Remarks as presented before the U.S.-China Commission
Session on Military Trends in the Cross-Strait Relationship
February 6 2004
Mr. Jason E. Bruzdzinski
Senior Professional Staff
The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia
Good Afternoon.
I appreciate the opportunity to present my views before the U.S.-China Commission.
Efforts to better understand the PLA's modernization and its implications are very important because China is an enduring challenge for U.S. defense policy and planning.
I hope that discoveries from my research on China's "Assassin's Mace" concept or shashoujian, which I will summarize today, will be helpful to the Commission's important work.
For the record, I submit my recent paper, Demystifying Shashoujian. This comprehensive analysis will be published later this year by the U.S. Army War College, The American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, in an edited compilation of academic papers on the PLA.
My remarks today express my own views and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government or my employer, The MITRE Corporation.
I would like to offer a working definition for. Then, identify its origins and discuss its emergence as a warfighting concept for the PLA. I will conclude with a few statements about the implications of China's concept.
Definitions
Shashoujian is a widely understood and commonly used idiom in Chinese society. Indeed, it would be hard to find Chinese who do not understand the concept.
Simply, it is the means or ways by which one overcomes a seemingly insurmountable obstacle. In this context, it implies an action or quality that offers strategic advantage when employed in a particular way, at a key moment of opportunity for the accomplishment of a specific goal.
In Chinese military vernacular, according to senior PLA officers, shashoujian connotes a secret weapon, a platform or system for deterrence, or a tool to achieve political, psychological and military victory through a single, decisive blow in combat. Shashoujian, in a military context, should be considered in two ways.
First, as a weapon or weapon system.
Second, as a warfighting concept, a stratagem (or combination of stratagems), or a method or tactic that enables the PLA to seize advantage and assure victory against a superior adversary.
From my research, I also believe it to be a codeword for a secret Chinese military research, development and acquisition effort. This effort, which I will discuss, appears responsive to China's military strategy and is aimed at deterring, countering or defeating the United States in a military conflict, should that come to pass.
Origin
Shashoujian is an ancient term finding its origin in the Tang period (618-907 A.D.).[i] I raise this point to emphasize the resilience of shashoujian in China's culture. It is significant that the concept has endured China's long and turbulent history.
Emergence in the People's Liberation Army
The concept of shashoujian emerged within the PLA during the early 1990s, when considerable debate and publication on strategy and force modernization requirements took place within China's Academy of Military Science and National Defense University. Three dominant schools of thought were influenced by a changing world and the observed effectiveness of U.S. armed forces in post-Cold War military operations. The three schools are commonly referred to as "the People's War" school, the more contemporary "Local War" school, and the "RMA" school.
Shashoujian surfaced from the PLA debates as 'common ground' - a concept that each school could relate to and respect.
Open discussion about shashoujian in the PLA appeared in the 1995-96 timeframe. But, through the late 1990s, PLA officers of increasing rank and political stature advocated shashoujian and there is a traceable chronology of public statements and writings from these individuals.
From my research, it is clear that by 1998, advocacy for shashoujian had reached the highest levels of the PLA and PRC leadership.
PLA Research, Development & Acquisition Possibilities
In 1998, China initiated a wave of military acquisition reforms. At the same time, China's leaders outlined the 998 State Security Project - a secret initiative to develop shashoujian concepts and weapons.
The plan was adopted by the CPC Central Committee in August 1999 at Beidaihe and publicly revealed in 2000 by a CPC Central Committee official in a Jiefangjun Bao article.[ii]
The 998 Project mandates the acceleration of programs for research, development and deployment of new weapons to resist "hegemonism."
Elements of the program include missiles, energy weapons and nuclear weapons. The program also calls for changes in PLA operational art and nuclear weapons policy.
The 998 Program is directed by a powerful Project Leading Group and conducts work conferences managed by the PLA's four General Staff Departments.
Open source references to shashoujian indicate that preliminary work on the 998 Project could have started as early as 1995.
If so, China may be nine years into a shashoujian weapons acquisition effort.
I would like to briefly mention two additional efforts that were initiated in 2000 and could be related to China's shashoujian concept.
The first is the 122 Project. The objectives of the project are to improve PLA combat effectiveness, counter-attack capability and develop a new generation of high-tech weapons, nuclear weapons, and improve the readiness of PLA strategic forces.
The second initiative is the 126 Program. The 126 Program was approved by President Jiang Zemin as the PRC's second national level program established for development of military equipment.
China's first such program, the well known 863 Program, was established by Deng Xiaoping in 1986. Under the 126 Program, China will initially develop six major projects within 12-15 years.
