February 4, 2010
Testimony before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
China’s Activities in Southeast Asia and the Implications for U.S. Interests
Room 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building
1st Street and Constitution Avenue
Washington, DC 20001
China’s Geostrategic Calculus and Southeast Asia—
The Dragon’s Backyard Laboratory
Dr. Andrew Scobell
Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the China Certificate Program
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University, 4220 TAMU
College Station, TX 77843
Ph: 979-862-3028; E-mail: ascobell@bushschool.tamu.edu
This statement examines the People’s Republic of China’s geostrategic thinking since the end of the Cold War and where Southeast Asia fits into the calculus. The author suggests that Southeast Asia might best be thought of as a “backyard laboratory” where China first tests new ideas and experiments with new approaches in its foreign and security policies. Southeast Asia was deemed fertile ground for such experimentation because there was no regional hegemon nor was the subregion totally dominated by any great power. Moreover, the subregion is of considerable importance to China. While the United States has been the most significant external security actor in Southeast Asia, its footprint has shrunk as a result of the withdrawal of military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the United States does not completely dominate economically or diplomatically. Indeed, it is Japan that has been the most important external economic actor but Japan has not dominated diplomatically nor had any military presence. Thus, Southeast Asia proved to be a valuable location where China has tested multilateral diplomacy and experimented with other soft and hard power initiatives.
In the early 1990s, China entered a brave new world. The Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 sending shock waves through the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The whimpering end of the once mighty Soviet superpower shook Beijing because it immediately called into question twin core security issues: regime security and national security. The CCP is adept at conflating the two by making continued communist rule synonymous with the survival and wellbeing of China as a nation-state. The double blow meant the CCP was at once increasingly alarmed about internal stability and fearful of new threats at China’s borders. So the end of the Soviet Union not only meant the sudden and shocking disappearance of the oldest and most consequential communist party-state in the world but also the appearance of three new neighbors in Central Asia.
Moreover, the Soviet collapse heralded the end of a bipolar world and the emergence of regional multipolarity. By 1992, the global system was no longer dominated by two superpowers. The system had been replaced by a chaotic situation in which power in Asia was becoming more diffuse and world politics more complicated and confusing. Beijing, long a proponent of multi-polarity, suddenly confronted the adage of “be careful what you wish for,” and scrambled to adapt to the new reality. Although the emergence of a multipolar Asia appeared to be an unmistakable trend, global unipolarity was the overarching reality because of the preponderance of American power. For China this meant the greater salience of a U.S. threat to China. Another core concern was the perpetuation of economic growth and prosperity. As a result, in 1992, ageing patriarch Deng Xiaoping sought to personally reinvigorate the reform effort and ensure there was no turning back from the course he had set the country on more than a decade earlier. Thus, Deng launched what became known as the “Southern Tour” (nanxun) on which he urged Chinese to embrace energetically ‘reform and opening.’
The situation forced Beijing to rethink its foreign policy outlook and China’s own neighborhood suddenly loomed much larger in its thinking. Securing regime stability and national borders required greater attention to neighboring countries. Countering the greater perceived challenge of a hostile—or at least unfriendly—United States meant serious efforts to build a network of relationships with other states, especially within Asia. This impulse was reinforced, in Beijing’s view, by the transformation of the United States from a prime catalyst for China’s economic trade and investment to a key obstruction to Chinese growth. Thus, Beijing began to seek commercial opportunities elsewhere. In short, China awakened to its geographic realities—it was first and foremost an Asian power.
What this meant was the emergence of a heretofore unseen phenomenon—the formulation of an Asia policy. Prior to the end of the Cold War, China had “been a regional power without a regional policy.” By the mid-1990s Beijing had adopted “good neighbor diplomacy” (mulin youhao waijiao) by which China undertook a multipronged effort to improve relations with all its neighbors. The result was the de facto appearance of an Asian policy.
Drivers and Regional Priorities in Asia:
There have been four drivers of China’s new found Asia policy. The first and most pressing driver was Beijing’s alarm over border protection and internal security. A close second was to maintain economic growth which Beijing feared might stall or sputter. Together these were China’s top priorities because they were seen as directly related to political stability. Without secure borders Beijing felt exceptionally vulnerable to the twin threats of external confrontation and internal upheaval. An economic downturn raised the specter of rising unemployment which would trigger social unrest. Dissatisfaction would be directed at the CCP calling into question the unwritten social contract between the rulers and the ruled. Once Beijing had made progress on the first two drivers, then a third driver came into play: countering the enormous power of the Washington colossus.
