

## **ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD**

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**Commission Question:** In Panel II, James Thomas of the DoD discussed our shifting global military posture as a result of our “hedging” approach to China. To help the Commission better understand how our hedging strategy should unfold in the future, please provide to us a short description of three or four specific actions you believe should form a vital part of this hedging strategy. For example, we should deploy “x” number of bombers to Guam, shift “x” number of carrier groups to the western pacific, etc.

**Answer:** Specific prescriptions for hedging do not fall within the remit of my testimony. That said, if, as suggested in my remarks, PRC strategy places an unusual emphasis on the use of superior intelligence to deceive and surprise enemies, then a hedging strategy would increase investment in intelligence capabilities and perception management while maximizing and diversifying US strategic options. An open hearing record might not be the best forum in which to discuss intelligence. Broadly speaking, maximizing and diversifying strategic options makes sense in light of the threat of surprise. In practice, this means not depending purely on diplomacy (cooperation on North Korea, e.g.), economic ties (China’s continued prosperity, e.g.), or military instruments (carriers and other naval assets in Asia, e.g.) to ensure the defense of the national interest. Some will argue that hedging increases the likelihood of conflict. This betrays an arrogant view of the US’s influence. The US should hedge against misjudging the PRC’s strategic trajectory and against picking the wrong target or kind of target of prospective Chinese aggression.