Undersea Dragons

China's Maturing Submarine Force

Lyle Goldstein and William Murray

goldstel@nwc.navy.mil murrayw@nwc.navy.mil
(401)-841-6982                       (401)-841-6984

This article will appear in the Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004) issue of 
International Security

Note:  The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the official viewpoints of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government.

Despite new tensions surrounding the March 2004 presidential elections on Taiwan, the United States and the People's Republic of  China (PRC) have witnessed over the last two years an impressive and unexpected warming of relations.[1]  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there have been a series of high-level meetings between the countries' leaders.  China backed United States military intervention in Afghanistan and actively supports the new regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul.[2] The past year has seen substantial United States - Chinese cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism, including the sharing of intelligence and the arrest of several suspected terrorists.[3] Surprising many, Beijing has supported the United States on all major United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the recent Iraq war.  Even more significant, American observers have been profoundly impressed with China's quiet efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula.[4]

WhileMany are convinced that a major corner has been turned in United States-China relations, with Beijing embracing a much more pro-American foreign policy.  An alternative explanation however, holds that Chinese leaders have instead opted for a pause in the evolving Sino-American strategic rivalry. Diplomatic gestures support the optimistic view of United States-China relations, but close inspection of Chinese military development provides ample evidence for both caution and concern.

Indeed, while the United States military remains focused on the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and and Central Asia, China continues its rapid military modernization.  As part of an increasing maritime focus, significant aircraft and destroyer purchases indicate a broad effort to improve combat capabilities.  There is little evidence however, that China will endeavor to field carrier battle groups.[5]  Moreover, Chinese airpower is constrained by weak aerial refueling capabilities, and its surface fleet lacks adequate air defense.[6]  Alternatively, preliminary indications suggest that submarines will lead China's new maritime strategic orientation.[7]

This development is demonstrated most clearly by China's unprecedented signing of a contract with Russia for eight new Kilo-class diesel submarines in May 2002.  Contrary to Western forecasts, China's confidence in imported Kilos has not halted domestic production of the new Song-class diesel submarine.[8]  In addition, China's nuclear propulsion program will soon field the first of its second-generation vessels, which will include both attack submarines and strategic missile boats.  Finally, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is undertaking an overhaul of the submarine force's weaponry, training, recruitment, and doctrine.  A Chinese appraisal of future naval warfare concludes, "The prospect for using submarines is good, because of their covertness and power.… Submarines are menaces existing anywhere at any time."[9] According to another s Chinese analyst, "Submarines are the maritime weapons posing the greatest threat to an aircraft carrier formation.  Submarines are also our Navy's core force."[10]

Recognizing this priority, the 2002 Department of Defense (DoD) report to the United States Congress on Chinese military capabilities concludes, "The PLA Navy likely intends to maintain a large submarine force."[11]  Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt (U.S. Navy, ret.), a close observer of the Chinese navy, similarly contends, "Submarines are an essential ingredient in the…maritime strategy of China," and calls for focused research on China's submarine force.[12]

Unclassified studies of Beijing's ability to conduct undersea warfare are rare.  Unfortunately, the analyses that have been available to the wider academic community are also misleading, built on highly problematic assumptions.  In particular, Michael O'Hanlon's article in International Security, although relatively accurate Unfortunately,concerning the prospects for an amphibious invasion, perilously simplifies the challenge posed by China's submarine force.[13]  This sanguine approach reflects a broader inclination within the American strategic studies community.  Indeed, few in the United States national security establishment view Chinese military modernization as a potential menace,[14] especially given the immediate nature of other threats such as terrorism and proliferation.  Many analysts make the all-too-frequent mistake of extrapolating from decades of peace in the Taiwan Strait.  A deeper understanding of Chinese security policy, however, suggests that peace in the Strait during most of the Cold War (since the 1960s) was the consequence of the virulent Sino-Soviet conflict that focused Beijing's attention elsewhere, rather than the product of a stable political reality.  With Soviet tanks poised to drive on Beijing, Taiwan was not an primary consideration for China's leaders.  Since the end of the Cold War, the East Asian strategic landscape has fundamentally changed, and growing Chinese power and nationalism make the status quo in the Taiwan Strait especially precarious.

Given the persistence of this troubling scenario, together with China's increasing maritime strategic focus, this article seeks to assess China's evolving submarine force and its likely impact on international security.  The first section describes the PLAN submarine force's emerging order of battle, consisting of both conventionally-powered, and nuclear-powered vessels.  The second section focuses on the all-important human and institutional dimensions that will support the major undersea platforms.  The third section places the analysis into a political context:  the crucial Taiwan scenario.  The final section develops a sketch of emerging PLAN submarine doctrine for warfare against the United States Navy.  We come to the preliminary conclusion that a dramatic shift in Chinese underwater htmirations and capabilities is under way, and that submarines are emerging as the centerpiece of an evolving Chinese quest to control the East Asian littoral.

An Asymmetric Solution for the Littoral

The PRC has long pursued a potent submarine force.  Indeed, submarines were highlighted in the founding doctrine of the PLAN, as outlined by the very first commander-in-chief, Xiao Jingguang.[15]  Though China succeeded in amassing a rather large force over the decades of the Cold War, these efforts were constrained by Maoist excesses, which tended to retard the technical and organizational progress so critical to building, maintaining and operating a first class undersea fleet.  Today's China is vastly altered since the era of Mao.  Now, China is poised to make a broad effort toward creating a submarine fleet that is both large, and modern.

CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINES

On 2 May 2003, China revealed that 70 PLAN submariners had perished in an undersea accident.  Details of the tragedy, hardly China's first submarine accident,[16] have gradually emerged.  Preliminary examination showed that the submarine had not suffered any damage and all victims were confirmed to have died of acute suffocation."[17]  Most likely, the accident resulted from the failure of a critical air intake valve to open.[18]  Regardless of the exact cause of this accident, the event raises troubling questions about safety procedures and the fundamental state of crew training on board PLAN submarines.  The Financial Times reported that the recent incident "cast a spotlight on China's aging and ill-equipped submarine fleet."[19]  But it would be a mistake to extrapolate from this incident and assume that the PLAN submarine force is incompetent and obsolete.  Such a perspective fails to recognize that submarine accidents have afflicted all of the major submarine powers.  Indeed, as the Kursk disaster and also the US Navy's near loss of the USS Dolphin in May 2002 illustrate, even the most mature submarine forces are not immune to serious accidents. 

Beijing responded to the accident with an unprecedented degree of candor.  In a high profile visit carried on national television shortly after the initial announcement, new President Hu Jintao and ex-President Jiang Zemin traveled to the submarine's Lushun base to console the families and inspect the vessel.[20]  In a subsequent political development , the PLAN's leader since 1996, Adm. Shi Yunsheng, was relieved and replaced by Adm. Zhang Dingfa.[21]  This shakeup at the top may or may not herald a new accountability in Chinese governance, but it is already certain that the submarine incident is having a profound effect on China's navy.  In particular, ADM Zhang's background as a submariner -- his predecessor was an aviator -- is one of many signs that the PLAN is accelerating its efforts in the realm of undersea warfare.[22]

The scale of China's $1.6 billion Kilo purchase from Russia suggests that PLAN strategists continue to view diesel submarines as a vital asset.  The eight new Kilos, all project 636s, Russia's top-of-the-line conventionally powered submarines, will augment the two 636s and the two somewhat more limited project 877s that China already possesses.  Combined, these twelve impressive submarines will over the next few years supplement China's nearly thirty aging Romeos, approximately twenty Mings (an indigenously produced modified Romeo), and its five or more of the newer Song-class submarines to become a formidable prospective undersea opponent.

Of all China's submarines, the Kilo is the most formidable.  It is well respected in the West, and is very quiet, employing a variety of advanced noise reduction measures including sound-dampening tiles, a raft-like shock absorbing base, and a seven-blade propeller to achieve its noteworthy stealth.  The Kilo is as quiet as the improved version of the United States Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine.[23] Double-hulled, it can dive to three hundred meters, has a maximum underwater speed of seventeen knots, and a crew of fifty two.  China’s Kilos can launch Russia's heavyweight wire-guided Test-71 ME, as well as 53-65KE wake-homing torpedoes.[24]

            The eight new Kilos, for which China has asked for "expedited" delivery within five years, will incorporate a number of significant upgrades.[25]  They will likely possess superior batteries (correcting a long-standing problem with exported Kilos), an enhanced digital sonar system, slower turning screws, and quieter main engines.[26]  Moreover, their weaponry will be state of the art.  They will be equipped with the versatile and potent Klub weapon control system that will allow them to fire the 3M-54E antiship cruise missiles (ASCM).  This  fearsome missile feature supersonic terminal homing and a 120 nautical mile range.  Additional Klub weapons the Russians will likely offer for sale include ballistic trajectory antianti-submarine and antisurface rocket thrown torpedoes.[27]  The new Kilos may very well deploy Russia’s supercavitating Shkval torpedo.  A recent Chinese discussion of these weapons offers the following characteristics for the Shkval: it weighs 2.7 tons, is 8.2 meters long and 533 mm wide, and has a range of 6-12 km with a maximum depth of 400 meters.  The speed is given as in excess of 200 knots, which is roughly three times faster than any torpedo carried by Western submarines.  Disturbingly, this article claims the Shkval system may already be operational within the PLAN submarine force.[28] Another source suggests that China may be fabricating its own supercavitating torpedo.[29] Chinese periodicals also evince a great interest in defensive armaments for submarines, including noisemakers and other antitorpedo systems, as well as surface-to-air missiles for use against antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft.[30]

            Air independent propulsion (AIP) technology promises to revolutionize the combat potential of future diesel submarines.[31] When submerged and operating on batteries, modern diesel submarines are notoriously difficult to detect -- and in many cases are even quieter than their modern nuclear counterparts.  This stealthiness is the single most valuable tactical feature of conventional submarines, enabling them, much like a sniper on land, to lie quietly in wait for enemy ships. Diesel submarine batteries require recharging every few days, however, which forces the submarine to sacrifice stealth by running its noisy diesel engines to generate electricity to charge the batteries.  When running its diesel engines, the submarine must raise its snorkel mast to take in outside air to satisfy the engine's enormous appetite for oxygen.  This protrusion provides a significant radar and infrared target for opposing forces to find.  Air independent propulsion, on the other hand, provides the means for diesel submarines to forgo these vulnerable snorkeling periods through continuous and quiet charging of the submarine's batteries by generating electricity using large stores of liquid oxygen.[32]

Although AIP-equipped diesel submarines cannot match the endurance or speed characteristics of nuclear submarines, AIP does permit diesel submarines to remain quietly submerged for weeks at a time.  The tactical advantages that this near independence from snorkeling brings has led all the European submarine manufacturers to offer AIP as an option on their newest export classes.  The Pakistani navy recently accepted a French AIP system for its most modern imported submarine.[33] There is little reason to believe that the Chinese will settle for less.  In fact, Chinese naval periodicals indicate a very significant Chinese interest in AIP.[34]  Even Chinese-built diesel submarines may soon appear with AIP.  Analysts noted in 2001 that China's twentieth Ming-class submarine was 2 meters longer than its predecessor, leading to speculation that it was a test bed for an AIP system.[35]  A major center for AIP research in China is the Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics.  Illustrating the high priority of this research in China, the institute was visited by Jiang Zemin in 1999.  The Dalian institute has apparently engaged in a substantive scientific exchange on fuel cell technology with German institutes, the world's leaders in fuel cells for submarines.[36]