In the aftermath of the 1989 upheaval in China and the rapid unraveling of the Soviet bloc which came on its heels, the United States loomed as the single greatest source of external challenges to China. Washington was deemed hostile and threatening—a conclusion based on U.S. rhetorical support for the spring 1989 protests, the vocal condemnation of the crackdown, combined with the post-Tiananmen sanctions imposed on Beijing. The emergence of a unipolar world only magnified the ominous nature of the U. S. threat from China’s perspective. As a result, Beijing began to undertake concerted efforts to check—or at least limit—U.S. influence in Asia. Lastly, a fourth driver emerged as China recognized that it possessed an image problem in the region. Beijing’s efforts to secure its own borders and protect its national interests had triggered a significant security dilemma. China’s neighbors began to fear that its military buildup and growing assertiveness constituted a threat. Starting in the late 1990s, Beijing sought to reassure its neighborhood and the world there was no “China threat.”
Initially the priority area for Beijing was Central Asia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union created major uncertainty on China’s vast land borders to the north and west. In addition to questions about the border with the Russian Federation and Mongolia, China suddenly faced newly formed Central Asian republics. Of particular concern were the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan which shared common borders with China. Once cordial relations with all these newly independent states had been established and confidence building measures had demilitarized the frontiers, border agreements reached, and territorial disputes resolved, Beijing’s attention turned to Northeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula in particular. The unraveling of the Soviet Union meant the end of Moscow’s economic largesse to Pyongyang. The cutoff of Soviet aid triggered an economic crisis for North Korea in the early 1990s while tensions with the United States ratcheted up as Washington became alarmed over a burgeoning nuclear program. China sought to perform a delicate two-level ‘balancing act.’ First, Beijing attempted to shore up its relations with Pyongyang as it simultaneously engaged in a rapprochement with Seoul. Second, China tried to moderate North Korean behavior while at the same time restraining the U.S. impulse to react too harshly. Beijing seemed able to pull off the balancing act as it established full diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992 while maintaining cordial if strained relations with Pyongyang. Moreover, the 1994 Agreed Framework seemed to ease tensions between Pyongyang and Washington as well as offer a roadmap for a rapprochement between the two erstwhile adversaries.
Coming to terms with Southeast Asia.
With conditions on China’s northwest frontiers ameliorating and the Korean Peninsula temporarily stabilized by 1995, Beijing could turn its attention more fully to its southeast. Possibilities in Southeast Asia seemed brighter than they did South Asia where progress on improving relations with India moved at a glacial pace. In contrast to the situation south of the Himalayas where New Delhi proved a wary and reluctant neighborhood hegemon unwilling to move quickly on contentious and seemingly intractable issues, Beijing faced no massive single great power to stall its initiatives in continental or maritime Southeast Asia. The greatest challenge China confronted in Southeast Asia was its own reputation. For the states of continental Southeast Asia—Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam—China’s legacy was one of war and revolution. China, for these countries, was a warmonger albeit one that had aided indigenous struggles against external “imperialists” in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. But China was also seen as having a history of aggression in a short and limited but very bloody war with Vietnam in 1979 and in subsequent clashes along their disputed land border throughout the 1980s.
For the states of maritime Southeast Asia—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam—China’s legacy was as a fomenter of revolution. Here especially, the sizeable ethnic Chinese populations in these countries were seen as fifth columns orchestrated by Beijing as the subversives and/or insurgents intent on seizing power. Ongoing insurgencies in countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines, and a bloody communist uprising in Indonesia in 1965 kept this a real concern until at least the late 1970s. Beijing made concerted efforts to overcome these fears by severing its ties with various insurgencies AND making clear that ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were citizens of their country of birth or residence with no allegiance to another state based on ties of race or ancestry. The greatest challenge over the status and loyalty of ethnic Chinese living outside of China emerged in Vietnam with the Hoa who were systematically persecuted in the late 1970s. This issue was a contributing factor to the 1979 war between China and Vietnam.
During the final years of the Cold War, China’s efforts to build better relations with Southeast Asia and improve economic ties made some progress. However, the perception within Southeast Asia of China as a military threat was only reinforced by Beijing’s clumsy and ham-handed steps to exercise sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. During the late 1980s and on into the late 1990s, China used coercive force to make good on its maritime territorial claims. While it sought to keep a relatively low profile, it did not eschew confrontation. Thus conflict flared in 1988 over the Spratly Islands between Chinese and Vietnamese forces. Conflict flared again periodically during the 1990s, including clashes between Chinese naval vessels and fishing boats from various countries and controversy over the occupation of small islands. Moreover, the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis raised fears in Southeast Asia that China was becoming more assertive and threatening.
