again, I believe that positive engagement
with China’s
leaders and institutions is critical. The
U.S. government was wise to support China’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. It should continue to encourage
China to develop its export control capacities and performance so it can become
a full-fledged and respected member of all of the multilateral export control
regimes. Engagement between governments,
agencies, industries, and non-governmental organizations can promote not only U.S.-China,
but also international understanding of common interests, and identify ways to
achieve those interests with positive outcomes.
With better cooperation, China
can become a critical player in promoting nonproliferation globally.
3. Finally, China can play a positive, leading
role in international nonproliferation and export control forums. The United States should continue to
encourage China to join and play a constructive role in nonproliferation export
control arrangement and should do all that it can to facilitate responsible Chinese
leadership in the various forums.
The
progress made in China’s export control and nonproliferation system over the
last decade is remarkable. The opportunities
to continue that progress today are abundant.
It is incumbent upon responsible leadership to take advantage of them.