            The 2002 DoD report to Congress on Chinese military modernization supports the idea that the Chinese are pursuing AIP, stating, "A new advanced version of the Song-class conventional submarine is expected to incorporate advanced AIP."  The same report details other Song innovations: a skewed seven-blade propeller, submerged ASCM launch capability, flank array sonar of French design, and German diesel engines.[37]  The PLAN intends the Song to be a modern replacement for its Mings and Romeos as well as a capable peer to its imported Kilos.  Some disagree.  Preliminary reports on the May 2002 Kilo sale projected that the purchase might signify the death knell for the Song program.[38]  Indeed, the five years that marked the interval between launches of the first two Songs did suggest profound engineering and design troubles.  But the completion of the second Song in 2001, and a third Song in 2002, with continued design improvements from their predecessors, the most obvious of which is the removal of the notch in the leading edge of the sail, suggest instead that the program is going forward in tandem with the Kilo purchase. 

The new sail on the Song is a matter of some misunderstanding.  One analyst wrote in Jane's International Defense Review, "Starting with the third vessel, the Song (Type 039) submarine is very close to the French Agosta 90B in external shape.  The height of the sail has been lowered in order to increase stability underwater.”[39]  It is apparent, however that the sail was not lowered.  Instead, the notch on the forward half of the sail was covered up by extending the top edge of the sail forward.   This becomes obvious after a close examination of photos of the Song before and after the correction.  Fortunately, several unclassified photos include human figures enabling relatively accurate (if unsophisticated) calculations regarding the height of the sail.  Design considerations bolster the argument that the Song's sail height was not lowered.[40]  The "smoothing" of the sail would doubtless make the flow of water around it much quieter.  Thus, the speculation that the Song was unstable underwater -- the supposed rationale for "lowering" the sail -- is also suspect.  To be sure, the five year gap in between hulls one and two is indicative of some serious problems.  But these problems may well be less significant than early Western appraisals suggested.[41]

If this submarine is better than originally estimated, then it should not be surprising that multiple sources report that several more of these vessels are being built.[42]  According to Rear Adm. Eric P. McVadon, (U.S. Navy, ret.), an authority on the Chinese navy, the Song has entered serial production.[43]  Another analyst even states that as many as ten Songs may be under construction, in two different shipyards.[44]  Considerable sunk costs in the Song program will certainly also propel this program forward.  China's continuing acquisition of Songs, while simultaneously purchasing Kilos, does suggest that the PLA submarine force is in the midst of a major near-term buildup.

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

Even PRC sources concede that China's Han nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Xia nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) were not only noisy but also posed serious hazards to their crews.[45]  Such early problems were doubtlessly exacerbated because both first-generation nuclear submarines were designed and built during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, 1966-69.  Indeed, the chief designer of these vessels Huang Xuhua, at one point, was sentenced to raising pigs.  Subsequently, a group of Red Guards even condemned him to death, a sentence that was only commuted with the direct intervention of Premier Zhou Enlai.[46]  Nuclear submarine design is sufficiently challenging without such blatantly deleterious political intrusions on the process and PLAN nuclear propulsion paid a heavy price.

Despite these deficiencies, the PLAN continues to operate both classes of vessels.  The problem-plagued Xia SSBN has just emerged from a major overhaul,[47] and the Chinese press continues to extol sorties by China's Han nuclear attack submarines -- even claiming that they played a role in the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis.[48] Exemplifying the importance that the PLAN attaches to its nuclear submarines, a recent Chinese article claims that Beijing's nuclear submarines are first among several factors (ranked ahead of nuclear weapons) that would stay Washington's hand in a future Taiwan crisis.[49]

            The PLAN is actively pursuing successors to its problem plagued first-generation nuclear submarines.  The new Type 093 SSN will soon succeed the Han, the last of which was commissioned in 1990.  Western sources suggest that the Type 093 will be technologically similar to the Russian Victor III, possessing enhanced sonar capabilities and advanced quieting.[50]  A recent PRC article claims that the powerful indigenous reactor will propel the Type 093 to speeds exceeding 40 knots.  The same report suggests that the 093 will be comparable in combat performance to the U.S. Los Angeles class SSN.[51]  Other Chinese media reports boast that the new Chinese nuclear attack submarine will not be left behind by the latest U.S. Sea Wolf class.[52]  American submariners may well scoff a such claims, but Western analysts underestimated the technical capabilities of late Soviet era submarines too.[53]  A bow-on photograph of the vessel in dry dock suggests that the ship has both upper and lower bow sonar assemblies, as well as flank arrays.  A Chinese report claims the 093 will have 65 cm torpedo tubes, which suggests it will be able to carry Russia's largest wake-homing torpedo -- one developed specifically to destroy aircraft carriers.[54]  The premier 093 was launched in 2002.[55]

            Production of the 2^nd generation SSBN, known as the Type 094, appears to be well underway.  Chinese sources assess that the Xia's successor aims to have a comparable acoustic signature with that of the very quiet Russian Typhoon.[56]  The first of the Type 094 SSBNs may have been launched in 2003, on schedule to become operational in 2005.  A second type 094 by 2008 is a distinct possibility.  A larger displacement SSBN, Type 095, which would carry a more capable set of ballistic missiles may also be planned.[57]  The ample space devoted to discussing SSBN operations in China's journal of naval warfare, Jianchuan Zhishi, implies that the PLAN's determination to develop a functional SSBN force remains strong.[58] Regarding SLBM development, a Japanese source suggests that the PLAN's old Golf-class submarine has been engaged in tests of the new JL-2 Submarine launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) since 1995.[59]

            The JL-2 promises to be a formidable SLBM.  Solid fueled, with a projected range of 8,000 km, it is 13 m long, 2 m wide, and weighs 42,000 kg.  Physically it is roughly comparable to the United States' Trident D-5.[60]  The JL-2 will reportedly carry either a solitary one megaton warhead or alternatively three to eight multiple independent reentry vehicles with nuclear yields of up to 150 kilotons, in addition to penetration aids.  It is expected to maneuver in flight using stellar and GPS navigational inputs, and may have a circular error probability accuracy of between 150 and 300 m.[61]  This weapon and its successors, so it seems, are being built with an eye on developments in United States national missile defense.  