Beijing began to recognize it had an image problem and sought to address this directly. The initiative began with repeated insistence that allegations of a “China threat” were “baseless” and malicious. This campaign was not terribly sophisticated, well calibrated, or immediately effective. Beijing unveiled in the late 1990s a ‘New Security Concept.’ Significantly, this was first launched in Southeast Asia. The concept was essentially a repackaged version of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence promoted by Beijing back forty years earlier. Nevertheless, the concept gradually resonated with many Southeast Asians because it was consistent with the so-called “ASEAN Way” which emphasized mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and consensus decision making. China’s multilateral initiatives were generally well received in Southeast Asia and the overlap in values and rules of the game proved a good fit for both the interloper (China) and the host entity (ASEAN) and its member states. Each learned they could get along relatively harmoniously to their mutual benefit. China found an unexpected level of comfort in the experience and was reassured that ASEAN states did not seek to gang up on them; ASEAN states were reassured by China’s conciliatory diplomatic efforts and the general absence of overt coercion.
As a result, Southeast Asians enter the second decade of the 21st Century more concerned with China as an economic threat than of China as a military threat. China has reassured continental Southeast Asian states of Chinese security intentions through peacefully resolving land border disputes. These include bilateral agreements with Vietnam and Laos during the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the expansion of economic ties with the countries of Indochina has signaled that China is not immediately interested in territorial expansion or military conquest. The negotiation of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Beijing’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in October 2003 have underscored this point to many Southeast Asians. Maritime states were also reassured by China’s willingness to engage multilaterally on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea—by signing in November 2002 the Declaration of the Code of Parties in the South China Sea at the eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002.
China’s immediate primary interests are in expanding markets and securing natural resources. Continental Southeast Asia has seen a higher profile for Chinese manufactured exports, investments, and extraction of raw materials. This has led to controversy over the negative impact of Chinese economic hegemony, including damage to domestic economies and ‘theft’ of national resources. In Vietnam, for example, public outrage erupted in 2008 over the efforts of a Chinese corporation to mine bauxite. Perhaps no issue has captured the concern of continental states more than management of river systems. The headwaters of some half a dozen major rivers including the Irrawaddy and Mekong are in China and flow through Indochina into the Bay of Bengal or South China Sea. Upstream Chinese dam building has serious downstream impact.
The non-traditional threats to Chinese security from continental Southeast Asia involve such things as the illegal trafficking in narcotics and people. While these issues are present in China’s relations with all five countries in Indochina, they are particularly sensitive in the case of one Southeast Asian neighbor: Myanmar/Burma. This country is one of the most fragile states on China’s periphery with significant strategic value to Beijing because of its location on India’s eastern flank. Thus, Myanmar serves as a key pawn in China’s on-going geostrategic chess game with India. The international pariah status of Myanmar’s military regime has left the country with limited options. As a result, Myanmar has moved closer into China’s embrace economically and militarily (see next section) to become almost a client state of Beijing. Myanmar has been wracked by ethnic insurgencies, internal unrest, and political instability. In 2009, domestic upheaval spilled over into China with a cross-border exodus of refugees.
Meanwhile, in maritime Southeast Asia, China’s focus has been on strengthening its claims to the South China Sea, exploiting or exploring for natural resources, and expanding trade and investment with the countries of the region.
The Military Dimension.
China is also active in Southeast Asia militarily. China has ongoing bilateral military relationships with all of the countries in the subregion. Senior Chinese military figures or PLA delegations have visited all of the 10 ASEAN states at least once in the past three years. In the past few years, China has also conducted a number of military exercises with Southeast Asian countries. These include bilateral military exercises with Thailand in July 2007 and July 2008, and a multilateral maritime exercise in May 2007 in Singaporean waters. Between 2000 and 2008 China sold an estimated US$264 million worth of arms to Southeast Asian states. Of this total almost two thirds (62%) reportedly flowed into one country—Myanmar. China has also reportedly been involved in the construction of military facilities on several islands controlled by Myanmar in the Andaman Sea.
The South China Sea in China’s Geostrategic Calculus.