These projects reportedly include the development of an aerospace technology system, electronic/information technology system, a strategic defense system, a deep-level counter-attack system, an optical laser system, and a special materials development program.
Under these six projects, 36 "theme projects" have reportedly been developed to support the 126 Program.
While neither the 122 or 126 efforts have been explicitly linked to shashoujian and the 998 Project, the members of the respective leading groups are very similar, as are the thrust areas of their identified initiatives.
Additional research will be necessary to determine whether these initiatives are associated with shashoujian.
Implications
Let me turn to address the implications of shashoujian.
PLA scholars have dedicated great effort to study the change in the requirements of warfare from the mechanization era to the information age.
As an example, General Wang Baocun, of the AMS, concluded in 1997 that ten defining features will characterize warfare in the information age. His ten defining features are:
limited goals in conflicts
wars of short duration
less damage
larger battlefields and less density of troops
transparency on the battlefield
intense struggle for information superiority
unprecedented force integration
increased demands for command and control
strategic objectives achieved through precision, not mass, and
attacks on weaknesses, not strengths, of the enemy's "combat system."[iii]
These features represent strategic and operational objectives, centers of gravity, and opportunities for the PLA to seize the initiative in conflict.
General Wang advocates the consideration of these features for the development of military strategy, warfighting methods and to guide the PLA's transformation process.
I believe that General Wang's assessments carry weight with the PRC's leadership and are a major force driving China's military modernization and its focus.
China's leaders recognize that the PLA has lagged behind foreign militaries in its ability to integrate science and technology with weapons and equipment - and, in this context, that the PLA is relatively inferior to advanced foreign militaries.
For much of China's pre-revolutionary history, the same was true of China's armies. Historically, China depended upon superior strategies and tactics to cope with the inferiority of its weapons and equipment. This trend continues today in the PLA.
Traditional emphasis on superior strategy and tactics is an important characteristic of China's strategic culture. This emphasis profoundly influences Chinese military thinking today, despite the recent focus placed on introducing advanced military hardware into the PLA.
This is how shashoujian can hold appeal for a wide range of PLA scholars and PRC leaders.
It effectively blends the old with the new.
Specifically, traditional Chinese warfighting strategies with modern platforms and weapons benefiting from the technology of the information age.
PLA Strategy (Using the Inferior to Defeat the Superior)
China seeks to leverage shashoujian weapons and methods to enable the inferior to defeat the superior. To defeat superior adversaries, China is attempting to develop new equipment while carrying forward traditional warfighting strategies.
PLA strategists pay great attention to the study of methods to reverse the balance of combat strength with superior strategy, and to identify key operational conditions where the weak can defeat the strong through the use of weapons against which there is no defense.[iv]
Operational Art (Methods)
There has also been much discussion in PLA literature about how and when shashoujian weapons and tactics should be optimally employed against superior adversaries. Key employment concepts emphasize: 1) acquiring good intelligence to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses, 2) seizing initiative and advantage through surprise, 3) the use of unorthodox means to attack enemy vulnerabilities, and 4) ensuring the survivability and counter-strike capability of shashoujian forces.
Effects of Strikes
PLA scholars also frequently discuss the key intended effects of shashoujian strikes. They are: 1) deterrence, 2) decapitation and 3) blinding, paralysis and disintegration.
Deterrence. Sunzi's maxim on 'winning without fighting' endures and is consistent with the PLA's requirement for a compelling deterrent value from shashoujian weapons. PLA scholars commonly refer to ballistic missile and submarine forces as "shashoujian forces" serving as a basis for psychological warfare.[v]
Decapitation. Traditionally, the defeat of an adversary by a single fatal strike or "death blow" is the intended outcome of a shashoujian strike. Ideally executed with foreknowledge of the enemy's disposition, it comes deceptively and swiftly - without perceptible indication or warning.
If employed correctly, a shashoujian strike kills the adversary instantly. The grim result is final and irreversible.[vi]
Blinding, Paralysis and Disintegration. As in the martial arts (and the medicinal practice of acupuncture), pressure point warfare (dianxue zhan) is intended to have systemic effects on an enemy's military structure or organization.
PLA strategists often discuss the importance of conducting shashoujian strikes on critical infrastructure. Some targets frequently identified include command and control centers and networks, early warning and intelligence systems, remote sensing platforms, and military logistics systems.
PLA scholars view these systems as dependencies (the relative weaknesses of a superior enemy) and as more vulnerable to attack than the relative strengths of a superior adversary. They contend that shashoujian strikes on the key nodes of a superior adversary can cause paralysis and initiate the disintegration of a superior force.[vii]
Conclusions
China's ancient history and traditions profoundly influence the thinking of its leaders and senior military officers. However, China's PLA scholars and senior leaders are reexamining, even critiquing, the viability of Mao Zedong's "People's War" doctrine for warfare in the 21st century.