Taken as a whole, Chinese efforts in developing nuclear submarines suggest a measured commitment to the establishment of a blue water capability over the longer term, which complements strong efforts made in the near term to secure the littoral.  Evidently, not all PLAN thinkers are satisfied with incremental development of the nuclear force.  One Chinese naval strategist, for example, recently called for a future force of twelve SSBNs and thirty SSNs to augment a fleet of sixty six conventional submarines.[62]

Human Resources and Institutional Dimensions

A central precept of Maoist strategy, and therefore of PLA doctrine during most of the Cold War, held that force of will trumps technology in warfare.  Deng Xiaoping led a technocratic revolution against Maoist doctrines, sparking China's spectacular economic growth of the last two decades.  "High-tech" also became a buzzword in the PLA during that era as China started to replace obsolete weapons systems.  Recently, however, study of the United States military and the wars that the United States fought through the 1990s has led the PLA to rediscover the human factor.  Beijing clearly recognizes the extraordinary emphasis that the United States military places on education and training.   The PLAN, in particular, is making serious efforts to redress recognized deficiencies in recruitment, training, logistics, and underwater technology research.

RECRUITMENT AND EDUCATION

While reducing personnel levels overall, the PLAN is also building communities of intellectual excellence, including the submarine force.  Recognizing that pay incentives are needed to attract qualified specialists in China's competitive labor market, the PLAN has initiated generous pay increases in recent years.  For example, some ranks saw a salary increase of 100 per cent in 1999-2000.[63]  In screening applicants, the PLAN gives priority to "outstanding student cadres whom are willing to volunteer for submarine service."[64]  Chinese military leaders, having identified a severe deficiency in developing competent noncommissioned officers, created a policy to redress this problem that is apparently producing an entirely new corps of specialists for undersea warfare.[65]  The PLA is also putting the finishing touches on a rigorous system of professional military education, including an initiative that replicates the United States ROTC program.  Using the United States military as a benchmark, the new Chinese system of military education is such that one Chinese submarine force admiral's resumé reads similarly to a United States counterpart's: Adm. Zhang Xizhao completed two tours at the Qingdao Submarine Academy and one each at the Nanjing Naval Command and Staff College and at the PLA's National Defense University in Beijing.[66]

The Qingdao Submarine Academy has recently undertaken a sweeping program of reform.  In a rigorous process of self-criticism, the academy's leadership concluded that "basic theories have often been stressed at the expense of operating skills."  Focusing on its core mission, the leadership has concluded that the only appropriate "yardstick" for evaluating "without mercy…existing teaching materials, including personnel and facilities" was "whether or not the relevant units are able to fight under hi-tech conditions." New courses have been added, student exchange is now encouraged, and "teaching modes marked by theory-to-theory 'indoctrination' were smashed."  In addition, the reforms have introduced interdisciplinary research and a new focus on applying theory to command decisions, "flexibly dealing with sudden incidents, as well as upgrading the students' psychological quality for fighting in a complicated environment."[67]

Another segment of the PLAN's education reform program concerns strategic research.  There is an increasingly discernible trend in Chinese military periodicals toward the objective and methodical study of lessons learned from the study of relevant campaign histories.  Although detailed discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II is discernible in these periodicals as early as the 1980s,[68] the pace of publication and the sophistication of the analyses has increased considerably.  Undersea warfare figures prominently in these analyses.  Hitler's U-boat campaign is of great interest to Chinese strategists,[69] as is Germany's broader evolution as a maritime power.[70] There is also extensive coverage of United States submarine exploits against Japan in the Pacific War.[71]  As highlighted elsewhere in this article, PLAN specialists continue to study Soviet tactics and strategy, in addition to other more contemporary submarine campaigns, such as the 1982 Falklands War.[72]  Thus, debates on strategy within the PLAN are now informed by an increasingly solid base of military historical research rather than ideological conformity.[73]

TRAINING REVOLUTION

Paralleling these intellectual innovations, the PLAN appears to be implementing a training revolution.  As good students of United States military operations, Chinese planners have become increasingly conscious of the imperative for joint planning and operations.[74]  Indeed the PLAN may have even exceeded the United States in selected areas of joint training.  For example, the PLAN has developed an innovative program of cross-training surface and submarine commanders.[75]  Beyond coursework and simulations, this program incorporates a system of cross-posting.  A striking facet of the PLA's effort to upgrade training is a distinct shift from rote, repetitive drills to what is described as "confrontational training", which allows for more free-play elements.  As is the case of joint operations, this notion appears to be an effort to imitate successful United States military practices.  In fact, a recent Chinese article describes China's "Fort Irwin," where "red teams" compete against an elite "blue team," with the goal of forcing the red team commanders to depart from prearranged plans and make on-the-spot adjustments.[76]  Thus, "confrontational training" or competitive, realistic war games are becoming increasingly common in the Chinese fleet, and, in particular, within the submarine force.[77]  Rounding out this trend toward interoperability, the Chinese armed forces, including the navy, have also recently executed a number of intertheater exercises.[78]