Maritime matters have loomed increasingly large for the PRC in recent decades. Why? Because, since the 1970s, China has turned increasingly outward. With booming international trade, an ever-expanding commercial fleet, and a growing navy, looking seaward is an inexorable trend. Moreover, the PRC has long standing territorial claims in the maritime sphere—most notably Taiwan but there are other claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea as well. Since the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which established 200 nautical mile economic exclusion zones for countries, Beijing has displayed a heightened interest in its maritime claims. Greater concern over natural resources, notably energy, has prompted China to make good on these. This is especially true where energy resources are concerned because Beijing has become preoccupied with energy security, especially since 1993 when China became a net importer of petroleum. This has elevated the importance of the South China Sea in two ways. First, it has heightened China’s belief that there are very likely subterranean hydrocarbon deposits. Second, it has highlighted the importance of sea lines of communication through which China’s petroleum must be transshipped from the Middle East and Africa. After navigating the Straits of Malacca, oil tankers must then transit the South China Sea.
China’s concentrated efforts to resolve territorial disputes in the past two decades have been much more successful on land than they have been at sea. While both types of disputes are important to Beijing, greater significance seems to be attached to the latter. Indeed, maritime disputes have been the most contentious and difficult to resolve. The vast majority of territorial disputes that have been resolved amicably are inland and in many cases China has conceded significant amounts of disputed territory to the rival claimant. Of the 16 times since 1949 that China has used force to pursue its territorial claims, half of these episodes have involved Taiwan or islands in the South China Sea. It is noteworthy that the most contentious unresolved disputes involve the island of Taiwan along with islets, reefs, and atolls in the East China and South China Seas. Since the 1950s, the PRC has claimed most of the South China Sea as Chinese maritime territory.
Slow Intensity Conflict in Three Phases
China has adopted a strategy toward the South China Sea that befits an ambitious rising power with weak naval capabilities but considerable national resources at its disposal. I have dubbed this strategy ‘Slow Intensity Conflict’ (or ‘SLIC’). This strategy is tailored to avoid serious backlash or unified resistance to China policy or adverse impact to China’s image. This SLIC strategy has progressed through three phases.
During the first phase, which lasted from the 1970s to the 1980s, China adopted a tough approach emphasizing hard power. Beijing made no real effort to make good on its claims in the South China Sea until the 1970s. In 1974 Chinese naval forces clashed with military forces of the crumbling Republic of Vietnam in the Paracel (Xisha) Islands. Emerging victorious, the PLA Navy (PLAN) took control of the western group of the Paracels. In the battle, a larger PLAN flotilla bested 4 vessels from the Republic of Vietnam. Then, 14 years later, in March 1988, Chinese naval forces clashed with forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the Spratly (Nansha) Islands. The main battle, which took place at Johnson Reef, was won by the PLAN and China went on to occupy seven nearby islands. That same year, Hainan Island became China’s newest province—the PRC’s 30th provincial-level jurisdiction. Up until this time the island had been part and parcel of Guangdong Province. There were multiple reasons behind this move, including spurring Hainan’s economic development. In addition to the island, the new provincial jurisdiction included all the islets, reefs, and atolls that the PRC claimed in the South China Sea. Thus the newly created province signaled greater attention to China’s maritime territories. Some of Beijing “highest hopes” were that petroleum and LNG would be found inside the territorial waters of China’s newest province.
In the second phase, during the decade of the 1990s, China adopted a hard power approach but blended this with a soft power dimension. In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Beijing became more conscious of the importance of energy security. This highlighted the importance of China’s maritime territories. In early 1992 Beijing passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Territorial Wars and Contiguous Territories which reasserted China’s claims to the South China Sea. Then, in early 1995, the Philippines discovered that China had built a solid, permanent looking structure on the disputed Mischief Reef. After initially working to resolve the issue bilaterally with Manila, Beijing began to work through the ASEAN Regional Forum.
During the third phase, in the first decade of the 21st Century, China adopted a more conciliatory approach toward dealing with the South China Sea emphasizing soft power. Perhaps the key multilateral agreement was the code of conduct signed between China and all ten member states of ASEAN. While the agreement definitely improved the overall “climate” of relations, there were significant limitations to the agreement. First, the issue of sovereignty was sidestepped. Second, the geographic area covered by the agreement was not specified. Third, and most importantly, the agreement was not legally binding.
In September 2004, the China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed an agreement with the Philippine National Oil Company to conduct joint marine seismic exploration in the South China Sea. Then, in March 2005, the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation also joined the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU). However, China did not completely abandon coercion and the above agreements did not prevent the rise of tensions between China and Vietnam in 2007. One of the most serious bilateral incidents of that year occurred in July when a Chinese patrol boat fired on a Vietnamese fishing boat in the Paracel Islands killing one fisherman.