Chinese think dialectically and assess military power holistically with emphasis on relative strengths and weaknesses. This approach to military assessment differs significantly from American approaches.
Contrasting conclusions and dangerous miscalculations can result from these different approaches.
Reacting to significant changes in the global security situation, China's military research and development efforts have been oriented toward the development of advanced systems, platforms and weapons for the prosecution of "Local War Under High Technology Conditions."
It is apparent that China's leaders and senior military officers are uncomfortable with American defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Particularly, as it concerns the future of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.
China's leaders are also troubled by advances in U.S. military capabilities that they have observed since 1991.
These concerns have prompted China to initiate military research and development programs tailored toward the prosecution of asymmetric warfare against superior forces.
Chinese military strategy will guide PLA forces to minimize the relative superiority of enemies while employing effective stratagems and tactics.
China will attempt to leverage the relative strengths and capabilities of the PLA at key moments - to be targeted against the relative weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a superior force.
Shashoujian and other uniquely Chinese warfighting concepts will be key elements of this approach.
Although an ancient concept, shashoujian is compatible and also potentially catalytic for current and emerging strategy and military capabilities. Shashoujian serves to help the PLA prioritize select military programs for special funding, rapid development and development of new combat methods.
PLA capabilities will likely increase incrementally as China continues its research and development in this regard.
Long-term challenges associated with hardware integration, force professionalization, training and education efforts, as well as military logistics, will complicate China's RMA goals.
However, the PLA's focus, dedication, and experimentation will likely enable some breakthroughs in military capability to be achieved in time.
China's focus on shashoujian and effects-based warfare (with emphasis on combining ancient military strategies with new warfighting concepts and operational art) poses a danger for the United States.
The U.S. Government should be concerned with and watch-out for the following elements or combinations of elements in order to counter shashoujian and the stratagem of "the inferior overcoming the superior":
the possibility of China presenting a military operational concept that takes the United States by surprise,
2) weapons systems and infrastructure that can enable the PLA to implement the operational concept, and/or 3) a strategic or tactical context in which the successful use of this operational concept is decisive.
To avoid potential military disaster precipitated by misunderstanding, miscalculation or strategic surprise, the U.S. Government should acknowledge the importance of China's history and traditions for the PLA, continue to pay careful attention to developments in Chinese military strategy and programs, conduct senior-level dialogue with China's leaders, and carefully monitor their statements and writings concerning military affairs.
At the same time, the United States should continue to be up-front and clear about its policies vis-à-vis China and Taiwan, present a compelling deterrent against Chinese military adventurism and maintain a degree of tactical unpredictability to prevent the PLA from anticipating U.S. military actions.
[i] Chinese Global Language and Cultural Center Online: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/taiwan/kungfu/e/5123-3.htm
[ii] Wen Jen, "Revealing Secrets of Beijing's 998 State Security Project," Tai Yang Pao, June 13, 2000 and Cary Huang, Hong Kong iMail (Internet Version), August 5, 2000, p. A3. Also see: Wang Congbiao, "Studying Jiang Zemin's 'On Science and Technology'," Jiefangjun Bao, February 13, 2001. FBIS Document ID: CCP20010221000077.
[iii] Wang Baocun, "A Preliminary Analysis of Information Warfare," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, November 20, 1997, pp. 102-111. Also see: Peng Guangqian, "Meeting the Challenge of the New Military Transformation," and Li Zhangrui and Liu Chunjun, "Firepower Cannot Be Excluded from Information Warfare," Jiefangjun Bao, September 19, 2000, p. 6. FBIS Document ID: CPP20000919000045.
[iv] Zian Ruyi, Command Decision-making and Strategems, Beijing: Kunlun Publishing House, 1999, pp. 4-5. FBIS Document ID: CPP20030424000250.
[v] Lt Gen Zhao Xijun, "Victory Without War and Modern Deterrence Strategy," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, October 31, 2001 pp. 55-60. FBIS Document ID: CPP20011228000132. Also see: Liu Xiaodu and Kang Fashun, "A Certain Brigade Builds Itself into an All-round, Perfectly Masterful 'Assassin's Mace' Unit," Huojianbing Bao, May 25, 2002, p.1. FBIS Document ID: CPP20020612000143., and Liu Xiaodu and Wang Xuezhong, "Charging to Control the High Ground of Training," Huojianbing Bao, October 6, 2001. FBIS Document ID: CPP20011219000162.
[vi] Tien Ping, "Space for Readjustment in Nuclear Policy," Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, June 23, 2003, p. A2.