Analysts generally agree that after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis the PLA focused on the United States as its most likely future adversary.  Training with United States capabilities in mind has driven China's submarine force to incorporate substantial innovation into its exercises.  For example, fighting the United States would likely mean that PLAN bases might be heavily damaged by air and cruise missile strikes at an early point in hostilities.  Working under this assumption, the submarine force has recently conducted a drill in which torpedoes were loaded onto a submarine at a small civilian port employing mobile cranes and other special equipment.[79]  Another recent drill focused on clearing disabled ships from a vital navigation channel.[80]

INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS

The PLAN leadership also appears to understand that building and maintaining a world-class fleet of submarines entails a huge investment in infrastructure.  Chinese sources suggest greater attention to logistics throughout the PLA.  Planning has shifted from "charts, sand tables, and individual micro-computers," to the development of a "theater and campaign logistics command training operations system."[81] There have also been efforts at standardization to increase the maintenance efficiency of the fleet.  For example, a recent initiative sought to reduce the number of high-grade lubricating oils used by the submarine force by increasing individual oils' quality and versatility.[82]

PLA logistics training scenarios are also based on a hypothetical confrontation with the United States.  A 2001 logistics exercise focused on disguising important targets and conducting rush repairs.[83]  In the PLAN, similar exercises have focused on air defense; port security; the evacuation of people and equipment; in addition to the emergency provisioning of warships with oil, food, water, and medical supplies.[84]  In addition, seaborne supply operations have been conducted with the newest Chinese submarines.[85]  Finally, the PLA leadership recently highlighted the vital importance of naval construction units.[86]  Such units could conceivably allow the PLAN submarine force to build submarine pens for its vessels -- "dragon palaces under the sea" -- which would not only offer the submarine fleet enhanced protection but might also allow for undetected egress from port.[87]  Extensive shelters already protect the nuclear submarine fleet at Qingdao.[88]

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Beijing's commitment to undersea warfare over the long term depends on developing an outstanding science and technology research system to sustain the fleet's development.  The outlines of such a system are beginning to appear.  The PLAN leadership has selected Wuhan and Harbin Universities as sites of maritime engineering excellence.  The former, which opened officially in 1999, combines the Navy Engineering Academy and the Navy Electronics Engineering Academy.  The curriculum focuses on "tackling the key problem of fusing and joining electronic information to weapons systems."[89]  The latter has colleges of nuclear propulsion and of underwater engineering.  Recent research achievements of Harbin University for the PLAN include technology for ocean bottom topographic mapping and a dual-use submersible for mine detection and deep-ocean salvage.[90] Undersea mapping, in particular, appears to be a significant PLAN priority.  Naval survey units have recently produced a three-dimensional digital chart of China's coastal waters.  This software not only conveys images for mariners but also sounds an audio alarm to warn of potential obstacles.[91] On an even more sophisticated level, Chinese naval cartographers are mapping regional deviations in the ocean's gravity, because of this force's influence on the accuracy of long-range weapons fired from submarines.[92] Among other topics that Chinese researchers are exploring are lasers for submarine detection and sophisticated remote seabed hydrophone systems.[93]

These research efforts are complemented by espionage.  Chinese hydrological research vessels maintain an increasing presence in the waters of Taiwan and Japan, prompting the suggestion that they are busy "collecting information for the (PLAN) submarine force."[94]  The director of the acoustic noise laboratory at Russia's Pacific Oceanography Institute stood trial in Vladivostok for trying to smuggle secrets to the Chinese.[95]  Of related interest, one might note the somewhat curious fact that Harbin has been selected as a premier maritime research institution, despite the city's considerable distance from the sea.  On the other hand, the university, just a few hours drive from the Russian border, is conveniently located for tapping underemployed former Soviet scientists.  Naturally, the United States is also a major target for Chinese submarine-related espionage.  The most notorious example concerns allegations against Wen Ho Lee with regard to the fate of plans for the W-88 warhead, a design optimized for SLBMs.  Less well known is another case involving alleged attempts by a Chinese graduate student at Iowa State University to illegally obtain detailed knowledge on the fabrication of Terfenol-D, a substance that promises to be crucial to future sonar system development.[96]

It would be a major mistake, however, to assume that China's future science and technology defense prospects are wholly dependent on Russian expertise.  Indeed, many United States analysts fall into the trap of extrapolating from the PLAN's historical development, gravely underestimating the impact of "systemic shocks" to that development, above all: the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Cultural Revolution.  It would be an error, therefore, to predict future developments within the Chinese submarine force based on the very slow development of the Han class SSN, for example, which was begun in 1958, but only went to sea in 1974.  Given the PRC's extraordinary efforts in education and especially basic science research, the ascendance of a generation of scientific personnel trained in the West, and market incentives that have vastly enhanced the technological sophistication of contemporary China, it is not surprising that one of the United States' foremost Sinologists warns that the next generation of Chinese-made weaponry will represent a marked departure from the past.[97]

The Taiwan Scenario

The PLAN's near-term focus on diesel submarines is one of several indicators that suggest that Beijing's immediate focus is on the Taiwan problem.  Observers of the military balance across the Strait generally agree that an invasion of Taiwan will continue to elude the PLA for at least the next decade.  Despite the steady upgrading of the PLA Air Force, the revamping of Chinese special forces, and particularly the fielding of a vast array of short-range missiles, the paucity of modern amphibious landing craft among other factors makes a full-scale invasion an unlikely, if still conceivable possibility.[98]

A BLOCKADE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

Enhanced submarine capabilities and numbers increasingly give credence to an alternative strategy for coercing Taiwan:  the naval blockade.[99]  As an island with few resources, Taiwan may be uniquely vulnerable to this form of coercion.  The volatility of Taipei's stock market during the 1996 crisis indicates that Taiwan's entire economy could face a meltdown if confronted with determined mainland efforts to subvert it.  Moreover, the former ruling and now opposition party in Taipei, the Kuomintang, has been critical of the current Democratic Progressive Party government's tendency toward pro-independence rhetoric.  This suggests a strong possibility that the mainland could succeed in exploiting Taiwan's internal political fissures in a crisis.  In other words, Washington cannot count on a united front within Taiwan -- speedy capitulation is conceivable if Beijing confronts Taipei with a sophisticated strategy of sticks and carrots.