The Challenge to U.S. Interests
The most direct threat to U.S. interests concerns assertive actions to make good on China’s claims to maritime sovereignty. China claims a 12 nautical mile-wide band of territorial waters and a 200 nautical mile Economic Exclusion Zone in vast areas of the South China Sea. This constitutes a serious Chinese challenge to freedom of navigation. Although Beijing has adopted a more flexible approach to joint exploration and sharing the resources of the South China Sea, it has remain adamant on the issue of sovereignty, unwilling to concede anything. This strict interpretation of sovereignty has resulted in Chinese harassment of U.S. military air and sea craft on routine surveillance or monitoring missions in what are considered international airspace and international waters. Of particular relevance are the EP-3 Incident of April 2001 and the USNS Impeccable Incident of March 2009. It is not clear whether these actions are the manifestations of an intentionally confrontational policy by the highest echelon of the CCP or the result of roguish soldiers acting without the full knowledge and approval of their civilian leaders.
While China clearly does seek to push back on the scope and range of U.S. military operations in the South China Sea, it does not appear intent on total area denial at this time. China continues to see the U.S. Navy in particular as an important protector of the sea lines of communication. However, as China’s own naval capabilities improve this thinking may change. For the United States China at present constitutes a truculent but key player in Southeast Asia. Beijing is an important partner for Washington as it attempts to address a host of non-traditional security threats which plague Southeast Asia such as terrorism, piracy, narcotics, human trafficking, environmental degradation and pollution.
Conclusions
The drivers of China’s strategy toward Southeast Asia are fourfold. First, Beijing is driven by a consuming desire to secure its borders and ensure internal security; second, Beijing is preoccupied with maintaining robust economic growth; third, China is engaged in unrelenting efforts to counter or at least check U.S. power and influence in the subregion; and fourth, Beijing is working to reassure the neighborhood that as China grows strong it does not constitute a threat to other countries.
Southeast Asia has provided China with an important testing ground—a “backyard laboratory.” The area is an important one for China economically and security-wise, ranking second only to Northeast Asia as a priority for Beijing. Thus, it is not surprising that China has made its first real steps in multilateralism, and experimented with soft power initiatives in Southeast Asia. Significantly, these various trial efforts have been deemed successful and served as the prototypes for larger global initiatives. While exporting these efforts beyond Southeast Asia have met with varying degrees of success, China’s comfort level in the subregion has grown considerably with the ‘ASEAN Way’ proving entirely consistent with China’s own paradigm for diplomacy.
While Southeast Asian countries have generally welcomed China’s increased presence in the subregion and growing participation in multilateral fora, this embrace has not been total. The countries of ASEAN continue to desire a robust U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic presence in Southeast Asia as a counterweight to a rising China. Even the pariah state of Myanmar is keen to improve its relationship with the United States to balance against Chinese domination. In this context, perhaps the greatest challenge to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia is not China but rather Washington’s own inattention to the subregion.
Steven I. Levine, “China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power,” in Harry Harding, ed., China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (Yale University Press, 1984), p. 107.
This is still the case. See, for example, China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 2009), p. 6.
For an overview of China’s effort to deal with the security challenges with Russia and the Central Asian republics, see Bates Gill, Red Star Rising: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 37-52.
Andrew Scobell, “China and Inter-Korean Relations: Beijing as Balancer,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 81-96.
By virtue of its geographic location Vietnam is both part of maritime and continental Southeast Asia.
Allen S. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension,” Asian Survey XXXVII: 4 (April 1997), pp 299-322.
See, for example, Tim Johnston, “A wider radius: Southeast Asia as China’s economic of strategic influence grows…,” Financial Times, January 28, 2010, p. 7.
M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 3.
See for example Richard Cronin’s Mekong research http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/?SN=SE20060519999
“The Strengthening Sino-ASEAN Defense Ties,” The Straits Times (Singapore) October 12, 2009 citing Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data.
Joyce Roque, “China’s Relationship with Myanmar,” China Briefing August 27, 2008 accessed @ http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2008/08/27/chinas-relationship-with-myanmar.html
On these points, see Andrew Scobell, “China’s Strategy toward the South China Sea,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, eds., Taiwan’s Maritime Security (Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 41.
Andrew Scobell, “China’s Rise: How Peaceful?” in Sumit Ganguly, Joseph Chinyong Liow, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies (Routledge, 2010), p. 16. The statistic is comes from Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, Table 1.5 on pp. 64-65.
Scobell, “China’s Strategy toward the South China Sea,” pp. 42-43, and Andrew Scobell, “Slow Intensity Conflict in the South China Sea,” E-Note (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, distributed August 16, 2000).
Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform (Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 307.
Ralf Emmers, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” in Ganguly, Scobell, and Liow, eds., The Routledge Asian Security Studies Handbook, p. 245.