The Taiwan Relations Act and the Referendum Issue in Taiwan: A Conundrum for the United States
OPENING STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN ROGER W. ROBINSON, JR.
U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission
Hearing on “China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance”
February 6, 2004
Washington, DC
On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, I would like to welcome you to our public hearing. Our focus today is on the political and military relationship between the United States, China and Taiwan. My colleagues, Ambassador Robert Ellsworth and Larry Wortzel, will co-chair today’s hearing and guide us through this important topic.
U.S. cross-Strait policy colors all other htmects of our relationship with China. It remains the key political and military flashpoint between the two countries, driving both China’s military modernization efforts and U.S. military assistance to Taiwan. The Congress made clear the importance of these issues by directing the Commission to assess “the triangular economic and security relationship among the United States, Taipei and Beijing, including Beijing’s military modernization and force deployments aimed at Taipei, and the adequacy of United States executive branch coordination and consultation with Congress on United States arms sales and defense relationship with Taipei.”
Recent developments have heightened tension in this trilateral relationship. Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s decision to hold a national referendum on China’s military build-up during next month’s presidential election has prompted strong rhetoric from Beijing concerning a possible military response. At a minimum, it appears likely to push Beijing to accelerate further its already substantial military modernization programs. The proper response to these developments by the U.S. is at the heart of our investigation today, and in fact the broader mission of the Commission.
Much of the debate about the rise of China since the early 1990s has centered on how fast China’s economic and military capabilities are increasing and how the United States should properly react to Beijing's offensive build-up. This hearing will take this assessment to the next level – by examining what China might actually do militarily or politically in different scenarios. We will also look at the historical underpinnings of U.S. cross-Strait policy – the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiqués – and the parameters they set out for U.S. commitments to Taiwan.
At this juncture, it bears repeating of a statement I made on this subject at our December 4 hearing on "China Growth as a Regional Economic Power: Impacts and Implications." In response to Beijing’s threatening rhetoric concerning Taiwan’s proposed referenda – which has again been in evidence over the past week -- I noted that given this environment, the United States would be well-advised to maintain its long-standing unstated policy of not actively supporting, but also not opposing, democratic moves in a direction that Beijing perceives to be toward independence with the goal of a peaceful outcome. Moreover, it would be counterproductive, and even perilous, for our government to allow itself to be perceived as in effect endorsing Beijing’s view of what constitutes a ‘provocation’ in cross-Strait relations.
In sum, China’s military modernization and its cross-Strait political posture are central to the Commission’s mandate to assess the national security implications of the U.S.-China economic relationship. I look forward to our comprehensive discussion of these issues today.