A recent Chinese article strongly suggests that PLA strategists are closely examining options for blockading Taiwan.  Reflecting on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, the author concludes, "The United States achieved its objective of a deterrent blockade, forcing the Soviet Union to give in."  According to this analysis, "A maritime blockade should be imposed suddenly, after thorough preparations, so as to have the effect of taking the enemy by surprise."  It is noted, moreover, that "a maritime blockade in a civil war…does not come within the scope of application of international maritime law."[100]  As another Chinese author explains:  "Once China blockades Taiwan, sea transportation would be cut, Taiwan's economy would be paralyzed and its political situation would become unstable."[101]

            Chinese diesel submarines would be the decisive force in this troubling scenario.  Employing its older submarines as mine-layers and decoys would allow China to rely on its more modern submarines to patrol north, south, and east of the island.  Even a few ship sinkings would prompt insurance brokers to revoke their coverage of merchant shipping, and commerce at Taiwan's two biggest ports, Taipei and Kaoshiung, would swiftly grind to a halt.[102]

TAIWAN'S ASW POTENTIAL

While the United States considered its options, Taiwan's navy might try to break the blockade on its own.  Its chances of success, however, would be relatively low.  Taiwan's otherwise formidable air force might well fall victim to PRC missile impacts.  Even without such strikes, Taiwan's aircraft are not well suited for ASW operations.  Indeed, a recent report suggests that out of Taiwan's twenty six S-2T Trackers, only six are operational.[103]  This is not surprising given that the aircraft have been in Taiwan's service since 1976, and were considered obsolete by the United States before that.  Taiwan's budget crunch, moreover, has cast doubt on the expected purchase of twelve P-3C Orions from the United States, so that the Taiwan navy may seek a life-extension on the S-2Ts through 2008.  The imminent delivery of the four Kidd-class destroyers from the United States will not significantly help the Taiwan navy in its ASW efforts either, even though the Kidd is potentially a capable ASW platform. 

The root cause of Taiwan's ASW woes is an inadequate number of ASW platforms overall.[104]  Finding and destroying submarines requires enormous resources.  As Owen Coté observes concerning the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, "the price of sea control was…substantially…[higher] than the price of contesting it…"[105]

The problem is exacerbated both by the large number of submarines that China can deploy and by the nature of the area in which China's submarines will operate, much of which is characterized by shallow, noisy waters that make ASW exceedingly difficult. 

Also affecting this calculus are the rapidly improving effectiveness and ease of operation of the weapons that China's submarines will carry.  Modern wake-homing torpedoes form a particularly cogent threat against surface ships.  They also have the benefit of requiring only rudimentary submarine skills to fire, in contrast to previous torpedo-homing schemes.

Many regard submarines as the best ASW platform, and there has been much talk of expanding Taiwan's small fleet of four diesel submarines, two of which date from World War II.  Superficially, Taiwan's prospective purchase of eight modern diesel submarines from the United States would help to restore some measure of equity to the increasingly lopsided undersea balance in the Taiwan Strait.  The purchase is plagued by numerous obstacles, however, and even if it does go forward, these submarines would do little to redress China's fundamental undersea superiority.  Unlike nuclear fast attack submarines, their diesel counterparts are not well suited to searching for other submarines.  Taiwan's diesel submarines might do well in chance encounters against their mainland adversaries, but they could not conduct the wide-area sanitizing operations required to lift a blockade.  Instead, additional modern submarines for the Taiwan navy would give Taipei some offensive undersea capability, but they would probably have little effect on PRC submarine operations against Taiwan.[106]

The timing and rate of submarine acquisition also mitigates against the notion that eight new submarines will help Taiwan's ASW prospects.  As noted previously, the PLAN expects to take delivery of eight Kilos between 2005 and 2007.[107]  These ships are being simultaneously built in three different Russian shipyards, which may suggest that Beijing is in a hurry.[108]  In addition, the PLAN may well have a system for accelerating crew training given that it maintains a large force of submarines and that it already has Kilos in its arsenal.[109]  A United States Navy delegation told Taiwan officials in November, 2003 that Taiwan was unlikely to get its eight new diesel submarines before 2019.[110]   Moreover, Taiwan's crew training would likely be a major bottleneck, suggesting some additional years before the vessels are truly operational.  This time lag, even under assumptions that favor Taiwan, will still significantly widen the already substantial capability gap later in the present decade.  The aforementioned Taiwan budget crunch that affects the P-3 Orion sale also casts doubt on the proposed submarine purchase.  With the Taiwan defense budget reaching an eight-year low in 2002,[111] the $4-5 billion commitment seems unlikely.  Also complicating Taipei's calculations regarding this purchase is the ominous challenge of water space management.  To avoid the problem of fratricide, Taiwan's submarine force would have to be shielded from potential United States ASW operations.  Making this point, former Taiwan Vice Defense Minister Ku Ch'ung-lien recently warned, "Taiwan submarines [may] be mistakenly attacked."  He concluded, "[Submarines] may not necessarily meet Taiwan's actual needs.[112]

Simply stated, Taipei is unwilling or unable to devote the necessary resources to mount a credible defense against a sustained submarine campaign.  It is therefore unlikely that Taiwan will be able to cope with such a scenario at present or for the foreseeable future.  The more salient question is:  Could the United States break the blockade?  Certainly yes, but the growing capability of the PLAN submarine force will increase the risk to United States naval forces operating in the vicinity of Taiwan.

ASW IS HARD, AND GETTING HARDER

The United States ability to wage ASW has withered significantly since the end of the Cold War. O’Hanlon estimates that “in an extreme case, a United States ship or two could even be sunk” in breaking a PRC blockade of Taiwan[113]  Our analysis shows this estimate to be too optimistic – off by an order of magnitude.  The discussion below reveals the flaws in O’Hanlon’s estimate.

As one PLAN strategist correctly explains, "Attempting to track submarines in the tremendous expanse of the ocean is extremely difficult."[114] This assessment fully corresponds to US Navy experience.  Coté, for example, cites one participant in the increasingly difficult hunt for quiet Soviet submarines in the late Cold War:  "[There were] several incidents in which the entire Navy had to deploy in order to find and maintain contact on one submarine."[115]  Finding and neutralizing quiet submarines requires an intricate choreography and the integration of the specialized characteristics of multiple aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and remote cueing systems.  The more physical assets that can be devoted to the problem of finding submarines, the more likely that adversary submarines can be found and destroyed, or at least driven off.  Similarly, the more highly skilled and trained the hunters are, the more likely their success. Unfortunately, the United States Navy 's ability to field large numbers of skilled submarine hunters and ASW platforms has fallen precipitously. 

During the Cold War, United States carrier-borne S-3 Viking aircraft were effective submarine stalkers, capable of finding periscopes at long ranges with their potent radar.  But the S-3s have been taken off of their ASW mission, and have become full-time aerial refueling aircraft.  Land-based P-3 Orion ASW aircraft, have suffered a 50 per cent overall force reduction, and in most regions they no longer focus on ASW as their principal mission.  A third of the remaining P-3s are scheduled to be removed from service by 2005 due to corrosion problems.[116]  The U.S. Navy has effectively mothballed its Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), and it has scaled back on the number and ASW prowess of its Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)-equipped T-AGOS ships, especially by failing to build beyond the first prototype of the Impeccable-class.  The navy has been unable to adequately test that ship's Low Frequency Active (LFA) sonar system due to lawsuits stemming from environmental concerns about possible harm to marine mammals.  This is a severe blow to the navy's shallow water ASW efforts given that the LFA system can provide particularly good long-range detection probabilities against modern diesel submarines in shallow waters.[117]  Significantly, only 5 of the Navy's 22 Cold War-era T-AGOS ships continue to perform ASW missions.[118]  The navy's fleet of surface combatants is also much reduced.  Such capable ASW ships as the remaining nineteen Spruance class destroyers are slated for accelerated decommissioning as a cost-saving measure.[119]  In fiscal year 2004, five Spruance destroyers are scheduled for decommissioning, as are four T-AGOS ships.[120]

During any United States attempt to break a Chinese submarine blockade, American nuclear submarines are certain to form the leading strike force.  The United States, however, now has only fifty four fast attack submarines, barely more than half of the 100 SSNs operational in 1985.[121]  Nor are current building rates particularly reassuring.[122]  The remaining United States SSNs are individually more capable than they were eighteen years ago, but whereas during the Cold War SSNs focused primarily on their blue water ASW mission, today's SSN force must divide time between ASW, surveillance operations, and most prominently, the attack of targets ashore with cruise missiles. Added to this reduction in force and shift in mission is the irreducible difficulty of finding the modern, quiet diesel submarines in China’s shallow and noisy littoral waters.

American SSNs could conduct a methodical search-and-destroy campaign against Chinese submarines, especially in the deep waters to the east of Taiwan where they can make full use of their superior technology, weapons, and training.  But as one analyst notes "shallow water is ideally suited for [Chinese] submarine operations.…[They] can hide between the layers of the underwater thermals and maneuver among the rocks and shoals, where acoustics are clouded."[123] In the vicinity of Taiwan, even the United States submarine force will be strongly tested, given the difficult environment, the large number of interfering merchant and fishing vessels that mask the quiet adversary, improvements in the PLAN submarine force's ASW weaponry, and the sheer weight of Chinese numbers.  This fundamental difficulty is exacerbated if United States SSNs are expected to operate in the Taiwan Strait, which is so shallow as to nearly preclude United States SSN operations there.[124]  Much of the East Asian littoral is comprised of shallow water, defined here as less than two hundred meters in depth. (See Figure 1)  This area, which encompasses nearly the entire Yellow and East China seas, provides severely disadvantageous conditions for United States SSN employment, weapons, and sensors.   Such conditions constitute nearly all of the waters to the west and north of Taiwan.   

Taking into account the forgoing analysis, the problems with O’Hanlon’s analysis become readily apparent.  First, he claims that the “overall outcome of [the blockade campaign] is hard to predict, given the rough parity in numbers between Chinese submarines and Taiwanese escorts.”[125]  This appraisal gives short shrift to the history of ASW warfare, which has repeatedly shown that ASW campaigns are extraordinarily resource intensive.  Thousands of United States and British escorts and aircraft were required to curtail the threat from several hundred Nazi submarines, and despite this great numerical advantage, this campaign was "a damned near run thing."[126] Similarly, during the Falklands War, the British navy expended nearly all of their ASW ordinance without sinking or disabling the two modern Argentine submarines that were active in the theater.[127]

In assessing the United States Navy’s overall present and future effectiveness against China’s submarine force, O’Hanlon’s analysis is again flawed.  He attempts to extrapolate from certain estimates regarding United States Navy effectiveness versus Soviet submarines.  Yet he ignores numerous problems with the comparison:  Diesel submarines are quieter than nuclear submarines; acoustic conditions in the littoral are much more complicated and difficult than in deep blue water; and there is no reason to believe that United States forces could rely on SOSUS hydrophones in the vicinity of Taiwan, as O’Hanlon assumes.  As demonstrated above, United States ASW is not what it was during the Cold War, nor is the likely future operating environment.  O’Hanlon’s quantitative assumptions regarding a United States ASW campaign against Chinese submarines are also not sustainable.  Thus, his notion that each Chinese submarine would only have a 20 per cent chance of detecting an adversary ship before being detected is, again, far off the mark.[128]  Our estimate is that this number could be at least 50-60 per cent if not higher.[129]  Similarly, he estimates that 75 per cent of Chinese submarines would be destroyed after one “round” of combat, a rather optimistic appraisal of United States ASW capabilities (and Chinese incompetence). [130]  Such changes in assumptions have major consequences in calculating possible United States losses.

O’Hanlon's mistaken estimates may stem from a misreading of Cold War submarine operations.  He extrapolates from a source claiming that in the late 1980s, forty United States SSNs could destroy all Soviet SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk within fourteen hours.[131]  He neglects, however, the original author’s caveat that this measure assumed no reaction by the Soviet armed forces, a truly bizarre assumption.[132]  The suggestion, moreover, that a few dozen Taiwan and United States ships and aircraft could adequately patrol his suggested 300,000-square-mile safe “corridor” is also highly questionable.[133]  Finally, O’Hanlon’s analysis is based on faulty estimates of Chinese submarine capabilities.  The analysis suggests that only 10 percent of China’s armed forces will have “late Cold War equivalent hardware” by 2010.  If the Song proves to be a capable platform, the Chinese submarine force in 2003 is already over that modest hurdle. Given recent developments, including especially the large new Kilo purchase and the imminent appearance of China's new SSN, there is no possibility that O'Hanlon's estimate on PLAN capabilities will hold to 2010.  Thus, O'Hanlon's conclusion that "in an extreme case, a United States ship or two could be sunk" does not meet the test of closer scrutiny.

PLAN Submarine Doctrine

Since at least 1996, the PLAN has been preparing to do battle with the United States Navy.  Consequently, PLAN submarine doctrine is developing with a distinct understanding of the asymmetric nature of its rivalry with the United States Navy. 

ASYMMETRIC TACTICS

In such an environment, PLAN submariners realize they must overcome the technological gap with innovative tactics that will allow them to confront a technically superior military.[134]  Of course, this is a condition that has prevailed in almost all of modern China's military conflicts and has therefore become deeply embedded in Chinese strategic culture.  Contemporary Chinese military journals frequently discuss the option of striking first as a key means of coping with inferiority.[135]  This finding is consistent with that of the 2002 DoD Annual Report to Congress on the Chinese military.[136]  Strategic timing is vital, but so is tactical timing.  One Chinese military author, for example, envisages the sortie of Chinese submarines from port during bad weather so that adversary ASW aircraft are temporarily grounded.[137] Speaking to reporters after a recent patrol, a PLAN submarine captain explained, "When we penetrated the first island chain, we took advantage of bad weather as cover, which did well in ensuring the concealment of our submarine."[138] Similarly, another Chinese strategist suggests that the Luzon Strait (between Taiwan and the Philippines) is ideal for submarine operations, because of the notoriously bad weather.[139] In this and like manners PLAN submariners intend to exploit the fact that hostilities are likely to take place in and around China's home waters.[140]  Thus, PLAN submarine commanders are working toward an intimate acquaintance with the topography, thermoclines, currents, and other hydrographic peculiarities of China's coast and particularly in close proximity to Taiwan.  One Chinese source says of the waters east of Taiwan:  "Owing to the enormously strong and warm western Pacific current in these waters, submarines operating there can submerge to a certain depth of water and antisubmarine sonar above the water finds it very difficult to detect them directly."[141]

A recent description of PLAN submarine exercises details operations in which the submarines stop their engines and rest either on the seabed or drift silently on a thermal layer as if "perched on the clouds."[142]  Another notes repeated practice in cloaking as a "submerged reef" and riding the rapid local currents.[143]  These peculiar phrases suggest that Chinese submariners clearly recognize the importance of having comprehensive local environmental knowledge and exploiting that knowledge to maintain stealth and other tactical advantages.

Chinese sources also note that PLAN submarines will work in conjunction with mining operations.[144] They observe that submarines played a role in the United States' campaign to mine Japanese waters during World War II, which led to the sinking of 670 Japanese ships.[145] Indeed, there is great interest in mines, and particularly deep-water rising mines.[146]  Submarines and mines are not the only underwater weapon systems receiving close scrutiny by PLAN strategists.  Minisubmarines, special operations, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) also appear to be of great interest.[147]

Previous discussions of PLAN doctrine have noted the potentially significant fact  that China's submarine force has not been officially tasked with an ASW role.[148]  This htmect of doctrine is in transition, however, and the development of submarine ASW tactics now appears to be a priority.[149] Indeed, the latest model diesel submarines are apparently training for this mission.[150] Against the formidable passive sonar systems of the United States submarine force, Chinese submarine captains recognize that frequent resort to active pinging is tantamount to suicide.[151]  The emphasis is therefore on improving the performance of passive Chinese sonar and the incorporation of towed arrays.[152]  Another improvement is that Chinese submarines are increasingly equipped with digital (versus less capable analog) sonar systems that make extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf computer processing technology.[153]  Western diesel-electric submarines have been successful during exercises in conducting mock attacks against American nuclear submarines.[154]

Conceivably, a future Chinese submarine force could be guided to ASW engagements, cued by acoustic information obtained from remote seabed hydrophone arrays, by a form of Chinese SOSUS, which has elicited considerable PLAN interest, as noted above.[155]  Chinese military analysts are also interested in sonar countermeasures,[156] including the use of acoustic signal masking with China's extensive merchant and fishing fleets. A United States naval strategist speculates,  "[Chinese] fishing vessels would seed periscope decoys, transponder buoys, and floating radar reflectors.  Merchant ships would transmit false radar signals and would tow acoustic jammers."